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The catalyst for this thesis were my experiences as a retired police officer 
volunteering with a charity supporting minority young people, which informed my 
understanding of Islamophobia and encouraged a desire to challenge social 
injustice.  
I examine the role of the UK government's Prevent Strategy and Fundamental 
British Values in 'othering' Muslims in Britain.  I identify a weakened 
multiculturalism, the print media and the securitisation of Britain's Muslims as 
factors limiting Muslim voices in society and dismissing them as epistemic agents. 
Therefore, the aim of the research is to explore the lived experiences of young 
British Muslims living in Wales, in the light of postcolonial and epistemic injustice 
theories. 
The study brings the unique voices of two groups of young Muslim men and 
women living in Wales.  This research identifies securitisation for the men and 
objectification for the women as constructs that impact their lives in public space 
embedded with Islamophobic assumptions. 
Using a Community of Enquiry, a collaborative form of purposeful discourse, data 
collection supported the voices of respondents to construct the research questions 
for themselves and enabled the voices of all respondents as they created inter-
subjective meaning together. 
Data analysis pioneered a 'thinking through theory' approach using 
postcolonialism, Islamophobia and epistemic injustice to open up ways of thinking 
with data.  Epistemic injustice revealed how injustice occurs.  It shifts conversation 
to universal justice instead of culture and religion which are misrepresented in 
postcolonial constructs.  Testimonial and hermeneutical injustice reveal how the 
respondents are marginalised for being Muslim.  Epistemic injustice prevents non-
Muslims from becoming virtuous hearers and giving credibility to Muslim 
testimony. 
The study concludes that widespread Islamophobia, notions of securitisation and 
objectification contribute to postcolonial conditions existing for Muslims.  Epistemic 
injustice may displace the lacuna of Islamophobia in the social imagination of the 










1. CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION  
This thesis explores the lived experiences of young British Muslims living in Wales 
through a postcolonial and epistemic injustice lens.  It comes at a time when 
Islamophobia is increasing and government response has been to securitise the 
Muslim community.  The thesis arose directly from my MA thesis into the 
construction of identity of young Muslim men (Mort, 2008a).  It originated from my 
interest in the experiences of young Muslims in Wales and my desire to hear their 
voices.  I wanted this research to provide a platform for the voices of young 
Muslim men and women in order to advance understanding of their lived 
experiences.  As with any study, the research conducted in this thesis has a 
background and context. 
Background 
On the 11th September 2001 (9/11) in New York and Arlington County, Virginia 
USA,  coordinated attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon were 
carried out by Al Qaeda, a militant group of Muslim extremists who opposed the 
policies and interventions of the United States and the United Kingdom, in Muslim 
countries.  On 7th July 2005 (7/7) the London bombings took place.  With the 
occurrence of these events, there was an increase in Islamophobia, manifested as 
verbal and physical attacks on young Muslims throughout Britain (Runnymede, 
2017; Tellmama, 2018; All Party Parliamentary Group on British Muslims, 2018).  
The response to these events from government was manifest in the CONTEST 
Strategy (Home Office, 2011) and later the Prevent Strategy (Home Office, 2011a) 




'Islamophobia' is defined as "The dread, hatred and hostility toward Islam and 
Muslims" (Runnymede Trust, 1997, p. 1).  It is a contested term (Runnymede, 
2017; Tellmama, 2018; All Party Parliamentary Group on British Muslims, 2018) 
affording little protection in law for Muslims in Britain and it is argued, does not 
accurately reflect prejudice against them.  Islamophobia as a concept is examined 
in Chapter 2 and as a protected ideology in Chapter 4 which is instrumental in the 
construction of the theoretical framework that guides the research.    
Recent research has focused on how Islamophobia operates within the fabric of 
British society, including the workplace (All Party Parliamentary Group on British 
Muslims, 2018) and where incidents of global and domestic terrorism have been 
sensationally and selectively reported by sections of the print media contributing to 
the rise in Islamophobia (All Party Parliamentary Group on British Muslims, 2018; 
Petley and Richardson, 2011).  In this thesis I argue that postcolonial conditions 
exist for Muslims living in Britain and that by continuing to research, publish and 
frame British Muslims in this context the media narrative has contributed to 
reinforcing postcolonial conditions for them.  Research beyond postcolonialism for 
this group is vital in order to hear their voices.  Meer (2014, p. 515) suggests an 
alternative "scholarship beyond the postcolonial tradition" which I argue lies within 
an epistemic injustice framework allowing narratives around their marginalisation 
to be reframed in advocacy which addresses issues of social justice.  Succinctly, 
Epistemic Injustice embraces testimonial and hermeneutical injustice.  
"Testimonial injustice occurs when prejudice causes a hearer to give a deflated 
level of credibility to a speaker's word" (Fricker, 2007, p.1).  Fricker (ibid) further 




in collective interpretive resources puts someone at an unfair disadvantage when it 
comes to making sense of their social experiences". 
In using the term 'British' or 'Britishness I acknowledge that this research does not 
extend to considering 'Britishness' in the context of Northern Ireland as I argue the 
Prevent Strategy and associated Fundamental British values are concerned with 
notions of so-called 'Islamism' and not security concerns generally associated in 
Northern Ireland, which is outside the scope of this research.  I further 
acknowledge Irishness and Northern Irishness having distinct cultural and political 
identities.  
Context 
I now briefly describe my professional work continuing my academic and 
theoretical journey in Chapter 4.  From 1980 until 2010 I was an operational 
uniformed police officer working in the South Wales area.  In 2001 I formed a 
professional relationship with a Muslim youth worker who worked with a local 
charity supporting young Muslims.  Together we produced audio/visual resources 
for schools to challenge incidents of Islamophobia which had increased since the 
events of 9/11.  We continued this work until I retired from the police service in 
2010 (Mort, 2004, 2008).  From 2012 until 2015 I continued to work for the charity 
delivering a series of workshops I had devised (THINK Project, 2012) to NEET 
white Welsh young people across South Wales to challenge far right-wing 
extremism ideology (for NEET [not in education, employment or training] see for 




From 2004 until 2010 in my work as a police officer I worked as a schools 
community police officer delivering a range of Personal, Social and Educational 
lessons (All Wales Core Programme, 2004) to pupils aged 5 to 16 years of age.  I 
also delivered these lessons in pupil referral units and the youth wing at a local 
prison.  
In 2004 I was enrolled at university to study for a graduate Diploma in Professional 
Development (Education).  This was a mandatory condition set by the (then) 
National Assembly for Wales in association with Education Authorities in Wales so 
Schools Community Police Officers may be competent in classroom delivery.  This 
was my first experience of higher education which subsequently led to me 
engaging in Master's and Doctoral degrees.  As a consequence of my studies and 
wider reading of the Prevent Strategy (Home Office, 2011a) and Fundamental 
British Values (DFE, 2014; ESTYN, 2015) I reflected that I may have unwittingly 
marginalised some of the young people I had worked with in delivering the All 
Wales Core Programme (2004) and the THINK project (2012) by deeming them to 
be vulnerable, limiting their choices and imposing aspects of Prevent in my 
delivery.  These two 'critical incidents' which I examine in Chapters 4 and 5 further 
shaped the theoretical journey and subsequent theoretical framework.        
Through the context of my work as a police officer and informal educator, I was 
aware that there were heightened verbal and physical attacks on Muslims and 
their properties that had rapidly increased during the ten-year period prior to the 
start of this research.  In my doctoral work therefore, I wanted to hear what young 
Muslims had to say about their experiences and be able to challenge 




the harm perpetrated on young British Muslims.  I sought beneficence for young 
British Muslims and to work "for the social 'good' " (Clough and Nutbrown, 2002, 
pp. 4-6).  An initial review of the literature showed a lack of research on Muslim 
voices and I sought to mitigate this lacuna by the research presented in this thesis.  
Research and personal experience as a former police officer and youth liaison 
officer, informal educator and researcher suggest that bringing the voice and 
narratives of young Muslims to non-Muslims may be a powerful tool to challenge 
Islamophobia (Think Project, 2012; Thomas, 2013; Cantle and Thomas, 2014; 
Cantle, 2017). 
This thesis argues that British Muslims are marginalised and portrayed as potential 
terrorists as a result of sections of the British print media distributing 
misinformation.  This is compounded by the British government's anti-terrorism 
strategy focusing on them as a 'suspect community' (Petley and Richardson, 2011; 
Morey and Yaqin, 2011; Esposito and Kalin, 2011; Thomas, 2010, 2012, 2014).  
Furthermore, the introduction of Fundamental British Values (FBVs), (DfE, 2014; 
ESTYN, 2015) within British education, has contributed to the legitimating of a 
postcolonial Britain for Muslims.  The Prevent Strategy (Home Office, 2011a) is a 
government-led initiative with Fundamental British Values introduced as part of 
education policy in England and Wales.  They have also been inextricably 
connected by the associated definition of extremism (HM Government, 2011; DfE, 
2014; ESTYN, 2015) legislated by Counter-terrorism (Counter-Terrorism and 
Security Act 2015) and Department for Education guidance (DfE, 2014; ESTYN, 
2015).  This makes counter-terrorism duties not only statutory for schools, colleges 




(Home Office, 2015).  Prevent, FBVs and the Counter-terrorism and Security Act 
are postcolonial constructs which have the potential to make Muslims in Britain 
feel and appear different or 'othered'.  The terms 'othered' and 'colonised' are used 
throughout this thesis to signify Muslims being marginalised as a consequence of 
postcolonial conditions existing for them.  Employing such terms in this thesis 
further acknowledges Spivak's (1988) use of the term 'subaltern' in describing 
persons subjugated as a consequence of political control.  This thesis argues that 
Muslims in Britain are politically impotent (Qurashi, 2018) and their agency as 
Muslims restricted.    
Overview of the Thesis 
The initial aim of this qualitative research was an analysis of the ways in which 
young Muslim men and women construct their identities, with the intention of 
uncovering their experiences of Islamophobia in post 9/11 Wales.  However, the 
semi-structured one-to-one interviews carried out did not uncover their 
experiences of Islamophobia and a revised research design employing a 
Community of Enquiry was carried out with the remaining cohort of Muslim men 
and women. 
I used the Community of Enquiry (CoE) (Muirhead, 2018; SAPERE, 2007) as a 
data collection tool, adopting an interpretive phenomenological position.  I carried 
out and transcribed two communities of enquiry with one group of young Muslim 
men and one group of young Muslim women and then began an iterative process 
that involved critiquing government policy, the media, and theory to construct a 




direction of the research changing its aim and research questions.  The thesis 
began as a response to increasing Islamophobia and a desire to understand its 
impact on Muslims living in Wales.  As the research progressed it was influenced 
by theory, in particular that of postcolonialism and epistemic injustice that informed 
the revised central aim of the research to: 
 Explore the lived experience of young British Muslims living in Wales in the 
light of postcolonial and epistemic injustice theories. 
The key concepts of Islamophobia, postcolonialism and epistemic injustice 
informed the development of the overarching research question for the focus of 
the thesis: 
 What are the lived experiences of young British Muslims living in Wales? 
The objectives of the research are expressed through the research questions that 
evolved as the empirical work progressed driven by analysis of my Muslim 
respondents' voices: 
 Is Postcolonialism visible in the narratives of young Muslims living in Wales 
and if so, in what ways? 
 Is Epistemic Injustice visible in the narratives of young Muslims living in 
Wales and if so, in what ways? 
 How might we understand Islamophobia in light of Muslim experience?    
In this chapter, I introduce the theoretical concepts that came to be most 
significant for the thesis: postcolonialism, epistemic injustice and Islamophobia.  
The literature reviewed for the thesis emerged from the iterative process of 




policy and examines a move from multiculturalism to the Prevent Strategy and the 
introduction of Fundamental British Values in education.   I now provide working 
definitions of each significant theoretical concept. 
Postcolonialism 
Postcolonialism is used to illustrate how Muslims living in Britain are made to feel 
different, or 'othered' and their minds 'colonised' by negative media reporting, the 
Government's Prevent Strategy, associated Fundamental British Values, and the 
normalising of Islamophobia in British society.  Postcolonialism is used as a lens 
through which Community of Enquiry data is analysed locating areas of injustices 
in the lived experiences of young Muslims.  The theory of postcolonialism is vital in 
explaining how Muslims living in Britain are controlled by policy and legislation 
restricting their agency as Muslims.  The argument I put forward in this thesis is 
that the Prevent Strategy and Fundamental British values are both postcolonial 
constructs that exclusively and negatively affect Muslims living in Britain.  
Postcolonialism is explored in depth in Chapter 4.  
Epistemic Injustice 
The theory of epistemic injustice emerged from the research journey when 
considering a Marxist approach progressing through Critical Theory to 
Postcolonialism.  Throughout the theoretical journey Islamophobia was considered 
to be an ideology, a false consciousness,  protecting Islamophobia from challenge.  
In order to address this impasse, Bhargava's (2013) observation, that restricting 
intellectual freedom was an epistemic injustice, was furthered to argue that 




non-Muslim British public and the Muslim respondents in this research.  This 
permitted false consciousness to be synthesised to hermeneutical injustice, an 
epistemic injustice, further allowing the community of enquiry data to be also 
analysed through an epistemic injustice lens which additionally located instances 
of injustices caused to Muslims.  Moreover, epistemic injustice allowed Muslim 
narratives to be heard free from postcolonialism that sought to continue to 'other' 
Muslim voices.  Epistemic injustice aligns itself to a Human Rights approach and is 
offered as an alternative lens with which to further Muslim voices.  Epistemic 
injustice is explored in depth in Chapter 4. 
Islamophobia 
Having earlier provided a working definition to Islamophobia and signposted its 
position as an emerging concept in Chapter 2 it may also be seen as a protected 
ideology which is explored in Chapter 4.  I argue that the definition of 
Islamophobia, although ineffective in protecting Muslims as it has no legislative 
authority, is inadequate.  A phobia of Islam or Muslims is not enough to offer 
protection in law of Muslims who are not a race of people but rather followers of a 
religion.  The argument I put forward in this thesis is Islamophobia is so 
normalised in British society that it blinds both non-Muslims and Muslims from 
recognising it.  This research therefore suggests that Epistemic Injustice 
approaches be considered when examining the lived experiences of Muslims living 
in Britain.   
In the roles I have taken as police officer, youth liaison worker, informal educator 




that prevents Muslim voices being heard in our society today.  This is a human 
rights issue for societies where a group of people not seen as valid epistemic 
agents are denied their human right to participate.  Being recognised as a valid 
epistemic agent means having a voice that is heard and acknowledging its 
credibility.  However, Muslims living in Britain are understood through the deficit 
discourse of Islamophobia.  Consequently, rather than being recognised as rights-
holders with agency they are understood as 'other', and because this deficit 
understanding is so deeply ingrained in our society, Islamophobia is normalised 
within the social imagination of the wider non-Muslim public (discussed in 
Chapters 2 and 4). 
I wanted to understand the lived experience of young Muslims and examine the 
impact of Islamophobia on their lives and what opportunities they have to 
participate as knowers in our democratic society.  This led me to postcolonialism 
and epistemic injustice which are examined in depth in Chapter 4.   
Statutory legislation coupled with the print media misrepresentation of British 
Muslims has reinforced postcolonial conditions for British Muslims, creating a "new 
Orientalism" (Amin-Khan, 2012, p. 1596) allowing notions of Islamophobia in the 
social imagination of the British public (Runnymede, 2017; Tellmama, 2018; All 
Party Parliamentary Group on British Muslims, 2018).  This thesis further argues 
that Islamophobia, a protected ideology, prevents Muslim voices being heard by 
the wider non-Muslim British public as a consequence of false consciousness 
(Lukacs, 1971). The voice of the Muslim is rarely heard in Britain today. To hear 
the voices of the Muslim men and women in this research, an epistemic injustice 




colonising of the Muslim mind, shaping the political agency of British Muslims. This 
research proposes a way forward by extending and synthesising false 
consciousness to hermeneutical justice (Fricker, 2007; Medina, 2013) employing 
epistemic injustice as the primary tool in the analysis of the data in order that 
Muslim testimony may be understood (Fricker, 2007).  It therefore has implications 
for policymakers, commentators and researchers.  
The focus of this research has been to locate areas of injustices that cause or 
contribute to the ideology of Islamophobia, and in so doing identify the rationale for 
holding stereotypical and prejudicial views toward Islam and Muslims in Britain.  I 
have suggested that a lack of knowledge or ignorance can create a vacuum in 
which alternative ‘knowledge’ is created to fill a void, particularly where sections of 
the British media present an incomplete and negative view of British Muslims.  The 
young Muslim men and women respondents in this thesis articulate narratives of 
their lived experiences that are uniquely individual, and in their own words show 
how discrimination impacts on their lives as they struggle for others to know more 
about them.  
Contribution to knowledge 
This thesis makes methodological and theoretical contributions to knowledge 
which I discuss below. 
Methodologically, this thesis advances a different approach to analysis of the raw 
data gathered from the CoE.  I developed an innovative analytical process to be 
used following a CoE that involves reading and thinking with theory alongside the 




This has implications for the researcher who may have to examine theory and 
policy they may have initially not considered.  This approach to analysing raw data 
generated from the CoE is a contribution to the generation of knowledge in 
qualitative research.  The approach has the potential to address the inter-
subjectivities of heterogeneous groups working across different contexts.   
Theoretically, this thesis adds to an understanding of epistemic injustice in the 
context of postcolonial thinking.  The presence of Islamophobia prevents Muslims 
from being heard in society and they are negatively affected by epistemic injustice.  
By combining a consideration of how government policy and wider media 
misinformation contributes to 'othering' of Muslims I argue that the social 
imagination of Muslims and non-Muslims are both influenced by Islamophobia.  I 
further argue that a weakening of multiculturalism for Muslims protects, maintains 
and sustains an ideology of Islamophobia which is seen as normalised in 
postcolonial Britain.  As such knowledge of Muslims is controlled and their agency 
to be heard is limited to postcolonial discourse. 
The findings in this research can help us think about human rights and epistemic 
justice for Muslims living in Britain and as such is a contribution to knowledge in 
the field and calls on us to explore the value of a human rights approach in 
furthering Muslim agency.  
Delineation of the Thesis 
This study is designed such that the chapters build upon one another and the 
ways in which the chapters inform one another is important.  In Chapter 2, I 




brief historical perspective of economic migration into Britain followed by an 
account of how government legislation attempted to deal with racism in Britain.  
Key incidents that shaped multicultural Britain are examined to identify how 
reactive policies and legislation impacted on British Muslims.  The review 
considers selected policies tracing a gradual transformation from multiculturalism 
to political multiculturalism to securitisation by the introduction of the Prevent 
strategy.  The review examines how a rise in Islamophobia was not checked by a 
refusal to introduce legislation to protect British Muslims allowing the British print 
media to propagate misinformation about Islam and Muslims without the fear of 
prosecution.  Multiculturalism has been examined and critiqued for its 
effectiveness in celebrating British Muslim identity against a hostile narrative which 
seeks to position Muslims as 'other'.   
Chapter 3 provides an outline of the government's Prevent strategy from its 
introduction following civil disturbances in British northern towns in the summer of 
2001 and the events of '9/11' in 2001, evolving into legislation customised by 
successive British governments into statutory requirements affecting public bodies 
including schools, colleges and universities.  The Prevent Strategy (Home Office, 
2011a) which started as a voluntary cultural awareness-raising programme 
encompassing all culturally diverse communities, evolved into a key counter-
terrorist and statutory requirement (Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015).  
Chapter 3 argues that Prevent focuses on Muslims and Muslim communities, 
impacting on their agency to openly display their identities, particularly in respect 
to political dissent and also examines the government's drive to promote 




makes Muslims appear more different as a result of FBV being linked by a 
common definition of extremism from the Prevent strategy (Clarke, 2014).   
Furthermore, making FBV a statutory requirement in schools (DfE, 2014; ESTYN, 
2015) means they have become a part of the National Curriculum in England and 
Wales and as such makes those teaching it "agents of the state" (Davies, 2016, p. 
6).  The chapter concludes with an examination of how the print media construct 
Muslims as the 'other'.  
Chapter 4 provides the theoretical position employed within this thesis justifying 
the choices made in locating injustices toward and analysing data about the young 
Muslim respondents.  This chapter connects with my personal and professional 
journey and examines my own ethical entanglement as a non-Muslim researcher 
seeking to collect and interpret data.  This reflexive stance was a catalyst for me to 
re-examine the Prevent Strategy (Home Office, 2011a) and to consider it within a 
postcolonial construct along with Islamophobia.  Furthering a Marxist approach led 
me to examine critical theory and to arrive at a stage of considering Islamophobia 
as an ideology which is a "false consciousness" (Lukacs, 1971; Rosen, 1996, p. 
33; Adorno, 1974; Eyerman, 1981, pp. 52-54) protecting Islamophobia from 
challenge.  A synthesis to epistemic injustice (Fricker, 2007; Medina, 2013) 
furthers the theoretical position along with a postcolonial position when analysing 
the data gathered from the young Muslim respondents.  
Chapter 5 justifies the choices made in designing a framework to gather data.  It 
includes the aims, objectives and research questions that guide the research 




respect of the young Muslim men and women who participated in this research 
including informed consent and the methods used to protect their anonymity.  A 
Community of Enquiry (CoE) approach is justified as a viable method of collecting 
data with marginalised groups of people.  Employing both postcolonialism and 
epistemic injustice as tools to interrogate the CoE data is explored and justified as 
ways of "plugging in" and viewing data across multiple perspectives (Jackson and 
Mazzei, 2012, p. 2).  
Chapters 6 and 7 present an analysis of the raw data gathered using the 
Community of Enquiry approach.  This approach allowed the young Muslim men 
and women to articulate their lived experiences providing a unique and privileged 
insight into their lives.  In approaching the data, I read the transcripts alongside 
theory in order to identify what new meanings may come from the data.  I engaged 
with literature from critical theory, postcolonialism and Marxism to illuminate my 
understanding of the transcripts.  I employed Fricker's (2007) notion of epistemic 
injustice and the theory of Islamophobia (Esposito and Kalin, 2011; Sayyid and 
Vakil, 2010; Allen, 2007, 2007a, 2012) in my search to see the impact of 
Islamophobia on my young Muslim respondents.  In this way I sought to better 
understand the marginalisation of Muslims in Britain and by extending my 
knowledge of theory, create a theoretical premise from which an effective counter-
argument to Islamophobia may be positioned.  I synthesised my conception of 
false consciousness (Lukacs, 1971) within an epistemic injustice (Fricker, 2007) 
proposal as a way to isolate false consciousness from Islamophobia and position 
my data interpretation within a framework that seeks out justice free from 




using postcolonialism as an interrogation tool, showed that the lived experiences 
of the young Muslim men and women was that of  being 'colonised' .  The data 
indicated that the young men had been 'securitised' just for being Muslim, while 
the young Muslim women had been 'objectified' by the public and the wider media.  
These are both postcolonial constructs (Young, 2001; Said, 1978; Spivak, 1988) 
as discussed in Chapter 4. 
Chapter 8 discusses the findings of the thesis, identifies gaps in the body of 
academic knowledge and the contribution that the CoE makes.  The chapter 
continues by exploring the value of a human rights approach in furthering Muslim 
agency and aligning the similarities of the research process with elements of 
human rights.  The research indicates that a Muslim-focused Prevent strategy, 
Fundamental British Values and biased print media reporting are factors that 
sustain Islamophobia within a Western postcolonial construct.  Although Prevent 
and FBV could not be conclusively evidenced in the narratives of the respondents 
they remain important considerations in the construction of postcolonial conditions 
for Muslims living in Britain and warrant further research.  A focus of concern from 
the Muslim respondents was their wish for the wider non-Muslim British public to 
have knowledge about them.  I acknowledge that postcolonial conditions existing 
for them limits their agency in furthering Muslim voices and argue that epistemic 
justice is an alternative paradigm where their voices may be heard. 
Chapter 9 provides the conclusion to the research, summarising the research 
process employed followed by acknowledging potential implications in reframing 
Muslim narratives and the rationale for doing so.  The contribution to knowledge 




research discussed.  The findings in this thesis has implications for government 
policy and conduct of the wider media at a time when Islamophobia is still a 
contested term.  By reframing the experiences of Muslims through an epistemic 
injustice discourse, I hope this research will help to decolonise the minds of non-
Muslims.  Finally, the use of a CoE as a research tool by young Muslims 
themselves could be a useful tool of empowerment.  
Conclusion 
The Muslim respondents in this research wanted non-Muslims to have knowledge 
of them and of Islam.  In ways that Muslim identity is conjoined with religion, their 
testimonies as Muslims can only be articulated through Islam which is distorted 
through the postcolonial construct of Islamophobia.  This research recognises an 
impasse in Muslims being heard and employs a concept of false consciousness as 
a stepping-stone to a hermeneutical injustice position as a way of reframing their 
narratives.  This enables injustices against them to be seen in a human rights 
context and destabilises the normalising of Islamophobia to afford them some 
protection.  Hermeneutical injustice also accedes the ideology of false 
consciousness to be understood through epistemic injustice so that non-Muslims 
may recognise an unconscious bias when giving a lesser credibility to the 
testimony of Muslims.  Epistemic injustice allows us to recognise that a lacuna 
exists in the social imagination of the wider non-Muslim British public which has 
been filled with Islamophobia as an ideology, and not ignorance.  If Islamophobia 
is recognised as a barrier to understanding between Muslim and non-Muslim then 




Britain's historical legacy in global colonialism is under-acknowledged.  It is also a 
reminder for the wider non-Muslim British public that their fellow citizens who are 
Muslim continue to be 'othered' in postcolonial thought.  It is vital that cognizance 
of postcolonialism for Muslims living in Britain be considered so that alternative 
thought can be progressed.  In this thesis I argue that epistemic injustice be given 
precedence in analysing narratives around Muslim discourse to identify injustices 
against them.  Future discourses, free from narratives of postcolonial 'othering', 
can contribute to deconstructing and exposing Islamophobia as an ideology.  This 
would additionally negate the need for a new definition of Islamophobia which, to 
date, successive governments have denied largely on the grounds of religion and 
freedom of speech.   
In this chapter I have introduced my aims for the research and the research 
questions that shaped it.  I discussed the adoption of the CoE as my key research 
tool and introduced the concept of 'plugging in' to data to engage with the 
transcripts of the CoE.  I introduced the key concepts of Islamophobia, 
postcolonialism and epistemic injustice and explained how these theories were 
read alongside the CoE raw data to analyse and make sense of it.  I outlined my 
contribution to knowledge and discussed key findings from the thesis.  Finally, I 
presented an overview of the chapters in the thesis.   
I now turn to the first part of the literature review which examines how government 
policy shaped the identities of Muslims living in Britain before moving on to 





2. CHAPTER 2: MULTICULTURALISM TO 9/11 A REVIEW OF THE 
LITERATURE 
2.1. Introduction 
This literature review examines how the print media's representation of Muslims 
living in Britain, coupled with a shift in the United Kingdom's Government policy 
from one of inclusion to one of securitisation, has contributed towards the 
marginalisation of Muslims in Britain and a rise in Islamophobia.  The 
government's policy and legislation impact on how society sees cultural diversity 
within the United Kingdom.  I argue that the history of multiculturalism and its 
metamorphosis into the government's Prevent Strategy (Home Office, 2011a) 
coupled with the selective and negative reporting of Islam and Muslims by the print 
media, influences how society views Muslims, stereotyping them as one 
homogenous Muslim community.  I argue that the Prevent Strategy (aspects of 
which are underpinned by the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015) has 
alienated Muslims living in Britain by positioning them as a suspect community 
closing down the potential for cross-cultural dialogue.  The lack of a safe space for 
dialogue compounded by continual negative reporting from the print media, in 
particular the right-wing press, has put the Muslim community under immense 
pressure.  Some young Muslims who are afraid to openly debate issues affecting 
them may seek out knowledge of Islam from the internet and social media where 
risks that include dangerous ideological radicalisation are present.  It is crucial that 
Muslims be allowed to engage in political debate to argue issues affecting them, 





In Chapter 4, I show how through a postcolonial lens implementation of the 
Prevent Strategy (Home Office, 2011a), a reactionary government policy, has 
stigmatised Muslims living in Britain, setting them apart from British society and 
rendering them vulnerable to verbal and physical abuse without legislative 
protection afforded to other minority groups.  I evidence how this anomaly is 
indiscriminately exploited by sections of the print media to further alienate British 
Muslims from society by associating Islam and Muslims with terrorism.  This allows 
them to be seen as suspect community in the social imagination of the wider non-
Muslim public where loyalty to Britain is questioned.  I illustrate how early 
'defensive' multiculturalism used legislation to protect minority groups, reinforcing 
perceived differences and failing to address Muslim concerns within a secular 
multicultural Britain.      
In Chapter Three, a continuation of the literature review, I trace the historical and 
reactionary implementation of Prevent in response to world events contributing to 
normalising Islamophobia, securitising and objectifying Muslims in Britain, 
lessening agency to engage with political Islam and to protest at Britain's foreign 
policy. 
I make the case that successive government policy has created negative spaces 
for Muslims living in Britain where agency to engage with multiculturalism is 
eroded to such a degree that notions of securitisation has replaced 
multiculturalism for them.  Government focus on legislation in addressing 




I have been selective in identifying literature, choosing key moments in the 
multicultural timeline for Muslims so that I may examine how I believe 
multiculturalism for Muslims in Britain has failed.  I explore multiculturalism for 
Muslims living in Britain in depth further in this chapter acknowledging that, as a 
concept, its "meaning varies by context and writer" (Bloemraad et al., 2008, p. 
159).  Succinctly, multiculturalism may be defined as the ability for Muslims living 
in Britain to publicly celebrate their religion, culture, heritage and identity. 
In this chapter I examine how migration and government legislation initially shaped 
multiculturalism before turning to key events that focused on Muslims and 
prompted a government response.  The concept of Islamophobia is interrogated 
before turning to the future of a multi-ethnic Britain and multiculturalism as a 
concept.  I continue to examine the role of the print media in reporting Islam and 
Muslims post 9/11.  I now trace the beginnings of Multiculturalism and government 
legislation to promote a multicultural Britain.  
2.2. Migration and Government Legislation in the United Kingdom 
For many years Britain has attracted migrants from across the world.  During the 
late 1940s and 1950s immigrants from the former colonies of India, Pakistan and 
the Caribbean arrived in Britain to fill labour shortages in predominantly low-paid, 
unskilled work (Small and Solomos, 2006).  Although legislation was passed 
initially to stem the flow of primary immigration in the 1960s (Modood and May, 
2001) entry of dependants allowed for family reunification seeing African-
Caribbean, Indians, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis bringing their spouses and 




minority groups facing racism, inequality and poor housing in their day-to-day lives 
(Small and Solomos, 2006; Hopkins and Gale, 2009).  In the decades that 
followed, this pattern of discrimination continued largely unchecked with young 
men from minority communities feeling particularly marginalised both socially and 
economically (ibid).  By 1976 many young black men felt they were being targeted 
by the police, who were using the notion of "mugging" as a racial crime to 
discriminate against them (Gilroy, 2002, p. 108).  The product of these and several 
other influencing factors provoked large scale civil disturbances or riots occurring 
in British towns and cities over nearly 30 years.  Following the Brixton riots in 1981 
the Scarman Report (1981; discussed in Appendix 7) made several 
recommendations that affected how the police would use stop and search powers 
particularly after Scarman noted how its indiscriminate use had alienated black 
youths.  A timeline of events include: Nottingham and Notting Hill (1958); the inner 
city riots in Chapeltown, Leeds, (1973, 1974, 1975); Notting Hill carnival riot 
(1976); St Paul's riot, Bristol (1980); Handsworth riots (1981); Brixton riot (1981); 
Chapeltown riots (1981); Toxteth riots Merseyside (1981); Chapeltown riot (1987); 
Brixton riot (1995), largely reported as 'race riots' (Gilroy, 2002; Lentin and Titley, 
2011; Fekete, 2009).  The Millennium saw a resurgence of civil unrest with the 
2001 riots in Bradford, Oldham and Burnley where Asian youths took to the streets 
to protest against long-term marginalisation and discrimination against working-
class Asians (Abbas, 2005; Amin, 2003). 
The reactive policies that the Government adopted in the wake of this civil unrest 
among minority communities did little to address the underlying issues of 




of race.  The revision of the Race Relations Act 1976 in 2000 (discussed in 
Appendix 7) placed legislative responsibilities on public bodies to have policies 
and procedures in place to prevent or counter incidents of race discrimination 
(Small and Solomos, 2006). Earlier, the Rampton (1981) and Swann (Department 
of Education and Science, 1985) reports dealing with racism and 
underachievement of Black and Asian pupils in schools respectively, reported 
schools were focusing on understanding cultures of minority communities 
(depicted as 'saris, samosas and steel bands') (Modood and May, 2001; Kymlicka, 
2012), at the expense of the day-to-day lived experiences of white, black and 
Asian working class people (discussed in Appendix 7).  Following the murder of an 
Asian student in a Manchester school, the Burnage Report (Macdonald, 1989; 
discussed in Appendix 7) was critical of the ways anti-racist policies had been 
implemented, paying lip service to multiculturalism and increasing racial tension in 
school and community.  This led Manchester Education Committee to adopt a 
policy of equal rights and practices informing its staff that failure to follow this 
approach would lead to dismissal (ibid).  This may be seen as a turning point 
where policies of celebration and cultural identity move toward policies that 
embrace punitive measures. 
Thus far, the identity of Muslims living in Britain had been subsumed into the 
umbrella term of 'Asian' with government policies keen to address racism through 
the prism of racial identity.  It would take the publication of a work of fiction to 
highlight that Asians living in Britain also had Muslim identity and that a connection 
with fellow Muslims globally (The Ummah or Umma) transcended British 




"solidarity" (McRoy, 2006, p. 39) with fellow Muslims, or a "global network of 
Muslim brotherhood" (Archer, 2009, p. 76) and sisterhood, and "imaginings of a 
global Umma (Islamic community)" (McLoughlin, 2009, p. 133).   
The Rushdie Affair  
'The Satanic Verses', first published in 1988 (Rushdie, 1988) marked a change in 
how Muslims were reported by the media. Until then Muslims had generally been 
viewed as part and parcel of the British Asian community which had chiefly 
concerned itself with issues concerning race and racial abuse.  Two chapters in 
Rushdie's book have been widely interpreted to refer to the Prophet Mohammed, 
his wives and other sacred references to the Koran and were seen as highly 
offensive and hurtful to Muslims.  Although these chapters caused intense anger 
among some Muslims, in general the book was perceived to have caused "a 
sense of hurt, not their anger but their distress" (Parekh, 1990, p. 3).  Parekh 
reported that Muslim leaders quietly pursued their concerns with the publishers, 
Members of Parliament and the Attorney General and were content to have a 
codicil included in the book stating that it was a work of fiction.  Muslim leaders 
failed to have their concerns taken seriously, they were dismissed by the press 
who mocked them as 'intolerant' (ibid).  On 2nd December 1988, a noisy but 
peaceful protest in Bolton, burned a copy of the 'Satanic Verses' but failed to gain 
national publicity.  On the 14th January 1989 in Bradford, after contacting the 
press, another copy was burned, however rather than drawing attention to the 
inflammatory nature of the book, it attracted a hostile reaction from the press who 
compared the 'uncivilised' Muslims to 'barbarians', 'fanatics', and 'Nazis' (Parekh, 




the attention of Muslim leaders overseas, with the result that the Ayatollah 
Khomeini of Iran pronounced a 'fatwa' or sentence of death on Salman Rushdie 
(ibid, p. 4; McRoy, 2006, p. 15).  This marked a development in the Muslim 
consciousness; having been powerless for so long they were now courted by the 
British Government and received the attention of the British press.  The press 
reporting created the impression that the "entire Muslim community was seething 
with a bloodthirsty spirit of vengeance" (Parekh, 1990, p. 4). 
Parekh (1990) made an important point when he said the press had unintentionally 
united the Muslim community creating a new orthodoxy "and made every Muslim 
who wished no harm to Rushdie feel 'inauthentic' and not 'Muslim' (Parekh, 1990, 
p. 4).  The Rushdie Affair resulted in some commentators calling for a review of 
the Blasphemy Act (in effect, Common Law Offences which were abolished in 
2008) to include protection for Islam as well as Race Relations Legislation to 
protect Muslims (McRoy, 2006).  Others went further calling for the creation of 
Muslim only schools to redress Rushdie's blasphemous narrative of Islam and the 
British government's "refusal to act against The Satanic Verses" (McRoy, 2006, p. 
14).  However, many of the Muslim respondents were ill-prepared and unable to 
articulate themselves well with the media within the confines of the, "principles 
British Society avowed.  Nor did they produce well-argued pamphlets or articles" 
(Parekh, 1990, p. 7).  Nevertheless, the 'Rushdie Affair' for some British Muslims 
was seen as a political awakening (Morey and Yaqin, 2011) and the "beginning of 
a British Muslim political identity" (ibid, p. 82) not just in Britain but also by forming 
allegiances with supporters of the fatwa against Rushdie, for example "the Islamic 




The Rushdie Affair illuminated a dormant Muslim identity particularly among young 
Asian men who, up until Rushdie, had largely experienced racial abuse in terms of 
skin colour rather than religion.  The Rushdie Affair was the catalyst for Muslims in 
Britain to become more politically aware of their Muslim identity and along with 
international conflicts (discussed in Appendix 7), 7/7 and 9/11, rekindled notions of 
Muslim solidarity and adherence to the "Ummah" (McRoy, 2006, pp. 9-10).  Some 
Muslims in Britain turned to political activism joining prominent 'Islamist' groups in 
the UK (Khan, 2016, p. 52) in search "for a Muslim identity that differed from their 
parents" (ibid, p. 56).  Previously Muslim involvement in civil protest or 
disturbances in the UK had been limited for example, those involving African-
Caribbean British youths.  The colonial histories of their Asian forefathers were 
also different as imperial subjugation and not slavery had associated them with 
Britain. However, the tentative claim that Asians feel more British and less likely to 
confront the establishment is under-researched (Maxwell, 2009). 
Following Rushdie, international conflicts between 1990 and 2012, and in 
particular Bosnia, where Muslims suffered great atrocities, cannot be ignored.  The 
subsequent effect on Muslims in Britain is beyond the scope of this research but a 
summary is provided at (Appendix 7). 
2.3. The Emergence of Islamophobia as a Concept 
A rise in anti-Muslim hostility in Britain (Runnymede Trust, 1997) prompted a need 
for this to be addressed other than by a focus on race.  The publication of 
'Islamophobia: A challenge for us all' (ibid) followed the report 'A Very Light 




Britain and had recommended that the Runnymede Trust set up a commission to 
consider Islamophobia.  The report heralded a series of academic and non-
academic studies looking specifically at Muslims and Islam in Britain and has been 
the catalyst for academic and non-academic publications examining every aspect 
of the British Muslim and in a wider global context (Allen, 2007).  At the conclusion 
of their report the commission considered their use of the word 'Islamophobia' as 
being: 
...not ideal but is recognisably similar to 'xenophobia' and 'Europhobia', 
and is a useful short-hand way of referring to dread or hatred of Islam 
and therefore, to fear or dislike of all or most Muslims (Runnymede 
Trust, 1997, p. 1).  
The commission recognised the need for a term to describe "anti-Muslim 
prejudice" (Runnymede Trust, 1997, p. 4) and the need for a descriptor which 
would encompass the proposed definition however, they maintained reservations 
about the definition.  The commission examined anti-Muslim prejudice, the history 
of Muslims in Britain, the role of the media in reinforcing Islamophobia, the vision 
of an ideal society, social exclusion and inclusion, anti-Muslim prejudice in other 
religions and the need for legislative change to protect Muslims.  The descriptor 
used to encompass prejudice toward Muslims was termed 'Islamophobia', defined 
as: 
The dread, hatred and hostility towards Islam and Muslims perpetuated 
by a series of closed views that imply and attribute negative and 
derogatory stereotypes and beliefs to Muslims (Runnymede Trust, 
1997, p.1). 
During their deliberations the Commission highlighted a comment made by 
journalist Peregrine Worsthorne who mistakenly referred to Muslims as 'Islamic' 




religious Islam (Worsthorne, 1978).  These terms have persisted for 20 years 
since the Runnymede report and still feature prominently in print media discourses 
of Islam and Muslims in Britain.  Other views of Islam that continue to persist are 
the closed views of Islam as being monolithic, separate, inferior, an enemy and 
manipulative (Allen, 2007), effectively naturalising Islamophobia: 
Criticism made by Islam of the 'West' is rejected out of hand, whilst 
hostility towards Islam is used to justify discriminatory practices  
(Runnymede Trust, 1997, p.5). 
The commission noted that the fall of communism had left a space for the 
demonisation of Islam to flourish, quoting from Huntington's 'Clash of Civilisations'  
(Huntington, 1996) which some commentators say has been realised.  I argue the 
continued reporting of a closed view of Islam and Muslims has had the effect of 
not only demonising Muslims, subjecting them to Islamophobia, but in promoting a 
growing belief that Islamophobia is justified (Allen, 2007). 
The consequences of Islamophobia for British Muslims are feelings of injustice 
where they are perceived not to have the same rights as other British citizens.  
Young Muslims may develop a sense or feeling of "cultural inferiority" which may 
make them vulnerable to extremism and to consider using violence as a means to 
redress marginalisation (Runnymede Trust, 1997, p. 12; Davies, 2008; Khan, 
2016).  "Islamophobia" silences Muslim voices excluding them from society 
(Runnymede Trust, 1997, p. 12) so they can't be part of any solution.   
The description and definition afforded to the term "Islamophobia" (Runnymede 
Trust, 1997, p. 1) is incomplete in terms of its failure to protect Muslims from being 




hostility to Islam and Muslims', identifies a prejudicial attitude towards a religion 
and its followers.  I argue that this is incomplete for three reasons. First, Islam is 
an all-encompassing way of life in beliefs and practices for most Muslims, from 
which Muslims cannot be separated.  Secondly, the definition fails to highlight that 
Islamophobia as a concept has the power to discipline Muslim autonomy for 
political identity within the British political arena, acting as a form of cultural racism 
(Kaya, 2011) or a form of governmentality (Finlay and Hopkins, 2019).  Thirdly, the 
culpability of prejudice within the term is highly contested and legislation is 
ineffective to protect Muslims in law.   
In considering changes that have since been made to incorporate the 
recommendations from Parekh (Runnymede Trust, 1997, p. 61), there were no 
changes made to blasphemy laws to include Islam or the recognition of Muslims 
as a distinct ethnic group, in contrast to Sikhs and Jews who are recognised and 
have protection in law.  There have been changes in law to protect Muslims from 
discrimination in the workplace and elsewhere such as the introduction of 
religiously aggravated crimes ([The] Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (as amended); 
[The] Racial and Religious Hatred Act  2006 ).  However Section 29J of the latter 
Act allows for expressions of "antipathy, dislike, ridicule, insult or abuse of 
particular religions or the beliefs or practices of its adherents" ([The] Racial and 
Religious Hatred Act 2006, pp. 6-7).  By allowing Islam (and by association) 
Muslims to be insulted I argue that this furthers Islamophobia allowing it to be a 
vehicle for carrying stereotypical cultural, religious, and identity prejudice 




A continuing negative discourse linking Islam to terrorism alongside many non-
Muslims having little knowledge of Islam and Muslims culminates in non-Muslims 
not being able to contextualise the reporting of Islam and Muslims and not being 
able to differentiate between "what is normative and mainstream Islam and what is 
a diversion" (Esposito and Kalin, 2011, p. 16).  Such conditions allow a 
'normalisation' of Islamophobia to occur, sustaining racist and divisive political 
discourses.   
2.3.1. The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain  
Following the Runnymede Trust report (1997), Bhikhu Parekh (now Lord Parekh), 
was commissioned to look into the future of multi-ethnic Britain.  The Commission 
was established in January 1998 by the Runnymede Trust and chaired by Parekh.  
Their remit was to analyse the current state of multi-ethnic Britain and propose 
ways of countering racial discrimination and disadvantage, making Britain a 
confident and vibrant multicultural society at ease with its rich diversity (Parekh, 
2000, preface).  This required covering wide-ranging issues including social, 
economic, health, education and legislation.  Their report is interesting for two 
potential ways that the commission saw as a way forward.  The nations of Britain 
(England, Scotland and Wales) were viewed to be at turning points in their 
histories and two possible scenarios were presented:  First, a narrow, inward-
looking country unable to forge agreement between themselves or between the 
regions and communities from which they are composed. Secondly, become a 
community of citizens and communities at the level of Britain as a whole and  
within every region, city, town or neighbourhood.  The Parekh report (2000) was 




Pilkington (2008) was "bridling from the Macpherson Report's inferences of 
'institutional racism' and looking for a way to strike back" (Morey and Yaqin, 2011, 
p. 50). 
The Macpherson Report (1999; discussed in Appendix 7) was a wide-ranging and 
influential report published as a response to the murder of black teenager, 
Stephen Lawrence in 1993.  The report was critical of the way in which the 
metropolitan police investigated the murder and how institutional racism, 
professional incompetence and a failure of leadership impeded the recognition that 
Stephen Lawrence's murder was racially motivated.  The 70 recommendations 
from Macpherson's report led to changes in law and practice affecting both the 
police and public bodies, however, it failed to assuage Muslims in Britain by not 
furthering recommendations made by Runnymede (1997) in respect of amending 
the Blasphemy Act.   
The Home Secretary Jack Straw initially welcomed the report from Parekh, but in 
the face of negative and hostile press headlines changed his stance to defending 
"Britishness" and attacking the "unpatriotic left" (Pilkington, 2008, para.2.4).  
Headlines published prior to and following the publication of the report give a 
clearer account of the ways the press reported Parekh's findings: "Straw wants to 
rewrite our history" (The Telegraph, 10th October 2000), "British is racist, says 
peer trying to rewrite our history" (The Daily Mail, 10th October 2000), "Drop the 
word 'British' says race trust" (The Times, 11th October 2000) "Ministers welcome 
report which says 'British' is racist and all our history must be rewritten" (The Sun, 
11th October 2000), "Racism slur on the word 'British' " (The Daily Mail, 11th 




reporting, "Race report angers 'proud Briton' Straw" (The Daily Express, 11th 
October 2000).   
Anger directed at Parekh's Report (2000) and not Macpherson's Report (1999) 
(which shared many of the same assumptions), was believed to be on account of 
the police and government largely accepting Macpherson's report.  Among 
Parekh's finding were a selective focus on national identity, particularly notions of 
'Britishness' which coupled with resentment to change (Pilkington, 2008), made 
Parekh's findings the catalyst for venting an uneasy perception of Britain's 
hierarchy in the world order.  By 2003, two thirds of Parekh's recommendations 
had been acted upon, notably for example, religious discrimination in the 
workplace, and later on the introduction of a unified single equality act 
(Runnymede Briefing Paper, 2004). 
In 2017 the Runnymede Trust's 20th anniversary report highlighted a need for a 
refined definition of Islamophobia (Runnymede, 2017) and for an accountability 
mechanism.  The report suggested that, "Islamophobia is anti-Muslim racism" 
(ibid, p. 1) [short version] which should be accepted by the government and the 
inclusion of 'racism' in the definition ensured existing legislation could be used to 
enforce incidents of 'Islamophobia'.  The report made further recommendations 
including more regulation of discriminatory media reporting and investigation by 
the press regulator for publishing Islamophobia, racism and hatred (Runnymede, 
2017). The role of the media in reporting Islam and Muslims is covered further in 
this chapter and in Chapter 3 with respect to 'othering' Muslims.  The report also 
called for a "full independent and fully transparent inquiry into the government's 




must answer whether the Prevent strategy should be withdrawn" (ibid). The report 
drew attention to whether the state should separate security apparatus from wider 
safeguarding or social policy strategies and not target British Muslims in their 
integration policies, but to encourage wider civic participation as a "shared 
concern" (All Party Parliamentary Group on British Muslims, 2018, p. 55).  
Community cohesion (Cantle, 2001; 2012; 2017; Cantle and Thomas, 2014; 
Cantle and Kaufmann, 2016) is considered in Chapter 8 as a progression from 
multiculturalism to interculturalism. 
On the 17th October 2017 Lord Bourne, when asked, "whether the government 
has a definition which guides its work in this area" replied, "The government do not 
currently endorse a particular definition of Islamophobia" (Bourne, 2017), adding 
that it had not attracted widespread acceptance.  When the Parliamentary Under-
Secretary for State in the Home Office, Victoria Atkins was asked on the 12th 
March 2018 whether it was time for a proper legal definition of Islamophobia, 
replied, "We do not accept the need for a definitive definition" (Atkins, 2018). 
In November 2018 a proposed definition was put forward by the All party 
Parliamentary Group (APPG) on British Muslims (All Party Parliamentary Group on 
British Muslims, 2018) focusing on a rise in Islamophobia and Muslim hate crime 
in Britain.  This brought attention to the government's hate crime plan, highlighting 
that Islamophobia had not been included in its 2012, 2014, or 2016 versions (ibid).   
 
The report by the APPG reiterated Islamophobia had become 'normalised' in 
everyday bigoted discourse and that not only Muslims were impacted by 




...British society at large who, by virtue of normalised prejudice against 
Muslim beliefs and practice, come to imbibe a panoply of falsehoods or 
misrepresentations and, consequentially, discriminatory outlooks to the 
detriment of social inclusion (All Party Parliamentary Group on British 
Muslims, 2018, p. 9).  
The above quote taken from the APPG (2018) report, encapsulates how this 
research sees the ideology of Islamophobia affecting the social imaginations of 
non-Muslims in Britain.  This is explored in Chapter 4 as 'false consciousness' and 
'hermeneutical injustice' for both Muslims and non-Muslims.   
The APPG (2018) report also referred to work carried out by the Runnymede Trust 
(1997; Runnymede Briefing Paper, 2004; Runnymede, 2017) "strongly echoing the 
findings of the 2004 report" (All Party Parliamentary Group on British Muslims, 
2018, p. 44) and alternative definitions, for example by the United Nations.  
Similarly, reports from the Runnymede Trust (1997) and the APPG (2018) on 
British Muslims specified areas where discrimination against British Muslims had 
occurred and the definition provided is only a reference point from which to identify 
specific discriminatory policies and procedures: "Islamophobia is rooted in racism 
and is a type of racism that targets expressions of Muslimness or perceived 
Muslimness" (ibid, p. 56).  Building on from previous definitions the proposed 
definition includes 'racism' (previously proposed) and 'Muslimness', allowing 
discrimination for being Muslim to be covered in the definition.  At the time of 
writing the British government has not adopted the proposed definition, and there 
is little hope that it will be addressed.   
There are some local councils which have supported and adopted the APPG 
(2018) proposed definition (see Perraudin, (2019) for example), but none are 




governments in addressing Islamophobia.  Failure in adopting the proposed 
definition is seen by Allen (2020, p. 125) as, "political failure, policy impotence" 
and a "mere smokescreen" (Allen, 2020, p. 7; Allen, 2019) to detract from it being 
a highly political and politicised phenomenon. 
The APPG (2018) continue to push for their proposed definition of Islamophobia to 
be legislated by the British government, allowing British Muslims to be protected in 
law.  I argue that if the APPG proposed definition were to be legislated, 
Islamophobia would lend itself to 'punitive' (see for example, Macdonald, 1999; 
Counter-terrorism and Security Act, 2015) measures being enacted, further closing 
down the spaces and hiding behind closed doors, the agency allowing 
Islamophobia as an ideology to be critically explored and deconstructed.  It is my 
intention to explore the conditions in which Islamophobia reveals itself through the 
lived experiences of the respondents in this research rather than focus on 
proposed definitions of Islamophobia which, I will argue, have not fully described 
the hurt caused to Muslims in Britain.  By employing Postcolonial and epistemic 
injustice thought, this research will locate conditions that have allowed Muslims to 
be widely considered as un-British causing them to be 'othered' and marginalised 
by sections of the wider non-Muslim public.  
I consider and explore Islamophobia as an ideology in Chapter 4 but now turn to 
multiculturalism for Muslims in Britain.       
2.4. Multiculturalism 
Having traced the journey of race and related policies that has provided protection 




as a concept, focusing on how it has evolved from being a celebration of diversity 
to a system of control for Muslims in Britain. 
I begin by introducing the concept of multiculturalism followed by how recognising 
and celebrating cultural differences progressed to highlighting cultural and 
religious differences for Muslims in Britain.  I continue by showing how a change in 
government policy from multiculturalism to community cohesion failed to 
acknowledge Muslim identity by focusing on cultural differences and not 
recognising matters of faith which are central to Muslims.  I consider the argument 
forwarded by Kymlicka (2012) and show how multiculturalism in Britain failed to 
accommodate British Muslims.  I go on show how the events of 9/11 in 2001 and 
7/7 in 2005 focused on British Muslims as a distinct group of people whose 
cultures and religion were stereotypically linked to breaches of human rights and 
terrorism respectively with little or no options in law to redress the negative and 
hostile reporting of them.  I show how some young Muslims reaffirmed their faith 
and association with the Ummah engendering a political awakening leading to 
them opposing areas of government foreign policy seen to marginalise fellow 
Muslims.  Throughout this section I will continue to show how reactive government 
policy and legislation lessened Muslim agency to publicly celebrate 
multiculturalism by its metamorphosis into the Prevent Strategy.  Prevent 
securitised Muslims, limiting their agency for political public dissent and 
subsequently by the introduction of Fundamental British Values, portrayed them as 
outsiders, questioning their loyalty to Britain, and reinforcing the view that depicted 




The term 'multiculturalism' comes from countries with long historical experiences 
of immigration for example, Canada, Australia and the United States.  Initially the 
term referred to European settlers who were expected to assimilate (have Anglo-
conformity) and attain citizenship (Modood, 2007).  When non-whites were allowed 
to settle it was accepted that full assimilation would not be possible due to cultural 
differences but some assimilation would occur (ibid).  Multiculturalism in Britain 
had a narrower focus particularly on racism and the right to settle which may not 
be a concern for countries where citizenship is bound by issues associated with a 
legacy of colonialism (ibid).  This chapter will study the British experiences of 
multiculturalism and its effect on Muslims living in Britain. 
A common view of multiculturalism (for example, Thomas, 2012) sees 
multiculturalist policies pre-2001 focused on supporting minority communities 
(financially or otherwise) with the unintended effect of reinforcing differences 
between ethnic minorities and perceived mainstream culture.  Thomas (2012) 
argues that minority identities were strengthened resulting in an inward looking 
society where some chose to live "parallel lives" (Cantle, 2012, p. 15).  Parekh 
(2000) argued that since the inception of multiculturalist policies the world evolved 
to expose more people to diversity or a "super diversity" (Cantle, 2012, p. 140) 
where relationships constantly change.  Hope for a more positive relationship 
between diverse communities failed to materialise culminating in some 
communities retreating into their own identities, embracing identity politics, and 
supporting separatist ideologies (Cantle, 2012). 
Multiculturalism has generally allowed for the celebration and recognition of 




strengthened by changes in legislation and training in diversity issues so public 
bodies may be aware of and be sensitive towards the needs of people from 
different races and cultures (Race Relations Act, 1976).  However, a central 
theoretical criticism of multiculturalism is that groups and cultures "do not exist in 
the ways it is presupposed" (Modood, 2007, p. 82), and that culture and those who 
share culture are not all alike.  Succinctly, "the cultures or groups it speaks of do 
not exist (ibid).  An anomaly in highlighting differences in race and culture are the 
exaggerations in the differences instead of the commonalities between people 
resulting in essentialising groups for convenience.  This position may be 
considered in the context of multiculturalism unwittingly and benignly being a 
colonial device in segregating minority communities.  However, for many Muslims 
living in Britain, Islam defines identity with culture being enacted from differing 
traditions and heritage.  It may be that multiculturalism for some is not as important 
as recognition and respect for example, to be recognised as a practicing Muslim, 
particularly when government considers that religion "is not necessary for the 
functioning of the state" (Modood, 2007, p. 25).    
Government appears to have abandoned multiculturalism around 2001 following 
rioting in Northern towns and cities including Oldham, Burnley and Bradford 
(Thomas, 2012; Thomas and Sanderson, 2011).  Well-meaning policies introduced 
since 1981 may have improved situations for minority communities in Britain, 
including a reduction of marginalisation and disadvantage, see for example, [The] 
Scarman Report, (1981), [The] Swann Report (Department of Education and 
Science, (1985), [The] Burnage Report (Macdonald, 1989), [The] Macpherson 




Equality Act (2010).  However, an unintentional downside of a reification of identity 
(a hallmark of multicultural approaches), was minority communities grouped 
together in areas sometimes disparagingly referred to as "ghettos" (Cantle 2012, 
p. 140), where trans-national loyalties to culture took precedence over free mixing 
between cultures.  Cantle (2012, p. 59) argues that some communities learned 
that to be different created a political advantage rewarded in terms of 
"representation and resources".  Ouseley (2001, p. 10) however, reported that 
ethnic groups were increasingly desegregating themselves to protect themselves 
from fear of "harassment and violent crime" and "to promote, retain and protect 
faith and cultural identity and affiliation".  Establishing minority community areas in 
some cases led to "white flight" (Cantle, 2012, p. 60) where traditional white 
working-class communities relocated to predominantly white residential areas.  
Furthermore, a decline in industry (which at one time fuelled a thriving economy), 
economic disadvantage, competition for limited poorly paid work, and a rise in far-
right wing groups in northern towns, all contributed to rioting in Bradford, Oldham 
and Burnley in 2001 (Amin, 2003; Cantle, 2012, p. 96).  The new focus of 
government was now on 'community cohesion' which was seen as the antidote to 
'toxic' multiculturalism (Lentin and Titley, 2011), now judged to be 'not fit for 
purpose'. 
Cantle's (2001; 2012) community cohesion approach reinvigorated the concept of 
contact theory encouraging interaction and common experiences to reduce the 
potential for stereotyping, prejudice and irrational fears to flourish.  The 
government were keen to progress community cohesion, blaming rioting on 




English, forced marriages and generally failing to conform to 'Britishness' 
(Pilkington, 2008, para.3.3; Forced Marriage (Civil Protection) Act 2007) and 
British values.  The government appears to have forgotten Macpherson's (1999) 
emphasis on institutional racism, along with the decline in the textile industry 
leading to the deprivation of largely Muslim communities as being significant 
factors creating conditions leading to the disturbances.  The focus for the 
government was 'fitting in' and not the celebration of diversity or culture which I 
argue is a move from "defensive multiculturalism" (Cantle, 2012, p. 56) which 
sought to protect minority communities by legislative means at the expense of 
integration, maintaining a "multicultural separateness" (ibid).  "Anti-racist politics 
has long struggled with and against multiculturalism" (Lentin and Titley, 2011, p. 
14).  I continue with the impact that legislation has on multiculturalism.   
The introduction of legislation to protect minority communities from racial abuse 
also saw conditions of so-called "political correctness" emerging (Modood, 2007, 
p. 54) allowing urban myths to flourish about what may or may not be allowed to 
be said about people from minority communities.  The unintentional consequence 
of the myth of political correctness, particularly in the tabloid press, was a closing 
down of spaces where conversations between different races and cultures could 
occur (Browne, 2006).  Younge (2010, p. 60) noted that in the period of one month 
in 2006, the British press used the term 'political correctness' "on average ten 
times a day".  A reluctance to speak about racial differences (which may be 
associated with historical inaccuracies in biological determination and superiority), 
allowed a new category to be created where difference may be hierarchically 




people to be progressed as a narrative that did not focus on race, thereby avoiding 
being accused of racism.  For Muslims in Britain attacks on their faith is a 
"continuation of the racial vilification, by using faith as a proxy for race" (Cantle, 
2012, p. 49). 
Aly (2015) argued that there is a clear genealogical line from biological racism to 
its replacement with ethnicity and culture as markers of identity within the context 
of British ethnic governmentality.  Furthermore, multiculturalism has been misread 
as a failed anti-racist project and that its coming and going "seems 
inconsequential" (Aly, 2015, p. 31) and it will emerge as another set of policy terms 
"to repackage and obscure Britain's unresolved postcolonial condition" (ibid; 
Hesse, 2000; Gilroy, 2006).  I argue that postcolonial conditions exist for Muslims 
living in Britain and that focusing on cultural differences distracts from addressing 
postcolonialism.   
Highlighting differences between cultures subjects them to categorisation where 
individuals are grouped, pigeonholed and labelled for convenience (Storry and 
Childs, 1997) allowing minority groups to be targets of demonisation either 
politically or by the media.  I argue that replacing race with culture allows 
unfettered prejudice to be facilitated against minority communities by imposing 
notions of belonging and identity to be couched in so-called British values.  This 
makes it easy to criticise multiculturalism by adopting the default position in 
arguing that we do not have agency over our race but have agency over our 
culture.  This infers that decisions whether to integrate and assimilate in society 
are individual choices when many Muslims in Britain believe that their religion and 




and Gale, 2009).  This has given rise to generalising that Muslims are inextricably 
monocultural and by definition unable to integrate although included in the 
multicultural family (Modood, 2007). "Self-segregation" (Cantle, 2012, p. 60) may 
not always be a free choice, being concerned more with socio economic factors 
when contrasted with "white flight" (ibid) which may be more of an informed 
decision by some of the majority population in Britain.   
Another area where control may be exerted over minority communities is the 
distribution of political resources for example, where political containment or a 
"micro-colonialism" (Lentin and Titley, 2011, p. 11) may be employed.  Lentin and 
Titley (2011) suggest that multiculturalism may be seen as an area where the 
coded evasions of political correctness can be discussed, such as race, culture, 
legitimacy and belonging.  Multiculturalism may be presented as a "failed 
experiment" (Lentin and Titley, p. 2011, p. 13) where anxieties of migration, 
globalisation and socio-political transformations can be explained or lamented as a 
benevolent naive attempt to manage the problem of difference.  Lentin and Titley 
(2011, p. 14) argue that the "death of multiculturalism" came after 9/11 to be 
replaced by a politics of "shared values" which serve to identify "those who do not 
possess them and must be cultivated and coerced to respect them".  McGovern 
(2017, p. 49) argues that the Prevent Strategy (Home Office, 2011a) has:  
little or nothing to do with people being 'drawn into terrorism' ", but is 
directed at a suspect community of British Muslims predicated on a 
rejection of multiculturalism and the promotion of an integrationist 
agenda.   
Politics has the capacity to affect society in many ways.  For young British Asians 
living in Britain, (most of whom are Muslim), being disengaged from society is 




their perceived allegiance to foreign politics for example, events concerning 
Muslims in the Middle East.  "This alienation is cultural, historical and above all 
religious, as much if not more than it is political" (Rieff, 2005, para.2).  The riots in 
the British northern towns occurred before the events of 2001, which is recognised 
as a watershed in a deterioration of relations with the Muslim community in Britain 
following the terrorist attacks of 9/11 (McRoy, 2006; Thomas, 2012 ).  Britain's 
Asian community was already a marginalised community before 9/11 (Allen, 2015) 
with tensions existing between Asian and white communities.  The drive of 
multiculturalism in maintaining minority group identity was at odds with the 
expectations that migrants would assimilate and accept the values of their new 
countries.  However, although multiculturalism had made many societies a fairer 
place in which to live when compared to life before its inception, it has been 
dogged by the criticism that "modest gains are taken as licence to ignore and 
negate continuing and shifting racism in multicultural societies" (Lentin and Titley, 
2011, p. 14). 
Characterised by class divisions, British society has seen the importance of class 
as a marker of social identity diminish in importance (Storry and Childs, 1997; 
Malik, 2015).  After the working-class lost economic and political power with the 
demise in traditional industry and union power, the difference between the politics 
of the left and that of the right ceased to be so far apart.  The institutions that once 
brought disparate communities together had gone and the emergence of the 
global market caused some communities to seek identity not in political terms but 
in ethnicity, culture or faith (Malik, 2015).  People defined the community they 




that had recognised and financially rewarded the various ethnic minority 
communities discovered there were more ethnicities present in British society than 
were expected resulting in competition between "communities for resources" 
(Malik, 2015, p. 3).  To be ethnically different was seen as being key to 
entitlement: the more different the ethnic need, the better chance of having power 
and influence (ibid).  The issue for Muslims, however, was not so much an identity 
based on ethnicity, but an identity based on religion, which did not fulfil 
multicultural criteria in being a distinct ethnic group (Hopkins and gale, 2009).  
"Religion is far more important to Muslims' sense of identity than it is for others" 
(Ipsos MORI, 2018, p. 37).   
Having highlighted culture and cultural differences instead of structures of power 
associated with ethnic and class inequality, multiculturalism created a framework 
where minority communities may be categorised.  I suggest that when 
categorisation is established, comparing and contrasting those who are perceived 
to be different progresses seamlessly to stereotyping.  Essentialising  groups of 
people and allowing multiculturalism to be used as a space where "cultural racism" 
(Modood, 2007, p. 9) is produced, sanctions minority communities to be 
marginalised without fear of accusation of 'racism' (Modood, 2007; Hopkins and 
Gale, 2009).  Building on a multicultural framework is thus straightforward in 
invoking concepts such as for example, British values, citizenship, belonging, 
integration, assimilation and identity.  I argue that creating a stronger national 
identity based on colonialist styled and imaginary values magnifies difference, 




When New Labour came to office in 1997, there was much emphasis on 
rebranding Britain as being 'Cool Britannia', as a "young country" (Tony Blair), a 
"mongrel" nation (Gordon Brown), a "chicken tikka masala eating" nation (Robin 
Cook) (Modood, 2007, p. 9).  However, following civil disturbances in the northern 
towns in Britain and the attacks of 9/11, there followed Government reversal in 
promoting multicultural policies (Modood, 2007) and a focus on British Muslim 
loyalty to Britain.  Sections of the British press were keen to hear Muslims 
opposing terrorist attacks (referred to incorrectly as 'jihad'), which ultimately led to 
questioning Muslim citizenship in Britain ( Morey and Yaqin, 2011).  Criticisms of 
multiculturalism continued with Malik (2001) arguing that it unwittingly helped to 
segregate communities far more effectively than racism.  Young (2001a) claimed 
multiculturalism was a useful Bible for 'Jihadis' to override their civic duties with 
Meer (2006) claiming that a 'politically correct' multiculturalism had fostered 
fragmentation rather than integration for Muslims who imposed self-segregation.  
The Chairman of the Race Equality Council Trevor Phillips said that 
"multiculturalism was useful once but is now out-of-date, for it made a fetish of 
difference instead of encouraging minorities to be truly British" (Baldwin and 
Rozenburg, 2004, quoted in Modood, 2007, p. 11). 
For proponents of multiculturalism however, the announcement of its death is 
premature.  Kymlicka (2012) defines multiculturalism as being "ideas about the 
political and the legal accommodation of ethnic diversity" (ibid, p. 1) and that it still 
remains a live option for Western democracies.  Kymlicka's (2012, p. 2) checklist 




1. If relations between the state and minorities are seen as an issue of 
social policy, not as an issue of state security. 
2. There is a shared commitment to human rights across ethnic and 
cultural lines. 
3. There are no fears over border controls.  
4. When immigrants come from many countries rather than one. 
5. When immigrants are seen as contributing to society, particularly 
economically.  
 
I argue from a British perspective (how Muslims are perceived within Britain), the 
checklist for the successful implementation of multiculturalism indicates we cannot 
implement multiculturalism.  
Notwithstanding that Kymlicka (2012) uses of the term 'immigrant', the checklist is 
important for British Muslims who are widely viewed as 'foreign' and in the context 
of this research which positions Muslims as 'othered' and are seen to be 
'immigrant' rather than British (Phoenix, 2018).  Kymlicka (2012) furthers his 
position saying that when the facilitating conditions are seen as high-risk 
multiculturalism is most needed.  He does not, however, support giving religious 
groups protection in law as part of a multicultural society, claiming that some 
Muslim leaders may use such laws to control apostasy within the Muslim 
community rather than use it as control against hostile discourses against non-
Muslims (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 43).   
It is important to recognise the multicultural paradigm employed in Britain so we 
can see how a weakening of Muslim agency came about, particularly post 9/11, 
when discourses of Muslim identity became widely known.  Prior to the events of 




being 'Asian', using perhaps their Country of heritage, for example Bangladeshi or 
Pakistani-British (Modood, 2007).  Following 9/11 Modood (2007, p. 97) argues 
that many young people are likely to identify as "British Muslims", reinforcing their 
religious identities, or as Younge (2010, p. 147) argues, "not a religious revival, but 
an establishment of identity".  I argue that as world events unfolded, their identity 
and worth as British Muslims in a multicultural society was questioned, including 
questioning the extent to which Muslims embrace human rights pushing them 
further to the margins of British society.   
"Multiculturalism is itself a human rights-based movement, inspired and 
constrained by principles of human rights and liberal democratic constitutionalism" 
(Kymlicka, 2012, p. 8), the goal of which is to challenge those illiberal and cultural 
practices that have been called into question by the human rights movement.  
Acknowledging this, as multiculturalism aligning with citizenship, it is logical to 
assume that groups 'associated' with such practices such as forced marriage, 
female genital mutilation, criminalisation of apostasy (Kymlicka, 2012) and 
homophobia, may be seen as an antithesis of the multicultural family.   
While culture and perhaps other religions may be interpreted differently, Islam and 
its associated practices govern the day-to-day activities of many Muslims (Bari, 
2004).  In particular the Holy Quran (Quran, 2000) is seen as irrefutable by 
Muslims and understood to be the words of Allah.  Attempts to interpret Islam may 
be seen as apostasy (Eaton et al., 2008) therefore interpretations are unlikely, 
even though failing to do so would be seen by some to offend areas of "human 




According to Esposito and Kalin (2011) an obstacle in the continuation of the 
multiculturalism debate for Muslims is the "secular-liberal ideals of the European 
Enlightenment" (ibid, p. 5) which were deemed to be the only emancipatory power 
in the modern world (Esposito and Kalin, 2011) which could not  "accommodate a 
non-Western religion such as Islam" (ibid, p. 5), thus preventing Muslims from 
taking part in multicultural debate.  This isolates Muslims to negotiate their identity 
in a hostile media controlled discourse of ethnic and religious profiling.  Muslims 
who identified themselves as Muslim before becoming British were accused of 
having dual or multiple loyalties jeopardising their right to full citizenships in the 
eyes of commentators (ibid).  Bano (2010) argues that all people in public spaces 
are expected to embody notions of Britishness regardless of culture and religion.  
Those, whose cultural and religious differences are deemed to be unacceptable in 
the public space, find themselves to be the focus of "regulation, surveillance and 
management of specific religious communities in British society" (Bano, 2010, p. 
136), permitting the state to define limits of religious practice in public spheres.  
An absence of multiculturalism and an environment of securitisation for Muslims 
living in Britain allows a constant 'othering' of Islam and Muslims by questioning 
their loyalties or by referring to Islam as being incompatible with British values.  
The wider media's use of cultural markers for example, the hijab, veil, and cultural 
dress in defining all Muslims are frames of reference discussed in Said's 
'Orientalism' (Said, 1978) which is considered as the foundation document in the 
field of postcolonialism. 
The events of 9/11, the subsequent invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan by American 




category in Britain, namely, the 'Muslim community' (McRoy, 2006; Thomas, 
2012).  There have been Muslims in Britain for hundreds of years, however, 
attacks on the twin towers in New York in 2001 and subsequent political and 
military incursions changed how Muslims were viewed (ibid).  Widespread 
Islamophobia in Britain along with attacks on Muslims and Mosques produced a 
verbal backlash with some outspoken and unrepresentative radical Muslims being 
reported by the British media (Petley and Richardson, 2011).   
The concept of the Ummah is an important area for some Muslims in Britain who 
see the plight of fellow Muslims as something they are duty bound to alleviate.  If 
they feel that Muslims abroad are being treated unfairly as a consequence of 
British foreign policy, then it is incumbent for them to protest against the British 
government.  However, this is often seen and reported by government and the 
media as non-conformity by British Muslims and reluctance to fully integrate into 
British society and embrace British Values (Lander, 2016, p. 275; Smith, 2016).  A 
refusal, perceived or otherwise, by Muslims to assimilate, cooperate, and adhere 
to British values, positioned them as potential threats which could not be politically 
controlled by multiculturalism (Modood, 2007) and thus positioned multiculturalism 
as having failed in the political supervision of Muslims.  A different approach to the 
social superintendence of Muslims was now deemed necessary by the 
government.  In 2006 the Prevent Strategy (HM Government, 2006; Home Office, 
2011a) was launched, having previously existed as part of the government's 
ongoing counter-terrorism strategy within the United Kingdom.  The examination of 




Prevent has replaced multiculturalism with a structure akin to colonialism seeking 
to control British Muslims within their own country. 
The media have an important role in accurately presenting news to the general 
public.   At one time reference to the media generally referred to newspapers and 
televised coverage by the broadcasting channels.  Nowadays the media has 
grown to include online coverage such as social media platforms including, 
Twitter, Face Book and YouTube, attracting millions of followers worldwide (Petley 
and Richardson, 2011).  Online platforms are rarely subject to regulation and can 
be forums where hateful, biased comments on Islam and Muslims may be made.  
This form of biased reporting resulted in marginalising Muslims, not only causing 
hurt and anger to Muslims, but also negatively affecting knowledge of Muslims.  As 
a matter of caution, it is relevant to comment that the extent to which the media (in 
all its forms), influences the public perception of Islam and Muslims is "contentious 
and debatable" (Allen and Nielsen, 2002, p. 46).  I now turn to examine the extent 
to which the media negatively presents Islam and Muslims, in turn shaping how 
the public is presented with an increasingly securitised discourse. 
2.5. The Role of The Media in the Reporting of Islam and Muslims in Britain 
post 9/11 
Throughout this thesis I refer to 'the media' as being responsible for negatively 
reporting Muslims in Britain supporting the argument by referencing the print 
media, which is the default position.  I acknowledge there are other sources of 
media including broadcast and online platforms and will cite the appropriate 




'the media' by authors who do not specify the type of media referred to, I use the 
term 'wider media' to encompass this.  
The Western print media have a long history in negatively reporting Islam and 
Muslims (Ahmed and Matthes, 2016).  Reporting largely focuses on using extreme 
examples to support stories which invariably describe the actions of a minority in 
Britain or the actions of terrorists purporting to be Muslims.  In using their 
considerable power in such an essentialist framework the media creates hostility in 
the social imagination of its audience reinforcing perceived differences between 
Muslims and non-Muslims, engendering ‘us and them’ discourses.  Imaginary 
historical recantations such as 'Christianity versus Islam' are supported for 
example, by the theories of Huntington (1993; 1996) positioning Islam and 
Christianity appearing as irreconcilable.  As a consequence of the media focusing 
on cultural difference such as Islamic cultural dress for example, the throbe and 
the hijab, they present Muslims as belonging to Middle-Eastern regions not in 
Western society, where they are portrayed as unwelcome foreigners whose 
allegiances lie within Islamic states (Morey and Yaqin, 2011).   
Since 9/11, a higher profile has been assigned to Islam and Muslims whose 
identities as Muslims were tarnished initially by the actions of terrorists for 
example, Al Qaeda (the base), and more recently the Islamic State of Iraq and 
Syria or ISIS and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant or ISIL (acronyms used 
by the press as translations for terrorists operating within Syria) (Tharoor, 2014).  
These groups continue to justify criminal acts for political gain in the name of 
Islam.  In Britain atrocities carried out by terrorists claiming to be Muslim and 




living in Britain.  This includes Muslims who are vocally anti-British being featured 
prominently by the media, even though they are not representative nor enjoy 
widespread support from Muslims in Britain (Morey and Yaqin, 2011).   
It follows that the unintended effects of multicultural policies resulting in minority 
groups appearing more different (Cantle, 2012) and the implementation of the 
Prevent Strategy (Mohammed and Siddiqui, 2013) (which focused on the Muslim 
community post 9/11), has led to discourses of Islam and Muslims in Britain 
appearing different or ‘othered’.  I argue that 'othering' Muslims has allowed for an 
expectation by the majority community that Muslims need to be regulated so that 
they conform to notions of "Britishness" (Lentin and Titley, 2011, p. 184) and "at a 
moment's notice be erected as objects of supervision" (Morey and Yaqin, 2011, 
p.6).  Furthermore, tolerating other values and opinions is limited by the 
parameters set by the majority community in any society (Seth, 2001).   
Sections of the print media portray Islam and Muslims as being in binary 
opposition to British society without space for differing interpretations in the ways 
Muslims live their lives.  In contrasting the Western discourse on individualism, 
Islam is presented as distinctly 'communal', relying on third world traditions, sharia 
law, arranged marriages, the segregation of men and women, and the perceived 
subjugation of women at the hands of bearded misogynists:  
The dominant view in the UK media is that there is no common ground 
between the West and Islam, and that conflict between them is 
accordingly inevitable (Petley and Richardson, 2011, p. 250). 
The dominant view presented by the print media may not be as philosophical as 




Alternatively, it may be as straightforward as the media wanting to sell newspapers 
and be part of the burgeoning anti-Muslim discourse framed for example, around 
'British values' as the antithesis of inclusive multiculturalism, positioning Muslims 
as outsiders.  I argue that by the media adopting tactics such as dialogic framing 
including stereotyping and the use of metonymy to visually depict Muslims and 
Islam negatively, it creates a 'normalisation' of Islam and Muslims associating both 
to discourses of suspicion and fear in the social imagination of Britons.  
Following 9/11 Islam was thrust into the spotlight as an ideology responsible for 
driving acts of terrorism around the world and by association, Muslims as potential 
terrorists (Petley and Richardson, 2011).  The print media were quick to capitalise 
on the sensationalism of portraying a visible ethnic minority not just by the colour 
of skin, but by clothing, culture and religion (ibid).  The terrorists responsible for 
their crimes had ensured this legacy by purporting to be Muslims guided by Islam 
to legitimise their acts of terrorism.  Media reporting of terrorists showing hostages 
being killed fuelled an unprecedented level of attacks on Muslims and Mosques 
around the world (Petley and Richardson, 2011).  From this a succession of 
‘home-grown’ terrorists was identified in Britain and attacks in London on the 7th 
July 2005, known as 7/7; the attack on Glasgow airport on 30th June 2007, and 
more recent attacks in Paris (BBC News, 9th December 2015), London for 
example, (BBC News, 23rd May 2013; BBC News, 22nd March 2017; BBC News, 
3rd June 2017; BBC News, 14th August 2018; BBC News, 29th November 2019; 
BBC News, 2nd February 2020) and Manchester (Smith and Chan, 2017) 




By focusing on the Rushdie Affair, 9/11, 7/7  and other events, British Muslims are 
portrayed by the print media as "angry fundamentalists" (Archer, 2009, p. 74) who 
are asked to "explain and situate themselves and their religious identities/practices 
through a simplistic, narrow dichotomy" (ibid).  By the print media highlighting 
differences along with a decline in working-class jobs in the manufacturing industry 
in Britain since the early 1980s has provided fertile ground for the seeds of 
xenophobia to grow, particularly when jobs are in short supply, or the need for 
services are being stretched.  The sight of a non-white person gaining social 
advantage before a white person is ideal fodder for the likes of far right-wing groups 
in Britain to promote xenophobia within communities.  The British National Party 
(BNP), who were "active" (Phillips, 2009, p. 25) in many poorer communities for 
example, Rochdale, Bradford and Oldham following the rioting in 2001, find 
recruitment and support for their ideologies far greater in number than in previous 
years (Chappell et al., 2010; Lewis, 2007). 
The Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), set up in 1997, was initially courted by the 
government who wanted a "single representative body" for Muslims in Britain 
(Morey and Yaqin, 2011, p. 83).  However, the government quickly discovered that 
the MCB was not representative of Muslims, did not always align with the views of 
the government and therefore was not a body that they could control or, from its 
representation, be able to exert influence over Muslims in Britain (Lewis, 2007).  
Having control over people who largely have an identity and culture based upon 
faith was proving to be difficult for the government, who will only recognise them if 
they "don't rock the boat" (Morey and Yaqin, 2011, p. 111).  A lack of representation 




level does not represent them (Ahmed, 2009), nor can they enjoy protection from 
the law as other racially defined groups.  Such a situation evolved as a result of 
successive courts failing to accept Muslims as a distinct ethnic group, unlike Sikhs 
and Jews.  Islam is a religion and a Muslim follows that religion; this is an important 
area of contention and one which has been debated for some time (Bari, 2004).  
Because religion is separate from race the wider media are able to negatively report 
Islam and by association Muslims.  Reporting British Muslims within a narrow 
dichotomy for example, only in terms of their 'Muslimness', "they do not appear as 
'normal' members of British society and the 'British public" (Archer, 2009, p. 74) and 
"that the current media panics are enacting a form of representational violence on 
Muslims in Britain" (ibid, p. 75).  The negative reporting of Islam and Muslims by the 
Western media in response to local and global issues is now further explored. 
The attack on the twin towers on 9/11 was a watershed in many ways.  It identified 
the mastermind behind the attack, Osama Bin-Laden, showed Prime Minister Blair 
and President Bush united in the 'war on terror', and created a hiatus in journalism 
that allowed journalists to be swept up in the national feelings of fear and outrage 
(Bonner, 2011).  Bonner (2011) recalls the many incidents post 9/11 that journalists 
were quick to report and sensationalise that subsequently turned out to be untrue, 
particularly when journalist use the phrase "linked to Al Qaeda" (ibid) so their stories 
would be published in the print media.  Bonner acknowledges his part (and other 
journalists) in failing to check allegations fed to them by intelligence officials without 
any journalistic investigation.  In the British media:  
There is general consensus among observers of Western media that on 
September 11, 2001, the conventional rules of newsgathering and 




From a journalistic aspect it was held that previous reports of terrorist attacks 
positioned the terrorists for example, the Irish Republican Army (IRA) as "holding 
out the possibility of negotiation and resolution" (ibid, p. 31).  However, the attacks 
on 9/11 were completely different.  Al Qaeda’s declaration of war to bring down 
Western democracy meant that any objectivity in reporting was not forthcoming from 
the Western news media, just as it wasn't in their coverage of the Nazis in 1939-45 
(Pludowski, 2007).  A lack of a journalistic detachment signalled an uneasy 
alignment of the media with the aims of the state in its "war on terror" (Morey and 
Yaqin, 2011, p. 214), with the Western media reluctant to critically examine or report 
Muslim grievances.   
Biased reporting of Islam and Muslims by some of the media is constructed in a 
framework where a balanced counter-view or argument is rarely allowed 
(Sobolewska and Ali, 2012).  The media create frameworks predominantly focusing 
on "terrorism and cultural differences" (ibid, p. 678) and it is vital therefore that the 
reader takes responsibility to interpret the story being reported.  Said (1981) argues 
that the reader needs to work through their own affiliations with society, including 
patriotism, and must draw on their formal education and understanding, employing 
disciplined reason in order to gain knowledge of other societies and cultures.  This 
task is more difficult when the reader has to make reasoned decisions based on the 
wider media's single or "alternative narrative" (Petley and Richardson, 2011, p. 22) 
between Islam and the West (Petley and Richardson, 2011), reinforced by the 
inference that Muslims are a suspect community and "doubts are cast on their 




It is beyond the scope of this research to investigate 'reason' as a way of arriving at 
a sound conclusion, save for the work of Mercier and Sperber (2017), who say that 
when faced with moral judgments based upon our emotions, we are unlikely to 
change our view even when faced with a credible counter-view.  However, if we 
were individually engaged in a debate over such an issue then we may well change 
our minds (ibid, p. 307).1   
I argue negative media reporting, the twin spectres of securitisation in the form of 
Prevent and the influence of Fundamental British Values contributes to 
discriminatory and exclusionary practices against Muslims.  I further argue that prior 
to 9/11 Muslim identity was subsumed within being referred to as Asian, post 9/11 
Muslim identity has been hijacked by the wider media, securitised by the state and 
enveloped in a postcolonial construct creating imaginary borders around those who 
are 'othered' within its society. 
It is difficult to assess the impact that negative reporting has, for example, on either 
a rise in hostility toward Muslims or on an individual being the victim of a hate crime.  
It is well documented that a rise in "anti-Muslim attacks" (Khan, 2016, p. 190) on 
Muslims and/or Muslim places of worship occurs following terrorist attacks where 
Islam or Muslims are purported to be involved (Tellmama, 2018; Petley and 
Richardson, 2011; Hopkins and Gale, 2009; McRoy, 2006; Morey and Yaqin, 
2011).  Reporting these attacks accurately or with a negative bias can result in a 
rise in so-called Islamophobia in either case.  It is the stereotypical link between the 
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attacks and all Muslims that is of concern with negative media reporting reinforcing 
the link.  The following research by Allen (2012), which was presented to the All 
party Parliamentary Group on Islamophobia, documents the role of the traditional 
British broadcast and print media in their reporting of Islam and Muslims.  While 
there is no direct evidence that the media causes Islamophobia or hatred toward 
Muslims in Britain, Allen (2012, p. 3) argues that research shows "the media plays a 
fundamental role in the formulation and establishment of popular views and attitudes 
in society".  I provide a summary of Allen's research to illustrate how negative 
reporting of Islam and Muslims in Britain by the Western media "shape and inform 
the ideological component of Islamophobia" (Allen, 2012, p. 5).  
 I acknowledge that there are also other messages and meanings that inform 
Islamophobia as an ideology:   
1. 64% of the British public claim that what they know is 'acquired through the 
media' (YouGov poll from 2002). 
2. 74% of the British public claim that they know 'nothing or next to nothing' 
about Islam (YouGov poll from 2002). 
3. Research from 2006 suggests that the press coverage relating to Muslims 
and Islam in British newspapers had increased by approximately 270% over 
the preceding decade. 
4. 91% of that coverage was deemed negative 
5. 84% of press coverage represented Islam and Muslims either as 'likely to 
cause damage or danger' or 'operating in a time of intense difficulty or 
danger' 
6. Research from 2008 once again confirmed that the press coverage of British 
Muslims had increased significantly since 2000, peaking in 2006, and 
remaining at high levels in 2007 and 2008. 
7. 2008 was shown to be the first year in which the 'volume of stories about 
religious and cultural differences' (32% of stories by 2008) overtook terrorism 




Allen's (2012, p. 2) research concluded that the consequences of this type of media 
coverage was: 
 Likely to provoke and increase feelings of insecurity, suspicion and anxiety 
amongst non-Muslims; 
 Likely to provoke feelings of insecurity, vulnerability and alienation amongst 
Muslims, and in this way to weaken the Government's measures to reduce 
and prevent extremism; 
 Unlikely to help diminish levels of hate crime and acts of unlawful 
discrimination by non-Muslims against Muslims; 
 Likely to be a major barrier preventing the success of the Government's 
community cohesion policies and programmes; 
 Unlikely to contribute to informed discussions and debate amongst Muslims 
and non-Muslims about ways of working together to maintain and develop 
Britain as a multicultural, multi-faith democracy.  
Research carried out by Whitaker (2002) prior to and after 9/11 found that there had 
been increases in the publication of articles involving Muslims ranging from the Daily 
Express, 219% to the Sun, 658% where: 
All Muslims were becoming homogenised as an indistinguishable and 
undifferentiated group where all of its members 'Muslims' were seen to 
have the same attributes, qualities, capabilities and characteristics most 
of which were extremely negative ( Allen, 2012, p. 7). 
A report published five years later suggested a worsening of the negative reporting 
where the newsworthiness of Islam and Muslims on a 'normal' week had increased 
by approximately 270% (Poole, 2002; Allen, 2007). 
Research carried out by Cardiff University (Moore, et al., 2008) confirmed the 
previous report adding that approximately 36% of all stories involving British 




Muslims involving threats, problems or opposition to dominant British values.2  
Cardiff University further reported that the media presented the view that Islam is 
dangerous, backward or irrational with nouns such as terrorist, extremist, Islamist, 
suicide bomber and militant being used.  The most common adjectives used were 
radical, fanatical, fundamentalist, extremist and militant, with negative assessments 
prominent in the tabloids (ibid).  Negative reporting of Muslims and Islam by the 
media has created the illusion of the Muslim as a single entity whose allegiances 
lies in foreign lands, with covert links to terrorism and a rejection of Britishness, 
explicitly, the enemy within. 
On Tuesday 20th February 2018, oral evidence was presented to the Home Affairs 
Committee on 'hate crime and its violent consequences' (Commons Select 
Committee, 2018).  The impact of evidence being presented culminated in the 
publication of 'Islamophobia Defined', (All Party Parliamentary Group on British 
Muslims, 2018) referred to earlier, and some 21 years after calls for the definition of  
Islamophobia to be re-defined.  In respect of Islamophobia and the print media, it is 
relevant here to include the evidence given by Rt Hon Baroness Warsi and 
Professor Chris Frost, Chair of the Ethics Council, National Union of Journalists.  
Baroness Warsi commented on Islamophobia passing the 'dinner table test' (ibid; 
Allen, 2020, p. 104) and said that other than herself, no mainstream politician had 
spoken about Islamophobia.  Warsi spoke about the daily occurrence of untrue 
stories about Muslims in the British press and its effect in normalising Islamophobia 
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within the public arena (Commons Select Committee, 2018).  She further pointed 
out the dangers of 'normalising' by the public perception influencing politicians in 
their decision-making processes with regard to policy.  She recalled how two of her 
fellow politicians had commented to her about the context of a story about Muslim 
family fostering a 'Christian' girl, published by the Times newspaper, which has 
proved to be false (IPSO, 2018) with The Telegraph urging Politicians to hold an 
inquiry (The Telegraph, 2017).  Giving oral evidence to the Home Affairs Select 
Committee (Commons Select Committee, 2018), Professor Frost said that 
newspapers editors were putting pressure on journalists to look for and create 
stories about Muslims which were designed to "raise issues of fear to sell 
newspapers", and to "pick an 'othered' group from the community and make them 
fearful".  He continued saying that newspapers were under commercial pressure 
from social media outlets to sell newspapers (ibid).  Furthermore, newspapers could 
publish largely defamatory stories about Muslims, without fear of prosecution or 
rebuttal from its regulatory authority IPSO (Independent Press Standards 
Organisation) set up by publishers, which he referred to as being "unfit for purpose" 
(Commons Select Committee, 2018). 
On 29th November 2012, The Leveson Inquiry into 'Culture, Practice and Ethics of 
the Press', was published.  It evidenced, among other issues, wrongdoing by the 
British press, who were telling journalists to look for Muslim stories (Leveson, 2012).  
Leveson (2012, volume 2, Chapter 6, paragraph 8.51) commented that "the 
evidence of discriminatory, sensational or unbalanced reporting in relation to ethnic 
minorities, immigrants and/or asylum seekers, is concerning".   At the conclusion of 




included regulation of the press.  This was dismissed by the Prime Minister David 
Cameron.  Part two of Leveson's inquiry was scheduled to be heard at the 
conclusion of police inquiries which were ongoing at that time.  In the week following 
evidence from Baroness Warsi, the Sun and Telegraph newspapers offered 
apologies over inaccurate stories written a year previously (Oborne, 2018).  During 
the same week the BBC broadcast a story concerning unregistered schools in 
London focusing on inappropriate behaviour by a 'teacher' within an unregistered 
Jewish school.  There was also footage shown of 'Forbidden', a book written by 
Muhammad Saleh al-Munajjid, advocating the murder of gay people, which the BBC  
claimed came from an unregistered school in Birmingham (Titheradge, 2018), even 
though the focus of the report was the abuse within the Jewish school.  The 
broadcast also featured an interview with Ofsted's Chief Inspector, Amanda 
Spielman, who lamented the lack of power that Ofsted had to intervene and 
prosecute unregistered schools.  Spielman is a supporter of Fundamental British 
Values being taught in schools and following the General election in June 2017 
agreed with Prime Minister David Cameron on the need to teach children British 
values so they can be resilient against extremism (Pells, 2017).  Spielman (2018) 
criticised schools for focusing too much on league tables above pupil interest and 
said that Ofsted inspectors would hope to "find good examples where schools have 
mastered this teaching, so that others who have struggled with the new 
requirements can build on their work" (ibid).  Spielman also wanted schools to 
actively "promote fundamental British values"  to "counteract terrorism", quoting the 
recent attacks in Westminster, London Bridge, Manchester and Finsbury Park 
(Spielman, 2018).  The day after the BBC broadcast, (Titheradge, 2018), the BBC 




second part of the Levison inquiry was not needed, citing that the press had 
"cleaned up its act" (BBC News, 1st March 2018).  While Health Secretary Hancock 
dismissed Warsi's pursuit of a campaign against Islamophobia saying, "there are 
others who take a more balanced approach" (Malik, 2019).  
2.6. Conclusion  
This chapter has focused on the shift of Governmental policy from a multiculturalist 
agenda to one of reactionary and largely punitive legislation.  The role of the media 
in creating a single narrative of Islam and Muslims in the mind of the non-Muslim 
majority community thereby creating the illusion of a suspect community of British 
Muslims by misrepresenting them has been examined.  The literature cited has 
been selected for its relevance in the creation of conditions within British society 
where Muslims have been subject to marginalisation.  In Chapter 3 I continue to 
argue that multiculturalism was replaced by the Prevent Strategy, however, this is 
only so for Muslims and would not be relevant for other minorities in Britain in the 
ways Prevent and its association with so-called 'Fundamental British Values' has 
impacted on their lived experiences (Home Office, 2011a; DfE, 2014).  This 
anomaly allows for the majority non-Muslim communities in Britain to remain firmly 
outside of the framework of securitisation that has been created, and as such 
engenders them with a perspective on Muslims which I argue in Chapters 4, 6 and 7 
are constructions of epistemic injustice.  Political policy and intervention are 
designed typically to curb certain behaviours and rarely "change public opinions, 




More recently, Modood (2019) has argued for a new form of multicultural secularism 
where religious minorities are treated in the same ways as other racialised groups.  
Modood calls for religious minorities to be accommodated in the here and now 
instead of a one-size-fits-all approach where Muslims living in Britain are 
marginalised by a multiculturalism that prioritises secularism over religion.  Modood 
(2019, pp. 14-15) calls for "compulsory religious education" (including Humanism) in 
schools and a widening of multifaith perspectives so that in understanding religion a 
multicultural recognition for Muslims will occur.  Islamophobia is central to 
understanding how Muslims living in Britain are marginalised.  In this Chapter I 
examined Islamophobia as a concept.  In Chapter 4 I examine Islamophobia as an 
ideology and suggest a reframing of Muslim voices in a secularly informed paradigm 
as a way to challenge Islamophobia.  I accept this approach is at odds with 
Modood's position in accommodating religion in multiculturalism, and I recognise 
that reframing Muslim voices is not an attempt to diminish their identity but to 
challenge Islamophobia by the most effective means available in conditions of 
postcolonialism that exist for Muslims living in Britain. 
I have considered the following as being important considerations when critiquing 
Multiculturalism in this chapter.  In Appendix 7 at 11.7, I provide summaries of 
each to place them in context.  
 [The] Race Relations Act 1965, 1976, Race Relations Amendment Act 
2000. 
 [The] Equality Act 2010. 
 [The] Scarman Report (Scarman, 1981)  




 International conflicts and Muslim reaction (1990-2012) (No references 
provided for International Conflicts) 
 [The] Macpherson Report (Macpherson, 1999) 
In Chapter 3, I continue the literature review bringing into focus the British 
government's Counter-Terrorism Strategy (Home Office, 2011) and in particular the 
Prevent Strategy (Home Office, 2011a) which I argue, influences the social 
imagination of Muslims and non-Muslims living in Britain, colonising the minds of 




3. CHAPTER 3: POST 9/11 AND MUSLIM COMMUNITIES 
3.1. Introduction: The Prevent Strategy 
The Prevent Strategy (Home Office, 2011a), is part of the government’s counter-
terrorism strategy referred to as CONTEST (Home Office, 2011).  Prevent is 
designed to be the "hearts and minds" approach in stopping people from 
becoming terrorists or engaging in terrorist activity (O'Toole et al., 2016, p. 162).  It 
has been revised several times since its inception in 2003, often in response to 
terrorist activity either domestically or globally.  Since 2015, it has become 
statutory within public bodies including schools (Counter-Terrorism and Security 
Act 2015).  The messages it wishes to give are therefore embedded in the public 
consciousness through the statutory requirements and its dissemination through 
public bodies including schools, colleges and universities.  
In this introduction I begin by providing an account of early development in the 
Prevent Strategy, linking it to domestic and world events that have contributed to 
its development.  I go on to examine its progression and subsequent legislative 
development which I argue can be seen as part of the history of engaging with 
minority communities that has emanated from government since 1976 (Race 
Relations Act 1976), "from where Britain's multicultural policies were developed" 
(Warikoo, 2019, p. 5).  In Chapter 2, I provided an overview of key milestones on 
the journey from multiculturalism to a time when the Prevent Strategy (Home 
Office, 2011a) had effectively replaced multiculturalism for Muslims in Britain.  In 
providing an account of how the media, in particular the British press, negatively 
reported on Islam and Muslims I acknowledge that Prevent may have contributed 




securitised framework.  In this chapter I focus on how Prevent, and its focus on 
Fundamental British Values (FBV) has marginalised Islam and Muslims enabling 
sections of the media to stereotype them by situating them within a legislative and 
security framework. 
I introduce the idea that the current Prevent Strategy unfairly marginalises Muslims 
by the statutory limited choices presented to them in either assimilating to FBV 
(DfE, 2014; ESTYN, 2015) or being viewed as potential security threats (Warsi, 
2017).  I argue that this limits the extent to which Muslims can participate in free 
speech and political debate within Britain.  I also examine the statutory obligation 
of educationalists to teach so-called Western-based FBV and to report those 
perceived to be at risk from radicalisation (DfE, 2015).  By migrating part of the 
definition of extremism from the Prevent strategy into statutory duties to teach FBV 
(DfE, 2014; ESTYN, 2015) FBV has been subsumed into the National Curriculum.  
I present an argument to support the claim that Prevent duties alienate Islam as a 
religion and by inference Muslims. 
A fundamental concept employed in this thesis in examining the Prevent Strategy 
(Home Office, 2011a) and FBV (DfE, 2014; ESTYN, 2015) is Epistemic Injustice 
(Fricker, 2007; Medina, 2013), which is examined in Chapter 4. 
3.1.1. The Background to Prevent  
The United Kingdom Government's overall response or "counter-terrorism 
strategy" to the threat of terrorism whether committed at home or abroad is 




The aim of CONTEST is to reduce the risk to the UK and its interests 
overseas from terrorism, so that people can go about their lives freely 
and with confidence (Home Office, 2011, p. 3).    
The 2011 policy is the fourth publication since its inception in 2003; revisions took 
place in 2006 and 2009.  The policy is split into four areas or objectives commonly 
known as the four P's: Pursue, Prevent, Protect, and Prepare. 
Pursue: to stop terrorist attacks; Prevent: to stop people becoming 
terrorists or supporting terrorism; Protect: to strengthen our protection 
against a terrorist attack; and Prepare: to mitigate the impact of a 
terrorist attack (Home Office, 2011, p. 6).  
The United Kingdom has a history of having to respond to the threat of terrorism, 
particularly in response to the years referred to as 'The Troubles' in Northern 
Ireland where the IRA (Provisional Irish Republican Army) and other off-shoots 
such as the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) were engaged in acts of 
terrorism (Thomas, 2012).  Following the attacks that occurred in the United States 
of America on the 11th of September 2001 (9/11), the long-running military 
involvement in Afghanistan from October 2001 and the subsequent invasion of 
Iraq in 2003, a new threat emerged in the form of 'Al Qaeda', "a major global 
threat" (Hopkins and Gale, 2009, p. 185) which, along with its affiliated groups, are 
threats to 'The West' which includes the United Kingdom.    
On the 7th of July 2005 (7/7), four British Muslims carried out a series of suicide 
bombings in London, attacking the city's transport system resulting in the deaths of 
52 commuters and causing life-changing injuries to many more.  Two of those 
responsible for the attacks, all from the West Yorkshire area, had recorded video 
tapes of themselves warning the British Government about involvement in 




A further failed attack in London on the 21st July 2005 (BBC News, 16th 
December 2014) and a subsequent attack on Glasgow airport in June 2007 
(Brocklehurst, 2017), reinforced the potential threat from so-called 'home grown 
terrorists', or "home grown bombers" (Younge, 2010, p. 185)  who self-identified as 
Muslims engaged in a Jihad, or war. 
The interpretation of 'Jihad' is widely reported on ranging from 'Holy war' to a 
'struggle for a good cause' and are wide-ranging as are definitions of what is a 
Muslim (Kundnani, 2014; Lewis, 2007).  One interpretation argues that a person 
cannot be Muslim if they engage in violence toward another, while others say a 
Muslim (a follower of Islam), has authority under Jihad to use violence toward 
enemies of Islam (BBC, 3rd August 2009).  It is the latter of these two definitions 
that CONTEST focuses its considerable might.  The differences between the 
threat in Northern Ireland and that of so-called "Islamic extremists" are 
considerable.  During 'The Troubles' (1968-1998) it was generally accepted 
(although there were some exceptions) that terrorist attacks were preceded with a 
warning so as not to involve civilian casualties.  With so-called Islamic terrorist 
attacks, no such warnings are given.  Civilians are seen by these terrorists as 
being supportive of their democratically elected governments and therefore are 
indirectly targets.  This has been demonstrated by attacks in Europe where so-
called Islamic terrorists carried out atrocities in Spain, France and Belgium 
resulting in the loss of life and life-changing injuries for members of the public 
(Eurojust, 2018), (see also, Sbrant, 2006; BBC News, 14th January 2015; BBC 




Recent attacks are now being claimed by an incarnation of previously fragmented 
terrorist groups now known as ISIS or ISIL, the Islamic State of Iraq and the 
Levant, which is alternatively translated as Islamic State of Iraq and Syria.  A 
change from Al Qaeda came about in 2014 after Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was 
named its caliph and as such the so-called caliphate claimed religious, political 
and military authority over all Muslims (BBC News, 28th October 2019).  The 
claiming of a caliphate essentially extended a duty upon all Muslims to 'do the 
bidding' of the caliph including upholding Sharia law.  For some Muslims, this was 
seen as a 'call to arms', and if possible, followers should travel to support ISIS in 
the areas that they operate, which at the time of writing are Syria and Iraq.  ISIS 
does not represent the majority of Muslims who overwhelmingly abhor its use of 
indiscriminate violence.  The trans-national call to arms, however, is one that can 
and has resulted in a few Muslims changing their ideologies to align with that of 
ISIS.  It must of course be reiterated that the mainstream and moderate 
interpretation of a Muslim is one who is a follower of Islam and as such is a 
peaceful person who will not support acts of violence.  Unfortunately, the term 
'Muslim' is subject to being negatively stereotyped as someone who is a potential 
terrorist or whose loyalties to the country they reside is questioned (Petley and 
Richardson, 2011; Fekete, 2009; Khan, 2016).  It is this background that has 
influenced the development of Prevent. 
3.2. The Emerging Prevent 
Prior to the attacks in Britain on the 7th July 2005, the Prevent strand had been 
the least developed of the four strands making up the CONTEST Strategy 




world's most extensive counter-radicalization policy" (Neumann, 2011, p. 21), 
culminating in 2015 where Prevent training in a wide body of public arenas was 
made statutory by part five of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015.  This 
included Local Government, the National Health Service, Universities, colleges 
and schools, with the onus on staff to additionally report those at risk of, or who 
have been, radicalised (Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015).  This of course 
is an important area in order to keep the United Kingdom safe by identifying 
potential terrorists.  However, It is fraught with danger as this aspect of the Prevent 
Strategy may be seen as a 'witch hunt' or a hunting down of the 'enemy within' by 
stereotyping Muslims and linking them with a terrorist group which selectively 
chose to include 'Islamic' in its name for example, [The] Islamic State of Iraq and 
Syria (ISIS).  The dangers in allowing 'home grown terrorists' to escape the notice 
of the authorities is a concern for those responsible for protecting British citizens.  
In response to the 7/7 bombings in London, Thomas (2012, p. 28) noted: 
The attackers were four young men from West Yorkshire in the North of 
England, 3 of them Pakistani-origin from Beeston in south Leeds, and 
one an African-Caribbean convert to Islam from nearby Huddersfield.  
All had been brought up and educated in Britain, with broad Yorkshire 
accents.  
The Prevent Strategy is the eyes and ears of the security services and reaches far 
into the community to try and identify those who are most at risk of radicalisation.  
Under the Labour Government, the policy was commonly referred to as Prevent 1 
and under the coalition Government, as Prevent 2, (Home Office, 2011a) as 






 The most recent change to the Prevent strategy is found within part 5, Chapter 1 
of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 which created a statutory duty:  
...on a range of Government organisations working with the public, 
including the police, local authorities, prisons, schools, and universities, 
to prevent people being drawn into terrorism (Cumbria Safeguarding 
Children Partnership Procedures Manual, 2015). 
The 2011 Prevent strategy has three objectives:  
1.  Respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism and the threat we face 
from those who promote it; 
2.  Prevent people from being drawn into terrorism and ensure that they are 
given appropriate advice and support; and 
3.   Work with sectors and institutions where there are risks of radicalisation 
 which we need to address (Home Office, 2011a, p. 7). 
In addition to the work of Prevent, it is crucial to consider that the other three areas 
of CONTEST (Counter-Terrorism Strategy, 2011) are actively prosecuted in 
Britain.  Some, which have been subject to legislative change (Counter-Terrorism 
and Security Act 2015) include temporary passport seizure, exclusion orders, 
investigation measures, internet protocol, border security, and Channel (HM 
Government, 2015), a voluntary deradicalisation programme operated through 
Prevent (discussed in Appendix 8).  However, the focus of this chapter will remain 
the Prevent strategy through its history and its impact on the Muslim community 
which are discussed in the analysis of the interview data in Chapters 6 and 7. 
3.2.1. Security Legislation 
At the time of data collection with the young men and women who took part in the 
CoE, the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 was three to four years away 




operating in schools or universities.  There was, however, the Terrorism Act 2000, 
which legislated against engaging in terrorism or threats of terrorism and had 
wide-ranging powers for the security services to stop and search, detain and arrest 
those suspected.  The Act also listed proscribed groups including domestic and 
international organisations that the Home Secretary deemed 'concerned in 
terrorism'.  Those having an affiliation with proscribed groups allowed the security 
services to suspect them of being concerned in terrorism.  Section 13 of the Act 
also extended to wearing of: 
...an item of clothing such as to arouse reasonable suspicion that he is 
a member or supporter of a proscribed organisation is sufficient to be 
prosecuted for a terrorist offence (Terrorism Act 2000). 
 
Although legislation had roots in outlawing paramilitary styles of uniform worn in 
public by some groups in Northern Ireland, it was viewed by some to include 
traditional and cultural styles of Muslim attire as being signifiers of a potential 
terrorist instead of a signifier of traditional or conservative Muslim values and 
religious piety (Pool, 2017).  This is stereotyping is at its most dangerous when a 
Muslim's "ethno-religious identity" (Modood, 2007, p. 98) is seen as having an 
association with terrorism.  Unfortunately, this is most prominent for Muslim 
women who wear the hijab, Niqab, or burqa that are highly visible as Muslim (Allen 
and Nielsen, 2002). 
Stereotyping Muslims is a catalyst for hate crime and anti-Muslim attacks, which 
increased following the vote to leave Europe in June 2016 and following 
subsequent terrorist attacks in Britain (Runnymede, 2017).  This highlights how, in 
a 'supposed' multicultural society, identity politics has permitted the hijab to be 




identity, associating female Muslims with oppression or terrorism (Morey and 
Yaqin, 2011).  Some Muslims feel they are singled out by the law as potential 
terrorists due to cultural dress and practices leading some to limit displays of 
'Muslimness' in public, "where to look like a Muslim or to be a Muslim creates 
suspicion, hostility, or failure to get the job you applied for" (Modood, 2007, p. 65).  
Displays of pious or conservative ethno-religious clothing worn by some Muslim 
men may be seen by some as signifiers of a Muslim identity that will attract 
unwanted attention from the security services (Bonino, 2013).  Displays of ethno-
religious dress is not, of course, an offence, unless it supports a view that the 
wearer is a member of a banned or proscribed organisation, for example 'ISIS' 
(Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015).  However, stereotyping in its most 
negative forms has potential to create association in supporting terrorism 
restricting agency for some Muslims.  
Legislation introduced to strengthen security in Britain includes amendments which 
make it an offence to be in possession of books or items for the purposes of 
terrorism (Section 57), and to collect information useful for terrorism (Section 58) 
Terrorism Act 2000.  These have proved perilous for some Muslims when 
accessing the internet either out of curiosity or for research if they are found in 
possession of such material (Fekete, 2009).   
While the security services would of course wish to prosecute those that are 
suspected of committing terrorist offences, the Act restricts those, some of whom 
are young Muslims, from accessing potentially hostile and inflammatory texts.  
This research suggests this may limit their abilities to challenge violent ideologies 




3.2.2. Critics of Prevent 
The rationale in highlighting Muslims and Muslim communities creates a single 
narrative about Muslims where the actions of a minority of those claiming to be 
Muslims, stereotype all Muslims.  Islam and Muslims are subsequently viewed as 
being associated with Islamist violent extremism domestically and globally and in 
doing so fall under the remit of the government's counter-terrorism strategy (Home 
Office, 2011), which has attracted generous funding and personnel to implement 
its various strategies, including Prevent (Thomas, 2012).  The same cannot be 
said for other forms of domestic violent extremism some of whom have advocated 
violence, for example, animal rights groups, anti-globalisation and anti-
capitalisation protestors, and far-right wing groups (ibid), who are not targeted with 
the same intensity as Muslims.  It may be because these groups do not fall under 
the category of international terrorism that they are given a lesser priority from the 
counter-terrorism agenda, which is reflected in their lack of media coverage.  
However, more recently Extinction Rebellion (an international global environment 
movement) were temporarily deemed to be an extremist organisation (Grierson, 
2020) under Prevent, with more than 250 people in Wales being referred to 
Prevent amid concerns of extremism (both right wing 24% and so-called Islamic 
15%) (BBC News, 5th February 2020).   
Since 9/11, the invasion of Iraq, Afghanistan, and conflicts in Libya and Syria has 
seen the rise of ISIS as a major terrorist group (Tharoor, 2014).  Events coupled 
with the atrocities perpetrated by terrorists purporting to be Muslims across the 
world, have stigmatised and marginalised a world-wide community of Muslims who 




and Kalin, 2011; Kumar, 2012; Runnymede, 2017; Allen, 2020 ) has seen Muslim 
communities become more insular in the face of what they perceive as an attack 
on their loyalty to Great Britain creating "invisible boundaries across which 
members of the Muslim community are not 'welcome' to step" (Runnymede, 2017, 
p. 38).  According to critics of the Prevent Strategy (Busher et al., 2017; Thomas, 
2012; Bonino, 2013), Prevent (Home Office, 2011a) securitised Muslims in Britain 
due to the actions of a few British Muslims and terrorism worldwide carried out by 
terrorists calling themselves Muslim. 
Continuing the critique of Prevent, we now turn to how the introduction of FBV in 
schools and its subsequent legislation made Muslims feel different.    
3.2.3. Schools and Prevent: from Fundamental British Values to 
Statutory Duties 
In 2014, the Government decided that British values should be taught in schools 
(DfE, 2014; ESTYN, 2015) largely as a result of the so-called "Trojan Horse affair" 
findings (Holmwood and O'Toole, 2018, pp. 127-141) where evidence of an 
Islamist campaign to target certain schools was allegedly uncovered (Wilshaw, 
2014).  The alleged attempts by some governors of the schools to control the 
appointment of favoured staff, as well as curriculum content, was viewed as the 
progression of a narrow-minded religious-based ideology (ibid).  The alleged 
evidence of anti-white, anti-Christian, anti-Jewish, homophobic and gender 
segregation by some schools all contributed to the fuelling of the anti-Islam and 
Muslim campaign.  The appointment of Peter Clarke as Education Commissioner 
for Birmingham was also viewed by some as controversial as Clarke had 




London leading the Counter-terrorism Command (Holmwood and O'Toole, 2018).  
Clarke's appointment led Sir Albert Bore, Labour council leader for Birmingham, to 
comment: 
I think many of the community in Birmingham would not want an 
investigation to be conducted along those lines because they do not 
believe that the activities in the schools are the starting point for 
terrorism in the city (BBC News, 15th April 2014).  
The Chief Constable of West Midlands Police Chris Sims, also referred to Clarke's 
appointment as "desperately unfortunate" (BBC News, 15th April 2014). 
A main part of Clarke's remit was to investigate the allegations largely in relation to 
child safeguarding which concluded that there was no evidence of terrorism, 
radicalisation or violent extremism in the schools of concern in Birmingham.  
Clarke was at pains to mention within his executive summary that he did not look 
for evidence of terrorism, but that there was clear evidence that some people in 
positions of influence within schools, espouse, endorse, or fail to challenge 
extremist views (Clarke, 2014).  Clarke made specific reference to the definition of 
extremism in the Prevent strand of the CONTEST strategy and appeared to link 
this to Prime Minister Cameron's speech at Munich in February 2011 (Cameron, 
2011).  During his speech the Prime Minister denounced the doctrine of state 
multiculturalism which he claimed had encouraged different cultures to live 
separate lives and to allow segregated communities to behave "in ways that run 
completely counter to our values" and that it had allowed a "weakening of our 
collective identity" (ibid).  Cameron also announced that his government would 
now be more proactive and would not shy away from confronting the ideology of 




human rights, including for women, people of other faiths, equality before the law, 
democracy and whether they encourage integration or separation (Cameron, 
2011).  The Prime Minister's speech came on the same day that 3,000 English 
Defence League supporters marched through Luton chanting anti-Islamic slogans.  
This was viewed by some commentators to be ill-timed on the part of the Prime 
Minister as his speech was seen by some right-wing activists as an endorsement 
of their views (Helm et al., 2011; Taylor and Davis, 2011).  The reaction by some 
Muslims was that the speech was just another example of an attack on Islam and 
Muslims, with the Muslim Council of Britain's assistant secretary general, Dr Faisal 
Hanjra describing it as 'disappointing' (BBC News, 5th February 2011).  Among 
the findings of the Office for Standards in Education's (Clarke, 2014; Wilshaw, 
2014) report into the 'Trojan Horse' controversy (Holmwood and O 'Toole, 2018), 
was one of the schools inspected by Clarke had failed to protect children from the 
risks of radicalisation and extremism.  This prompted the then Education Secretary 
Michael Gove to announce in the House of Commons that schools in future would 
be required to "actively promote 'British values' " (Gove, 2014) but did not say what 
they were, leaving the media and other commentators to forward their own 
definitions including equality between genders and tolerance of other faiths 
(Wintour, 2014; Struthers, 2017, p. 96).  The promotion of British values was not 
new and was originally included in the Department for Education's Teachers' 
Standards (DfE, 2011).  What is of interest within the document is that the 
definition of 'Fundamental British Values', which include "democracy, the rule of 
law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and 
beliefs" (ibid, p. 9), is taken from the Prevent strategy's definition of "extremism" 




opposition to fundamental British values" (ibid).  The original definition was brought 
about to clarify particular groups or organisations, including Muslim groups, that 
the Home Office would or would not fund, or talk to and work with, dependent on 
how they fit into the definition.  The rationale behind this is the ideology or 
narrative known as 'Islamism', based on a theory claiming that it was the root 
cause of terrorist acts (Richardson and Bolloten, 2014).  The Standards' document 
(DfE, 2011) required teachers not to undermine the above values within and 
outside of school.  To reiterate, the definition of extremism taken from Prevent 
(Home Office, 2011a) and legislated includes: 
...the vocal or active opposition to our shared values. These include 
democracy and the rule of law, mutual respect and tolerance of other 
faiths and beliefs (Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015). 
The definition of Fundamental British Values, legislated by DfE (2014, p. 5) 
guidance is: 
...democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty, and mutual respect and 
tolerance of those with different faiths. 
As a codicil to the so-called 'Trojan Horse Affair', the investigation established that 
there was no attempt to 'Islamicise' schools or any evidence of radicalisation 
(Holmwood and O'Toole, 2018).  There was contestation over concepts of British 
values, and that the schools in question were judged on their implementation of 
the Prevent Strategy when there was, at that time, no guidance issued (Holmwood 
and O'Toole, 2018).  Holmwood compared the handling of the so-called Trojan 
Horse Affair to the Hillsborough scandal (Scraton, 1999; Hillsborough. Report of 
the Hillsborough Independent Panel, 2012), and was later quoted as saying that 




destructively colluded to create a false narrative of events that vilified an entire 
community (Oborne, 2018).  A Parliamentary select committee concluded:  
We note once again that no evidence of extremism or radicalisation, 
apart from a single isolated incident, was found and that there is no 
evidence of a sustained plot nor of a similar situation pertaining 
elsewhere in the country (Education Select Committee, 2015).  
However, in 2014, the government's drive for 'British values' to be implemented in 
schools continued unabated with the Department for Education (DfE, 2014) 
announcing that they would censure schools for failing to actively promote what it 
calls "Fundamental British Values" (Oborne, 2018; Revell and Bryan, 2016).  The 
guidance offered by the Department for Education preceded the findings of the 
official enquiry into the 'Trojan Horse Affair' (Holmwood and O'Toole, 2018) which 
raises the question whether the government used the affair to implement the 
promotion of its 'British values' agenda rather than wait for its findings, as argued 
earlier (Allen, 2015; Struthers, 2017).  In this thesis I argue the 'British Values' 
agenda is part of a political drive to 'normalise' the differences the public at large 
perceive between themselves and Islam, and by inference British Muslims.  
Furthermore, FBV are "open to conflicting interpretations, and over the years have 
had different meanings at different times and in different contexts" (Richardson 
and Bolloten, 2014, p. 10; Struthers, 2017), leaving educators largely to their own 
devices in implementing FBVs (ibid).  This research further argues that FBV in the 
curriculum may be seen as educative practice, formally used in colonial settings 
(Fanon, 1952; 1961), and is considered in this research as a postcolonial 
construct.  I now turn to how the British values agenda became part of the 




3.2.4. Fundamental British Values 
The Department for Education published its 'Promoting Fundamental British 
Values' advice document in November 2014 (DfE, 2014). The advice was deemed 
as non-statutory although under section 78 of the Education Act 2002, schools in 
England were required to promote the spiritual, moral, cultural, mental and 
physical development of pupils at the school and of society (DfE, 2014, p. 3; 
Education Act 2002).  The publication of the document was met with mixed 
responses, particularly considering schools were already obliged to follow the 
framework of the Equality Act (Equality Act 2010), which included much of what 
FBV were seen to be.  However, prior to 2014 there were several statements by 
British politicians who inserted their own interpretations of 'British values' into the 
public domain, with Tony Blair proclaiming "fighting poverty and unemployment", 
"securing justice and opportunity" and being a "compassionate society" (Blair, 
1997; Struthers, 2017, pp. 93-94).  Blair continued, "fair play, creativity, tolerance 
and an outward-looking approach to the world" (Blair, 2000; Struthers, 2017, p. 
94), "the belief in democracy, the rule of law, tolerance, equal treatment for all, 
respect for this country and its shared heritage" (Johnston, 2006; Struthers, 2017, 
p. 94).  Gordon Brown continued the theme during a speech (Brown, 2004), 
illustrating... "a strong sense of national identity", "a passion for liberty anchored in 
a sense of duty and in an intrinsic commitment to tolerance and fair play", and "the 
idea of duty as the virtue that reinforces neighbourliness and enshrines the idea of 
a public realm and public service".  Following the 2005 terrorist attack in London 
committed by radicalised British citizens (London Assembly, 2006), the 
government commissioned a report to strengthen "national identity and British 




'Britishness' part of the English secondary school curriculum (Department for 
Education and Skills, 2007).   
In 2011 the coalition government's review of Prevent (Home Office, 2011a, p. 107) 
defined 'extremism' as being "vocal or active opposition to FBV" laying down the 
seeds for FBVs to be made statutory for education (DfE, 2014; ESTYN, 2015), 
along with Prevent duties (Home Office, 2011a) being legislated by the Counter-
Terrorism and Security Act 2015, thus connecting Prevent with the Curriculum in 
England and Wales.  The delivery of FBV by teachers was not straightforward with 
divisions over exactly what British values were and whether they are shared by all 
(Maylor, 2014).  As the definition of extremism was migrated from the Prevent 
Strategy, teachers were perturbed by "such blatant reinforcement of teachers as 
instruments of the state within a liberal democracy" (Lander, 2016, p. 275).  
Although the introduction of FBV may be popular having political consensus, they 
were not wholly representative and seen as "troublesome" when forging cohesion 
(ibid).  According to Hoque (2015), this was intentional, creating notions of insider-
outsider citizen or "the subaltern internal 'Others' " (Taras, 2013, p. 420) reflecting 
notions of postcolonialism.  Political and military events across the world, as well 
as European incidents of terrorism and the events covered in this chapter, have 
led to "the proliferation of securitised requirements for schools such as the need to 
promote Fundamental British Values" (Lander, 2016, p. 275) leaving teachers and 
student teachers to rely on "nostalgic imperialist constructions of Britishness" (ibid, 
p. 276), when what should be taught is a transformation of British values to: 
 ...embrace an inclusive notion of Britishness which reinforces notions 
of belonging to a multicultural, multilingual and multiethnic Britain no 
matter where schools are sited in the country (Lander, 2016, pp. 278-




I acknowledge that the delivery of Fundamental British values in Northern Ireland 
has "relatively little association with national security and Islamism as framed by 
the Prevent Strategy" (McCully and Clarke, 2016, p. 354). 
An alternative interpretation of FBV has been explored by Smith (2016) who 
examined 'Britishness' within the framework of racist nativism to examine 
constructions of 'Britishness' through political, media and student-teachers' 
comprehension.  Using the definition by Perez Huber et al., racist nativism is 
defined as: 
The assigning of values to real or imagined differences, in order to 
justify the superiority of the native, who is perceived to be white, over 
that of the non-native, who is perceived to be People and Immigrants of 
Colour and thereby defend the rights of whites, or natives to dominance 
(Perez Huber et al., 2008, p. 43. 
In respect of native racism and its association to FBV, the responses from student-
teachers in Britain over a 3-year period revealed an awareness of FBV along with 
references to the 'other', without actually naming the 'other'.  Students also tended 
to "position those who constitute the 'us' as superior, replicating political and media 
presentations" (Smith, 2016, p. 309).     
In essence, therefore, the racist nativist discourse apparent in the 
students' responses demonstrate how the term FBV is a signifier for the 
'what' and 'who' of Britishness, the who of Britishness, constituting the 
'us', are those who hold these values and do the tolerating of 'others', 
and in so doing, are superior (Smith, 2016, p. 310).  
Smith (2016) concludes by acknowledging that students were thinking critically 
about FBV, recognising its effects on pupils and their families and giving hope for 
opening up critical debate between students.  However, Smith warns of the 
proposal by Ofsted to introduce Prevent training into teacher education and that 




an understanding of the political history that has led to notions of 'Britishness' 
(ibid).  "In short, we may witness the collapsing of discussions on identity to 
assertions about security" (Smith, 2016, p. 311).  In respect of FBV, Struthers 
(2017) argues that a vague definition by the government may be part of broader 
policies of a patriotic nature which "can be a powerful political tool" (Cole, 2000; 
Glazer, 1997; Soutphommasane, 2012). 
There is an existing body of literature that would suggest that the FBV 
agenda may represent an expression of nationalistic sentiment and a 
desire to retain exclusivity in the face of ever-greater multiculturalism     
(Soutphommasane, 2012, pp. 30-31). 
The above would appear to add weight to claims made in Chapter 2 that 
multiculturalism has been weakened for Muslims in Britain, at the expense of 
Prevent (Home Office, 2011a) and FBVs (DfE, 2014; ESTYN, 2015). 
There is a deceit in legislating that educators work "hand in glove" (Sukarieh and 
Tannock, 2016, p. 29) with security services to deliver a politically driven agenda 
of "official thinking biases and prejudices" (ibid) without being able to question 
British foreign policy for fear of being labelled 'radical' and 'extremist'.  I now turn to 
the introduction of legislation which ensured compliance from educators. 
3.2.5. Statutory Duties 
The introduction of the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act of 2015, Part 5 
Chapter 1, placed statutory duties to deliver Prevent by public bodies, including 
schools, colleges and universities.  At the National Union of Teachers annual 





The NUT believes there is a moral obligation on schools and teachers 
to protect children and young people against extremism of whatever 
nature.  The Union does, however, have some concerns regarding 
aspects of the current Prevent strategy (Blower, 2016).    
The General Secretary's comments came after a motion was put forward and 
backed by delegates at the conference calling for Prevent to be scrapped: 
Teachers have voted overwhelmingly to reject the Government's 
prevent strategy, designed to tackle extremism, over concerns that it 
causes "suspicion in the classroom and confusion in the staffroom"   
(Adams, 2016). 
One delegate at the conference, Gary Kaye from North Yorkshire, called for the 
Government to withdraw the Prevent duty from schools and colleges "and stop 
education professionals being the secret service of the public sector" (Adams, 
2016, unpaged ).  Whilst Alan Kenny, an NUT executive member who moved the 
motion said that teachers were receiving Prevent training "of varied context, 
provided by a multiplicity of organisations, without accreditation or regulation" 
(ibid).  The conference reaffirmed its opposition to Prevent, claiming Prevent 
stopped teachers discussing global issues and the legitimate "expression of 
(political) opinion" by students (NUT, 2016, p. 39; Sukarieh and Tannock, 2016).  
One prominent NUT activist, Rob Ferguson (Ferguson, 2015, 32.53-33.15) 
addressing the 2015 Marxism conference quoted from paragraph 10 of the 
'Prevent duty to schools' saying that, "non-violent extremists purport to identify 
grievances to which terrorist organisations then claim to have a solution" and "that 
one clause wipes out any pretence or claim at a commitment to free discussion 
and debate in the university lecture hall or the classroom".  Geraint Evans, 
Ofsted's National Lead for Extremism took an opposing view about shutting down 




college look for opportunities for young people to have discussions about 
controversial issues" (Dickens, 2015, unpaged).  The advice from the Department 
for Education concurs with Evans wanting extreme views discussed and 
challenged within the classroom, rather than closing down debate. One head 
teacher described having the dual problem of parents subscribing to far-right wing 
and Islamist extreme views (Khan, 2016). 
The 2015 University and College Union conference claimed Prevent would force 
its members to spy on learners, "help racist parties such as UKIP to flourish" and 
encourage discrimination against Muslim staff and students and normalise racist 
views in society (UCU Left, 2015).  The 2016 NUT conference "voted that the 
Government should entirely withdraw Prevent from schools and develop a totally 
new strategy" (Khan, 2016, p. 110).  
According to Sukarieh and Tannock (2016), a growing concern for schools, 
colleges and universities was the erosion of radicalism as "an expression of 
legitimate political thought" (ibid, p. 24) due to the term 'radicalism' being 
embedded in Counter-terrorism strategies, influencing individual education 
policies.  Not only are Prevent and FBV harmful to young Muslims but their agency 
to challenge government for its policies may be seen to contribute to social 
problems in Britain (Sukarieh and Tannock, 2016).  This includes criticism of 
Western foreign policy in the Middle East, which for some Muslims living in Britain, 
is highlighted by the concept of Ummah due to British foreign policy affecting 
Muslims worldwide.  This has implications for Muslims and non-Muslims who want 
their voices heard within the largely abandoned "radical tradition in education at 




reticent to engage in promoting "transformational educational practice" (ibid) for 
fear of being seen to condone 'radicalisation' within the remit of Prevent (Home 
Office, 2011a).  Now that 'radicalisation' is policed in educational establishments 
and often positioned alongside policies that include, "sexual exploitation, crime, 
drug abuse and child neglect" (Sukarieh and Tannock, 2016, p. 34), it is no 
wonder that young people are "fearful of speaking out and being labelled as 
radical" (ibid).  I acknowledge that radicalisation is a contested term founded on 
concepts of vulnerability, which as indicators of radicalisation, may unfairly 
categorise young people in pre-criminal spaces (Heath-Kelly, 2013; O'Donnell, 
2018).   
3.2.6. How Prevent has been Implemented in Schools and 
colleges 
The United Kingdom is the only nation in the world to deliver 
counterterrorism within its education, healthcare and social care sectors 
as safeguarding (Heath-Kelly and Strausz, 2018, p. 10). 
 
It is important to separate the statutory duties of educators in referring a young 
person under the Prevent strategy guidelines, and their focus on teaching and re- 
enforcing 'Fundamental British Values' in a diverse multi-ethnic community.  The 
latter has proved problematic for some teachers to define British values.  Some 
schools adopted alternative descriptions such as "school/college values", 
"community values", "democratic values" and "universal values" (Busher et al., 
2017, p. 28).  It appears phrasing 'British values' was seen to have connotations of 
harking back to the "British Empire and all that kind" (ibid), and it, "feels a little bit 
BNP, UKIP-y to sort of say, I mean patriotism's kind of been robbed from us hasn't 




It is clear from Busher et al., (2017) that teachers recognised a rise in the 
popularity of right-wing politics globally which affected patriotism being unfairly 
seen through a prism of division and racism, particularly where Muslims were 
concerned.  Furthermore, teacher professionalism culminated in some engineering 
terminology to lessen any offence or suspicion to young Muslims (ibid).  The report 
by Busher et al., (2017) also shows how Prevent has largely been successfully 
implemented within schools by teachers having better training, comfortably 
subsuming Prevent in the school's safeguarding procedures.  There is however, 
issues as to whether or not to report and refer young people having had 'difficult 
conversations' with students over issues affecting them.  Furthermore, whether it is 
more appropriate they should be discussed and delivered to young people by the 
'Prevent team' responsible for Local Authority delivery in schools (ibid).  Teacher 
training is limited to issues of safeguarding either by accessing an online course, 
for example WRAP (Home Office, 2020) or online resources recommended by 
Prevent , but not, I argue, including matters concerning foreign policy which may 
be relevant to some Muslim students as they explore their understanding of the 
Ummah. 
It is vital that young people have spaces where they can talk about 'dangerous or 
difficult conversations' they feel strongly about in an environment where they can 
have answers as well as state their views.  Teachers may be able sanitise FBV in 
its delivery, whereas there is little room to sanitise 'difficult conversations' other 
than closing down debate.  Although some teachers claimed (Busher et al., 2017) 
they were confident or fairly confident in having conversations about extremism 




areas such as Syria and ISIS-inspired extremism, where they did not know enough 
to answer, to continue with 'difficult conversations,' or because of "saying the 
wrong thing, getting it wrong" or that "comments would be misconstrued as racist 
or Islamophobic" and "I think that's a real fear in the [further education] sector" 
(ibid, p. 34 ).  The authors of the survey were keen to make the distinction of 
teachers being confident in their responsibilities for having conversations with 
students about extremism and radicalisation within their safeguarding frameworks, 
compared with actually having those "difficult conversations" (Busher et al., 2017, 
p. 35), "or at least that their confidence in having such conversations is of limited 
depth" (ibid, p. 36).  The research showed that 83% of staff who were part of a 
safeguarding team or those with specific knowledge were confident with having 
'difficult conversations', while 45% of those who were not part of that team or in the 
case of recently qualified teachers said they were "confident about implementing 
the duty" (Busher et al., 2017, p. 38).  This appears to show that subsuming 
Prevent in the remit of safeguarding policies made it easier to deliver.  However, 
this does not negate the issue that Prevent duties are at work "through the lens of 
a securitised framework of surveillance" (O'Donnell, 2017, p. 178), and may be 
seen as a "pedagogical injustice" (ibid).  Teachers also reported Prevent was 
"clearly a continuation of monitoring and reporting already in place" (Busher et al., 
2017, p. 53), and that 43% reported more open discussions.  However, in 
response to the question 'has the Prevent duty made it more likely or less likely 
that Muslim students might feel stigmatised?' 14% reported 'considerably more 




Research carried out by Taylor and Soni (2017, p. 242) showed the "securitisation 
of educational settings inevitably limits freedom of expression" and that they are 
no longer considered safe spaces for political and moral debate (Saeed and 
Johnson, 2016).  Considering the critics of Prevent, post 2015, such criticism must 
be viewed as 'work in progress' as at the time of writing there are daily examples 
of opposition to the implementation of Prevent appearing in the media, almost 
exclusively relating to over-zealous or security-focused intervention by teaching 
staff.  This is an unfair criticism of educators who very often have received limited 
and/or poor quality training, and as Khan (2016, p. 112) notes, how many 
teachers, for example, would know the differences between the "conservative 
practices of Islam and extremist beliefs".   
The Prevent strategy addresses both far-right and so-called Islamist extremism 
(Home Office, 2011a).  These can be difficult areas for educators to understand 
and deconstruct so they can put forward a counter-view to extremist narratives 
allowing young people to safely debate these issues in schools.  This may be 
difficult for some teachers who are universally duty-bound to report young people 
they identify at risk of radicalisation and may be easier for some to avoid these 
conversations.  I argue that it is easier for some teachers to have a conversation 
involving far-right wing extremism than a conversation involving Islamic extremism.  
This is true when the majority of students are white, and right-wing rhetoric may be 
more commonplace and teachers are used to deciding what is 'banter' and what 
would need reporting.  This in itself 'normalises' right-wing racism as 
"commonplace", as argued by one senior teacher in West Yorkshire (Busher et al., 




Many young Muslims get their knowledge of Islam or being a Muslim from their 
parents, which may include incomplete knowledge founded on "cultural norms" 
(Lewis, 2007, p. 39) rather than religious teachings and subjected to cultural 
interpretation (discussed in Chapter 6).  There may also be a reluctance between 
some Muslims to critique or openly discuss knowledge of Islam and being a 
Muslim when knowledge from their parents is doubtful.  Any critique or 
deconstruction of normative areas of Muslim practice may be seen as an attack on 
Muslim identity where having to defend Islamic knowledge may lead to them being 
labelled as at risk of radicalisation.  Struthers (2017, p. 100) argues that the 
teaching of FBV in the United Kingdom is a potentially discriminatory act toward 
"minority groups" which I argue are overwhelmingly Muslims living in Britain and, 
according to Struthers, in direct conflict with the teaching of human rights values 
by 1) the "discriminatory interpretation of the values it promotes" (Struthers, 2017, 
p. 91) and 2) being likely to "perpetuate anti-human rights sentiments" (ibid) by 
failing to challenge misconceptions.  Struthers (2017) argues that a lack of 
guidance in defining 'values',  allows teachers to interpret statutory duties in 
different ways with some expressing viewpoints "more commonly associated with 
the front pages of certain sections of the tabloid press" (Struthers, 2017, p. 101).  
Furthermore, the guidance given to schools fails to mention the broader human 
rights framework included in the Prevent Strategy (Home Office, 2011a; DfE, 
2014; ESTYN, 2015).  Struthers (2017) argues that British values should be taught 
within a human rights framework placing it within an area of secularism.  In 
Chapter 4, I support Struthers' (2017) argument by reframing Islamophobic 





If we are to rely on the definition of FBV to hail from security legislation and not 
from a multicultural and inclusive perspective that encompasses "belonging" 
(Healy, 2019, p. 428) then schools run the very real risk of promoting a powerful 
exclusionary force to the detriment of minority groups, particularly British Asian 
Muslims.  Furthermore, by embedding Prevent within the normal and accepted 
safeguarding processes in schools, it runs the risk of 'normalising' the 
securitisation of Muslims (Busher et al., 2017; Struthers, 2017), setting them once 
again as 'other'. 
It is vital that cognizance be given to teachers and educators in the ways they 
implement Prevent and FBVs in their workplace.  Recent studies reveal that 
educators vary greatly in their interpretation of Prevent and FBVs obligations, 
along with what constitutes 'Britishness' (Farrell, 2016), attempting to carry out 
their statutory duties by reducing its most harmful effects (Jerome et al., 2019; 
Vincent, 2019).  This is "testament to the professionalism and dedication to 
student well-being both of school/college staff and, indeed, local Prevent teams" 
(Busher et al., 2017, p. 8).  Teaching of FBV however, remains a problem for 
practitioners, some of whom claim it stigmatises Muslim students (Busher et al., 
2017), generating different responses from educators in their delivery of what 
some see as a problematic philosophy (Vincent, 2019), that has the potential to be 
seen as monocultural (Moncrieffe and Moncrieffe, 2019). 
Wolton (2017) makes the comparison between Prevent and the suffragettes' 
extremist tactics as an example of the dichotomy between yesterday's heroes and 
today's extremists.  A part of Wolton's (ibid) concerns were how teachers could on 




and at the same time promote democracy and British values to their pupils.  Just 
as Wolton (ibid) argued that the suffragettes were opposed to the British values of 
their time, I argue that Muslims are similarly experiencing being marginalised from 
an increasingly comprehensive 'call to order' by Prevent and its securitisation 
reaching into Muslim spaces, including schools and universities.  Some 
commentators see recent advice from the Department for Education (DfE, 2020) 
as attempts to suppress dissent by targeting organisations who promote anti-
capitalism or teaching materials branded as 'extreme' from being heard in English  
schools (Mohdin, 2020; Merrick, 2020; Shadijanova, 2020).  The recent guidance 
is beyond the scope of this research but is worthy of further research alongside 
issues of free speech (Office for Students, 2018; Higher Education and Research 
Act 2017; see also Appendix 8).   
In Chapter 2, I explored how sections of the media reported on Islam and the 
media post 9/11.  In the next section I explore how the media report and construct 
the Muslim living in Britain as 'other'. 
3.3. Media construction of Muslim as the "Other"  
Since the events of 9/11, there has been a marked rise in the way that the British 
media in general has negatively reported on Muslims and Islam (Fekete, 2009; 
Allen, 2007a, 2012; Petley and Richardson, 2011; Kumar, 2012; Kundnani, 2014; 
Talwar and Ahmad, 2015).  Naturally one would expect a rise in coverage 
following a terrorist attack where the perpetrators have claimed to have acted in 
defence of Islam and who self-identified as being Muslim.  There is, however, 




and Muslims is a self-generating phenomenon, fuelled by stereotyping and media 
bias.  Petley and Richardson (2011) provide compelling evidence that increased 
media output in relation to Islam and Muslims is independent of terrorist attacks 
and continued long after the story was newsworthy.  Assuming the media are 
driven to increase its output in relation to Islam and Muslims then a logical 
conclusion would be that a market or 'appetite' exists for such interest, which 
extends beyond the so-called 'war on terror' including the cultural differences 
between Muslims and non-Muslims (Moore et al., 2008).  There may be another 
conclusion equally worthy of consideration, that the media narrative shapes public 
discourses creating a mood of Islamophobia exacerbated by the actions of a 
minority of Muslims who hold radical anti-Western sentiments.  For example, Abu 
Hamza, a one-time leader at the Finsbury Park Mosque, currently serving a long 
prison sentence in the United States (Adams, 2017), and Anjem Choudary a one-
time solicitor, also sentenced in Britain in the summer of 2016 for encouraging the 
support of the so-called Islamic State or ISIS (Swerling, 2019).  Neither holds any 
Islamic qualifications or credentials but were seen as the first port of call for some 
members of the media to collate quotes and referring to both as 'radical clerics' or 
'preachers', even though both were largely denounced by Muslims as not 
representative of them.    
It would be unfair to suggest that the media alone are responsible for the rise in 
Islamophobia.  Cultural differences between Muslims and non-Muslims existed for 
centuries and that prior to 9/11, between the 22nd and 24th June, and the 7th and 
9th of July 2001 there had been disturbances involving both Asian and white 




gathering in the Northern towns of Burnley and Oldham (Kundnani, 2001).  Both 
white and Asian youths were responsible for attacking the police amid allegations 
of 'heavy-handed' policing (Thomas, 2012), and both white and Asian businesses 
were attacked.  The aftermath resulted in heavy prison sentences with subsequent 
reports from Sir Herman Ouseley calling for the creation of "social harmony" 
(Ouseley, 2001, p. 1),3 and Cantle (Cantle, 2001), who was commissioned by the 
then Home Secretary David Blunkett, to Chair the community cohesion review 
team.  Cantle's findings found both white and Asian communities living parallel 
lives with ignorance of each other's communities which, "can easily grow into fear, 
especially where this is exploited by extremist groups determined to undermine 
community harmony and foster divisions" (Cantle, 2001, p. 9).  Cantle reported the 
annoyance that minority communities felt over the biased reporting of the riots by 
the press, which were inflammatory, referring to "problem areas"  and printing 
anonymous "letters to the editor" which were deemed to be "preserving free 
speech" but in fact undermined the freedom of minority communities in some 
cases (Cantle, 2001, p. 45).  Cantle was also explicit in referring to communities 
'living parallel lives' or "parallel societies" (Cantle, 2012, p. 15) and how separate 
identities which were potentially antagonistic to each other could harden as a 
result of mono-cultural situations.  This was certainly a reference to earlier 
multicultural policies which favoured reification of distinct ethnic and faith identities, 
which had given certain Asian groups more funding than their white neighbouring 
communities (Thomas, 2014).  Following the events of 9/11, the term 'Asian' was 
largely substituted for 'Muslim' and wrongdoers widely reported by the media in 
                                            
3




religious rather than racial terms.  This is seen as "the starting point of an 
increased focus on British Muslims" (Petley and Richardson, 2011, p. 45), which 
saw media stories concerning British Muslims rise from less than 500 in the year 
2000 to over 4000 in 2006 (ibid). 
Following the 'Trojan Horse' (Clarke, 2014; Holmwood and O'Toole, 2018) 
controversy, the media were also keen to remind people of British values: 
"Cameron tells UK Muslims: Be more British" (The Mail on Sunday, 2014; 
Cameron, 2014).  I suggest that British values are more often than not, values that 
are universally shared by the majority of people in Britain, and not confined to one 
section of the community.  It is not clear whether Cameron is calling for Muslims to 
integrate by adhering to so-called 'British values' or whether he is suggesting that 
those who do not subscribe to British values may fall into the extremist or terrorist 
category and be made subject of counter-terrorism legislation.  Rather than an 
attack on Islam as a religion, the focus on British values may be more to do with 
the culture and practices of some Muslims who are deemed to be different  rather 
than a question of values, which are likely to be shared by most Muslims (Asim, 
2015), dependant on how values are interpreted.   
3.4. Conclusion 
In this chapter I have identified and analysed the implementation of the Prevent 
strategy from its inception to its current form and in doing so tracked its effects on 
some members of the very diverse Muslim community in Britain.  I have 
highlighted the increased securitisation of Prevent, to seeing Prevent subsumed 




British Values which has the potential to 'other' young Muslims.  I argue FBV as an 
extension of an alien postcolonial construct, limiting Muslim agency to engage in 
political dissent.  This is an epistemic injustice (Fricker, 2007; Medina, 2013). 
At the time of writing, there are calls for the government to scrap the Prevent 
Strategy (Grierson, 2019; Hooper, 2020; Proctor, 2020; Walawalker, 2020).  Lord 
Carlisle (one of the architects in the implementation of Prevent), was removed as 
an independent reviewer of Prevent following a legal challenge by Rights Watch 
UK (Bowcott, 2019) over his impartiality.  Although the legally binding deadline for 
the review was August 2020, the government has removed the statutory deadline 
and now aims to complete the review by August  2021 (Home Office, 2020a).    
I have considered the following as being important considerations when critiquing 
Prevent in this chapter.  In Appendix 8 at 11. 8, I provide summaries of each to 
place them in context.   
 [The] Channel Programme (HM Government, 2015) 
 [The] Casey Review (2016) 
 [The] Office for Students (2018), ([The] Higher Education and Research Act 
2017), and Prevent on Campus 
Chapter 4 shows how I engaged with theory, policy and data, shaping the 
construction of my theoretical position, subsequently allowing analysis of the data 






4. CHAPTER 4: THEORETICAL POSITION 
4.1. Introduction: The Research Journey 
I begin this chapter with an account of the catalyst for this thesis, my work as a 
former police officer working in education.  Reflection on my role as an educator 
led me to critical theory and critical pedagogy which kick-started the theoretical 
journey that underpins this thesis.  This journey was an iterative process and is 
central to understanding how I developed my theoretical position over time.  My 
journey moved from critical theory, to examining Islamophobia as an ideology and 
false consciousness, before postcolonialism emerged as my key theoretical 
position and epistemic injustice the primary data analysis tool.  Throughout the 
process I read theory alongside the raw data gathered from the Communities of 
Enquiry (CoE) carried out with two groups of Muslim men and women, alongside 
my investigation of government policy from multiculturalism to Prevent.  In the 
development of the theoretical frame I recognise that my reflections on the 
experience of the CoE contributed to my thinking.  I begin with my personal 
journey. 
In Chapter 1, I briefly referred to my work as a police youth liaison officer where I  
delivered safety lessons to young people in primary and secondary schools in 
Wales.  I also worked with young people in pupil referral units and the youth wing 
of a local prison.  I engaged in higher education as a student and since retiring 
from the police service had the opportunity to lecture at university and to continue 
my work with a charity challenging and disrupting far right-wing extremism (Think 
Project, 2012; Cantle and Thomas, 2014; Sheldrick, 2014; MacTiernan, 2015; 




Ramalingam, 2014).  I worked with young people engaged in 'alternative 
curriculum' in schools and those 'not in education, employment or training' (NEET) 
(Welsh Government, 2018).  The hopelessness that I recognised in many of the 
young people I worked with led me to study critical pedagogy and to put into 
practice some of the theory I had learned.  Many young people harboured 
negative and discriminatory views about Muslims, asylum seekers and economic 
migrants from Europe (Cantle and Thomas, 2014), shaping my research journey 
and theoretical position.   
In this chapter I examine a range of theories influential to my research 
methodology and analytical framework including my reflexive position and reading 
CoE data with theory (Jackson and Mazzei, 2012).  I show how engaging with 
critical pedagogy influenced the research methods leading me to consider a critical 
theory approach.  I go on to show how postcolonialism (an effective tool to analyse 
the CoE data and identify Islamophobia as an ideology), guided me to consider 
false consciousness (Lukacs, 1971) and finally epistemic injustice (Fricker, 2007; 
Medina, 2013) which I employed as my primary data analysis tool.  Critical 
pedagogy was compelling for me in understanding my reflexive position as an 
educator and in recognising that policy created for good (Home Office, 2011a; 
DfE, 2014; ESTYN, 2015) may also harm Muslims. 
It will be seen from a preview of the research process map, further on in this 
chapter, that the initial research design comprised of a series of one-to-one semi-
structured interviews carried out with a cohort of Muslim adults.  The interviews did 
not uncover Islamophobia and a review of the collection methods used resulted in 




men and women.  Scrutiny of the data from the one-to-one interviews shaped my 
thinking in reflecting on my experiences, the use of stimulus in the CoE and 
engaging in critical pedagogy.  The data from the one-to-one interviews were a 
start point in my research journey and though not subjected to data analysis, 
transcripts from the interviews are available to view if required, and a summary of 
themes provided at Appendix 3.  The CoE is used as the primary data collection 
tool and is explored at length in Chapter 5. 
I next provide a preview of the research process employed (a copy taken from 
Chapter 5), which I describe in sections 5.10 and 5.11, followed by an overview of 

























4.2. Critical Pedagogy 
Critical pedagogy is derived from critical theory.  A key proponent, McLaren (1998) 
argued that schools reproduce inequality from a curriculum imposed by the 
incumbent government.  I recognised from my work with young people that this 
may also include work-related training programmes designed for 'low achievers' to 
meet the demands of low paid and semi-skilled market forces.  Critical theorist 
Gramsci (Smith, 1971) revealed how Italy adopted the vocational school in order 
to 'modernise' but it was also seen as a way to keep the population in its place.  By 
limiting the choices that young people have in not engaging with the National 
Curriculum, hegemony that marginalises them and limits agency to engage in the 
world of work is present (Apple, 2001). 
Some of the young people I worked with knew they were treated differently from 
their peers but were unable to change their situation, being required to re-sit more 
examinations to be able to gain employment.  They recognised their 'oppression' 
(Freire, 1970) but did not have the skills to progress outside of their area of 
knowledge.  McLaren (1998, p. 172) argues that this is a contradiction of the ethos 
of many schools in allowing "the inadvertent oppression of less able students by a 
system which aspires to help all students attain their 'full potential' ".     
Critical pedagogy also made me question aspects of the 'All Wales Core 
Programme' (2004; Roberts, 2006) I taught during my time as a police officer and 
educator, from 2004 until 2010.  The content of the programme comprises a series 
of lessons underpinned by legislation4 and delivered to young people from 5 to 16 
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years of age.  It is important young people know the legal consequences of their 
actions and to stay safe.  However, on reflection I considered that some of the 
lessons I delivered limited the choices of the young people by restricting agency to 
debate and disagree what they were told by presenting only right and wrong 
options.  There was no space for them to challenge hegemony they perceived to 
be wrong or engage in epistemic friction (Medina, 2013).  For example, one of the 
lessons focused on anti-social behaviour and its consequences (All Wales Core 
Programme, 2004).  As a result of engaging with critical pedagogy I considered 
there was a moral argument in supporting dissent which, "is to be valued" 
(O'Donnell, 2016, p. 65) in challenging policies underpinned by legislation that 
prioritise political will over freedom of speech.  This is important for all young 
people, particularly Muslims living in Britain, some of whom may want to explore 
opposing political views (perhaps in respect of foreign policy), and are "afraid of 
speaking their minds" (O'Donnell, 2018, p. 994) for fear of being labelled 'extreme' 
under Prevent Strategy legislation (Home Office, 2011a; Taylor and Soni, 2017; 
Saeed and Johnson, 2016).   
Critical pedagogy made me question whether I had been acting as an instrument 
of government, using my position as a police officer and educator teaching 
contentious aspects of the programme to young people.  Further, I may be 
responsible for limiting agency to question what I told them (Giroux, 2011; 2016).  
This had implications for my delivery of the THINK Project which although judged 
successful (Think Project, 2012; Cantle and Thomas, 2014; Cantle, 2017; 
Cifuentes, 2016; Smith, 2014) had association with Prevent.  I created a project I 




white Welsh people, imposing a government-sanctioned programme, informed 
from my knowledge of Prevent.  McLaren describes content of a course as being 
the "micro objectives defined by its narrowness of purpose and content-bound 
path of enquiry" (McLaren, 1998, p. 172).  He contrasts his argument with 'macro 
objectives', "designed to enable students to make connections between the 
methods, content, and structure of a course and its significance within the larger 
social reality" (ibid), and that it is a lack of macro objectives which prevent students 
from having a dialectical mode of inquiry to allow them to see the connections 
between content and the wider society.  To reiterate the founder of critical 
pedagogy Freire, the 'oppressed' must be made aware of the nature of their 
situation to remove themselves from it (Freire, 1970).  This was a dilemma for me 
which needed further investigation.  I had placed great store adhering to Prevent 
Strategy ideology as a way of informing white Welsh youngsters of dangers posed 
by right-wing ideology.  I presented them with a course laden with micro objectives 
(Think Project, 2012; McLaren, 1998, p. 172), informed by Prevent (Home Office, 
2011a), limiting agency to critically analyse what I was telling them and thus 
unintentionally marginalising them.    
As a consequence of  incorporating Prevent ideology in my delivery of the THINK 
Project (2012) I considered ways that Prevent may have impacted on the Muslim 
respondents in this research and reflected on how best to analyse data from the 
CoE to uncover "micro objectives" (McLaren, 1998, p. 172) identified in my work 
with white, Welsh young people.  I wanted to explore whether I could use a similar 
proposal in my research with young Muslims.  I suspected that further engagement 




was the way forward and I would also have to re-appraise my association with 
Prevent.  
4.3. Developing a Theoretical Stance 
The theoretical framework emerged as an iterative process which included a 
recognition that the British government had strengthened its position on Prevent 
and Fundamental British Values.  By the government creating legislation ensuring 
compliance from schools, universities and public bodies (DfE, 2014; ESTYN, 
2015; Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015), it paved the way for Prevent and 
FBV to be a statutory instrument in education.  The CoE data was collected 
between 2011 and 2012, which preceded statutory implementation of 
Fundamental British Values (DfE, 2014; ESTYN, 2015) and Counter-Terrorism 
and Security Act 2015  legislation.  However, the decisions made by the 
government in legislating was a catalyst in my examination of how policy impacted 
upon Muslims living in Wales.  I suspected that Prevent and FBV created 
suspicion about Muslims in the social imagination of the wider public making them 
appear different and setting them apart from society and contributing to 
Islamophobia (Home Office, 2018). 
I considered the concepts of oppression and powerlessness as being important 
allowing me to look more deeply at critical theory.  The idea of 'powerlessness' is 
not a new concept and can be traced back to Marx's theory of alienation as a 
critique of capitalism (McLellen, 2000; Gamble et al., 1999) which in simple terms 
argues that in society there are some who have power, and some who do not.  In 




situation yet failed to bring about change.  This led for example, to "Marxist-
inspired theories regarding hegemony" (Cunningham, 2014, p. 526) being 
developed to explain these difficulties (Smith, 1971).  Engels argued that a "false 
consciousness" (Heywood, 1994, p. 85) kept the working classes from recognising 
oppression and would only be able to rise to "trade union consciousness" 
improving their lot in a system of capitalism (ibid).  Gramsci (Smith, 1971) rejected 
this, (citing the theory of cultural hegemony) arguing that power is unrecognisable, 
normalised, and maintains cultural oppression, with Freire (1970) arguing to strive 
for change, the nature of oppression must be recognised.  The concept of 'false 
consciousness' distinguished between a universal application of 'false 
consciousness'5 and the application of ideology (as a form of explaining by 
intellectuals) to legitimise false consciousness (Eyerman, 1981, p. 43).  I explore 
false consciousness as one of my central theoretical foundations further in this 
Chapter at 4.5.1., however, I continue to make reference to false consciousness 
during my theoretical journey. 
I considered that if Islamophobia in British society is 'normalised', it supports 
Gramsci's (Smith, 1971) theory of cultural oppression.  Gramsci argued that to 
reach a consensus, rulers must paint a picture on which society will agree (ibid), 
including a moral and political agreement appearing as 'commonsense' or 
'normalised'.  Consent to this is achieved by the majority agreeing to power being 
exerted against a minority for example: 
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Political leadership based on the consent of the led, a consent which is 
secured by the diffusion and popularization of the world view of the 
ruling class" (Bates, 1975, p.352). 
My prior research on the implementation of Prevent (Home Office, 2011a) and 
FBV (DfE, 2014; ESTYN, 2015) and underpinning legislation (Counter-Terrorism 
and Security Act 2015) strengthened my argument that by limiting Muslim agency 
to allow them to strive for change (Freire, 1970; Gamble et al., 1999; Boothman, 
2008), a cultural oppression or hegemony (a dominant moral or intellectual 
leadership) had functioned against them (Smith, 1971).  I suspected widespread 
Islamophobia inculcated a 'false consciousness’ in the social imaginations6 of the 
wider non-Muslim public (Smith, 1971; Maglaras, 2013; Boothman, 2008).  I was 
confident in applying Marx's theory of alienation of the 'working class' to my 
Muslim respondents and the wider British Muslim community to collate them as an 
oppressed group.  However, Muslims are a unique religious and cultural social 
community, which became a defining issue in my theoretical search.  I recognised 
a potential danger in replacing 'Muslim' with 'working class' as I had now removed 
the 'economic' element of 'working class', replacing it with a different cultural form 
(Eyerman, 1981, p. 44).  However, removing 'economically oppressed' and 
replacing it with 'culturally and religiously oppressed', allowed me to move from a 
position of class-consciousness to an area where a synthesis of false 
consciousness would allow me to progress.    
I suspected that by following the Marxist tradition of conscious-raising and 
employing education as a way to "eliminate false consciousness" (Cunningham, 
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2014, p. 529), I could move from a position where a lack of knowledge about Islam 
and Muslims by the wider non-Muslim population may be considered.  I believed at 
that time, a lack of knowledge about Muslims rather than biologically informed 
racism, or "racisms" (Gilroy, 2002, p. 36) was responsible for Muslim oppression.  
If this were correct then it is likely the wider non-Muslim public may also be 
'oppressed' in their social imaginations of Islam and Muslims living in Britain, 
allowing me to consider Muslims being misrepresented by the manipulation of 
knowledge about them.  I began to think that sections of the British print media 
were responsible for transmitting values by 'consensus' (Smith, 1971), and it was 
possible that such a perception and knowledge of Islam and Muslims may 
contribute to a form of false consciousness existing in the social imagination of the 
wider non-Muslim public, maintained by widespread Islamophobia.   
The traditional Marxist view of false consciousness is concerned with a "theory of 
working class false consciousness" (Eyerman, 1981, p. 49).  Lukacs (1971) argues 
that in a capitalist society false consciousness is a form of consciousness 
produced "in the very life practices of capitalist society" (Eyerman, 1981, p. 49).  
The difference between Lukacs’ and Gramsci's use of false consciousness is 
Lukacs applies false consciousness to both the "capitalist" and the "working class" 
(ibid, p. 52) allowing me to consider both Muslims and the wider non-Muslim 
British public.         
Critical theory had thus far proved to be the key in unlocking a scenario where 
Muslims living in Britain could be seen to be 'colonised' in British society and that 
its citizens were unwittingly colonisers.  I had wrongly assumed that the Muslim 




was unsure whether my synthesis of 'working class' for 'Muslim' as an 'oppressed' 
group would be theoretically sound.  Though the theory of Lukacs (1971) was 
founded on lived or epistemological experiences, I considered Fromm's argument 
(Eyerman, 1981, pp. 52-54) to be significant.  Fromm argued that false 
consciousness evolved from a distorted experience, cognitively and emotionally.  If 
this were correct, then I could consider Islamophobia as being a false ideology.  
Accepting Fromm's theory, I would be unable to apply Marx's theory to examine 
'false consciousness' because of the emotional attachment in Fromm (ibid), and 
the emotional element present within the definition of Islamophobia (Runnymede 
Trust, 1997).  This has potential in protecting false consciousness in the social 
imagination of the wider non-Muslim British society concealing it from analysis.  I 
now go on to examine critical theory but return to the concept of false 
consciousness to reassess how this may be unpicked to expose it for critical 
analysis.  
4.4. Critical Theory 
The transformative intent of critical theory encompasses a range of thought 
stemming from the early days of the "Frankfurt school" (Cunningham, 2014, p. 
526) also referred to as the "Institute for Social Research" (How, 2003, p. 13).  I 
considered that social justice for Muslims living in Britain would be best served by 
critical theory to locate, critique and challenge structures of power that negatively 
affect them (Horkheimer, 1972).  Identifying hegemony that protects and maintains 
power (Smith, 1971) and marginalises Muslims, this research progresses to 




Research identified sections of the media, the Prevent Strategy (Home Office, 
2011a), and FBV (DfE, 2014; ESTYN, 2015) as structures that 'other' or 
marginalise Muslims living in Britain.  This, I argue, contributes to a  'colonising' of 
the Muslim social imagination preventing them from recognising Islamophobia and 
challenging it.  I reflected on whether Prevent and FBV could be considered as a 
form of "intellectual colonialism" (Sharonova et al., 2018, p. 339) for Muslims in 
Britain.  In defining it as the "cultural and intellectual enslavement of the 
population" (ibid, p. 339), Sharonova (et al., 2018) presents a formidable argument 
that manipulation of systems of education allow the assimilation of "ethical, moral 
and ideological norms taught (by this particular university)" (Sharonova et al., 
2018, p. 341).  Although considered as an important concept particularly in this 
research which claims a 'colonising of the Muslim mind', further research would be 
required to substantiate claims of intellectual colonisation which are outside the 
remit of this research (see for example, Bhargava, 2013, p. 413).  I have however, 
considered the position put forward by Struthers (2017, p. 89), who claims FBVs 
are "vague and potentially discriminatory".  Struthers (2017, p. 98) argues that 
British values (FBVs) should be couched within the broader framework of human 
rights, a secular position which would contribute to "societal cohesion and 
harmony".  Working with a similar concept, I later show how I synthesise the 
problematic phenomenon of Islamophobia to epistemic injustice (Fricker, 2007; 
Medina, 2013) as a way of potentially negating the harmful effects of a problematic 
phenomenon.  However, as argued, 'othering' British Muslims by the introduction 
of FBV securitisation led me to consider postcolonialism (an offshoot from critical 




In Chapter 2, I introduced Islamophobia as an emerging concept and how a 
definition proved problematic in protecting Muslims living in Britain.  I now turn to 
consider Islamophobia as an ideology, to better understand how it 'others' Muslims 
yet remains hidden from view, before returning to false consciousness arguing its 
importance for seeing Islamophobia in ideological terms.    
4.5. Islamophobia as an Ideology 
In this section I extend critical theory and examine how Islamophobia may be seen 
as an "ideology" (Allen, 2020, p. 34).  I show how ignorance, notions of whiteness, 
and belief systems may be seen in an epistemic injustice context as ways of better 
understanding Islamophobia.  I then return to false consciousness placing it in 
context of Islamophobia to argue that it is a protected ideology. 
Mills' (2017) argument that racism be considered as an ideology is important when 
arguing for an epistemic injustice approach to data analysis of the CoE.  Mills 
traces the influence of Marxism, Critical Theory, and the contributions from Lukacs 
(1971) and Gramsci (Smith, 1971) all of whom have been instrumental in shaping 
the theoretical position in this research.  One weakness of Marx's theory was the 
concept of oppression centred on class.  By widening Marx's social class 
oppression to group oppression I argue Islamophobia as an ideology 
encompasses four forms of consciousness proposed by Shelby (2003).  This 
broader notion is also significant in tracking deficient cognition in "whiteness" as 
an internalised white superiority (Mills, 2017, p. 108) and also within an epistemic 
injustice framework discussed later.  I exchange 'Whiteness' with notions of FBV 




of interpreting a lacuna in the hermeneutical resources of non-Muslims.  I 
acknowledge there are both black and white non-Muslims referred to in the context 
of the 'wider non-Muslim community' and further acknowledge research is required 
so as to isolate or include groups of people.  In the context of this research I allude 
to the majority 'white' population when referring to the 'wider non-Muslim public, 
community or population'.  According to Mills (2007), a white ignorance 
responsible for the subjugation of 'blacks' (members of the black community) does 
not have a lacuna to be filled with knowledge.  "Whites are imprisoned in a 
cognitive state which both protects them from dealing with the realities of social 
oppression and, of course, disables them epistemically" (Mills, 2017, p. 108).  
It may be that for some members of the wider non-Muslim population "white 
supremacy" (Mills, 2017, p. 105) and racial domination toward Muslims constitutes 
their worldview.  Even if white ignorance (ibid) were to be corrected, according to 
Du Bois (1903) a white supremacist view would remain.  The work of Du Bois 
(1903) in respect of double consciousness is interesting, however, this research 
has not extended to gauging the views of the wider non-Muslim public and as such 
any claims to significance are to be considered within the parameter of the 
research, which primarily concerns Islamophobia, as being distinct from racism. 
The "Standard View" of ignorance, according to Le Morvan and Peels (2016, p. 
12) is a lack or absence of knowledge.  The 'New View' however, is that ignorance 
is the lack of or absence of true belief, with varieties of ignorance being subject to 
a sliding scale in degrees of ignorance (ibid).  Ignorance has significance for 
epistemic injustice (Fricker, 2007; Medina, 2013) in respect of "active ignorance" 




sociality of the knower) (Pohlhaus, Jr., 2012, pp. 714-735) where both testimonial 
and hermeneutical injustices contribute to the "preservation of ignorance" (Peels 
and Blaauw, 2016, pp. 160-177).  Ignorance may also be seen as a philosophical 
construct where for example, a belief that there is no God by the wider public may 
benefit Muslims in Britain by keeping them "under the radar" (McBrayer, 2016, p. 
154).  However, knowledge is also a prerequisite "with regard to moral virtue" (ibid, 
p. 155) and essential for the virtuous agent to become the virtuous hearer.  I argue 
that a lacuna in the collective epistemic resources of the wider non-Muslim public 
is occupied by Islamophobia, an ideology, and not ignorance, preventing the 
hearer from making sense of Muslim voices.  Furthermore, I argue that because 
these conditions exist within a construct of postcolonialism for Muslims (discussed 
in 4.6), Muslims wrongly believe that if non-Muslims have knowledge of Islam they 
will no longer be ignorant of them, thereby lessening oppression (see also data 
Chapters 6 and 7).  Knowledge and ignorance were central to European colonial 
empires demanding the "domain of knowledge" (Alcoff, 2017, p. 398) to be 
controlled.  This is also a consideration in how Western philosophy failed to 
include non-European philosophical writing into its canon (ibid, p. 397).  The 
concept of 'ignorance' is explored in terms of epistemic injustice further in this 
Chapter (see for example, Peels and Blaauw, 2016; Medina, 2013; Fricker, 2007). 
Remaining with the concept of a lacuna occupied by Islamophobia, How (2003, p. 
98) turns to Adorno's study of "Oedipus complex" in that the lack of a leader or 
"father-figure" creates a vacuum in unconsciousness.  Adorno (1974) believed that 
the popularity of fascism was underpinned by the appeal and imagery of fascist 




propaganda lacked any rational content and in fact "must not be rational" (ibid).  I 
considered this had relevance when considering how Islamophobia may be 
deconstructed as an irrational "fear (phobia) or dread of Islam or Muslims", 
emerging "from the experience of imperialism and colonialism" (Abbas, 2010, p. 
22).     
Mills (2013) is critical of both Fricker (2007) and Medina (2013) in their use of the 
terms 'hermeneutical injustice' and 'collective hermeneutical resources' being 
available for those having "white racist ideology" and those who have "white 
ignorance" (Mills, 2013, p. 40).  Mills (2013) clarifies his previous use of the terms 
and warns that "race, white racism, and white privilege have been under-
theorized" (ibid, p. 39).  He further argues that white ignorance may also be shared 
by non-whites (MIlls 2007), which reinforces Marxism's early class structure 
narratives that people (whatever colour) can be imprisoned in a cognitive state 
protecting them from social realities (Eyerman, 1981).  This has implications for 
how hermeneutical injustice is seen when one considers the 'collective 
hermeneutical resources' available to progress counter-hegemonic alternatives, as 
I also include Muslims as having a false consciousness.  Acknowledging 
Islamophobia as an ideology (Kaya, 2011) allows the exploration and location of 
widely held beliefs, by sections of the non-Muslim public, which are not wholly 
dependent on ignorance of Islam and Muslims.  Epistemic injustice and in 
particular hermeneutical injustice is dependent on degrees of ignorance held by a 
person, to either change a level of credibility or to change the amount of 
hermeneutical resources available to a person, for them to make sense of a 




return to the argument that Islamophobia as an ideology and not white ignorance 
is foremost in the social imagination of the wider non-Muslim public.  
Shelby rejected the "inferiorization model" (Shelby, 2014, p. 66) of racism 
proposing that racism should be thought of as a type of ideology which introduces 
belief systems that can change over time and depend on cultural, political and 
economic contexts (ibid) to allow a philosophical approach.  Considering racism as 
an ideology, for example, allows oppressive social consequences to be explored 
and conduct to be examined to locate where and how prejudices are constructed.  
Thinking of racism, (or Islamophobia), as ideologies, allows constructs to be 
unpicked, identified and examined, enabling counter-arguments to be put forward 
to disrupt harmful content.  Shelby argues (2003, p. 154) "I contend that ideology-
critique is indispensable for understanding and resisting the forms of oppression 
that are characteristic of the modern world".  Mills (2017, p. 104) argues ideologies 
serve to "justify, rationalize, legitimize, and/or obfuscate wrongful social 
domination" supported and maintained by "vested group interests" (ibid).  Shelby 
(2002) goes on to argue that racially profiling members of the black community 
leads to stereotyping that positions them as prone to crime and in need of societal 
surveillance.  I argue such a view is replicated by the Prevent Strategy (Home 
Office, 2011a) and FBV (DfE, 2014; ESTYN, 2015) securitising Muslims living in 
Britain and further reinforced in the social imagination of the public by hostile 
media reporting contributing to widespread Islamophobia. 
Shelby (2003, p. 155) goes on to defend the use of ideology furthering 




capable of having an enormous impact on social relations and the prospects for 
progressive social change" (ibid, p. 155).  He defines ideology as follows:   
1. The beliefs in the subset are widely shared by members in the relevant 
group; and within the group, and sometimes outside it, the beliefs are 
generally known to be widely held. 
2. The beliefs form, or are derived from a prima facie coherent system of 
thought, which can be descriptive and/or normative. 
3. The beliefs are part of, or shape, the general outlook and self-conception of 
many in the relevant group.  
4. The beliefs have a significant impact on social action and social institutions 
(Shelby, 2003, p. 158). 
Though Shelby explains (1-4 above) in terms of racism, they may apply equally to 
Islamophobia, elements of which are inculcated in the social consciousness of 
the wider non-Muslim British public.  However, rather than being wholly false, 
ideologies may contain "half-truths", the "neglect of pertinent facts" and the 
"misuse of authoritative sources" (Shelby, 2003, p. 166).  "Normative" belief 
systems which include religious, moral and political beliefs may also include 
beliefs that are illusory (ibid, p. 167).  "It is the task of the specifically epistemic 
dimension of ideology-critique to unmask or reveal the illusory character of racist 
and other ideologies" (ibid, p. 169).  Furthermore, the need to acknowledge that 
as social circumstances change so does the content of ideologies, allowing "the 
philosopher, social scientist and social critic" to "have an important role to play in 
diagnosing and undermining the various illusions of ideological consciousness" 
(Shelby, 2003, p. 169). 
Having explored Islamophobia as an ideology I now return to false consciousness 




Islamophobia may be seen to be a false consciousness protecting, sustaining 
and hiding itself from exploration in the social imagination of the wider non-
Muslim British public.  
4.5.1. False Consciousness 
According to Marcuse (1964, p. 13), "false consciousness" (of their rationality) 
becomes "true consciousness" and "ideology into reality" having significance in 
considering Islamophobia as an ideology.  Marcuse (1964, p. 149) continues 
arguing that "false consciousness" contributes to the "preservation of a false 
order of facts" which I believe resonates with effects of Prevent and FBV as 
technical apparatus responsible for reproducing the false order of facts (ibid).   
Having argued earlier that Islamophobia may be considered an ideology, Shelby 
(2003, p. 171) concurs that it is widely held that even after rational criticism of 
racist belief, people still hold such beliefs even when they "have been shown 
repeatedly to be without merit".  Moreover, if a false consciousness is held 
"irrationally" (Shelby, 2003, p. 170; Rosen, 1996, p. 34) it lends support to the 
view that if such beliefs are held, they are held with, and unaware of, cognitive 
failings.  "Ideologies are forms of social consciousness that suffer from distorting 
illusions and are widely held with a false consciousness" (Shelby, 2003, p. 172).  
How (2003, p. 31) argues ideologies are "not so much a matter of false 
consciousness" in holding mistaken ideas about class interests but "went all the 




In Chapter 2, I argued that Islamophobia was 'normalised' within the social 
imagination of the wider non-Muslim public, doubting whether Islamophobia was 
ideological having cognitive defects that undermine its claim to knowledge.   
 
Acknowledging the harm from Islamophobia, Shelby (2003, p. 174) argues we 
should: 
...oppose and seek to subvert ideologies, not simply because they are 
rooted in illusions and irrationally held, but because of the oppressive 
social consequences of their wide acceptance.    
Islamophobia is an ideology that maintains negative views of Islam and Muslims.  
Ideology may be considered as accurate in "reproducing the structure of reality", 
"and misleading" or "inverted at the same time" (Rosen, 1996, p. 33), and is a 
"necessary false consciousness" (Adorno, 1974, p. 169) with religion and politics 
"being especially liable to false consciousness" (Rosen, 1996, p. 10).  However, 
some theories do not support the position that societies are self-maintaining and 
self-advancing (Rosen, 1996) and deference must be given to explaining human 
nature differently from the dominantly held rational Western view.  Succinctly, the 
rationalist view is to seek the path which is in our "long term interests" to follow 
(ibid, p. 17) instead of the line of "least resistance".   
However, according to Fromm (Eyerman, 1981) it is also where our emotions can 
take precedent over rational thought and allowing an ideology which is false; a 
false consciousness.  Notwithstanding that Fromm (ibid) wished to separate 
ideology from false consciousness, I maintain Islamophobia is an emotionally 
charged ideology and a false consciousness.  Rosen (1996, p. 31) suggests a 




subject" or "collective" identities of a subject (in this research, Muslims living in 
Britain) occurs, which I have argued occurs in the social imagination of the wider 
non-Muslim British public.  Islamophobia has been normalised to such a degree 
that rational thought is so diluted that reflection, argument and discursive activity 
are not effective counter-remedies to highlight falsehoods in Islamophobia.  I turn 
to Rosen (1996, p. 34) again to support the view that Islamophobia is ideological 
and a false consciousness:  
If one reason why some explicit beliefs are ideological is that they are 
characteristically irrational, then one of the most likely ingredients in that 
irrationality would be that the person who holds the belief is not aware 
of the reasons - the real reasons - for holding it. In that case, as well as 
the original explicit belief, they may have a second, conscious false 
belief-a belief about the first belief - which is the account that they would 
give to themselves of their reason for holding it.  
Supporting the position that Islamophobia is both ideological and a false 
consciousness, I turn to the latter part of the definition of Islamophobia, 'phobia' 
which is "an abnormal and irrational [my emphasis] fear or dread aroused by a 
particular object or circumstance" (Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, 2007, p. 
2186).  I argue that the definition of Islamophobia does not reflect the harm caused 
to Muslims living in Britain and has become 'normalised' in the social imagination 
of the wider non-Muslim public (All Party Parliamentary Group on British Muslims, 
2018, p. 9).  Tania Saeed (2018, pp. 38-39) defines a 'phobia' as being "far from 
an irrational fear, informing social and political contexts that rationalizes such fear 
and hatred of Muslims", a view supported by Amir Saeed (2007, p. 443) who 
argues Muslims are the subjects of "public anxiety", and Taras "who frames 
contemporary responses to Muslims within a persisting European anxiety about 
Orientalism" (Taras, 2012, p. 112), supporting the argument for postcolonialism 




I have therefore reconsidered my earlier position and now argue that a false 
consciousness may also exist in the minds of my respondents whose perceptions 
of their non-Muslim British public advocates may be seen as a cognitive false 
consciousness (Rosen, 1996, p. 31).  The Muslim respondents cannot recognise 
that their non-Muslim advocate is ideologically hampered by a false consciousness 
of Islam and Muslims as a result of Islamophobia.  It is in the interest of the wider 
non-Muslim public not to be a victim of false consciousness.  However, if this is a 
consequence of their perception of religious belief then, "rational criticism cannot 
be successful against such false consciousness unless it is also able to deal with 
the sources of the emotional disorders behind it" (Rosen, 1996, p. 55).  It is 
possible that Islamophobia prevents non-Muslims from adopting a critical 
awareness to re-examine their negative views about Islam and Muslims. 
It appears that wide-spread and "normalised" Islamophobia (All Party 
Parliamentary Group on British Muslims, 2018, p. 9) may limit agency for Muslims 
to articulate oppression.  Furthermore, along with postcolonial conditions existing 
for them, the wider non-Muslim British public would, I argue, dismiss Muslim 
voices.  This weakens challenging false consciousness in a critical theory 
discipline as well as lacking a counter-argument to Islamophobia thereby limiting 
the achievement of an ethical position to destabilise false consciousness in the 
social imagination of the wider non-Muslim British public.  There are no widely 
available sources of information available to the British public from which they 
have the opportunity to reject, such as, a "blanket rejection of evidence" 




Further on I show how by extending the concept of false consciousness to 
hermeneutical injustice (Fricker, 2007, p. 6) I justify this position. 
Recognising that Prevent and FBV may have impacted on the lived experiences of 
Muslims living in Britain (at that stage of my research journey and in a critical 
theory paradigm) I searched for narratives that have "political edge" (How, 2003, 
p. 24) from where I may be able to construct a framework to analyse the CoE data.  
My reading of postcolonialism illuminated 'othering' and objectification in the CoE 
data offering a way to examine the concept of 'othering' and progressing my 
theoretical journey from a wholly critical theory paradigm.  I acknowledge 
similarities and differences in both approaches (Ingram, 2019) and accept that I 
have prioritised "responsibility to otherness" over the "responsibility to act" (White, 
1991, p. 20) where I may be able to examine the effects of Prevent (Home Office, 
2011a) and FVB (DfE, 2014; ESTYN, 2015) which I believe are "normative political 
values and normative political objectives" (Scott, 1999, p. 135).     
4.6. Postcolonialism as a Theoretical Position 
In this section I show how I engaged with postcolonial thought to further my 
theoretical position, tracing its history and the influential theorists who shaped it.  
In the development of the theoretical framework I recognise that my reflections on 
the experience of the CoE contributed to my thinking, and by cognizance of 
concepts including false consciousness and Islamophobia I show how I engaged 
with theory and data (Jackson and Mazzei, 2012).  Through postcolonialism I 
show how 'othering' controls and interprets knowledge of the 'colonised' (Young, 




for example, by critiquing the effects of Prevent and FBV through my interpretation 
of the CoE data, undoing the "ideological heritage of colonialism" (ibid, p. 65).  I 
argue that such conditions may be seen as a 'red pedagogy' (Grande, 2007) which 
privileges indigenous voices and political integrity (Rigney, 1999) and "is 
concerned with the dehumanizing effects of colonization on both the colonized and 
the colonizer" (Denzin and Lincoln, 2011, p. 82). 
I examine the theory of postcolonialism (Young, 2001; McLeod, 2007) to explore 
how prejudice against Muslims in Britain acts to privilege the voices, needs and 
desires of the non-Muslim wider community.  I also examine how, although 
prejudice against Muslims is widespread and deeply embedded within society, it 
remains largely unchallenged (Warsi, 2017) and that such prejudice perpetuates 
deficit models of Muslims (Morey and Yaqin, 2011; Edwards and Cromwell, 2018). 
The argument I put forward in this thesis are repositories of knowledge in the 
social imagination of the British public may have induced a 'false consciousness' 
thus allowing me to consider how a 'normalising' of Islamophobia may have led to 
injustices being committed toward Muslims.  I am conscious not to replicate 
marginalising Muslims using postcolonialism, but strive to locate theory or 
combinations of theory to de-stabilise 'normalising' Islamophobia.  
In her reading of Foucault and Derrida, Spivak (1988, p. 82) refers to "epistemic 
violence" of imperialism done upon Indian 'subalterns', (Spivak's construct for 
'discourse').  I considered Spivak's epistemic violence in terms of hegemony 
responsible for marginalising Muslims living in Britain.  Spivak uses the term 




West), giving an example of the ban on 'sati'7 (Spivak, 1988) by British colonisers 
deciding that 'sati' was a barbaric practice even though it was not universally 
practiced.  I considered that the introduction and legislation of FBV (and its 
association with the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015) may also be seen 
as imposing values which have potential to 'other' Muslims, a continuation of 
colonisation.  The analogy is unrepresentative of the relationship between 'sati' 
(Hindu values) and FBV but serves to illustrate the dismissal of values by 
legislating minorities.  Spivak further warned the subaltern being spoken for and 
not by themselves (Spivak, 1988) describing it as keeping the subaltern in a 'space 
of difference', which in postcolonial thought is "everything that has limited or no 
access to the cultural imperialism is subaltern" (de Kock, 1992).  To better define 
my use of terms I use 'othered', 'oppressed', 'marginalised' and 'colonised' to 
signify Spivak's use of the term 'subaltern' in this research.  
Similarly, while Gramsci (Smith, 1971) was imprisoned he used covert language 
referring to the 'proletarian', the working class.  This research does not specifically 
focus on a class-based structure of oppression where one group is just waiting 
turn, not having their piece of the pie (de Kock, 1992) or victim mentality.  I argue 
Prevent and FBV deny Muslims a voice which 'others' them simply for being 
Muslim.  Identifying structures of 'othering', this research clears a space (Spring, 
1996) for Muslims to be heard rather than speaking for or representing them.  
Beverley (2001, p. 233) summarises the position on Muslim discourse succinctly: 
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The subaltern can, of course speak, but only (allowed) through us, 
through our institutionally sanctioned authority and pretended objectivity 
which gives us the power to decide what counts as relevant and true. 
I argue that Muslims living in Britain are positioned in a politically constructed 
paradigm (Home Office, 2011a; DfE, 2014; ESTYN, 2015) obstructing them from 
breaking free from the ideological bond (that placed them there) and being able to 
forward counter-hegemony.  Both Gramsci (Smith, 1971) and Spivak (1988) 
argued for the working class and subaltern to have their own voice or as Gramsci 
argued, for the working class to have their own organic intellectuals (Burke, 1999) 
from within their own groups not by 'intellectuals' claiming to represent them.   
Said (1978; 1993; 1981) argued how the West (the occident) appropriated 
discourse about the East (the Orient) in order to control it.  Using the term 
"Orientalism" (Said, 1985, p. 90) he referred to "communities of interpretation" 
(ibid, p. 93) subjected to repeated interpretations over time.8  Orientalism however, 
allowed communities to be seen in need of representation as they were 
considered as unstable.  Said (1978) initially situated the West and the East as 
being in direct opposition in a manufactured clash of civilisations which he 
suggested could be cut across using a 'humanist critique' (Said, 1978) as a better 
framework in which to understand cultures.  He argued that such position would, 
"introduce a longer sequence of thought and analysis to replace the short bursts of 
polemical, thought-stopping fury that so imprisons us" (ibid,  preface 17).  I 
considered that a 'humanist critique', an approach suggested by Said (1978), 
appeared to offer a way forward in highlighting the similarities between Muslims 
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and non-Muslims instead of focusing on the perceived differences between Islam 
and the West.     
I considered that under postcolonial conditions existing for Muslims in Britain, their 
agency to inform non-Muslims of their oppression was limited to prioritising Islam 
as a method of discourse and not, for example, cultural, political, or humanistic 
ways as conduits to wider British non-Muslim enlightenment.  I acknowledge that 
this view is a direct opposite of the one proposed by Gandhi (Young, 2001, p. 338) 
in his opposition to British colonial rule where spirituality was diffused into all 
aspects of everyday life as Islam does for Muslims.  This could be considered as a 
counter-cultural and political technique used in colonised societies by creating 
cultural spaces where the colonisers (or those controlling hegemony) are forced to 
parley (ibid).  However, in examining Gandhi's counter-cultural technique (Gandhi, 
1910) it was noted that he had garnered public support for his subversion which is 
not currently the case for Muslims in Britain.  I turn now to Nandy (2015) to 
examine how a counter-argument may be constructed with which to challenge 
colonisation.   
Nandy (2015) reflected on Gandhi's legacy proposing a colonisation of the mind or 
a psychological resistance to colonisation needed to be recognised by the 
colonised to move from oppression.  He subsumed Gandhi's thinking and political 
strategies (Young, 2001) bringing together discourse (Said, 1978; 1993; 1981) and 
his own theory of the psychological effects of colonialism (Nandy, 2015) which he 
claimed needed to "be defeated ultimately in the minds of men" (ibid, p. 63).  This 
research shows how the British government distanced itself from an ideology of 




Terrorism and Security Act 2015), transforming the ideology into issues of security 
that largely attracted support from the public.  The 'colonised' Muslim mind has 
little or no room for critical thinking when Counter-terrorism legislation underpins 
Prevent, controlling Muslim dissent (Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015; 
Home Office, 2011a).  Fanon (1961), whose work was subsequently seized upon 
by "theorists of colonial subjectivity" (Sardar, 2008; Nandy, 2015), focused on how 
the colonised felt including the psychological effects of colonisation.  Fanon (1961) 
argued the effects of colonisation is not only as the physical presence of the 
colonisers but  pre-colonial history was devalued.  FBV may be seen as an 
attempt to re-write or affirm a meaning of 'belonging', or as a range of belongings 
such as "belonging to" and "belonging-with" (Healy, 2019, p. 428) as part of a 
British narrative claiming a type of nationalism as identity at the expense of 
accurately recalling Britain's colonial past.  Avoiding a direct attack on Islam, the 
government affirmed so-called FBV framing them in a cultural arena so other 
values are viewed as inferior.  This endorses theories from Huntington (1993) and 
Said (1978) where the fear of 'Orientalism' contributes to constructing 
Islamophobia.  I argue that FBV are postcolonial constructs.  To consider how 
language is appropriated in a British Muslim context and to examine how 
reframing of British Muslims presents them as 'different', I now turn to the work of 
Calvet (1974) as a way of extending cultural markers within postcolonial ideology. 
Calvet's theory (1974) has its roots within an orthodox Marxist framework focusing 
on how the function of the language of the colonised is devoured by the colonised 
and replaced by the coloniser's language preventing the colonised from partaking 




free speech and lawful protest has been curtailed by government legislation.  
Calvet believed that colonialism "is an extreme version of the capitalist state 
structured according to material inequality and thus social conflict" (Young, 2001, 
p. 393).  Extending Calvet's quote to encompass what I believe is an ideology 
fuelled by a hegemony of Prevent (Home Office, 2011a), Young (2001, p. 393) 
says:  
The state maintains its power by direct force, together with 
accompanying juridical and legal structures that serve to legitimize its 
dominance. The discourse of the state reinforces its ideological 
superstructures, which in the colonial situation will include the value 
system that operates in favour of the language and culture of the 
colonizer against those of the colonized. 
Calvet (1974) warned that traditional linguistics has failed to define concepts such 
as language and dialect in relation to social power (Phillipson, 2003, p. 39) and 
that a "language is a dialect that has succeeded politically" (Calvet, 1974, p. 54).  
Calvet's work with indigenous communities does not have the same relevance in 
this research other than the need to consider ideological and political forces in the 
analysis and interpretation of Muslim voices to recognise powerlessness in their 
discourses. 
In sum, the Prevent strategy is a postcolonial ideology contributing to colonising 
Muslim minds by legislation and a 'postcolonial gaze'.  The attitudes and 
perceptions of the Muslim community are conveyed by Prevent (Home Office, 
2011a), disseminated to the public through the media and clearly informing the 
thinking of the respondents in this study (discussed in Chapters 6 and 7).  The 




discourse is that Islam and Muslims are 'different' and if they "were more like us" 
(Allen, 2015, p. 8) then the problem would be solved.  
Political inactivity in addressing Islamophobia (Allen, 2020) reinforces 'normalising 
Islamophobia', in the minds of the non-Muslim public in their "common-sense" 
"everyday thinking" (Hall and O'Shea, 2013, p. 8).  In Chapter 2 I argued that 
multiculturalism for Muslims has been diluted to such a degree that notions of 
securitisation filled a lacuna in the wider non-Muslim public imagination limiting the 
agency of Muslims to publicly identify as Muslims and moving markers of race 
identity from skin colour to culture.  Barker (1981) and later Allen (2015) 
recognised its use by the Conservative government in the late 1970s and early 
1980s to describe minority groups in Britain which revealed, "more overt 
expressions of racism" (ibid, p. 8). 
The shift to use cultural markers as descriptors allowed minority groups to be 
singled out to be 'different' thereby avoiding the label of 'racist' being attributed to 
the government.  The effects of targeting culture as markers of 'difference' made 
'difference' problematic threatening to create a new racism exaggerating difference 
and its perceived consequences (Barker, 1981) allowing a new racism to appeal to 
the 'common sense' of the British public.  "Common sense" (Allen, 2020, p.34) can 
be seen to support the "normalisation" of Islamophobia (All Party Parliamentary 
Group on British Muslims, 2018, p. 8) in the social imagination inculcating false 
consciousness.  According to Kundnani (2016) Islamophobia (as a lay ideology) 
offers an everyday common-sense explanatory framework placing the Muslim 
outside of the social order.  Kundnani (2016, p. 7) argues that oppressing Muslims 




Thus Islamophobia involves an ideological displacement of political 
antagonisms onto the plane of culture, where they can be explained in 
terms of the fixed nature of the 'other'.  
Kundnani (2016, p. 17) further argues that Western values and whether Muslims 
accept them or not are always viewed across a plane of Western culture and that 
Islamophobia is a way of containing Muslim knowledge of imperialism.  "Muslim 
dissent against empire is never heard as dissent but only as extremism".  The 
consequences of using 'British values' to further exaggerate differences between 
Muslim and non-Muslim communities makes it "a forceful and vengeful political 
vehicle that seeks to differentiate, demarcate and subsequently discriminate 
against Muslims and their communities" (Allen, 2015, p. 9).   
Gilani-Williams (2014) argues that an Islamic critical theory tool within the area of 
education would offer an alternative view of critical theory encompassing Islam 
and its moral guidance as a way forward.  I argue that although Muslims are 
restricted in putting forward religiously informed counter-arguments, it is still within 
the spirit of critical theory, as "a paradigm that gives Islam and Muslims visibility 
and the right to dialogue from their own predilection" (Gilhani-Williams, 2014, p. 
19), which I suggest is an example of a counter-argument with which to challenge 
conditions of colonisation.9   
Meer (2014) warns of the potential in replicating colonial injustice when applying 
"postcolonial thought" (ibid, p. 502) particularly the "relationship between 
knowledge, representation and politics" (Meer, 2014, pp. 505-506).  Accordingly, 
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Muslim consciousness may exist beyond the postcolonial tradition and within 
liberal democratic frameworks which challenge Islamophobia (ibid, p. 515).  I 
argue the lived experiences of some Muslims are so deeply informed by Islam, 
their cultural identity is subsumed within the ideology of Islamophobia.  Therefore, 
cultural contexts as conduits for Muslim voices will fail.  The common 
denominators "religion and culture", which define Muslims (Dobe and Chhokar, 
2000, p. 382) are not concepts that will allow the political representation of 
Muslims in Britain and challenge the ideology of Islamophobia.  Furthermore, the 
supposed historical incompatibility of European and Western values is "central to 
the rise in Islamophobia" (Taras, 2013, p. 419), all of which suggests that 
analysing CoE data through a postcolonial lens would not further Muslim voices.  
Meer argues that postcolonialism informs the concept of Islamophobia in three 
ways, first by continuity where "historical colonial dynamics are reproduced in 
contemporary postcolonial environments" (Meer, 2014, p. 515), second by 
translation which relies on the first but with an Orientalist critique for the concept of 
Islamophobia (ibid).  The third concerns an account of Muslim consciousness, 
lying in "terrain that is also populated by scholarship beyond the postcolonial 
tradition" (Meer, 2014, p. 515).  Meer argues that this is an area where Muslims 
construct their identities against a background of Islamophobia (ibid), without, I 
argue, voices which the wider non-Muslim British public are able to hear.  The 
terrain where Muslims may have a voice beyond postcolonialism is not clear.  
Meer argues that postcolonialism in the form of continuity and translation is used 
to "inform the concept of Islamophobia" (Meer, 2014, p. 515).  He calls for an 
alternative third way, separate from the tradition of postcolonialism to a way 




Recognising the limitations of the scope of this research and the warnings of using 
postcolonial thought, I considered whether a humanistic, ethical and moral 
paradigm may bridge the divide between religion and culture to where oppression 
of Muslims and non-Muslim actors could be considered.   
It is not ethical for either Muslim or non-Muslim to be oppressed and I considered 
the executive summary of the most recent proposed definition of Islamophobia: 
It is not just British Muslims who are impacted by Islamophobia. It is 
British society at large who, by virtue of normalised prejudice against 
Muslim beliefs and practices, come to imbibe a panoply of falsehoods 
or misrepresentations and, consequentially, discriminatory outlooks to 
the detriment of social harmony and social inclusion (All Party 
Parliamentary group on British Muslims, 2018, p. 9). 
Bhargava (2013) (in his study of epistemic injustice and colonialism in India under 
British rule), recognised that the belief in the cultural superiority of the colonisers 
not only conquered lands and goods but also the Indian mind.  He argued that 
when an epistemic framework is created that prevents the colonised from 
accessing concepts and categories by which they can understand themselves, 
then epistemic injustice occurs.  "Epistemic injustice occurs when the basic 
epistemic forms of a group are altered by the arbitrary or deliberate actions of 
another powerful or dominant group" (Bhargava, 2013, p. 414).  Where an 
epistemic framework is sustained, preventing members of a social group from 
accessing conceptual goods then a damaged capacity results in a persistent 
failure to think for oneself (including intellectual freedom) (ibid, p. 415) which is an 
epistemic injustice. 
Bhargava (2013, p. 416) makes a connection between intellectual freedom for 




Indian intellectual life" where a "near-total reliance on academic practices and 
books and journals that are transmitters of a new inescapable form of colonial 
power".  Bhargava (2013, p. 416) argues that this is an "epistemic injustice" and 
that sufferers must not view it as a subjection but strive to renew "a potentially 
common tradition".  I argue that Bhargava's notion of intellectual freedom has an 
association with false consciousness for the wider non-Muslim British public and 
for the Muslim respondents, whose intellectual freedom is also affected.  I 
considered that both Muslims and non-Muslims were victims of an epistemic 
injustice and that Bhargava (2013) is a catalyst allowing me to consider an 
amalgamation of my reading of postcolonialism.  I considered that by extending 
the concept of false consciousness into an epistemic injustice paradigm I could 
progress my theoretical framework to a secular, ethical, and humanistic area 
beyond postcolonialism for both Muslim and non-Muslim voices.  
I also considered that I may be adding to the layers of institutional practices in 
Western academia (Pitts, 2017, p. 153; Bhargava, 2013) by giving voice to the 
oppressed, thereby failing to heed the warnings from Spivak (1988), sustaining 
Western academic thought and colonising the Muslim mind.  However, as argued, 
my intention is to progress from postcolonialism toward epistemic injustice in order 
to challenge and deconstruct the ideology of Islamophobia paving the way for 
epistemic justice and a platform for Muslim voices. 
Postcolonial conditions exist for Muslims living in Britain.  British Muslims are 
made to feel different and their rights as British citizens questioned.  This 
negatively impacts on their sense of belonging, citizenship, representation and 




the wider, non-Muslim public view Muslims as 'foreign', an 'enemy within', 
practicing a "barbaric" (Allen, 2020, p. 58) religion with allegiances to the Middle 
East. These conditions affect the concept of Britishness permitting British Muslims 
to be placed outside of what is considered to be British, denying them their rights 
as citizens and making them appear as guests of Britain rather than British 
citizens.  Maintaining postcolonial conditions for Muslims living in Britain is a 
structure of social control, which must be explored and challenged.  In order to 
progress such challenge, I now turn to epistemic injustice focusing on the theories 
of Fricker (2007) and Medina (2013).      
4.7. Epistemic Injustice   
I begin with an examination of Fricker's (2007) notion of epistemic injustice.  I 
argue that prejudice against Muslims results in them being victims of two forms of 
epistemic injustice: testimonial injustice, where their voices are not given due 
credibility, and hermeneutical injustice, where there exists a lacuna in society's 
knowledge of Islam and Muslims which is filled by Islamophobia.  Drawing on 
Fricker, I then turn to Medina (2013) who, in extending epistemology to 
encompass oppression and resistance, widens and deepens the theory of 
knowledge.  Together, Fricker and Medina pave the way for the analysis of the 
interview data illustrating how the British public's knowledge of Muslims and Islam 
has been constructed and misrepresented, resulting in the marginalisation and 
subsequent oppression of Muslims living in Britain.  
Adopting a postcolonial lens allowed me to locate the negative spaces where state 




been the lens through which I locate injustice and epistemic injustice is the 
microscope through which I can observe how knowledge maintaining injustice for 
both Muslims and non-Muslims operates.  Building on arguments further in this 
chapter I examine how negative spaces within the concept of epistemic injustice 
(Fricker, 2007; Medina, 2013) are also repositories for hegemony.  Similarly, 
epistemic injustice must be located in the negative spaces of the lived experiences 
of Muslims.  'Normalising' injustice (Fricker, 2007) creates a need for the 'hard to 
reach' spaces to be explored.  Epistemic injustice allow this to occur so 'othering' 
of Muslims seen in a postcolonial context may be also seen in an alternative 
paradigm.   
Fricker (2007, p. 1) focused on the negative spaces where epistemic wrongs have 
occurred and adopting an ethical standpoint, termed injustices as: 
1. 'testimonial', "when prejudice causes a hearer to give a deflated level of 
credibility to a speakers word" and, 
2. 'hermeneutical', "when a gap in collective interpretive resources puts 
someone at an unfair disadvantage when it comes to making sense of their 
social experiences".  
Socially constructed 'othering' of British Muslims by Prevent, media stereotyping 
and FBV has enabled Islamophobia to germinate in the social imagination of the 
public.  As a consequence, hermeneutical injustice to Muslims living in Britain has 
been "caused by structural prejudice in the economy of collective hermeneutical 
resources" (Fricker, 2007, p. 1).  Structural identity prejudice or "identity power" 
(Fricker, 2007, p. 14) against British Muslims is largely based on negative 
assumptions about their cultural practices.  Along with Islamophobia, this occupies 




of credibility to the testimony of British Muslims, resulting in hermeneutical 
injustice.  'Hermeneutical marginalisation' represents a marginalised group or 
community (Fricker, 2007, p. 153) and in the context of this research, Muslims 
living in Britain.   
I argue that there are similarities between "false consciousness" (Eyerman, 1981, 
p. 44; Rosen, 1996) in the social imagination of the wider non-Muslim British public 
and a "cognitive disablement" or a "hermeneutical lacuna" (Fricker, 2007, p. 151) 
impeding making sense of or understanding an experience.  Both Muslim and non-
Muslim are cognitively handicapped by a cognitive disadvantage.  However, only 
Muslims remain vulnerable to be 'othered' as a consequence of their membership 
of a marginalised group (Fricker, 2007) and therefore only Muslims are 'affected' 
by hermeneutical marginalisation.10  
Having argued that non-Muslims are also negatively affected by a "hermeneutical 
lacuna" (Fricker, 2007, p. 151) it is in their interest to have a better understanding 
of their cognitive behaviour so they may be able to move to a position of a 
"virtuous hearer" (ibid, p. 171) where they may give credibility to the testimony of 
Muslims. 
Drawing on my argument that postcolonial conditions exist for Muslims in Britain, I 
re-frame 'othering' of Muslims by using epistemic injustice as my primary data 
analysis tool.  This allows Muslim narratives to be seen in ethical and secular 
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terms by focusing on notions of justice and removing them from their religiously 
defined position which I claim is an impasse in a postcolonial construct.  I use 
epistemic injustice to challenge Islamophobia by using a counter-false 
consciousness narrative discourse by appropriating the concept of the 'virtuous 
hearer' (Fricker, 2007, p. 171) to bring about epistemic justice.  Recognising that 
an economy in the hermeneutical resources of the wider non-Muslim British public 
has allowed for a lacuna to be filled by Islamophobia I adopt an epistemic injustice 
approach rather than critical theory allowing me to replace false consciousness 
with hermeneutical injustice.  Staying with the idea that false consciousness is 
ideological, it is logical to suggest that it is in the wider non-Muslim public's interest 
to move to be "virtuous hearers" (ibid, p. 169) ridding themselves from being 
negatively affected by hermeneutical injustice.  Fricker's definition of 
hermeneutical injustice differs from Medina's (2013) in respect of whether a person 
suffers injustice due to being unable to "properly comprehend her own experience" 
(ibid, p. 6).  I argue Islamophobia has created a cognitive disadvantage in the 
minds of some of the non-Muslim British public, preventing them from 
comprehending their situation and being able to move on to an ethical position.   
Fricker's later work (2017, p. 56) acknowledges the legacy of Marxism, the 
ideology of false consciousness (Lukacs, 1971) and the need to make epistemic 
injustice a tool that may be used in "everyday lived experiences of injustice", not 
burdened with class, gender or race.  Fricker (2017, p. 56) also recognised the 
need to "start with the experience of powerlessness and show that it raises 
philosophical questions" which I see supporting the methodological position 




Having introduced the work of Fricker (2007; 2016; 2017), I now turn to the work of 
Medina (2013).    
4.8. Medina 
Medina (2013; 2017) extends the work of Fricker (2007) by identifying a range of 
epistemic injustices responsible for marginalising individuals.  Medina explores the 
theory of knowledge as ways to understand how human behaviour, in many 
instances, is programmed to look after its owner very often at the expense of 
others.  Medina uses societal concepts of hierarchy to argue that some people are 
unable to comprehend specific categories of knowledge caused by hierarchy 
'blinding' them to another's situation.  However, Medina (2017, p. 42) does not 
excuse or "let off the hook"  the responsibility of the person who commits 
hermeneutical injustice(s).  Along with Fricker (2007, pp. 168-169), Medina calls 
for an epistemic "virtue" or a "responsible agency" to be adopted (Medina, 2013, p. 
128) to 'see' the plight of others.  Medina clarifies that "insensitivity and numbness" 
(Medina, 2013, p. xii) is more appropriate than 'blindness' in describing how our 
epistemic sensibilities can be affected.   
On this basis, Islamophobia may be seen as a product of epistemic injustice 
(maintained by Prevent, FBV and negative media reporting) allowing Muslims in 
Britain to be 'othered'.  Using Medina's visual analogy, I use epistemic injustice as 
a microscopic lens to analyse the CoE data, magnifying instances, (perceived or 
real), identified as problematic in the lived experiences of Muslims living in Britain.  
I then engage with the concept of "epistemic resistance" or dissent (Medina, 2013, 




cognitive-affective functioning" sustaining them (ibid).  I later use "epistemic 
friction" (Medina, 2013, p. 289) as a way to further Muslim voices (discussed in 
Chapter 8) in recognising "beneficial and detrimental epistemic friction" as ways to 
rid "the kind of stubbornness that gets in the way of knowledge" (Medina, 2013, p. 
50).   
Medina (2017, p. 41) defines hermeneutical injustice as, "phenomenon that occurs 
when the intelligibility of communicators is unfairly constrained or undermined, 
when their meaning-making capacities encounter unfair obstacles".  He suggests 
forms of hermeneutical injustice are so damaging they may result in 
"hermeneutical death" (Medina, 2017, p. 41) leading to a radical curtailment of 
voice, interpretive capacities, and status as a participant in meaning-making and 
meaning-sharing practices (ibid).  The similarities between hermeneutical death 
and silencing of voices within a postcolonial context are not easily dismissed.  
Medina goes on to offer four possible criteria in distinguishing and classifying 
hermeneutical injustice; the source of the problem, dynamics of the problem, 
breadth of the problem and depth of the problem.   
 The "source of the problem" is categorised as semantically produced, 
where unavailable 'labels' or words or a lacuna exist, instead of where a 
name should. (Medina, 2017, p. 45). I consider Islamophobia within this 
category.  
 The second category is "performatively produced" where the subjects' 
accent, unorthodox demeanour (Medina, 2017, p. 46) or "expressive style" 
(Fricker, 2007, p. 160) may be perceived as indicative of "intelligibility" 
(Medina, 2017, p. 46). I consider being identified as a Muslim living in 
Britain as befitting this category.  
 Medina's second criteria, the dynamics of the problem also forms two 




Strategy, FBV, the media, and interpersonal dynamics such as 
communicative intimidations where Muslims in Britain are accused of being 
medieval, barbaric, terrorist sympathisers, the enemy within, receiving 
'funny looks', "which may be nothing" (Allen, 2020, p. 58), and where such 
micro-aggressions constrain their testimonial capacities (ibid).   
 Medina's third criteria, breadth, seeks to find out how far the injustice 
reaches across the social fabric. This includes both incidental and 
systematic cases of hermeneutical injustice. The CoE data (Chapters 6 and 
7) reveal the extent that Islamophobia has reached into the lives of the 
Muslim respondents.  
 Medina's fourth criteria, the depth of the problem, shows how deep the 
hermeneutical harm goes in undermining or destroying meaning-making 
and sharing capacities. I consider the Muslim participants as relevant here.  
I have argued that as a consequence of Islamophobia false consciousness has 
prevented Muslims from recognising Islamophobia which remains protected, 
maintained, and hidden.  A hermeneutical death may be considered to have 
occurred when the interpretive powers of Muslims fails to see Islamophobia 
resulting in their voices being "killed" (Medina, 2017, p. 47).  The extent of harm 
subjected to Muslim voices are considered in the data analysis chapters (6 and 7), 
and in the findings (Chapter 8). 
It may be that oppressed groups refuse to engage with "oppressive rhetorical 
spaces" (Pohlhaus, Jr., 2012, p.  228; Medina, 2017, p. 50), choosing to do so and 
"maintaining hermeneutical privacy" (Fricker, 2016, p. 169).  In postcolonial 
thought this is considered to be a counter-argument or challenge from an 




Fricker (2007, p. 159) argues that hermeneutical injustices are epistemic wrongs 
that simply happen, without perpetrators, "it is a purely structural notion".  Medina 
clarifies his position which differs from Fricker (ibid) saying that it is not whether 
there "are expressive and interpretive resources available for meaning-making, but 
how these resources are used, by whom, and in what ways" (Medina, 2017, p. 43).  
This has significance in my reference to the wider non-Muslim public who are not 
the subject of data analysis, but as a body of people, use the resources available 
to them in different ways.  To reiterate, Medina does not excuse them (non-
Muslims) from their epistemic responsibility and that "refuge (in) ignorance" is not 
acceptable (Medina, 2013, p. 140) as is also the case for criminal law in Britain 
(Law and Martin, 2014). 
I considered the possibility that Muslims in Britain may be reticent in discussing 
issues that they feel are important for fear of being labelled extremist.  Medina 
(2013, p. 5) says:  
Democracy is not only about voting but also about talking. In fact, 
talking is prior to voting because, if voting is about ratifying certain 
proposals, public discourses are antecedently needed for the 
formulation and discussion of these proposals.  
Anderson (2006, p. 11) concurs with Medina saying we need a "model of 
democracy in which its epistemic success is a product of its ability to take 
advantage of the epistemic diversity of individuals".  British Muslims are not able to 
engage in a "resistance model of democracy" (Medina, 2013, p. 10), or in the 
practices "of resistance in which epistemic friction can be found" (ibid, p. 16) in 
order to be able to "fight against ignorance, to know oneself and others" and "to 




applicable to everyone, which I recognise in arguing that false consciousness 
prevents an understanding that is in their interest.  Medina (2013) argues that only 
"when significantly different perspectives are available and they are allowed to 
interact" (ibid, p. 18) can we learn from each other and work toward democratic 
social interaction.  This requires epistemic resistance to become exposed to self-
questioning and becoming "perplexed" (Medina, 2013, p. 18) about who we are to 
unmask and undo the "social construction of our perspective" and "interrupting the 
flow of familiarity and obviousness" (ibid, p. 19).  At first glance this appears as a 
wish list to achieve utopian ideals in self-improvement.  However, unless we can 
unpick hegemony seeking to normalise and make comfortable Islamophobia, 
'othering' and 'hermeneutical marginalisation' for British Muslims will endure.  
Returning to Freire (1970, p. 26) "only power that springs from the weakness of 
the oppressed will be sufficiently strong to free both". Recognising hermeneutical 
marginalisation and false consciousness in Muslims and non-Muslims 
respectively, illuminate 'oppression' so that progression from it may occur.   
This research argues that postcolonialism is an affective concept to locate 
injustices perpetrated against British Muslims.  Medina (2013, p. 13) refers to 
"ubiquitous hermeneutical and testimonial injustices" that surround us in our 
everyday practices, appearing as normal, desensitising us from real injustices.  
This, I argue is a reflection on how postcolonialism operates in Britain using a veil 
of securitisation over Muslims as a result of Prevent, FBV, Islamophobia and 
negative media reporting.  The introduction of FBV and its link to security issues in 
Britain normalises negative views of Muslims ensuring that "self-questioning" (ibid, 




resistance (ibid, p. 22) are not areas engaged in or critiqued by the wider non-
Muslim public .  In epistemic injustice terms, Prevent contributes to a 
"hermeneutical injustice" (Fricker, 2007, p. 6) and "detrimental epistemic friction, 
...censoring, silencing, or inhibiting the formation of beliefs, the articulations of 
doubts, the formulation of questions and lines of enquiry" (Medina, 2013, p. 50) for 
some Muslims in Britain.     
The social imagination of the British public is a palette of grey narratives fed by 
misinformation which requires a change to a "kaleidoscope" of colours (Medina, 
2013, p. 22) in the social imagination to expand our social sensibilities recognising 
oppression within British society.  Medina described oppression in epistemic 
relations (specifically inequality), as being "the enemy of knowledge" (ibid, p. 27).  
The range of injustices categorised by Medina allowed this research to locate and 
explain how Muslims became negatively affected by epistemic injustice and further 
show knowledge of their lived experiences.  Summarising, social inequalities 
affecting Muslims living in Britain have epistemic consequences including injustice.  
Epistemic injustice is caused by the flow of information being manipulated to suit a 
class or social group marginalising, 'othering', duping, stereotyping, and denying 
people inhabiting a 'different' group.  Medina (2013; 2017, p. 48) offers a 
"challenge by exerting epistemic friction against the normative expectations of 
established interpretive frameworks" of which postcolonialism may be considered 





In this chapter I provide an account of my educational journey and how reflecting 
on my experiences and the CoE has shaped this thinking.  Young people are often 
negatively stereotyped and categorised as suitable for certain types of work at the 
expense of being given skills to think critically and independently.  I saw the work 
of critical pedagogical theorists as being important considerations in considering 
critical theory as a way of disrupting, challenging and potentially de-stabilising 
government policy that I argued were oppressive to Muslims living in Britain.  In 
Chapter 3 I argued that the Prevent strategy and FBV are oppressive postcolonial 
constructs which limit Muslim agency.  
I suggested that Islam and Muslims are portrayed as abnormal within British 
society and that at the time of writing no other group of people are treated with 
such suspicion and hostility.  I believe they are being 'colonised' within the 
confines of their own country and that the implementation of a postcolonial 
perspective has allowed this research to examine the various ways in which power 
has been used to firstly colonise groups (in this instance Muslims) and secondly to 
control them.   
I outlined the work of prominent postcolonial theorists as a way of constructing a 
framework that I used to locate areas of power imbalance and to illuminate how 
young Muslims accept that they are 'othered' in British society.  Using postcolonial 
theory I argued that although the wider non-Muslim public were ignorant of 
Muslims and Islam, a false consciousness in their social imagination was filled by 




impasse in continuing to analyse my data through a postcolonial lens I engaged 
with wider theory and data (Jackson and Mazzei, 2012).  This allowed me to 
consider that moving to a secular position may enable me to reframe discourses of 
'othering' and marginalisation of Muslims by a universal justice approach instead 
of a religiously and culturally informed postcolonial narrative.  I formed the view 
that by moving from a postcolonialism clouded by the fog of a normalised 
Islamophobia to an epistemic injustice position I may be able to remove barriers to 
knowledge.  Furthermore, this would provide a conduit through which a counter-
argument could inform the social imagination of the British public to challenge 
Islamophobia thus contributing to social justice for Muslims in Britain. 
In the data analysis that follows in Chapters 6 and 7, I use both postcolonial 
thought and epistemic injustice (Fricker, 2007; Medina, 2013) as lenses through 
which to interrogate the young Muslim's responses in order to evidence Muslim 
marginalisation within the social imagination of the British public.  I introduce the 
idea that young Muslims experience prejudice in Britain because they are 
identifiably Muslim and are considered as a distinct and separate group within 
society (Storry and Childs, 1997).  By employing epistemic injustice, and 
specifically hermeneutical injustice, I show how Muslims are marginalised when 
others hold unjustified or incorrect attitudes about them based on their 
membership of a social group (Fricker, 2007).  I further argue that the Prevent 
Strategy contributes to Muslims in Britain becoming victims of hermeneutical 
injustice as a result of being securitised within British society and 'othered' by the 
creation of divisions as a consequence of the initiation of FBV  (Cameron, 2011; 




Having outlined the theoretical framework I now move to Chapter 5 which provides 
an account of my methodological approach including the justification for the 





5. CHAPTER 5: RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
5.1. Introduction 
In this chapter I state the aims, objectives and research questions at 5.2 followed 
by the research methods used in this qualitative study at 5.3.  In section 5.4 I 
describe the 10-step process employed in the Community of Enquiry (CoE) and in 
section 5.5 I introduce the research participants followed by the research setting in 
section 5.6.  In section 5.7 I continue with the data collection and preparation with 
the transcripts of both sets of CoE data available at (Appendix 1 and 2).  In section 
5.8 I continue by describing how my reflexive position shaped the research and in 
section 5.9 describe the methodological position adopted for this research.  In 
section 5.10 I provide an account of the initial research design justifying not using 
the one-to-one semi-structured qualitative interview data from key Muslim adults, 
instead prioritising the community of enquiry(CoE) interview data from young 
Muslim men and women.  In section 5.11 I continue with the revised research 
design, tracing my research journey (see 5.1.1).  As an aid to show how my 
thinking was influenced, a short biography of the participants from the one-to-one 
interviews is provided and a summary of themes from the interviews at (Appendix 
3).  The inclusion of this data is important in understanding how its initial scrutiny 
was a catalyst for me to further engage with theory, government policy and data, 
shaping the theoretical position and decisions made throughout the research 
journey.  This process allowed me to uncover the phenomenon Islamophobia and 
to place it within a theoretical framework where I could locate areas of injustice 
and consider a way forward.  Table 5.11.1 provides contrasting accounts of the 
limitations and mitigation of both data collection tools used in this research, 




they were used in this research.  In section 5.12 I continue with my rationale for 
analysis of the data.  In the discussion of the CoE data I briefly revisit my 
theoretical position justifying choices made in the analysis of the data.  I continue 
with standards of validation and evaluation in section 5.12.1.  The chapter 
concludes with the ethical considerations employed (see 5.13) which includes my 
ethical stance, interviewer effect, informed consent, and confidentiality, with the 
conclusion at 5.14.  I once more provide an overview of the research journey in 


















I now turn to the research aim and questions that have guided the thesis followed 
by the research methods employed where I provide a rationale of my principle 
research tool, the Community of Enquiry.    
5.2. Research Aim and Research Questions.  
The overarching research aim for this thesis is to: 
 Explore the lived experience of young Muslims living in Wales in the 
light of postcolonial and epistemic injustice theories.    
The research questions are: 
 Is Postcolonialism visible in the narratives of young Muslims living in 
Wales and if so, in what ways? 
 Is Epistemic Injustice visible in the narratives of young Muslims living 
in Wales and if so, in what ways? 
 How might we understand Islamophobia in light of Muslim experience?  
These questions evolved concurrently alongside my methodological position, 
informing my reading of theory and government policy, allowing me to engage with 
the data over time and subsequently becoming important to my thinking.  
Underpinning the research throughout was the aspiration to identify where 
Islamophobia had impacted upon the lives of my respondents and to locate the 
areas where injustice toward them prevailed.  This warranted a focus on the lived 
experiences of my respondents in order to get rich and "thick descriptions" (Cohen 
et al., 2000, p. 311;  Denzin and Lincoln, 2011, p. 9; Geertz, 1973) of their 
experiences.  I now turn to the methods employed in this research providing 
accounts of my rationale along with limitations and mitigation of the methods used 




5.3. Research Methods.  
Following my initial research design using semi-structured one-to-one interviews 
with Muslim adult workers I engaged with wider theory and policy (see research 
process map 5.1.1) employing a CoE approach as a data gathering tool with a 
group of young Muslim men and a group of young Muslim women.  I will now 
justify the CoE as a data collection tool followed by a description of how the 
process of a CoE was carried out.   
The one-to-one interviews had produced largely biographical narratives of how the 
key Muslim adults lived their lives as Muslims in Wales with little reference to 
Islamophobia (see Appendix 3).  I knew many of them had been subjected to 
Islamophobic abuse but had chosen not to speak about these experiences.  I 
suspected that somehow, elements unknown to me in the employment of the one-
to-one interviews, were not conducive to enabling the key Muslim adults to speak 
of their experiences of Islamophobia.  I thought about my work in schools and how 
groups of young people spoke about personal and sometimes distressing 
experiences within Community of Enquiry settings.  I had experience of the 
Community of Enquiry (CoE) being facilitated in schools and university settings 
and had been trained to SAPERE level 1 in Philosophy for Children (P4C) 
(SAPERE, 2007) while studying for my Graduate Diploma.  A group of young 
Muslim men and women had already agreed to be part of the study and I 
considered using a community of enquiry approach as a data collection tool 
instead of the one-to-one interviews.  The main pedagogic tool of P4C is the 
community of enquiry and I wanted to assess the efficacy of a CoE approach as a 




with the theory of critical pedagogy which gave me confidence that the CoE may 
be considered as a critical pedagogical tool in my research and that the ethical 
construct of a CoE (see 5.13) prioritised the voices of the participants or "partners" 
(Kincheloe et al., 2011, p. 164).  I believed that the CoE exemplified critical 
pedagogical research where the Muslim participants were able to "see more 
critically, think at a more critical level, and to recognise the forces that subtly 
shape their lives" (ibid).  Furthermore, the structure of the CoE would allow them to 
collectively generate questions which concurs with the work of Freire (1970) who 
used his knowledge of a community along with the knowledge produced by his 
students to inform curriculum (Kincheloe et al., 2011).  The CoE is therefore a 
viable research approach in qualitative research with a particular focus on 
researching the beliefs, attitudes, perceptions and values of respondents.  At that 
stage in my research journey the work of Freire (1970) strengthened my 
confidence in using a CoE as a data collection tool, and my theoretical stance to 
uncover hidden power.  Succinctly, I argue that a CoE approach is a pedagogically 
infused data collection tool and is positioned within the empowering tradition of 
critical pedagogy (Freire, 1970), which provides a rationale to uncover false 
consciousness.  Critical pedagogy would prove to be the catalyst in furthering my 
theoretical journey to locate, uncover and deconstruct hidden power that I argue 
sought to marginalise Muslims in Britain.   
Initial scrutiny of the themes in the one-to-one interviews identified elements of a 
political disconnect and lack of representation for Muslims in British politics (see 
Appendix 3), and that critical research was "unafraid to consummate a relationship 




was a respectful way of discussing philosophical questions where participants 
would be able to move an enquiry forward and that facilitation is a skilful task.  I 
made the decision that I would engage an experienced CoE practitioner to conduct 
the enquiries and that my involvement in the data collection process would be 
limited to the facilitation of each research conversation along with the 
management of the audio/visual recording equipment.  This was not to address 
any bias or interviewer effect (see 5.13.2) but a decision made that the CoE would 
be better served being conducted by an experienced practitioner.  The facilitator is 
referred to as 'Kim' in the data analysis at Chapters 6 and 7.  
I wanted to encourage a philosophical narrative among the young Muslim men and 
women and by following the 10-step process, (described further on), allowed both 
groups to democratically choose the questions that would guide each enquiry.  I 
decided to use a DVD produced four years earlier as a stimulus to the enquiries 
which would allow them to develop questions for the participants to vote on.  The 
choice of stimulus in Step 1 of the ten-step process was a deliberate decision by 
me to forefront Islamophobia.  I used a 10-minute DVD that I had produced (Mort, 
2008) showing Muslims in the South Wales area speaking about their experiences 
of Islamophobia.  This allowed me to forefront the phenomenon I wanted to 
explore and in phenomenological terms would move the research to a 
hermeneutical phenomenological position (Creswell, 2013; van Manen, 1997) by 
not bracketing the essence (Islamophobia).  This would allow the respondents to 
see the phenomenon of Islamophobia and interpret their "lived experience(s)" (van 
Manen, 1997, p. 4; Laverty, 2003, p. 24) of Islamophobia creating meaning and 




focus from the position of Husserl (1970), "phenomenology's recognized founder" 
(Ladkin, 2014, p. 613), to Heidegger (1962), a position of 'knowing' to 
'experiencing and understanding', would allow me to explore the historical, cultural 
and social experiences of Muslims in Wales (which subsequently informed my 
theoretical interpretive and analytical positions within this research).  The decision 
to move from bracketing the phenomenon Islamophobia made clear to me the 
need to establish criteria for trustworthiness of my research.  Allen (1995) argued 
that a clear distinction between phenomenology and hermeneutical 
phenomenology does not exist.  However, in methodological terms a 
hermeneutical approach allows the researcher to "engage in a process of self-
reflection" (Laverty, 2003, p. 28) allowing biases and assumptions to be 
"embedded and essential to interpretive process" (ibid).  I explore standards of 
validation and evaluation in the data analysis section at 5.12.1 and justify 
discarding epoche within the methodology.  I also discuss epoche in reflexivity at 
5.8, as a way to reinforce my values in wanting to make things better for young 
Muslims by addressing the phenomena.  
Having adopted a CoE as my primary data collection tool I now consider its 
efficacy as an example of ethical practice and in particular how it may be used to 
disrupt the binary situation of researcher and researched to allow the voices of the 
participants to be prioritised.   
Most commonly used with children in classrooms under the auspices of 
Philosophy for Children (Lipman, 2003) the CoE is used in over 60 countries and 
research evidence supports its claims to promote deliberative enquiry in a variety 




central to Philosophy for Children (P4C) as exemplified in the way a space is 
created for all voices to speak and be listened to.  Dialogue is valued as a key to 
self-knowledge and mutual understanding and collaborative talk is the key dialogic 
mechanism.  It is the participants who generate the question they wish to explore 
following presentation of a stimulus.  In this way participants are treated as active 
epistemic agents (Lyle, 2008).  The aim of the CoE is to uncover through dialogue 
personal understanding and knowledge in order to discover the truth (Fisher, 
1995; 1998).  This links to Bakhtin's (1984, p. 110) notion that truth is not to be 
found inside the head of an individual, "... it is born between people collectively 
searching for truth, in the process of their dialogic interaction".  Questions are not 
decided by the researcher but created by the participants and the sum knowledge 
created by the participants in dialogue is greater than any one individual.  
Echeverria and Hannan (2017) argue that the community of philosophical enquiry 
is an example of an educational model that allows participants to engage in the 
process of democracy encouraging them to think deeply and listen to each other.  
The role of the facilitator is to enable the participants to share ideas and insights 
and support and challenge each other's ideas and thinking.  It seeks to empower 
participants and take the researcher out of the spotlight. 
If one considers traditional research in "Western epistemological frameworks" 
focuses on the researched as "passive subjects" rather than "relevant 
stakeholders" (Iwowo, 2014, p. 632) then I argue this may be seen as underpinned 
by postcolonialism in knowledge creation.  Succinctly, the use of a CoE empowers 




I now turn to the "10-step process" of the Community of Enquiry (Muirhead, 2018, 
pp. 7-17) which provides a clear model for both enquiries and discuss its use as a 
data collection tool.  Each step is explored and justified in the data analysis of the 
CoE's in Chapters 6 and 7.  An important component of the CoE process is that 
the respondents choose the question for their enquiry.  The 10 steps are set out 
below: 
5.4. Community of Enquiry: 10 Step Process.  
1. Choosing a stimulus for the enquiry. 
2. Presentation of the stimulus. 
3. Individual thinking time. 
4. Forming questions 
5. Justifying the choice of questions 
6. Voting. 
7. The enquiry: first thoughts. 
8. Middle words. 
9. Last words. 
10. Review of the enquiry. 
 A Community of Enquiry may be described as a "workshop-style session that 
offers space for a group of people to collaboratively explore ideas and ask rich and 
meaningful questions of each other" (Muirhead, 2018, p.  2), and as "a 
collaborative form of purposeful discourse" (Garrison, 2014, p. 147).  A CoE, 
alternatively referred to as a Community of Inquiry (CoI), is normally understood as 
a pedagogic practice (Dumitru, 2012; Christie et al., 2007).  A Community of 
Inquiry (CoI) has been used in action research as a learning model, "for learning 
and creativity", "problem-solving" and "constructing new ideas and knowledge" 
(Garrison, 2014, p. 150) about which research has been carried out (Andrews et 




collaborative philosophical enquiry (see for example P4C; Topping and Trickey, 
2007) as a teaching tool or as an intervention strategy to see if a CoE improves 
outcomes for children (Yan et al., 2018).   
A CoE allows the participants to share their experiences and to listen to other 
participants' points of view.  The question or problem for the enquiry are set by the 
participants who define what they want to discuss.  The whole process is 
facilitated by a practitioner who guides the enquiry through the 10-steps explaining 
each step to the participants. 
Steps 1 and 2 involve a stimulus being shown to the group with steps 3 to 6 set 
aside for them to think about and discuss forming questions before democratically 
choosing a question for the enquiry.  Steps 7 to 9 allow each participant an 
opportunity to discuss the question.  There are strict rules in not interrupting a 
speaker and participants may choose to pass to another rather than speak.  
Speakers are encouraged to disagree but are also encouraged to give reasons for 
their comments.  The facilitator is there to ensure the rules are observed and 
intervene only to clarify or offer alternative points of view for the participants to 
build on the conversation or gain a deeper understanding of each others' views.  
Step 10 allows the group to summarise they key points discussed and to see if 
there are further issues arising for discussion.    
There are currently a number of papers out for review on the use of the method 
(Lyle, 2019) however there are limited comprehensive accounts as to how the CoE 
can be used as a research tool.  Golding (2015, p. 205) argues that the CoE 




in a CoE the researcher is able to gather in-depth information about the 
participants because of its dialogic and collaborative nature.  The argument for the 
value of a dialogic approach to enquiry using the CoE is discussed in Lyle (2008).  
Golding (2015) argues a CoE as a research method blends collaborative 
philosophical enquiry and empirical data collection and analysis methods.  This 
research has used the CoE as a tool to gather data which proved particularly 
beneficial with groups of marginalised people in community settings.  I have, 
however recognised its limitations in this research (see table 5.11.1) in the 
researcher being unable to set questions for discussion relying instead on the 
choice of stimulus used to generate questions in the area of the phenomenon to 
be explored.  In addition, by not subjecting the cohort of one-to-one interviewees 
to a CoE it is not known whether such a method would have uncovered their lived 
experiences of Islamophobia.  Nevertheless, utilising a CoE allows participants 
autonomy on the direction of the CoE prioritising and articulating areas that 
concern them, which may be different from those of the researcher.  The 
significance of this is reflected in my "plugging the theory and the data into one 
another" (Jackson and Mazzei, 2012, p. vii) permitting me agency to explore the 
wider literature for ideas with which to consider theoretically rather than approach 
the CoE with a pre-defined theoretical position.  Although this process was born 
from my initial design it developed over time allowing me to engage with wider 
policy and theory to shape the theoretical framework and be able to analyse the 




5.5. Research Participants. 
The young Muslim men and women who took part in two separate CoE at a 
meeting room provided for the purpose were recruited either by word of mouth or 
from a social media platform used by young Muslims at a local University.  I had 
produced a research information leaflet (see Appendix 4) which I left at a local 
drop-in centre used by young Muslim men and women, asking the workers there 
to distribute to young Muslims.  I also asked a female Muslim colleague to post the 
research information leaflet on a female-only Muslim social media site that was 
being used at a local university.  I discuss 'gatekeepers' or "key informants" 
(Creswell, 2013, p. 94) in the research setting at 5.6.  I wanted all of the 
participants to be able to self-select to become part of the research cohort without 
coercion or feeling pressured.  In my research information leaflet (see Appendix 4) 
I had provided a brief pen picture of myself including a reference to 'Oanez', a 
well-known Muslim youth worker in the community who I had collaborated with 
over a 10-year period.  I wanted the young people to have someone they trust as 
point of reference should they want more information about me and my intended 
research.   
I considered my position as a "participant as observer" (Creswell, 2013, p. 166) in 
the gathering of the data employing a "purposeful sampling" strategy (ibid, p. 154) 
with both groups who met the criteria of being Muslim and living in Wales.  The 
young people are not representative of the diverse Muslim community in Britain 
and each person has an opportunity to tell their lived experiences of being a 
Muslim living in Wales including "experience of the phenomenon being studied" 




were less than the 12 persons recommended by (Echeverria and Hannam, 2017) 
but were sufficient for them "to develop a collective story" (Huber and Wheelan, 
1999, pp. 381-396).  I referred to the cohort as being 'young Muslims' with their 
ages ranging from 19 to 32 for the men and 13 to 29 for the women.  My use of the 
term 'young Muslim' does not follow the definition of 'young person' in Wales which 
is 13-25 and is not used in order to categorise them by age but refer to the CoE 
cohort.  I deal with the suitability (by age) of the two 13 year-old young Muslim 
women in the informed consent section at 5.13.3.   
I set dates when I was able to use the research setting for the CoE (see 5.6) 
restricting 20 persons per enquiry.  I used the voluntary services of three Muslim 
youth workers, referred to as 'Arvind', 'Oanez' and 'Deeba', to liaise with and 
collate the first 20 Muslim men and 20 Muslim women who wanted to be part of 
the research and subsequently gave each group dates and location for the CoE.  I 
was not aware of how many young people would turn up until the day of each 
enquiry and was made aware by each 'gatekeeper' that those wishing to take part 
had viewed my research information leaflet prior to attending the research setting.  
The CoE with the women involved 15 participants, and the CoE with the men 9 
participants.  Pen pictures for each person are provided at the beginning of the 
data analysis at (Chapters 6 and 7).    
5.6. Research Setting.  
The two CoE with the Muslim men and women were conducted on separate 
occasions nine months apart at a local support centre where most of the young 




of the centre and could not be seen by any other persons who were not involved in 
conducting the CoE.  Due to the use of the centre by various agencies and the 
academic term commitments of those studying at university it was not possible to 
conduct the second CoE sooner.  Permission was given for me and my facilitator 
to use the centre and the Muslim youth workers responsible for collating both 
cohorts were present at both CoE.  Neither "gatekeeper" (Creswell, 2013, p. 94) 
took part in the CoE and were not within hearing of the CoE.  The gatekeepers 
neither selected nor coerced any of the participants but were instrumental in 
allowing me to access them.  The 'gatekeepers' Arvind, Oanez and Deeba also 
took part in the one-to-one interviews (see Appendix 3).  Of those who attended as 
participants, all but one person chose to take part.  Refreshments were provided 
and an opportunity to get to know each other facilitated by myself before each CoE 
commenced.  The relaxed and informal surroundings of the venue as well as 
specific ethical consideration as regards to gender proprieties (see 5.13) allowed 
for a comfortable and respectful environment in which to conduct research.  
5.7. Data Collection and Preparation.  
Data was collected from the one-to-one interviews using an audio recorder and 
were subsequently transcribed.  The following transcripts were created: 
 Interview with male Muslim adult youth worker (revert/Asian) 
 Interview with an Imam. 
 Interview with Muslim male adult youth worker (revert/ white). 
 Interview with a female member of the Muslim community. 




The transcripts of the six one-to-one interviews are not included in the research 
but are available to view.  Research diaries were made and are also available to 
view upon request.  A summary of the interviews with each interviewee is included 
at (Appendix 3) where they were scrutinised for themes.  Scrutiny of the one-to-
one interviews formed the start of the research process and were instrumental in 
shaping the revised research design.  The one-to-one interviews did not show 
evidence of Islamophobia, although I knew from experience that most of the 
participants had experienced it. 
It was my intention to continue one-to-one interview with a cohort of young Muslim 
men and women using the same questions as used earlier with the cohort of 
adults.  However, following a review of the data I decided to use a CoE as a data 
collection tool where the phenomenon Islamophobia would be forefronted in an 
attempt to uncover it.  Hence, the focus of my research changed from 'an analysis 
of the ways in which young Muslims construct their identity'  (see, research 
information leaflet at Appendix 4; research process map at 5.1.1) to forefronting 
Islamophobia in Community of Enquiry research settings so as to be able to 
uncover and challenge it.           
Both Communities of Enquiry ( CoE) were audio and video-recorded and 
subsequently transcribed.  I used research diaries to capture my thinking and the 
connections I made to theoretical ideas when I examined the transcripts, which I 
go on to describe at 5.12.  I repeatedly revisited the transcripts and my diaries to 
seek new connections and ideas.  The following transcripts were created: 
 Community of enquiry with Muslim women (Appendix 1). 




The recordings made with both CoE are explored in the informed consent section 
at 5.13.3, and a transcript from the research conversation (Farrell, 2005) with the 
women is available on request.  A research conversation was carried out with the 
men while we were gathered for a meal prior to their CoE, but not recorded.  The 
research conversations are an important part of informed consent and are 
included at 5.13.3.  The question decided by the Muslim men in their CoE was: 
"Do common stereotypes or media influence your own perception about Islam 
even though you are Muslim ?" (discussed in Chapter 6). The question chosen by 
the women in their CoE was: "Is the media misrepresenting Islam for their own 
gain ?" (discussed in Chapter 7). 
Following the transcription of both audio and audio/visual recordings from each 
CoE the raw data were subjected to initial analysis and further engaging with 
theory, policy and personal experience so as to be able to 'read' and interpret the 
data.  This lengthy process which encompassed the theoretical journey (see 
diagram 4.1.1) is shown in the research process map at 5.1.1.  Through the 
iterative process of reading theory with data (Jackson and Mazzei, 2012) the 
analytical process were revised at two points during the research process allowing 
an amalgamation of theoretical and interpretive positions to be employed to 
construct research findings.  
It will be seen that the raw data in Appendices 1 and 2, although checked and 
edited for accuracy against both audio and video recordings, remain in their 'raw' 
state following transcription by a service provider and are not edited to an 




I now go on to explain my reflexivity statement followed by the methodology at 5.9 
in which I discuss the methodological and philosophical assumptions that have 
driven my research journey. 
5.8. Reflexivity  
As a researcher I have engaged in critical self-awareness to recognise how I am 
situated within the research and how reflexivity has shaped my interpretation of 
the CoE data and analysis.  I first summarise reflexivity and acknowledge that it is 
woven throughout the research for example, in critical incidents that made me:  
 Question my role in potentially marginalising young people (see Chapter 1 
also 4.2 at Chapter 4) leading to me considering the Prevent Strategy and 
Fundamental British values as responsible for marginalising Muslims living 
in Britain. 
 Scrutinise the one-to-one interviews (see Appendix 3) leading me to 
consider that Islamophobia was not visible to the Muslim cohort. 
 Consider how knowledge for young Muslims and about Muslims living in 
Wales is subject to control. 
 Try to 'read' the CoE data and in failing to do so engage with wider policy 
and theory.  
 Bring all of the above together in employing postcolonial thought to analyse 
and interpret the young Muslim voices.  
 Recognise the need to move from postcolonialism to redefine Islamophobia 
as a protected ideology (see Chapter 4).  
Using theories associated with postcolonialism, I positioned myself as a 
researcher-investigator looking for authority that I believe 'othered' Muslims living 
in Britain.  I interrogated their voices through a postcolonial lens which I 
determined to be 'marginalised' and 'othered' voices.  Turning the postcolonial lens 




role as an educator (All Wales Core Programme, 2004; Think Project, 2012) 
leading me to consider that policies and procedures designed for social good also 
have the potential to harm. 
My role in the collection of data in both CoE was confined to introducing and 
welcoming each respondent, operating the recording equipment, facilitating the 
research conversations (Farrell, 2005) (see also informed consent at 5.13.3) and 
presenting the stimulus to the CoE.  In the DVD, I feature as a presenter and 
interviewer and both groups would have seen that I was a former police officer.  
They would also be aware that the aim of the DVD was to show how Islamophobia 
had affected Muslims living in South Wales and that as a resource for schools it 
was produced with the intention of being for the social good of Muslims.  This was 
an important consideration for the young Muslims to know that my research would 
be focused on the well being of Muslims (see also research information leaflet at 
Appendix 4). 
As a consequence of forefronting Islamophobia by using the DVD as stimulus I 
acknowledge that I did not 'bracket' the phenomena Islamophobia (Smith et al., 
2009; see methodology at 5.9) which was a deliberate decision in order to uncover 
Islamophobia and I acknowledge this decision in doing so.  I had experience and 
knowledge of Muslim colleagues not wishing to speak about incidents of 
Islamophobia (see Appendix 3).  I had been in the company of Muslim friends 
when they told me that some members of the public had given them "funny looks" 
(Allen, 2020, p. 58; Fricker, 2007, p. 37; Medina, 2013) see also (Aya in Chapter 7, 
line 262 in Appendix 1).  I had not recognised, nor was I able to understand "funny 




Islamophobia.  It was central to the CoE that Islamophobia be uncovered so I may 
be able to locate, identify, and challenge it.   
By using a CoE approach to gather data the Muslim men and women were able to 
control their own narratives in the construct of a pedagogically infused data 
collection tool which is aligned with the empowering tradition of critical pedagogy.  
Moreover, a CoE is a safe space for political thought and an "emancipatory 
process" (Kincheloe et al., 2011, p. 164) with which to challenge perceived 
injustices (see table 5.11.1; Freire, 1970).  The Muslim men and women 
articulated narratives of 'othering' in their respective CoE (discussed in Chapters 6 
and 7) lending support to my assumption that postcolonial conditions existed for 
them and that confirmatory supporting literature would be needed to underpin such 
an assumption.  Both men and women said that they enjoyed the process of the 
CoE and saw the benefit of further CoE with non-Muslims (see Chapters 6 and 7; 
Men's transcript lines 499-522 and Women's transcript lines 53-56 at Appendix 1 
and 2).  
I acknowledge my role as a participant in the construction of knowledge during the 
CoE and that by interpreting the participants' narratives through postcolonialism 
the knowledge produced is an amalgamation of the respondents and myself.  I 
also considered whether I may be further contributing to the canon of postcolonial 
thought in asserting an "imperial ideology" (Kundnani, 2016, p. 7) in speaking for 
Muslims (Spivak, 1988) and analysing Muslims through an "imperialist gaze" 
(Denzin and Lincoln, 2011, p. 171), validating and consolidating structures of 
domination (ibid) ( see also revised research design at 5.11).  In recognising the 




position to the theory of epistemic injustice allowing analysis of the CoE data along 
with postcolonialism to locate areas of injustice and further interpret Muslim voices 
in narratives where their voices may be able to be heard (Fricker, 2007; Medina, 
2013) (discussed in Chapters 6 and 7).  A continuing theme through both CoE was 
the need for young Muslims to gain knowledge of Islam and for non-Muslims to 
have knowledge of Muslims.  This is a vitally important area which I have argued is 
shaped by government policy and disseminated by sections of the media who 
misrepresent them.  Epistemic injustice encompasses theories which seek to 
unpick how knowledge (a lack of or an ignorance of) (Peels and Blaauw, 2016) 
contributes to injustices being caused to marginalised groups (Fricker, 2007; 
Medina, 2013).  In Chapter 8, I propose a way forward to redefine Islamophobia 
from what I argue is a protected ideology and a postcolonial construct in an 
attempt to improve the lives of young Muslims living in Wales.  I now turn to the 
methodological approach adopted in this research. 
5.9. Methodology    
In their introduction to qualitative research Denzin and Lincoln (2011, p. 6) state 
that it encompasses a "multiparadigmatic" approach which allows the researcher a 
range of interpretive practices.  I have conducted qualitative research to explore 
the phenomenon of Islamophobia in the lived experiences of a group of young 
Muslims living in Wales.  Creswell (2013, p. 48) says that qualitative research is 
suitable for research with groups or a population to be studied that possesses 
"variables that cannot be easily measured".  Qualitative research is also 
conducted when we want to empower individuals to "share their stories, hear their 




and the participants in the study" (ibid).  This is important when investigating a 
snapshot of a diverse marginalised community whose voices have traditionally 
been ignored.   
Building on the iterative and reflexive process of the research journey (see 
diagram 5.1.1) the aim of the research was to 'Explore the lived experiences of 
young British Muslims living in Wales in the light of postcolonial and epistemic 
injustice theories'.  In order to do so I have adopted a qualitative research "social 
constructionist" (Creswell, 2013, pp. 24-25) paradigm approach which is 
appropriate in enabling me to "isolate target populations, show the immediate 
effects of certain programs on such subjects, and isolate the constraints that 
operate against policy change in such settings" (Denzin and Lincoln, 2011, p. 15).   
"Qualitative inquiries study how people and groups construct meaning" (Patton, 
2015, p. 5); this allows me to evaluate and assign meaning to how the Muslim 
respondents interpret ways that Islamophobia affects them.  Subsequently, as 
researcher I have also assigned meaning or interpretation to their voices using 
theory as an "act of composition" (ibid) in order to determine what is meaningful 
and to present a counter-argument to challenge Islamophobia. 
Researching the phenomena of Islamophobia means capturing people's stories, 
subjecting them to qualitative analysis by close attention to the language used and 
the "nuances of culture, politics, economy, history, geography, resources and 
institutions" (ibid, p. 9).  I argue that this may not be sufficiently achieved by a 
traditional form of phenomenological inquiry where there is a bracketing or 




own experiences (Moustakas, 1994) I engaged with theory and concepts 
(including a weakening of a multicultural society for Muslims living in Britain, the 
media and the government's Prevent Strategy letting me doubt suspending the 
notion of Islamophobia in the CoE.  I considered that by extending 
phenomenological inquiry to encompass my theoretical and experiential position a 
hermeneutic or interpretive approach may be employed to further 
phenomenological inquiry.  Thus, phenomenological research is suffused with a 
hermeneutic or interpretive approach as well as an idiographic analysis of 
Islamophobia, encompassing the constituent parts of 'Interpretive 
Phenomenological Analysis' (IPA) (Smith et al., 2009) allowing the 'lived 
experiences' (Alase, 2017) of the research participants to be examined "without 
fear of distortions and/or prosecutions" (Moustakas, 1994, p. 135).  Although 
originally considered a psychological approach (Smith, 1996), in respect of 
reflexivity, "IPA does in fact go further than many other approaches in addressing 
these issues” (Brocki, and Wearden, 2006, p. 92) and is increasingly being used in 
human, social and health sciences (Noon, 2018; Shinebourne, 2011).  The 
objective of IPA is to understand lived experiences and explore how individuals 
make sense of their personal and social worlds (Smith and Osborn, 2003), and is 
"compelled with affording privilege to the voice of participants" (Noon, 2018, p. 80). 
IPA may also be "a particularly useful methodology for researching individuals or 
groups of individuals whose voices may otherwise go unheard" (Noon, 2018, p. 
80; Creswell, 2013).  The in-depth phenomenological interpretation and analysis of 
the phenomenon Islamophobia is central in allowing this research to explore the 




Chapter 4, the theoretical position, traces my journey in engaging with theory 
culminating in a synthesis of false consciousness as a way of disrupting the 
dominant and harmful ideology of Islamophobia in Britain.  My broader 
philosophical assumption is that post 9/11 an increase in Islamophobia has 
impacted upon young Muslims in Britain.  My theoretical position is informed by 
personal and professional reflexivity (see 5.8) and engaging with the wider 
literature and policy has led me to use a social justice approach to analyse the 
CoE data.  In my interpretive framework I use a postcolonial approach to locate 
injustices committed towards Muslims in Britain which I consider to be a 
progression from critical theory and a humanistic Marxist approach, political in its 
desire for a radical change of circumstance for Muslims in Wales.  I overlay 
postcolonialism with epistemic injustice (Fricker, 2007; Medina, 2013) as a way to 
move from the warnings of speaking for a marginalised group of people (Spivak, 
1988), or falling into the trap of "inquirer-oriented power" (Canella and Lincoln, 
2011, p. 82) within postcolonial discourse, to my primary data analysis tool where I 
synthesise false consciousness (Lukacs, 1971) within an epistemic injustice 
framework (Fricker, 2007; Medina, 2013).  This allows me to consider 
Islamophobia as an ideology as well as a phenomenon to be explored.  By 
exposing Islamophobia as a construct within a postcolonial paradigm I go on to 
employ epistemic injustice as a "countercolonial alliance" (Cannella and Lincoln, 
2011, p. 82) to challenge the effects of the Prevent Strategy (Home Office, 2011a) 
and Fundamental British Values (Cameron, 2011; DfE, 2014; ESTYN, 2015) which 
has 'othered' Muslims living in Wales.  This is an ethical perspective and an 
emancipatory paradigm (Alderson and Morrow, 2004) or condition of 




making representations of "marginalized peoples" (Cannella and Lincoln, 2011, p.  
82) which may also maintain 'othering' which I have referred to as a 'colonising' of 
the Muslim mind.  Beneficence, "for the social good" (Clough and Nutbrown, 2002, 
pp.4-6) encompasses an epistemic injustice paradigm (Medina, 2013; Fricker, 
2007), a central theoretical approach adopted in this research which seeks "self-
empowerment" (Medina, 2013, p. 7) for members of minority groups.  Postcolonial 
and epistemic injustice thought also allowed me to empathise with the 
respondents to share and better understand the hurt they feel as a consequence 
of experiencing Islamophobia.  I also recognise my own position and privilege in 
constructing 'the other' (Cannella and Lincoln, 2011, p. 83) in using a postcolonial 
narrative (Kincheloe et al., 2011, p. 171) which I further acknowledge in reflexivity 
at 5.8 and in ethical considerations at 5.13. 
This research has strived to justify and evidence a theoretical paradigm with which 
to drive the research process and not be seen as critical or a "disguised version of 
Marxism" (Denzin and Lincoln, 2011, p. 2) with which to singularly discredit British 
government policy and legislation.  This is an important distinction as the 
theoretical and methodological position in this research has been informed by 
critical theory which has used Marxism as a stepping-stone to progress, 
concluding with postcolonial and epistemic injustice paradigms.       
5.10. Initial Research Design. 
My initial research design (see research process map 5.1.1) comprised of a 
qualitative phenomenological inquiry employing semi-structured questions to carry 
out one-to-one interviews with six key Muslim adults who had experience of 




which young Muslim men and women living in Wales construct their identities 
(against a background of widespread Islamophobia).  I wanted to gauge the extent 
to which Islamophobia was present in their lives.  I personally knew six adult 
Muslim youth workers who I identified as being 'key' because they had background 
knowledge of young Muslims as well as their own experiences working with and 
supporting young Muslims.  I had worked with the ‘key adults' for a number of 
years to challenge Islamophobia and was confident that they would address 
incidents of Islamophobia when interviewed.  I had identified five areas to question 
them with an overarching aim to understand how Islamophobia might influence 
Muslim identity amongst young people.  These were home, family, school, 
mosque, and the Ummah.  My rationale for interviewing the adults was to 'set the 
scene' and have background information about young Muslims in Wales.  I was 
also aware that five of the six key adults had been subjected to Islamophobic 
abuse.  The respondent who had not received any Islamophobic abuse was a 
white revert to Islam who told me prior to being interviewed that no one had ever 
'abused him for being Muslim'.  Following the semi-structured interviews, I 
intended to carry out further interviews with young Muslim men and women using 
the same interview questions.  I identified Islamophobia as the phenomenon or 
essence of a problem that exists for Muslims in Britain and that it would be the 
focus of my research.  However, not all of my one-to-one respondents had 
experienced Islamophobia, which I now consider may have been a weakness in 
adopting a phenomenological approach, where I initially made the assumption that 
all of my research participants had experienced  the phenomenon to be explored 




I had wrongly assumed that my interviewees would highlight incidents of 
Islamophobia without semi-structured interview questions having to specifically 
probe for incidents.  This was an error in my philosophical assumptions.  I did not 
want to portray nor suggest that my interviewees were victims and I was confident 
that a phenomenological approach was the right one to analyse the lived 
experiences of my respondents in the light of having identified Islamophobia as 
being the essence of the phenomenon that I wanted to explore (Patton, 2015).  In 
my over-zealous adherence to Husserl's concept of epoche or "bracketing" 
(Patton, 2015, p. 117; Creswell, 2013, p. 78), my personal knowledge of 
Islamophobic abuse experienced by my respondents, along with limiting my 
epistemological claim to know how Islamophobia had affected five of the six 
Muslim respondents did not forefront Islamophobia as the 'essence' of my 
research.  The result was that my respondents presented largely biographical 
accounts of their lives as Muslims with little or no accounts of their lived 
experiences of Islamophobia (see Appendix 3).  I was unable to reflect on my 
experiences and knowledge of the Muslim community and my respondents, as 
well as my knowledge of Islamophobia.  I also considered that in adhering to 
epoche, or bracketing the phenomenon, I may have created a vacuum which 
prevented me from immersing myself in the research along with my Muslim 
respondents.  This method did not, however, reveal the phenomenon in enough 





5.11. Revised Research Design   
Following the one-to-one interviews with the key adults (see research process 
map 5.1.1), I decided that I would cultivate a "curiosity" (LeVasseur, 2003, p. 418) 
of Islamophobia (the phenomenon or essence being explored) among my 
interviewees, encouraging philosophical discussion to generate themes about 
Islamophobia.  Building on my initial research design efforts to identify 
Islamophobia within a phenomenological construct, I considered my experiences 
working with young Welsh people (Think Project, 2012; All Wales Core 
Programme, 2004) and critical pedagogy, becoming aware that I may have 
unwittingly 'othered' them.   
In Chapter One, I referred to two critical incidents which gave rise to the 
consideration that I may have 'othered' young people while at the same time trying 
to educate them to stay safe (All Wales Core Programme, 2004) and be aware of 
the dangers in right-wing extremism (THINK Project, 2012).  
 I engaged with critical pedagogy and in particular, applied a "critical pedagogical 
lens" (Kincheloe et al., 2011, p. 167) to see how I may have 'othered' young 
people when teaching them. Critical pedagogy and critical theory allowed me to 
"plug the theory and the data into one another" (Jackson and Mazzei, 2012, p. vii) 
shaping my theoretical position (discussed in Chapter 4).  However, critical theory 
did not go far enough in illuminating the data to uncover how Muslims had been 
'othered'.  I could tentatively see that the data from the one-to-one interviews 
suggested the 'othering' of my respondents had a political element to them being 




I considered my methodological stance and decided to employ a CoE as a 
research tool to generate questions and produce data from young Muslim men 
and women living in Wales (see also 5.3 and 5.4).  The democratic nature of each 
CoE necessitates that the participants not only drive the enquiry but also steer its 
direction.  The use of a stimulus prior to the enquiry is, in my view, central in 
planting a seed to allow the participants to formulate a question for enquiry.  For 
researchers this potentially may take the nature of the enquiry away from the 
central research question or area for research and the researcher may not get the 
data relevant for their research.  Remembering that the role of the facilitator is to 
progress the enquiry and not introduce his or her agenda requires an act of faith 
that the relevant stimulus is fit for purpose and that any probing questions put by 
the facilitator is to progress the enquiry and not take it into areas that the research 
participants have not chosen.  Nonetheless, an important aspect of the nature of a 
CoE is the production of knowledge which may not specifically answer the 
researcher's question, but may give an insight into the lived experiences of the 
respondents that may be more relevant, insightful, personal and meaningful than 
initially considered.  In this research the Muslim men and women addressed the 
essence or phenomenon of the research but articulated their lived experiences in 
their own ways and in their own voices positioning them as individuals who 
construct and produce knowledge, in a "critical realism" paradigm (Denzin and 
Lincoln, 2011, p. 11) which they interpret through their lived experiences as young 
Muslims living in Wales. 
My research had moved from a general phenomenological perspective to a 




now be interpreted within a paradigm of a shared experience for the young Muslim 
men and women.  Furthermore, my experience and knowledge of the Muslim 
community along with knowledge of theory led me to extend the phenomenological 
perspective to a phenomenological study and finally to adopt an interpretive 
phenomenological analysis of my CoE data.  I hoped the DVD stimulus chosen 
would cultivate a curiosity (LeVasseur, 2003) potentially raising a notion of 
Islamophobia and prompt the respondents to consider how they had been 
'othered' in their lives. 
I have acknowledged the limitations of my initial research design but learned from 
it in order to progress my research by reading my data and seeking out the wider 
literature in order to construct a theoretical framework and position as researcher.  
I now discuss the iterative process in more detail, in particular drawing on the work 
of Jackson and Mazzei (2012) and their ideas around plugging theory and the data 
into one another.   
Traditionally qualitative researchers focus on language for understanding the 
reality of the respondents in research (MacLure, 2013).  I wanted to engage with 
the dynamic reality of the data by using theory to illuminate the words of the 
respondents (Jackson and Mazzei, 2012).  In my data analysis I sought to look 
beyond and between the actual lines of what was said through the process of 
plugging the data into theory to better understand how action in the world acts on 
what is said.  By reading the data alongside the theory I sought to find meaning in 




The move from the process of coding community of enquiry data to allowing the 
young Muslim men and women to "speak for themselves" (ibid, p. viii; Mazzei and 
Jackson, 2012, p. 745) is not a rejection of an interpretive approach but is a way of 
including previously un-thought of data.  By using theory alongside data the 
concepts woven throughout this thesis, for example, the Prevent Strategy (Home 
Office, 2011a), Fundamental British Values (DfE, 2014; ESTYN, 2015) and the 
notion of the 'colonising' of the Muslim mind, "multiple, conceptual perspectives" 
(Jackson and Mazzei, 2012, p. ix) achieve significance in the reading of the data 
rather than resorting to mechanistic coding which potentially may not (Jackson and 
Mazzei, 2012, p. ix).  Jackson and Mazzei (2012, p. 2) refer to the process of 
"plugging in" as a production of knowledge that connects the previously 
unconnected fields of a) reality (data, theory, method), b) field of representation 
(producing different knowledge, resisting stable meaning) and c) a field of 
subjectivity (becoming researcher) (Jackson and Mazzei, 2012, p. 2).  Building on 
their focus on theoretical concepts, I used my theoretical framework and 
postcolonialism to plug into the data and to seek the voice that is not "normative, 
but one that is transgressive" (Jackson and Mazzei, 2009, p. 4) in order to further 
a social justice narrative for Muslims in Britain. 
I engaged with wider literature, theory, and government policy exploring and 
critiquing incidents of 'othering', evidencing them as Islamophobia, where they 
remained unrecognisable to my Muslim respondents.  I considered my reflexive 
position, re-read the one-to-one interviews and considered postcolonialism.  
Revising my analytical position (1), I attempted to illuminate and uncover 




consciousness' (Lukacs, 1971) existed in the 'colonised' social imagination of my 
Muslim respondents.  I used the concept of false consciousness as a way of 
explaining why it potentially hindered Muslims from recognising Islamophobia, 
instead, blaming their 'othering' as a consequence of a lack of knowledge on the 
part of non-Muslims, including the media.  Having recognised and rejected the 
normalising of Islamophobia within a postcolonial construct, the work of Kincheloe 
et al., (2011) referring to this process as committing knowledge to work to help 
address the "ideological and informational needs of marginalized groups and 
individuals" (ibid, p. 164) was useful.  Similarly, taking cognizance of the four areas 
of radical enquiry proposed by Clough and Nutbrown (2002, pp. 24-27), radical 
listening, radical looking, radical questioning, and radical reading is suffused 
throughout the thesis to construct a sound methodological claim.  I revised my 
theoretical position to include epistemic injustice, correspondingly revising the aim, 
research questions and analytical process (2).  I acknowledge that postcolonialism 
has been an effective concept and data analysis tool to locate injustices 
perpetrated against Muslims in Britain and consider my use of postcolonialism as 
a "resistance version of critical theory" (Denzin and Lincoln, 2011, p. 93).  
However, I also recognised the warnings in speaking for the 'other' and lay bare 
my research for the reader when considering my theoretical, positional and 






5.11.1. Table 5.11.1. Illustrating methods used in the initial one-to-one interviews and subsequent Community of 
Enquiries as data collection tools, with limitations and mitigations identified in this research. 
 











Traditional phenomenological  paradigm 
brackets the Phenomenon (Patton, 2015, p.117; 





Semi-structured questions may place 
boundaries on certain areas of discussion.  The 
areas selected for discussion may not be the 
one's the interviewees wish to address when 
speaking about their 'lived experiences'.  
Potential for interviewer effect in silencing the 
voices of the participants. 
The researcher is able to directly ask questions to inform the problem 
being researched (although within traditional phenomenological 
inquiry, the essence is bracketed). However, an Interpretive 
Phenomenological Approach (IPA) (Smith et al., 2009) allows the 
essence to be forefronted, and affords privilege to participants (Noon, 
2018, p. 80) 
 





This research recognised that the respondents may have chosen not 






May not address nor answer the problem that 
the researcher is trying to research due to the 
democratic nature in respondents choosing the 
question for enquiry, although the choice of a 
stimulus allows the enquiry to narrow its focus in 
discussion.  
 
The implications for the analysis of the data lies 
in allowing the data from the CoEs to drive the 
choice of theoretical framework.   
 
Some researchers may want to test their theory 
(ies) with the data, which in the case of CoEs, 
may have been driven in a different direction by 
the participants. 
When engaging with wider literature and theory 
to interpret data, the researcher may seek out a 
confirmatory theory through which to analyse 
the CoE data. It is vital in social research that 
theory attempts to lessen or negate the 
problematic phenomenon and not solely as an 
academic exercise.  
The Community of Enquiry participants decide the nature of the 





A Community of Enquiry is a respectful Philosophical process that 
allows enquiry to return to the roots of Philosophy. 
 
The work of Jackson and Mazzei (2012) was instrumental in plugging 
theory and data into one another to engage in wider literature. 
Prioritising the voices of the CoE participants is vital in social justice 
research, allowing groups of marginalised people to democratically 
choose areas that concern them for discussion and subsequent 
research. An insight into the lived experiences of the respondents 
may be more relevant, insightful, personal and meaningful than 
initially considered by the researcher. 
Engaging with wider literature and theory may take the researcher 
out of his/her comfort zone to areas which may enrich academic 
research. A CoE approach is suited to social justice and pedagogical 
enquiry (Kincheloe et al., 2011, pp. 164-165; Freire, 1970).               
A CoE approach is a pedagogically infused data collection tool 
aligned within the empowering tradition of critical pedagogy, and in 




 A CoE is a safe space for political thought and critique to occur and 
"unafraid to consummate a relationship with emancipatory process" 
(Kincheloe et al., 2011, p. 164), and to challenge perceived 
injustices. Further engaging with theory allowed me to progress from 
postcolonialism to concepts of ideology and false consciousness  
(Lukacs, 1971), which I was able to synthesise to epistemic injustice 







5.12. Analysis of Data 
In the initial reading of both sets of CoE data I identified significant statements 
from each CoE group but at that time could not 'read' the data to understand what 
they were saying.  Succinctly, I was unable to make sense of their lived 
experiences other than be able to recognise themes, specifically, oppression and 
powerlessness, within each CoE.  As the theoretical framework progressed it 
shaped my approach to data analysis.  Following my reading on postcolonialism, 
the Prevent Strategy, and Fundamental British Values, I concluded that the 
concept of 'othering' is essential to understanding and uncovering Islamophobia.  I 
therefore began my analysis of both sets of CoE transcripts by applying 
postcolonial thought identifying areas where the participants told their lived 
experiences of being 'othered'.  This approach allowed me to see how the 
participants articulated Islamophobia, a postcolonial construct, uncovering the 
essence or phenomenon Islamophobia, permitting me to interpret their narratives 
and locate them in the context of postcolonialism which so far, had been 
concealed from analysis.      
I continued by re-reading both sets of CoE transcripts this time employing my 
primary data analysis tool, epistemic injustice, with which to analyse the data.  The 
work of Medina (2013) was instrumental in furthering Fricker's approach by 
allowing me to consider the importance of dissent, epistemic "resistance" and 
"friction" (Medina, 2013, p. 7) as ways in which to further young Muslim discourse 
outside of a postcolonial paradigm.  By employing "epistemic friction" approaches 
(Medina, 2013, p. 27) as "resistant ways of imagining" (Medina, 2013, p. 252), I 




contesting "exclusions and stigmatizations" (ibid).  Medina also allowed me to view 
my interviewees not as informants, but as givers of knowledge (Medina, 2013, pp. 
92-93), thereby allowing Muslim voices to be heard within a paradigm aligned to 
Universal Human Rights discourse rather than an ideologically informed and 
socially constructed postcolonial paradigm . 
Writing in this way took a lot of time and commitment to constant examination of 
the data and expansion of my reading to understand how theory can inform 
practice (Jackson and Mazzei, 2012).  I read the CoE transcripts from the men and 
women (Appendix 1 and 2) separately, allowing my reading of both sets of raw 
data to be interpreted through postcolonial and epistemic injustice lenses, 
constructing two interpretations of the participants' lived experiences of being 
'othered', influencing analysis of the data (discussed in Chapters 6 and 7).  The 
limitations to analysing data in this way are primarily the length of time taken to 
engage with the wider theoretical literature along with the data and in this 
research, government policy.  By engaging with a wide corpus of theory, policy 
and reflexivity, and having the welfare of young Muslims living in Britain as a 
priority, this research provides a practical and theoretical paradigm which young 
Muslims may choose to engage with, in order to further their own agency and 
challenge Islamophobia.   
5.12.1. Standards of Validation and Evaluation  
I return briefly to summarising the methodological perspective adopted in this 




 I have allowed the research questions to emerge during the 
research journey. The lack of uncovering Islamophobia as 
essence or phenomenon during the one-to-one interviews 
allowed me to engage with my personal and professional 
experience and the wider literature to allow the lived experiences 
of the young Muslims in the CoE's to drive the research 
questions by adopting a democratic and philosophical approach 
to enquiry. 
 The CoE is an effective and ethical method to gather sensitive 
and personal data from groups of people who are marginalised 
within society and it prioritises their voice. 
 I make my assumptions clear from the start of this research that 
Islamophobia is the essence or phenomenon to be uncovered 
and position myself reflexively within the research to illuminate 
my subjectivity. 
 I am explicit with the theory used and my synthesis of concepts 
within the research (see Chapter 4). 
 My study has value in answering the "so what?" question 
(Creswell, 2013, p. 255) attempting to make things better for 
young Muslims in Wales.   
I acknowledge my interpretive standpoint which seeks to benefit the Muslim 
community in Wales by facilitating a platform where their voices may be more 
clearly heard.  I acknowledge my reflexive position within the research and have 
made clear my position as researcher with the participants in the Communities of 
Enquiry (Creswell, 2013) see also 5.8.  The "concept of verisimilitude" where my 
writing captures my thinking (Richardson, 1994, p. 521) is a deliberate attempt to 
make clear the decisions made in the research journey to be "clear, engaging and 
full of unexpected ideas" (Creswell, 2013, p. 54).  This research is transparent and 




engaged and have an understanding of the lived experiences of the Muslim men 
and women.  I have interrogated the voices of the young Muslim men and women 
through theories of postcolonialism and epistemic injustice and together these 
corroborate instances of Islamophobia where my respondents have been 'othered' 
and made the focus of epistemic injustices in their lived experiences.  Thus, 
interpretive standards in conducting qualitative research (Richardson and St. 
Pierre, 2005) may be applied to this research to assess its efficacy.   
In respect of phenomenological research, Creswell (2013) asks whether the author 
has an understanding of phenomenology and a clear 'phenomenon' to study; do 
they use procedures of data analysis recommended by Moustakas (1994) or van 
Manen (1997) and convey the overall essence of the experience of participants 
whilst remaining "reflexive" throughout the study (Creswell, 2013, p. 260).  I have 
traced my research journey illustrating (see 5.1.1) and critiquing how I uncovered 
Islamophobia in order to challenge it.  Decisions made in my theoretical framework 
and in this chapter were made to avoid misrepresenting Muslims and at the same 
time provide academic rigour to the research process and findings.  Transparency 
in decision making has allowed me to produce research which is "interpretively 
rigorous" (Denzin and Lincoln, 2011, p. 120) which I extend to my "research 
participants" (ibid) to consider a new paradigm (discussed in Chapter 8) as a way 
of benefiting themselves as Muslims living in Wales to challenge Islamophobia. 
I have made clear my bias and decisions made in respect of bracketing and 
epoche and the use of a CoE as a data collection tool in order to allow Muslim 




my interpretation of CoE data (and the possibilities for variation in interpretation by 
other researchers).  I justify my position as researcher and make clear the values I 
hold throughout the research so that its integrity may be judged.  I now turn to the 
vitally important area of ethics.   
5.13. Ethical Considerations   
5.13.1. My Ethical Stance  
It is important to consider how I came to the research in the light of my previous 
and ongoing professional experiences.  I provide a brief review of my professional 
journey and its impact on this research in Chapter 1, expanding in Chapter 4.  I 
acknowledge how my work as a former police officer and educator in a range of 
contexts impacted in the analysis of the research data and that my reflexive stance 
influenced the interpretive position I adopted in the reading of the data.  I next 
describe how my ethical stance encompasses the areas of interviewer effect, 
informed consent and permission, and finally confidentiality.   
5.13.2. Interviewer Effect and Power Relations During Interviews  
I considered whether my work as a police officer may have had an effect on the 
responses of the young Muslims in both CoE.  My concern was the recognition 
and "understanding" of researcher bias or effect, not its elimination (Delamont, 
2002, p. 8).  I wanted to know how Kim and myself as non-Muslims and 
particularly me as a former police officer may contribute to interviewer effect in 
both CoE.  Although my role was limited to introductions, research conversations 
and managing the audio/visual recording equipment, I was aware of the potential 




presence may have a "bearing on the amount of information" the participants 
would be "willing to divulge" (Denscombe, 1998, p. 169).  
Medina presents an interesting argument that marginalised groups "are often 
forced to hide" certain bodies of their knowledge, for example, that they know 
more about their oppression than their oppressors (Medina, 2013, p. 44).  Denzin 
and Lincoln, (2011, pp. 457-458) interpret silences by respondents on specific 
issues (such as fascism) as evidence of a "scar" or a "wound"  in everyday 
experience, whilst Passerini (1980, p. 9) sees it as a "preoccupation with the 
events of everyday life".  However, further research (along with false 
consciousness) would be called for to substantiate whether interviewer effect has 
any relevance in contributing to respondents choosing to 'hide' the ideology of 
Islamophobia from discussion. 
The Muslim respondents in this research knew I was a former police officer and 
that the 'gatekeepers' Arvind, Oanez and Deeba had knowledge of me and my 
previous work with young Muslims, should they need it.  I recognise that traditional 
forms of qualitative interviewing has the potential for an "unequal power dynamic 
between the interviewer and the interviewee" (Creswell, 2013, p. 173), and that 
this may be more so as a consequence of my association with the police.  I carried 
out research conversations (Farrell, 2005) with both CoE groups, which were 
continued by the facilitator Kim, in explaining the process of the CoE.  These were 
the beginnings of an undertaking addressing any potential imbalances of power.  
This was mitigated through the democratic and pedagogically infused content of 




upon for each enquiry, and they alone decided whether or not they wished to 
contribute to the CoE.  The collaborative nature of a CoE allowed the respondents 
to stimulate ideas from each other contributing to the progression of the enquiries.  
This is a major shift in control from the interviewer to the interviewee where 
knowledge is not found but constructed by each interviewee. 
Overwhelmingly both CoE groups articulated wanting Muslims and non-Muslims to 
have the right knowledge of Islam with some recognising the limitations in getting 
the right information particularly for young Muslims learning about Islam 
(discussed in Chapters 6 and 7).  This may be seen as confirmation of an ethical 
consideration by the respondents since to interpret or synthesise knowledge of 
Islam (other than in Islamic scriptures) is considered  non-negotiable and an act of 
potential apostasy.   
My role as researcher and the role of Kim in facilitating the CoE are recognised in 
the ethical considerations employed in the research process.  The use of the CoE 
is a vitally important consideration in mitigating the potential for interviewer bias 
which was justified in the comments made by interviewees in their responses in 
experiencing the CoE (see Chapters 6 and 7 and transcripts at Appendix 1 and 2).  
I acknowledge that using a stimulus prior to each CoE may be seen as potential 
bias to try and uncover Islamophobia, however I mitigate this charge in the 
methodology by justifying its use in my revised research design.  In Chapter 8, I 
argue potential rationale as to why the interviewees chose to articulate 




Islamophobia.  I continue exploring the content of the research conversations used 
which forms a part of informed consent to which I now turn.       
5.13.3. Informed Consent.  
Prior to conducting both CoE respondents were reacquainted with the research 
information leaflet (see Appendix 4) which outlines the research along with a 
checklist to be read and signed by each respondent.  Additionally, research 
conversations were carried out prior to each CoE (a transcript of the women's is 
available upon request).  The research conversations included introductions, the 
aim of the research, the structure of the recording process, anonymity, safe 
keeping of the data and its eventual destruction including the original mini CDs 
and mini DV tapes at the conclusion of the research.  I explained my role in the 
CoE and the role of the facilitator.  I also explained that following transcriptions of 
the recordings, each respondent would be emailed a copy to check for accuracy.  I 
asked whether everyone was happy to continue and if there was anything that I 
could do to make things better before the research commenced.  Everyone 
intimated that they were happy to continue.  The CoE facilitator Kim then 
continued the research conversation explaining the process of the CoE.  
In her work with children, Farrell (2005, p. 60) refers to this process as making 
"visible the moral work involved in the ethical process of gaining consent from 
research participants (who are children)".  This of course has advantages for 
researchers who, having presented their proposals to the respondents should be 
confident that they have ‘come clean’ and have not held back any important un-




provided with such information that would be likely to influence their decisions 
(Diener and Crandall, 1978). 
Two of the fifteen young women who presented themselves for the CoE were 13 
years of age.  Both were members of the young person's group at the centre and 
were told of the research by two of the youth workers (gatekeepers), Oanez and 
Deeba  (who were in loco parentis of both girls as members of the Centre).  I 
spoke with both girls who recognised me from when I had delivered a project at 
their school (from the research information leaflet, see Appendix 4).  I was happy 
for them to continue as part of the cohort (some of whom were known to them) 
and applying a rationale (that they were competent to be part of the group and to 
continue without parental consent) (Taylor, 2007; Wheeler, 2006) that their voices 
as younger Muslims were important (United Nations Convention on the Rights of 
the Child, 1989; BERA, 2011, p. 6, para.16-24).  Both girls referred to as Naomi 
and Nessa contributed to the CoE (see Chapter 7).  Although the process of the 
CoE is briefly referred to at the beginning of their CoE, it was also video-recorded 
showing Naomi and Nessa interacting and actively contributing to the research 
process with their peers.  
All of the participants were e-mailed a copy of their respective CoE to check for 
accuracy.  None replied saying that they were unhappy or did not want their CoE 
conversations to be used.  I have strictly followed the guidelines for educational 
research (BERA, 2011), particularly with regard to my responsibilities to my 




confidentiality and transparency.  I now turn to explaining how I provided 
confidentiality to my respondents.   
5.13.4. Confidentiality  
In order to provide anonymity to my respondents pseudonyms were assigned to 
each person taking part (Kamberelis and Dimitriadis, 2011).  Each respondent 
selected their own pseudonym known only to themselves and me so that in any 
subsequent reading of this thesis only they would know texts that could be 
attributed to them.  The audio and audio-visual recording were made on mini CD 
and mini DV tapes respectively.  At the conclusion of the research the original 
recordings will be deleted in the presence of two of the key adults referred to as 
Deeba and Oanez and any digital audio/visual files kept by myself deleted.  All 
hard copies have been edited so that respondents remain anonymous and all 
stored data can only be accessed by the author. 
5.14. Conclusion. 
The decision to use a CoE as a data gathering tool with young Muslims was born 
out of attempts to uncover Islamophobia from the one-to-one interviews conducted 
with the key adult Muslims.  At the time I conducted the CoE with the young 
Muslim men and women I was not fully aware of why the one-to-one interviews did 
not uncover Islamophobia.  I conducted the CoE with two groups of young 
Muslims as a way to test a CoE as a method to gather data but was not able to 
'read' and interpret the CoE data.  I further engaged with theory, literature and 
government policy becoming more aware of a potential range of possibilities that 




forefronted Islamophobia as a stimulus in both CoE to uncover it in the lived 
experiences of young Muslims.  My research journey was an 'iterative' process 
(see diagram 5.1.1) where only after understanding the data by engaging with 
theory (Jackson and Mazzei, 2012) was I able to interpret the data within 
postcolonial constructs.  Recognising the warnings of speaking for Muslims in 
postcolonial terms I moved to consider how Islamophobia may be hidden and 
protected, synthesising false consciousness to epistemic injustice which shaped 
my research questions.  
I have provided a transparent research process through which the research 
methodology and methods used allow Muslim voices to be interpreted in order to 
identify, locate and challenge forces that 'other' them.  The process employed 
along with theoretical positioning informs the wider literature and addresses a gap 
in knowledge of how Muslims living in Wales articulate their lived experiences of 
Islamophobia.  I now turn to the analysis of the CoE beginning with the Muslim 




6. CHAPTER 6: DATA  ANALYSIS OF THE COMMUNITY OF ENQUIRY 
CONDUCTED WITH THE COHORT OF MUSLIM MEN. 
6.1. Introduction 
In this chapter I present the transcript of the community of enquiry carried out with 
9  Muslim men (Appendix 2).  I refer to the original transcript by line numbering.  
My analysis of the transcript is woven through the chapter as the question for 
enquiry is identified and explored by participants.  Five key and related ideas are 
explored during the enquiry: 
 being made to feel different; 
 media influence on Muslims without knowledge of Islam; 
 media influence on non-Muslim's knowledge of Muslims and Islam; 
 the lack of knowledge of Muslim young people of their religion; 
 the lack of knowledge of non-Muslims of Islam. 
Thinking with the ideas identified in Chapters 2 and 3, I identify postcolonialism 
and securitisation as underpinning concepts that informed the enquiry.  Drawing 
on the ideas of Miranda Fricker (2007) and Jose Medina (2013), I recognise 
Islamophobia as a lacuna that impacts on Muslim ability to speak out and creates 
epistemic relations and practices which cause both Muslim and non-Muslim to be 
wronged as epistemic subjects.  I identify discriminatory epistemic injustice that 
includes identity prejudice, credibility deficit, testimonial and hermeneutical 
injustice, as important concepts that I use to analyse the discourse of the 
respondents, in order to shed light on how Muslims are wronged as epistemic 
subjects in Britain today.  I begin by providing brief pen-pictures of the 




have subjected to critical analysis using the key concepts of Islamophobia and 
discriminatory epistemic injustice. 
6.2. Brief Pen Pictures of the Respondents 
The nine Muslim men who took part in the community of enquiry originated from a 
range of social backgrounds encompassing those studying at a local university 
(including foreign students) and those in employment.  Some of the men knew 
each other and others were introduced for the first time.  The men at university 
used the on-campus Mosque while the others had attended Mosques either in the 
North of England or in South Wales.  The brief pen pictures that follow are limited 
in their description to preserve the anonymity of the Muslim men. 
 Abdullah: Is in his late 20s and is educated to degree level in social 
sciences.  He is in full-time employment in a large public sector 
organisation. 
 Abdullah B: Is in his early 20s and in full-time employment with a 
predominantly non-Muslim workforce.   
 Arikarikam: Is in his early 30s and in full-time employment as a qualified 
youth worker.  
 Bongo: A foreign student is in his early 20s studying at a South Wales 
university.  He lives in Tanzania, East Africa.  
 Carlito: Is in his early 20s and is in full-time employment. 
 El-Fino: Is a full-time university student in South Wales. 
 Mr Fish: Is in his late teens and is a full-time university student. 
 Sandman: Is in his early 20s and is in full-time employment. 




6.3.  Introduction to the Community of Enquiry. 
The Community of Enquiry (CoE) took place at a community centre on the 6th 
October 2012.  A research conversation was carried out prior to the CoE and a 10-
step process was followed to progress the CoE. 
Step 1: Choosing a stimulus for enquiry. 
A ten-minute video 'Being Me' was selected.  The DVD focuses on audio/visual 
face-to-face interviews with young Muslim men and women about their 
experiences of Islamophobia in Swansea.  The recording also included 'vox pop' 
(popular opinion represented by informal comments) street interviews with 
members of the public who were asked what Islam and Muslims meant to them. 
Step 2: Presentation of the stimulus 
The DVD was shown to the group. 
Step 3: Individual thinking time. 
Participants were asked to take some time to reflect and make notes on what the 
DVD made them think about. 
Step 4: Forming questions 
The men were split into four groups and were asked to formulate a question they 
would be interested in discussing.  The following were offered for enquiry and in 




6.3.1. Question 1. Why is it when Muslims do bad, their religion is 
the main cause of blame regardless of other factors e.g. 
nationality and personality? 
Bongo justified the choice of question saying that whenever Islam is discussed, 
Muslims are framed as doing bad things such as committing terrorist acts.  
Negative framing is not applicable for non-Muslims committing crimes and they are 
not judged by religion.  Bongo continued saying that a person committing crime 
should be judged on their personality or nationality rather than religion.  This 
suggests the group is aware that as Muslims, they are targeted as a suspect 
community by the media who misrepresent Islam and Muslims focusing on 
criminal acts and categorising Muslims as potential criminals and terrorists. 
Discussion 
Bongo lives in Tanzania, East Africa, where approximately 35% of the population 
are Muslim and 61% Christian.  The remainder of the respondents live in Britain 
which has a Muslim population of approximately 4.8% (Office For National 
Statistics, 2012).  Bongo suggests that Muslims in Britain are primarily judged by 
religion while non-Muslims are not.  The group believe the media deliberately 
misrepresent Islam linking Islam and Muslims to criminality, specifically terrorism.  
Bongo says the media should report on the person committing the offence and not 
their religion suggesting that knowledge of Muslims living in Britain is manipulated 




6.3.2. Question 2. Why is there Isolation between Muslims and 
wider community? 
Step 5:  Abdullah B spoke on behalf of his group and referring to the media and 
specifically the film industry that influence society's perception of Muslims through 
negative portrayal.  He spoke about a lack of knowledge by non-Muslims about 
Islam and Muslims, as well as the isolation of Muslims who have been rejected by 
the wider society.  He suggested there were many issues that could be discussed 
if their question were selected from many angles. 
Discussion 
The isolation experienced by the Muslim community and rejection as a community 
from wider society, stems from the perception propagated by sections of the media 
that they are a suspect community.  The men suggest a lack of knowledge of 
Islam and Muslims makes society more likely to be influenced by the media that 
contributes to Isolating Muslims from wider society (Hopkins and Gale, 2009).   
6.3.3. Question 3. Do you really know Islam?  
Abdullah B explained that their question asked whether people judge Islam by the 
actions of the Muslim and not by Islam which is pure.  Abdullah B's group were 
concerned that Muslims who do not have the correct Islamic knowledge 
misrepresent Islam and by inference the wider community, who were not seeing a 
true picture of Islam because of the 'impurity' of the Muslims who do not know 
Islam.  He went on to say that Muslims who do not know their religion, confuse 
cultural practices with Islam to the extent that they are unsure of the 'laws' 




misrepresent them and should be more responsible.  Abdullah B also said that his 
group thought the media should know more about Islam and their reporting post 
9/11 demonstrated a lack of knowledge.  He concluded by saying that the group 
believe knowledge of Islam should be a focus of greater depth in religious 
education lessons in schools.   He said that he knew Islam, had good knowledge 
of Islam and was aware that terrorism is not a part of Islam. 
Discussion 
This discussion argues that good Muslims should know their religion and that 
Muslims who do not know their religion are just as culpable as the media in 
misrepresenting Islam and Muslims.  They believe that more education and 
knowledge of Islam to provide a counter-argument against misrepresentation by 
the media is needed. The group identify the importance of education for both 
Muslims and non-Muslims.  
6.3.4. Question 4. Do common stereotypes influence your own 
perception about Islam, even though you are Muslim?  
 Abdullah argues that a lack of knowledge of Islam by non-Muslims and Muslims is 
detrimental.  He makes a reference to the stimulus employed at step 2, where 
British Muslims were shown to say that they were proud to be British or Welsh 
Muslims.  Abdullah was critical of some of the Muslims shown in the DVD for not 
knowing their religion and doubting whether or not terrorism has a place in Islam.  
He said that such a lack of knowledge of Islam would jeopardise the claims made 
that they are proud to be Muslims.  Abdullah said that this was an "identity crisis 




counter abuse levelled against them or their religion.  He said someone who was 
Bengali, Pakistani, or Polish would be able to counter racist claims.  He  believed 
that a lack of Islamic education by Muslims and non-Muslims was to blame.  He 
continued by referring to news coverage the previous day about the extradition of 
Baba Ahmad (Ahmad and others, 2013).  The media had only shown the photo of 
Abu Hamza when there were four others involved in extradition proceedings who 
were not like Abu Hamza but were portrayed as being similar by the media.  He 
concluded by inferring that the media were selective in their news reporting 
showing video news footage of the banned so-called Islamic group Al Muhajiroun 
(an alternative name for the proscribed group Al Ghurabaa) (Home Office, 2017) 
protesting, when moderate Muslims considered the extradition of some of the 
group illegal and immoral and all five cases different.   Abdullah B supported 
Abdullah agreeing that the media misreport and that there is a feeling that Muslims 
are being targeted, saying, "but that's another question". 
Discussion 
The group argue that stereotypes exist in society and are normalised to a degree 
that Muslims are not exempt from stereotyping.  They know both Muslims and 
non-Muslims lack knowledge of Islam and that the media exploit this by 
associating terrorism and Muslims.  It therefore follows that Muslims who do not 
have knowledge of their religion are not only unable to put forward a counter-
argument but may also doubt whether violence is part of their religion.  Abdullah 
suggested a lack of knowledge about their religion could lead to an identity crisis.  
Muslims may be able to put forward a counter-argument when racially abused, but 




led to an interesting conclusion by the group suggesting that Muslims without 
Islamic knowledge may also be considered as culpable in stereotyping Islam and 
Muslims as the media.   
Summary 
The concepts evident in the four questions put forward by the Muslim men include 
the following:  
 
1. Muslims are negatively stereotyped by the media as being a 
suspect community linked to acts of terrorism. 
2. Muslims feel isolated and rejected from wider society. 
3. Knowledge is the key to understanding Islam and Muslims.  
Knowledge is needed by Muslims in order to be able to put forward 
counter-arguments to support and defend Islam and is vital for 
Muslims to understand their identities as Muslims; knowledge can 
be manipulated by the media to their detriment. 
Step 6: Voting 
A 'blind' vote was carried out to choose one question to explore further during the 
CoE. The question chosen was No.4: 'Do common stereotypes or media influence 
your own perception about Islam even though you are Muslim'? 
Discussion 
The Muslim men recognise that narratives of their identity as Muslims are 
controlled which is reflected in their choice of question for discussion.  Their choice 
of questions additionally encompasses an affirmation for Muslims to know their 
religion better and so be knowledgeable enough to put forward a counter-




negatively stereotyped by the media.  They want to address injustices of 
stereotyping, isolation, rejection, and 'othering' by wider society.  They know that 
having the 'right kind of knowledge' will help them challenge being 'othered'.  Thus 
in this early stage of the enquiry the respondents are seen to be keen to challenge 
easy generalisations and assumptions about Muslims perpetrated by sections of 
the British press and its presentation of Muslims as 'all the same'. 
Step 7: The Enquiry: First thoughts 
Respondents sit in a circle facing each other to address the chosen question: 'Do 
common stereotypes or media influence your own perception about Islam even 
though you are Muslim'?  The group whose question it was are invited to begin.  
Abdullah was the first to respond to the question:  
I think in my own view a lot of Muslims are totally affected by what they 
see in the media and also about common stereotypes, it gives a kind of 
inferiority complex that people doubt certain aspects of their faith 
because they don't have the knowledge about Islam or about that 
subject matter (lines 31-34).  
Here we see how the CoE approach allows room for thoughts on the meaning of 
the question.  Abdullah has recognised that the media link terrorism with Islam and 
Muslims.  He introduces a theme that constantly reoccurs in this research that 
Muslims need to have knowledge of Islam.  It is a lack of knowledge of Islam that 
works against the interests of Muslims in not being able to effectively challenge or 
counter stereotyping of them.  Abdullah continues, "and so for example, the key 
question would be does terrorism have a place in Islam?" (line 34).  Abdullah has 
taken it upon himself to forward his own question (rather than the one chosen by 




importance of having the 'right' knowledge of Islam.  Abdullah has recognised that 
the view presented by the media infers Islam endorses terrorism and by 
association Muslims must be treated with caution lest there be terrorist 
sympathisers among their ranks (Edwards and Cromwell, 2018).  Abdullah says 
that he is knowledgeable about his religion (from reading the Quran and from the 
readings of the Prophet Mohammed), and that he obtains his information from 
different sources (other than the media).  He says that Muslims who do not have 
knowledge may believe that terrorism does have a place in Islam. 
Abdullah believes that knowledge of Islam and Muslims are negatively 
manipulated by the media, and that some Muslims may be influenced by this 
(Petley and Richardson, 2011; Fekete, 2009; Morey and Yaqin, 2011). He 
supports his assertion by giving an example of Muslims who 'joke' about fellow 
Muslims being overtly Muslim in appearance as being likened to the 'Taliban' (lines 
31-33). The implication of this example are that Muslims who make jokes do not 
have sufficient knowledge of Islam to know that terrorism does not have a place in 
Islam.  Abdullah is aware that the media portray Muslim protesters as "angry and 
crazy" (line 46), even though "we have legitimate protests" (line 44).  Abdullah is 
making an important distinction between Muslims (such as himself) who have 
Islamic knowledge and are secure in their Muslim identity to publicly display it and 
those who do not.  This manifests itself, for example, by growing a beard and 
trimming the moustache in line with the teachings of the Prophet Mohammed.  He 
contrasts this view with those who he believes lack the knowledge to separate 




Muslims without knowledge may be seen as suffering from testimonial injustice as 
a result of being misinformed by the media; they have a credibility deficit (Fricker, 
2007) compared to fellow Muslims who have Islamic knowledge.  They are not 
however, victims of testimonial injustice in the eyes of the public that agree with 
the media and Muslims without knowledge do not voice a challenge which will be 
given a lesser credibility (Fricker, 2007) by the wider non-Muslim public.  I argue 
that Muslims without knowledge suffer from the effects of Islamophobia and 
hermeneutical injustice as they remain part of the Muslim community and are 
wronged in their capacity as subjects of social understanding (Ibid).   
I further argue that negative reporting of Muslims and Islam by the media 
influences the social imagination of the wider non-Muslim British public 
contributing to conditions of postcolonialism existing for Muslims.  Islamophobia 
occupies a lacuna in the social imagination of the British public displacing the 
potential for ethical concerns for Muslims to exist there.  This allows for an "unduly 
deflated credibility judgement" (Fricker, 2007, p.  22) towards Muslims.  Medina 
argues that practices of resistance or contestation by oppressed subjects are 
"epistemic friction" (Medina, 2013, p. 16) and that we should look for possibilities 
of resistance in every discursive practice.  Abdullah believes (in this instance) that 
a counter-argument or "epistemic friction" (ibid) to challenge Islamophobia is for 
Muslims to learn about Islam.  Medina (2013, p. 17) further argues that to fight 
against ignorance one has to: 
...know oneself and others in certain respects, to learn and facilitate the 
learning of others, to resist epistemic vices and to work toward 
epistemic virtues, to meliorate epistemic habits and attitudes, and in 





The need for Muslims to have knowledge of Islam is seen as a way for Muslims to 
disassociate themselves and Islam from terrorism to deter fellow Muslims living in 
Britain from believing that terrorism is part of their religion.  When significantly 
different perspectives are available to us and we question areas of our lives we 
may become "perplexed" (Medina, 2013, p. 18) and our perspectives interrupted 
"by the flow of familiarity and obviousness" (Medina, 2013, p. 19) preventing us 
from engaging in epistemic friction.  I argue the transmission of Fundamental 
British Values (FBVs) by the media and others works against "interrupting the flow 
of familiarity and obviousness" (ibid).  Such conditions hinder Muslims from 
becoming perplexed, engaging with epistemic friction and achieving epistemic 
justice.  "Perplexity and self-estrangement are of the utmost importance for 
cognitive, affective, ethical and political learning; democratic sensibilities depend 
on them" (Medina, 2013, p. 19).  However, when one form of moral position is 
'normalised', for example the notion of FBVs, the "perplexities we feel in the 
normal course of everyday life" (ibid), which can arouse our "social sympathy" 
(Medina, 2013, p. 19) with others is thwarted. 
Step 8: Middle words  
Carlito built on Abdullah's assertion that Muslims in Britain were portrayed by the 
media as potential terrorists by providing an example from his own experience 
when after the events of 9/11 a teacher in his Mosque (Rochdale area) did not 
want to talk about terrorism and "it wasn't until later life I actually from my religious 
views I discovered that terrorism isn't part of my religion" (line 52).  This concurs 
with Muslims being uncomfortable addressing issues that which have no place in 




interrogated and interpreted.  Carlito was left to find out for himself that "terrorism 
isn't part of my religion" (line 54).  Carlito recognised the need to negotiate his own 
understanding of Islam and discovered something that contradicted his early 
experiences and here he recounts his move to a more adult religious identity.  This 
insight into how he has coped with the impact of Islamophobia that labels him as 
'terrorist' came from his own resources not from his Mosque. 
It is an important consideration that some teachers in Islamic centres for example, 
Mosques and Madrassas are reluctant to address terrorism when Muslims are 
being accused of being terrorist sympathisers. The failure by Mosques to address 
issues affecting young Muslims is a recurring theme within this research and is 
one I have considered as 'othering' in the context of Postcolonialism.  However, as 
Medina argues, "nobody can be exempted from the obligation to resist and to 
contribute to the formation of a kaleidoscopic social imagination" (Medina, 2013, p. 
22).  Carlito believes none of the tutors from his Mosque wanted to discuss 
terrorism with him because of his age, even though he made it known he wanted 
to know more about Islam and terrorism.  Carlito had made the connection 
between Islam and terrorism and wanted clarification to assuage doubts. The gap 
or lacuna in his knowledge had been filled with messages from the media who 
misrepresented Islam and Carlito did not have the hermeneutical resources to 
counter the widely held perceived link between Islam and terrorism. The tutors at 
Carlito's Mosque could have helped him, however, I assume they failed to 
recognise his cognitive inability to find out whether terrorism was a part of his 
religion.  Carlito was subjected to a hermeneutical injustice (Fricker, 2007) in being 




knowledge.  Although Mosque tutors were also part of a hermeneutically 
marginalised group they failed in their "epistemic duties" to engage in "epistemic 
friction" and to strive toward achieving "epistemic justice" for young Muslims 
(Medina, 2013, pp. 17-22).  
The Mosque members who were charged with passing on Islamic knowledge were 
"participating unequally in the practices through which social meanings are 
generated" (Fricker, 2007, p. 6) and were afraid they would be misrepresented by 
others due to them being seen as part of a 'suspect community'.  The Mosque 
members that decided he was too young to understand terrorism, even though he 
was seeking knowledge about it, also hermeneutically marginalised him.  The only 
knowledge he had of Islam and its perceived association with terrorism, had been 
constructed by the media.  Carlito did not have the knowledge to challenge 
messages from the media nor agency to exercise "epistemic friction" (Medina, 
2013, p. 18).  Fricker, (2007, p. 153) argues that, "the notion of marginalization is a 
moral-political one indicating subordination and exclusion from some practice that 
would have value for the participant", which lends support to my argument that the 
Muslim mind may be 'colonised '.  
Abdullah B agrees with Carlito that the media influences some Muslims providing 
examples from the Islamic society at university.  He says that over the past five 
years: 
...many of the students have come up to me and they have told me that 
their parents told them not to join the Islamic society and that's because 
the media making the Islamic society as a hot bed for extremism and 
you hear you know in the news, Islamic societies, the presidents of 




and that kind of stuff or attempting to blow people up and they think 
'ooh', even the parents are thinking 'my son', especially the sons more 
than the daughters, yeah, are going to an Islamic society event or 
something like that, is going to label them a terrorist and especially 
when people become more observient [sic], maybe from a physical 
point of view, maybe he starts growing a beard or he starts 
praying...many Muslims come from a background where the family are 
not that religious, so many...the family themselves don't really pray and 
all that, so some families, for example, the kids or students, ...lots of 
Muslims are learning Islam from a society because they are staying with 
their fellow Muslims and when they start doing stuff that perhaps their 
parents should be doing from a religious point of view, the person starts 
thinking 'wow, look what the media says, is my son becoming the next 
Osama Bin-laden' or something like that, because the media is giving 
that perception to them and that is quite daunting from the kid's point of 
view because they are a bit confused...they think they are doing a good 
thing but unfortunately you know media stereotypes (lines 58-74). 
Abdullah B knows his fellow Muslims at university connect spiritually with each 
other while on campus but their parents and family members are concerned that 
they risk being labelled as terrorists or are becoming terrorists. He is aware that 
some parents are influenced by media misinformation which they pass on to their 
sons and daughters as being fact and that some Muslim students attending British 
universities have gone on to commit terrorist offences even though this has been 
proven to be factually inaccurate (Thomas, 2016).  Some parents believe that on-
campus Islamic societies are linked to terrorism or being recruiting agents for 
terrorist organisations and that their sons are at risk (Saeed and Johnson, 2016).  
The men believe their parents and families are not able to question media 
misinformation about this due to a lack of Islamic knowledge.  This makes them 
suffer from a situated hermeneutical inequality in that "a collective hermeneutical 
gap prevents them from making senses of an experience which it is strongly in 
their interests to render intelligible" (Fricker, 2007, p. 7).  They pass on incorrect 




hermeneutical injustice as 'knowers'.  Furthermore, they suffer from a testimonial 
injustice and in their capacity as 'givers' of knowledge as their knowledge of Islam 
is partial and incomplete.  However, Abdullah B has knowledge of Islam and 
believes that as a possessor of 'true' Islam (which he obtains from reliable 
sources), he is qualified to give knowledge to British non-Muslims to 'put the 
record straight'.  He believes he is able to exercise "epistemic friction"  (Medina, 
2013, p. 7) and that the wider non-Muslim public can hear him.  Abdullah B is a 
member of a marginalised group who are given a lower credibility in their 
testimony and he is therefore subjected to hermeneutical injustice.  He is also the 
subject of "testimonial justice" as a giver of knowledge, even though he believes 
given the opportunity, he will be heard (Fricker, 2007, p. 7).  Medina (2013, p. 27) 
argues that "members of groups that have been systematically disadvantaged" are 
often depicted as intellectually inferior, given less credibility than other members of 
groups which can lead to their "capacity to impart knowledge to others and to 
receive knowledge from others" being negatively affected (Medina, 2013, p. 28).  
Abdullah B possesses Islamic knowledge so may be considered privileged as a 
knower among his peers and parents.  He may also be given credibility in his 
testimony as a young Muslim with other Muslims.  However, as a Muslim living in 
Wales his testimony is given lesser credibility as conditions of postcolonialism 
sustain widespread Islamophobia.  
Bongo challenges the perception that linking Islam and terrorism is a generational 
issue because of a lack of knowledge and offers a counter-example.  He says that 





...events that are happening in the society and how the society interact 
with each other.  So it is just recently it's been a situation whereby in 
Islam, there is a direct link between Islam and terrorism.  Now this direct 
link ... is a perception ... most people get informed about Islam is from 
the media, you see, and this media is not taking responsibility ... they 
are just taking the one part of the story and but they are not showing the 
other part of the story, you see? (lines 81-88).  
It is not clear whether Bongo's reference to the media being to blame stems from 
his experiences while studying in Britain or from his life in Tanzania.  He is aware 
that the media may distort 'perception' or knowledge of Islam and that people are 
more likely to be influenced by how society interacts with each other rather than 
parental influence.  It is clear that the media are one of several influences that 
contribute to postcolonial conditions existing for Muslims sustaining Islamophobia.  
Muslims are subjected to hermeneutical injustice (Fricker, 2007) from a lack of 
knowledge about them and are hermeneutically marginalised as a consequence of 
a gap in their hermeneutical resources being filled or 'colonised' by media 
misinformation.  For some Muslims an absence of knowledge may lead to a 
response or epistemic resistance to pursue a route of violent extremism, which 
may (for them) be seen as a form of "epistemic friction" (Medina, 2013, p. 16).    
Mr Fish challenged Bongo saying that he believed it was a generational issue and 
gave an example from his experience.  He believes his parents' generation saw 
the news as being 'gospel' whereas younger Muslims accessed social media 
rather than mainstream news.  Mr Fish continued saying that his family had told 
him not to grow a beard (as a visible signifier of being a Muslim) because he would 
not get a job and "I said if that's the case then that's it isn't it?  That's the world 
then so I'm not going to like adapt myself just to get a job - that's just pathetic 




who were Islamophobic but decided his Muslim identity was more important.  This 
contrasts with his family who believe he would be considered less employable 
identifying as a Muslim instead of as a Pakistani young man.  Mr Fish knows that 
being identifiable as Muslim may harm his chance of employment but is clear his 
identity as Muslim is more important.  Mr Fish recognises his family are aware of 
negative identity prejudices against Muslims and want him to hide his Muslim 
identity.  They believe that non-Muslim employers consider him untrustworthy and 
have situated him as both sufferer of hermeneutical and testimonial injustice 
(Fricker, 2007).  Mr Fish says his family believe the media, making them 
possessors of incomplete knowledge which they pass to him.  As a way to contrast 
his parents' generation being  'othered' by the media Mr Fish says that young 
British Muslims get their knowledge from social media (which I argue he believes 
to be more accurate than the media) and that he is confident to display his 
'Muslimness' even at the expense of lessening his opportunity for employment.  Mr 
Fish has recognised structural identity prejudices against Muslims in Britain and 
has been hermeneutically marginalised by membership of a marginalised group.  
Furthermore, his chances of employment in a predominantly non-Muslim British 
workforce may be lessened by his testimony as a Muslim being given lesser 
credibility (Fricker, 2007).  In fact, concealment of identity or "strategic ignorance" 
(Bailey, 2007, p. 77) and "social silence" (Medina, 2013, p. 117) by Muslims to 
protect themselves from Islamophobia or to promote mobility has been well 
documented. 
In recognising that they are marginalised the young Muslim men have "beneficial 




misinformation.  However, Muslims without knowledge who are marginalised by 
media misinformation linking them with terrorism may be seen as having 
"detrimental epistemic friction, censoring, silencing, or inhibiting the formation of 
beliefs, the articulation of doubts, and the formulation of questions and lines of 
enquiry" (ibid).  In this thesis I argue postcolonialism and Islamophobia sustain 
detrimental epistemic friction.  
Abdullah B agreed with Mr Fish that there was a generational gap with Muslim 
parents who had migrated to Britain for economic purposes with the: 
...utopian goal of going back to their country and living in a villa, living in 
a mansion, perhaps I'm going too much into our culture, too much yeah  
(laughs), but what's happened 30/40 years down the line, they actually 
settled down here.  They haven't realised that.  Most of them in their 
70s now they still thinking 'I want to go back home again'. Most likely, 
no offence here, but their graves are going to be in [name of town]" 
(lines 110-115). 
Abdullah B continued by saying that young Muslims are now more in touch with 
reality than their parents, considering themselves as British and that he should be: 
...able to print my identity inside British society and so we're a bit more 
free...you know...we don't feel that we need to conform to you know, 
make our people happy, so I think the parents probably have a bit more 
inferior complexity than the kids themselves. We were born into a 
society where we probably interacted with the whites more than they do 
and so it's not actually a big deal.  They actually think it's a big deal but 
it's actually not a big deal (lines 121-126). 
 
Abdullah B is progressing an argument that their parents' generation consider 
themselves to be temporary or migrant workers dreaming of returning to the 
country of their birth.  The young Muslims want to be seen as British citizens and 




him taking some time from work to pray but that his wider relatives and a lot of the 
older generation would not ask their employer for time to pray (lines 129-135). 
Abdullah B knows there are differences in how his generation and the generation 
before view 'Britishness' and citizenship. His parents' generation position 
themselves as being subservient even though their wish to return 'home' is likely to 
be a 'pipe dream'.  They remain 'othered' in Britain unable or unwilling to 
assimilate or 'print their identity' as British Asians and British Muslims.  They locate 
themselves as 'cultural Muslims' who are unable to counter media attacks on 
Muslims and Islam due to a lack of knowledge of religion.  Their sons have enough 
knowledge to know their religion but have not articulated so far that they are able 
to forward a counter-argument themselves.  Abdullah B says he should be able to 
"print his identity" (line 121) within British society, but has not said if he is able.   
Fricker helps us to think about Abdullah B's ideas differently.  Using Fricker's lens 
we can see that previous generations of Muslims have been "wrongfully excluded 
from the community of trusted informants" and "demoted from subject to object, 
relegated from the role of active epistemic agent" (Fricker, 2007, p. 132).  They 
have been confined to "the role of passive state of affairs from which knowledge 
might be gleaned" (ibid).  Older Muslim generations accepted subservient 
citizenship which Fricker allows us to name as hermeneutical marginalisation 
(Fricker, 2007). 
Abdullah B believes that his parents' generation have not embraced their 
entitlement to British citizenship, which Abdullah B demands as a young Muslim 




education shaped their lives and how they are hermeneutically marginalised (ibid).  
Without a voice they adopt a "self-imposed public silence" (Medina, 2013, p. 102) 
which may be their only choice, and is an example of postcolonial conditions 
existing for them.  However, Abdullah B is not content for this to happen to him 
and seeks political justice to challenge the "political dysfunction" (Medina, 2013, p. 
87) which silenced his parents' generation reflecting their testimonial virtues being 
both moral and epistemic (Medina, 2013, p. 86).  The theories of Medina (2013) 
and Fricker (2007) depart here with Fricker maintaining the primary harm done to 
a speaker as a knower, is an ethical harm (Fricker, 2007, p. 44).  Medina furthers 
Fricker's claim by including a moral and political revision to her theory, allowing for 
the "differential treatment of entire groups" (Medina, 2013, p. 88) to be 
encompassed.  Medina qualifies his revision and expansion of Fricker by calling 
for "sustained political action and deep interventions in social and political 
structures" (Medina, 2013, p. 86) when the "normative structures that govern our 
epistemic, ethical, and political lives become corrupted" (ibid).  I argue Prevent and 
FBV contribute to normalising Islamophobia and that the epistemic excesses of 
authority and credibility on the part of the wider non-Muslim public spoil epistemic 
character creating a meta blindness or a meta-insensitivity to the plight of Muslims 
living in Wales requiring a "political reeducation that touches on all aspects of 
people's lives in common" (Medina, 2013, p. 89).   
Abdullah then returns to the theme that their parents still see themselves as 
economic migrants: 
I think a lot of the parents who come to this country, they see 
themselves as guests of this country and on any occasion where you 




that Islam or whatever in the media, if it's going to antagonise the native 
community, basically, even if that makes people feel uncomfortable or 
whatever they want to avoid that at all costs ...and so there is a real 
problem in that we see the parents and we also have to look at most of 
our parents especially in the Asian community, Pakistani, Bengali, most 
of our parents come from a country which is pretty much illiterate.  A big 
proportion of the community/population is illiterate, particularly the 
women and so most of their knowledge of Islam, they can't rely on 
books or texts or articles to arrive at an understanding of Islam, this 
limits their knowledge and so this is a real problem. Because we know 
English and because there's a lot of texts and a lot of Islamic scriptures 
that have been translated into English, we have a lot more access to 
Islamic knowledge than our parents and so their understanding and 
ideas of Islam is slightly different to ours, and that's why we tend to say 
that they are very traditional in their views (lines 136-155). 
Abdullah uses the term 'traditional' to describe subservience among his parents' 
generation who see themselves as guests and not citizens in Britain.  He blames a 
lack of English language for poor Islamic knowledge and that their knowledge of 
Islam has come from the media.  By associating Islam with terrorism it has brought 
his parents' generation into conflict with younger educated Muslims.  The use of 
the word 'natives' by Abdullah (lines 144-145) referring to non-Muslim white 
citizens and 'guests' to refer to Muslim parents are examples of postcolonial 
thought which reinforce subservience.  The word 'native' also has an association 
with colonial European rule for example, 'colonised' however, as argued in this 
research the emphasis is the 'colonising of Muslim mind'. 
It is unclear whether previous generations of Muslims were subjected to 
hermeneutical injustice as membership of a marginalised community or due to 
limited English language capabilities and lesser agency were unable to engage in 
citizenship.   If the latter were to be the case then they would not have been 
hermeneutically marginalised as the definition requires this to be systematic.  This 




'informant' is considered a "good informant" or has "markers of 'trustworthiness" 
(Fricker, 2007, p. 130) which would not undermine the informant in their capacity 
as a speaker. Fricker describes 'good informants' as having signs of "positive 
markers" in that such speakers have a proven track record in being truthful 
(Fricker, 2007, p. 117).  Similarly, Fricker distinguishes between two kinds of 
socially produced silences based upon identity prejudices.  In the first instance 
groups may be silenced by not being included in communicative exchanges 
referred to as "pre-emptive testimonial injustice" (Fricker, 2007, p. 130).  In the 
second instance a group may be allowed to communicate but they are only treated 
as "sources of information" (Medina, 2013, p. 92) who convey information but not 
as informants, subjects of knowledge or "epistemic agents" (Fricker, 2007, p. 133) 
who convey information.  This is an important distinction which this research 
recognises and prioritises, particularly when using a postcolonial construct to 
locate areas of injustice and equally using epistemic injustice to interpret the 
voices of young Muslims.  I also recognise and acknowledge that "public silences 
should not be equated with a complete expressive and interpretive capacity" 
(Medina, 2013, p. 101) and that other oppressed and marginalised groups have 
used silence or have appeared to be "silent on the outside" (Medina, 2013, p. 102) 
as ways of finding safe spaces of interaction, and hidden communicative 
processes (Mills, 2007). 
Abdullah continues by exploring how Mosques cater for older generations of 
Muslims by employing Imams who speak Bengali or Urdu but may not be able to 
speak English.  This allowed the early generations of migrant Muslims to have 




Muslims are not able to understand.  Abdullah says the generational gap is never 
bridged because of a lack of qualified Imams who can be understood by everyone. 
Each Mosque caters for its own community and its home language (lines 155-66). 
Abdullah's claims suggest that knowledge of Islam is negotiated by older Muslim 
men at the expense of younger ones.  They want an Imam who can speak English 
so they can access Islamic knowledge which is vital for constructing their identity 
as British Muslims and to be able to address identity crises.  If this is the case, the 
young Muslims suffer from a hermeneutical injustice and are hermeneutically 
marginalised (Fricker, 2007) in being denied knowledge from the Mosques who 
prioritise the older generation of Muslim men.  The older and possibly 'respected' 
Muslim men are preferentially treated in the distribution of knowledge leading 
some younger Muslims to turn to social media to get knowledge and potentially be 
misinformed by the media about their religion.  It may be that some Mosques rely 
on interpreting Islam through a cultural rather than Islamic lens which serves the 
need of less informed older Muslims.  This appears to be recognised by educated 
younger Muslim men who are aware of the differences between cultural and true 
Islam for example when their 'traditional' (lines 136-155) parents interpret Islam 
through a prism of culture and heritage and not Islamic scriptures.  A "silence" by 
older men at Mosques (Medina, 2013, p. 102) to address terrorism may have also 
been influenced by the events post 9/11 where oppressed groups are justified in 
"maintaining their oppressor's ignorance and inability to make sense of certain 
experiences until a more equal participation in hermeneutical practices is available 
to all" (Medina, 2013, p. 117).  Medina differs from Fricker (2007) in his views of 




such responsibilities because it is the ethical thing to do.  Medina (2013, p. 140) 
extends epistemic responsibility to challenge those who seek to hide their actions 
in individual or "collective ignorance".  Medina (2013, p. 144) introduces a 
"cognitive minimum" of social knowledge to achieve "responsible agency" to 
extend epistemic injustice so it may be identified.  I consider a denial of knowledge 
about Islam and culture, though reinforced as a consequence of oppressive 
legislation, lends support to the argument that postcolonial 'othering' exists for 
Muslims in Britain. 
Carlito continues the theme of Mosques by saying that when he lived in a northern 
British town his uncle was the chairman of the Mosque.  After the older Imam died 
an Imam who was able to speak Urdu, Arabic and English was employed.  Carlito 
said the new Imam was able to pacify the older generation saying, "when you 
came here you had an Imam to explain everything to you in terms you could 
understand.  You know everything.  You've been here, now it's our time to teach 
the younger generation" (lines174-176).  Carlito said he was able to speak to the 
Imam about personal issues which he could not have done with the previous Imam 
and that it would be good if all Mosques could offer that (lines 178-184).  Carlito 
wanted knowledge from an Imam but was initially hermeneutically marginalised by 
being unable to access knowledge from his parents due to their lack of knowledge 
and absence of an English-speaking Imam.   
Sandman agreed with Carlito saying that his Mosque kept the old Imams who 
focused on aspects not important for modern day young Muslims and that they 




don't understand Gujarati ... so I never used to benefit from any of the talks" (lines 
189-191).  Sandman continued: 
I felt intimidated too. I would never ask them about any personal issues 
because firstly I didn't understand them and they probably would not 
have spoke English with me and I think again a lot of the time it's a lack 
of education in a sense for the youth and um, also the elders in a sense 
too (lines 192-195).      
Sandman has identified an obstacle in getting knowledge of Islam because of 
language barriers.  He recalled how he attended a Madrassa to listen to talks from 
the Imam but could not understand him.  He said that he didn't learn anything and 
couldn't approach the Imam for advice on personal matters.  Sandman also felt 
unable to approach his family for help and said that a lot of the time: "it's a lack of 
education in a sense for the youth and um, also the elders in a sense too" (lines 
194-195).  Sandman says both young people and the elder community are missing 
out on being educated at Mosques due to language barriers between themselves 
and the Imam.  The concept of credibility is an important element in epistemic 
injustice and is being articulated by the Muslim men to explain how knowledge of 
Islam and being Muslim is managed by Mosques.  The voices of the younger 
Muslims are given less credibility than the older men positioning them as being 
hermeneutically marginalised (Fricker, 2007) due to their age and status in the 
Mosque community and as subjects of social understanding (ibid).  However, as 
argued earlier it may be that the older men are suspending their hermeneutical 
obligations (Medina, 2013, p. 117) as a way to challenge the dominant media 




I Initially thought that Sandman was criticising a lack of education by young people 
and elders in not being able to speak the language of the Imam.  However, the 
thread of the discourse was a lack of Islamic knowledge due to the Imam not being 
able to speak English, which was confirmed by Abdullah B who said: 
...the last portion of the talk has been about the elders but it does also 
affect a lot of the youngsters in the sense... a lot of parents... the 
Muslim generation back three generations, the really elder generations 
were quite religious and quite traditional, then the ones in between, 
probably in their fifties or their forties, they are not as religious and 
some of them are not they are not religious at all... they are having 
children who know nothing whatsoever about their religion.... so they 
are learning their Islam from the media itself... so, whatever the media 
portrays, they start thinking 'is that what Islam really is'? ...but they have 
no background knowledge whatsoever and, in a sense, that is affecting 
their faith... the media is affecting their perception of Islam (lines 199-
211).  
Abdullah B is confirming what has been said previously about their parents' 
generation not knowing religion but instead learning about it from the media.  A 
lack of Islamic knowledge subjects their parents to hermeneutical injustice 
(Fricker, 2007) in that the knowledge they have of their religion is incomplete, 
manufactured and distributed by the media.  Conditions of epistemic injustices are 
spread to their sons who, being unable to access knowledge from Mosques are 
also subjected to hermeneutical injustice (ibid).  A lack of agency in accessing 
knowledge is additionally indicative of postcolonial conditions existing for Muslims 
living in Britain.  Returning to epistemic injustice Medina (2013, p. 120) argues 
that: 
It is indeed very hard to live up to one's epistemic responsibilities under 
conditions of oppression and systematic injustice, but not for everybody 




Bongo returned to how the media misrepresent Islam and Muslims saying that 
many young Muslims are attracted to the entertainment industry but there are 
movies that inaccurately portray Muslims, for example in their depiction of 
terrorists on film who are portrayed saying "Alahu Akbar" (line 221) prior to the 
detonation of explosives or whilst committing terrorist acts.  Bongo clarified that 
the term used (which in translation means 'God is great') had been corrupted by 
the entertainment industry to such a degree that "Muslims themselves say 'no I 
won't say God is great in Arabic in case...I'd rather keep quiet' " (line 228).  Bongo 
recognises that Muslim agency has been restricted by the corruption of a 
commonly used Muslim expression by the entertainment industry.  They have 
taken an Arabic phrase used to praise God (Allah) turning it into a phrase used by 
terrorists for the consumption of Western audiences and at the expense of causing 
"enormous chaos in Islamic countries" (line218).   Knowledge of Islam has been 
constructed linking Islam and Muslims to acts of terrorism.  Appropriation of 
language by the entertainment industry has subjected Muslims across the world to 
suffer epistemic injustices by misinformation being spread and normalised.  It 
manifests in permitting Muslims to repeat an incorrect understanding of 'Jihad' and 
restricted their agency to avoid saying 'Jihad' because they believe it has a 
connection to terrorism. This makes them suffer testimonial injustice as knowers 
and givers of information of their religion (Fricker, 2007).  The use of the word 
'Jihad' by anyone may allow them to be considered as a victim of testimonial 
injustice in that they are wronged in their capacity as a giver of knowledge which is 
a falsehood.  However, this is dependent on the context in which the word is said.  
For example, if both hearer and speaker know the correct meaning of 'jihad' then 




The entertainment industry, in similar ways as the media, stereotype Muslims as 
potential terrorists and inculcate the social imagination of the wider non-Muslim 
public a normalising of Islamophobia and that according to Medina (2013, p. 129) 
"the normalization of a presumed justice and the concomitant abnormalization of 
injustice have important ideological effects".  Medina further argues that such 
injustices contribute to active bodies of ignorance being formed, perpetuating 
injustices and making us insensitive to the suffering of others (Medina, 2013).    
Abdullah builds on Bongo's remarks by discussing how religion, including 
Christianity, are viewed in the United Kingdom by the liberal media: "I think religion 
is generally perceived as something that is against science and something that's 
backward, you know something of the old that needs to be let go" (lines 231-233).  
Abdullah continues by making comparisons between Muslims and Christians for 
example, when atheist authors such as Richard Dawkins (see for example, 
Dawkins, 2007) and the late Christopher Hitchens attack religion (see for example, 
Hitchens, 2007).  Abdullah argues that Muslims have to deal firstly with attacks on 
faith generally being perceived as backward (Brown and Richards, 2016), also the 
negative stereotyping of Islam (lines 234-240).  Abdullah continues by exploring 
how the media stereotype Muslims by linking them to political events that may be 
interpreted in several ways which: 
...complicates things even more for the Muslims, ...because this is 
where the real identity crisis comes from ... more complicated that 
religion where you got like every person has their own political ideas 
and opinions um and what we see in the world is sometimes most of us 
feel as though we are under attack and I'm saying this quite clearly; I 
think people think their Islamic faith is under attack from certain forces 
...and this complicates things a lot more for them because, for example, 
the war in Iraq and the war in Afghanistan; those people who are 




Muslim activists, when they talk about some of these issues then 
sometimes they are perceived to be disloyal to this country or 
something or against the native population but that's not the case, it is 
that they have different, they interpret politics differently um because 
um they are not really directed from the newspapers, but they actually 
go to the sources um and comments like David Cameron when I think 
he was in Germany I think the EDL (English Defence League) were on 
the march the same day and he made this you know he said that 
multiculturalism had failed and the same comment was made in 
Germany and then we see the rise of the far-right parties in Belgium 
and Switzerland and France and other countries as well and then you 
see like George W Bush saying 'you are with us or against us' and so 
people think that Muslims sometimes think their faith is under attack 
and when they speak out against it, they are normally engaged in 
political activities and that's where the news from the cameramen 
catches them and this is what kind of fuels this stereotype and 
Islamophobia in society (lines 242-261).   
Abdullah is aware that Christianity in Britain has declined and that some 
commentators are broadly hostile to faith.  He returns to the theme referred to 
earlier where Muslims experience an "inferiority complex" (line 32) due to being 
stereotyped.  Abdullah now refers to Muslims having a "real identity crisis" (line 
242) as a result of Islam being drawn into political events around the world and by 
linking Islam and Muslims to conflicts or "war" in Iraq and Afghanistan (line 248).  
Abdullah recognises that Muslims may have different political views but that in the 
end they are all stereotyped as being 'Muslim' by the media particularly when 
Muslims are protesting in Britain.  Their identities as political activist or protester is 
always forefronted by their Muslim identity and they are presented as being anti-
British with their loyalties aligned to Iraq or Afghanistan.  The perception that 
Muslims are anti-British is widely held and is an element that contributes to 
widespread Islamophobia and attacks on British Muslims (Esposito and Kalin, 
2011; Faith Matters, 2018) further supporting the argument that conditions of 




politically aware are not "really directed from the newspapers but they actually go 
to sources um and comments like from David Cameron" (lines 252-253).  This 
concurs with previous comments made in the CoE confirming that Muslims without 
knowledge learn about Islam from the media while those who are knowledgeable 
get their information from other sources.  It may be that the Prevent Strategy 
(Home Office, 2011a) is constructed to lessen the agency of politically-minded 
British Muslims who want to protest against government policy particularly with 
regard to its effects in the Middle East.  In associating legitimate political protest 
and dissent by British Muslims to notions of anti-Britishness, the media and 
government have 'othered' Muslims in political and democratic discourse setting 
Muslims apart from society.  Abdullah has made the connection of a perceived 
disloyalty to Britain by protesting Muslims referring to the speech in Munich of the 
then Prime Minister David Cameron.  Cameron attacked multiculturalism as being 
dead and warned British Muslims to be more British and to follow Fundamental 
British Values (Cameron, 2011).  Abdullah is also aware of the irony in the timing 
of Cameron's speech which was delivered on the day the English Defence League 
(EDL) marched in Britain against Muslims.  He concluded by noting the rise of the 
far-right parties in Belgium, Switzerland and France and in comments made by 
George W. Bush to Muslims "you are with us or against us" (lines 257-258).  
Abdullah has interpreted Bush's comments to refer to the Muslim community 
whereas Bush's speech was directed at anyone supporting terrorism and not 
specifically to Muslims (The Guardian, 2001).  Abdullah is mistaken in assuming 
Bush was calling for Muslim assimilation into Western life and relinquishing their 
identity which is the antithesis of a multicultural society.  In contrast to Bush's 




reinforce notions of Britishness in order to create a perceptive difference between 
Muslimness and Britishness.  Cameron's vision was later shored up by curriculum 
and legislative control and maintained by sections of biased media reporting.  It 
appears that there are no 'safe spaces' for Muslim voices to be articulated in the 
British political arena without them being labelled as anti-British. 
The young Muslim men practice Islam to a greater degree than their parents.  
Their parents know this could bring their sons into conflict with a Western view of 
Islam and Muslims in Britain and are keen that their sons avoid conflict.  The 
Muslim men are educated in their religious beliefs and recognise the media in 
Britain misrepresents Islam and Muslims.  They also know that political rhetoric 
and security legislation seeks to limit their agency as Muslims by positioning them 
as a suspect community.  The effects of distorting their identity as Muslims living in 
Britain creates epistemic disadvantage for them. 
Abdullah has addressed several issues of concern to himself and his fellow CoE 
respondents where liberal commentators debate a decline in religious beliefs for 
Britons (Field, 2018).  I consider the trend of being a less religious society in the 
context of Muslim testimony and epistemic injustice.  During testimonial 
exchanges for example, between believer and non-believer, a person with a belief 
in a faith may suffer an epistemic injustice when their belief is questioned.  
However, for it to be epistemic in its nature it would require that prejudice exists 
rather than a difference of opinion in faith or belief in religion (Fricker, 2007).  If 
there is prejudice toward Islam and Muslims then I argue that Muslims are the 




for Muslims to understand whether 'attacks' (lines 234-261) on Islam are founded 
on belief or prejudice, presenting further challenges to Muslims in understanding of 
Islamophobia.  Medina (2013) initially makes the distinction between the 
responsible agent who has self-knowledge and knowledge of the environment and 
those who have knowledge of the intentional states of others under special 
circumstances.  Minimal knowledge of both states does not mean that the person 
is not a responsible agent, whereas a total lack of self-knowledge or a total lack of 
knowledge of the intentional states of others "is sufficient to disqualify someone as 
a responsible participant in discursive practices" (Medina, 2013, p. 125).  
However, "when an agent is systematically deceived about her own intentional 
states, we do not consider her a responsible agent" (ibid).  Medina further argues 
that minimal knowledge is not enough for responsible agency and calls for a 
"minimal social knowledge of others and minimal empirical knowledge of the 
world" (Medina, 2013, p. 127).  Medina calls for the "presumption of epistemic 
authority in all the different areas of ordinary knowledge required for everyday 
activities" (ibid).  The implication being that the wider non-Muslim public should 
have a minimal knowledge of Islam and Muslims living in Wales.  However, the 
existence of widespread Islamophobia which is responsible for "pervasive 
epistemic injustices" (Medina, 2013, p. 128) prevents agents from attaining 
responsibility and their epistemic authority is in fact an epistemic deficit.    
Abdullah B continues the theme of Muslim citizenship and injustices perceived to 
have been committed against British Muslims by citing the example of the 





...we had Mosques around the UK with an epetition with over 150,000 
Muslims signing a petition because and we had a lot of non-Muslims 
signing that petition because they thought it was unfair with the law that 
you could extradite a British citizen to America, but you can't do it the 
other way around, with very minimal evidence whatsoever and so that's 
partly why we had a big response.  Unfortunately he failed the appeal, 
but we have a twitter generation and so on who believe may be Babar 
Ahmad today, your son tomorrow, we don't know why we still don't 
know why he is being sent to America, we still don't fully know why 
because they still didn't represent the full evidence... you know it feels 
like we are under siege again you know because apart from one 
suspect the rest are Muslims you know... the guy who tried to hack into 
the American system, the rest of the suspects are all Muslim and most 
of them British-born Muslims so it just makes it more complicated (lines 
296-306). 
Abdullah B clearly believes the British authorities capitulated to American security 
services in allowing the extradition of a British citizen to America with what he 
believes to be minimal evidence.  Abdullah B referred to an 'epetition', used as a 
way to protest against the extradition of Baba Ahmad and that it had failed.  He 
continued saying that: "we have a twitter generation" (line 300), intimating online 
and social media platforms are preferable means of protest for Muslims instead of 
protesting in public where they are misrepresented by the media or vulnerable to 
arrest.  Abdullah B uses the terms "British citizen" (line 298) and "British born" (line 
305) emphasising that 'Muslim Britishness' is not the same as 'Britishness' and 
that the extradition of British citizens would not go ahead if it were not for the fact 
that four of the five men are Muslim, citing "the guy who tried to hack into the 
American system" (lines 304-305) as being the only non-Muslim to face 
extradition.   
Abdullah B believes the British government are guilty of structural identity 
prejudice (Fricker, 2007) by ignoring the 'epetition' to challenge the extradition.  He 




may be your son tomorrow for something" (line 301) suggesting that the law had 
been circumvented for British Muslims.  This indicates that Muslims in Britain have 
been subjected to a hermeneutical injustice by their membership of a community 
"wronged in their capacity of social understanding" (Fricker, 2007, p. 7).  Medina 
differs from Fricker by way of introducing privilege as "white ignorance" (Medina, 
2013, p. 108).  I draw on Medina to illustrate how white ignorance, an injustice, are 
both "epistemic and non-epistemic (e.g., economic, legal, political) interests" (ibid).  
Medina (2013, p. 108) argues that the white community, "those without resources 
to understand their racial identities and experience" do not suffer the practical 
consequences of being victimised by racial ignorance.  Although hermeneutically 
disadvantaged, it is in their interests to comprehend white privilege to improve 
their understanding making them responsible agents.  To acknowledge this would 
make them "vulnerable, undermines their authority, and requires them to pay 
attention to things that can be uncomfortable and disempowering" (ibid).  
Abdullah responds to the theme of Muslims not being able to express themselves 
politically saying: 
...when we were told to you know express our opinion, freedom of 
expression, express freely but the moment that the people were 
beginning to express themselves especially with regards to political 
events, then they are under siege.  I think that's when they feel like 
certain events that have happened, I don't know why they should be 
targeted for example the Muslims when they use, they are under the 
radar, are being checked and so on and when they go to the airports 
and so on.  It's like what happens is that sometimes, like, if you have a 
broad mind sometimes some of the decisions and policies that have 
been made is basically meant to try to kind of create an internal barrier 
around the Muslim mind that you can't express regarding politics, 
outside that, if that makes sense... if you talk about certain events then 
sometimes there is suspicion that you may be under the radar.  We are 
not talking about extremists; we are just talking about people who are 




Abdullah is expressing the view that young people are encouraged to speak freely 
exercising freedom of expression.  However, he knows Muslims who do so draw 
attention to themselves as "being under the radar" (line 317) suggesting they have 
yet to be brought to the attention of the security services.  Abdullah believes being 
politically vocal and Muslim alerts the security services risking further scrutiny as 
potential terrorists and gives examples of Muslims who are 'racially profiled' 
(Morey and Yaqin, 2011).  Abdullah goes on to speak about decisions and policies 
which create "an internal barrier around the Muslim mind" (lines 315-316) which I 
interpret to be the effects of the government's counter-terrorism strategy, 
specifically the Prevent strategy (Home Office, 2011a) which had received 
widespread condemnation for unfairly targeting Muslims.  Abdullah articulated that 
to be political was to be considered anti-British and a potential terrorist, "you can't 
express regarding politics outside" (line 316).  His analogy of "an internal barrier 
around the Muslim mind" (lines 315-316) is indicative of postcolonial conditions 
existing for Muslims and was recognised by Abdullah who is politically well-
informed.   
The messages received by Muslims are they are viewed as potential terrorists and 
are "under siege" (line 310-311).  This is an epistemic injustice (Fricker, 2007).  
The presence of Prevent may also be seen as "an alternative to a reified 
panoptical state" (O'Toole et al., 2016, p. 166) in controlling Muslim agency.  
These conditions have been referred to in this research as a 'colonising of the 
Muslim mind' and support the argument that conditions of postcolonialism exist for 




Abdullah believes the government does not make a distinction between Muslims 
being politically vocal or active and Muslim extremism (lines 316-318), and is 
subjected to an epistemic injustice in that his democratic right to protest is 
restricted for fear of prosecution.  This is an infringement on his democratic rights 
as a British citizen and an infringement of his human rights (Human Rights Act 
1998).  He is also part of a "hermeneutically marginalized" community (Fricker, 
2007, p. 152) and by "negative identity prejudices" (ibid, p. 35) from Islamophobia 
where there has been "an unreliable empirical generalization" (Fricker, 2007, p. 
32) about Muslims in Britain. 
To further Medina's (2013, p. 108) argument of "white ignorance" and "white 
privilege", and acknowledging that postcolonialism exists for Muslims in Britain, I 
consider how Abdullah articulates being subjected to a white colonialist gaze.  It 
may be that the West has recreated a version of the Orient allowing for an 
"epistemic irresponsibility" (Medina, 2013, p. 189) where the "interrelated cognitive 
minimums of social knowledge of others and self-knowledge are violated" (ibid).  In 
Chapter 4, I employed the concept of 'false consciousness' synthesising its use to 
one of hermeneutical injustice as a way of illustrating how the effects of a 
postcolonialist Islamophobia protects it from being understood.  In similar ways, 
Medina argues for cognitive minimums so as to achieve epistemic responsibility 
(Medina, 2013, p. 85; pp. 119-135). 
 Abdullah B responds by making reference to a joke among his Muslim friends that 
George Galloway, then a Member of Parliament for the Respect Party (Robinson 




supporter for the state of Palestine, can get away with criticising British foreign 
policy.  However, he continued, should a Muslim do so, they would be locked up in 
Paddington Green (a high security police station) (lines 319-324). 
Abdullah B has returned to the theme of Muslims unable to lawfully protest like 
non-Muslim Britons, without having a genuine concern they may be arrested.  As a 
consequence of feeling they are unable to protest Muslims are denied a voice in 
influencing policy to benefit them, for example, changing the legal definition of 
Islamophobia which could afford them some protection and potentially lessen its 
effects.  This may allow the virtuous hearer (Fricker, 2007, p. 169) to challenge 
hermeneutical injustice (Islamophobia) to bring about hermeneutical justice (ibid) 
for Muslims in Britain.  By failing to effectively challenge Islamophobia the British 
government is contributing to Muslims in Britain becoming victims of hermeneutical 
injustice.   
To support a challenge to negative influences of concepts including the Prevent 
Strategy, FBV and conditions of postcolonialism, I turn to Medina (2013, p. 252):    
...when it comes to injustices that concern issues of knowledge, 
ignorance, and interpretation we need to address how the social 
imagination can become exclusionary and stigmatizing, making certain 
groups vulnerable to expressive and epistemic harms, and promoting 
the social tolerance of their suffering. 
I argue negative reporting by the media, the introduction of Prevent, and notions of 
FBV absolved the wider non-Muslim public from a degree of epistemic 
responsibility and positioning them as bystanders (although as May (2010) argues, 
legal responsibility is shared with the moral responsibility of bystanders).  Medina 




processes and their subjective accompaniments simultaneously".  Having argued 
that structural processes negatively affect Muslims in Britain, I also acknowledge 
Medina's "resistant imagination" (ibid) which requires our imaginations become 
"pluralized, polyphonic, and experimentalist"  (Medina, 2013, p. 252).  I provide 
examples of resistant imagination in the CoE from the responses of Arikarikam 
and Abdullah B who discuss how the media look to Muslims to condemn acts of 
terrorism.  Arikarikam responds to Abdulla B saying: "I think there is some do you 
know, do you mean like condemning bad things?" (line 333).  
Abdullah B confirmed he believed a lot of Muslims do condemn (bad things) but 
the media do not want to listen (or report).  He gave examples of The Sun 
(newspaper) reporting "a so-called cleric is calling the 9/11 bombers 'the 
magnificent 19' " (lines 340-341), saying that it was not the view of the majority of 
Muslims. "The Sun ain't going to sell four million newspapers per day saying oh 
Muslims are saying they are against the burning of the (laughs)... rather what they 
say is 'those Muslim guys with beards, shouting Allah' and burning down the 
Embassy...that is going to sell" (lines 336-338). 
Abdullah B confirms the view that the media stereotype Muslims and fail to report 
Muslims who speak out against acts of terrorism.  He said that he doesn't know of 
any Muslim who has condoned acts of terrorism and he believed that this was the 
view of the majority of Muslims (lines 335-341).  What is not clear is whether the 
media fail to report Muslims who speak out against acts of terrorism or whether 
Muslims do not feel able to publicly criticise these acts.  This raises the question  




which they are not able to interpret to modern day meanings (Eaton et al., 2008) 
(notwithstanding terrorism has no place in Islam and is not supported by the 
majority of Muslims living in Britain). 
Abdullah B knows Muslims who condemn terrorist attacks but also that the media 
fail to report Muslims who do so.  Muslims living in Britain are not represented by 
any single organisation nor is there a spokesperson to represent them.  Due to 
structural inequality, Muslim voices are effectively silenced as a consequence of 
being hermeneutically marginalised as Muslims.  Abdullah B has demonstrated he 
has a "resistant imagination" (Medina, 2013, p. 252) in recognising the role that 
the media have in "distorting and excusing the suffering" (ibid) of his fellow 
Muslims in Wales and that Muslims are negatively portrayed, in order to "sell four 
million newspapers per day" (lines 336-338).  The perceived lack of a Muslim 
response concurs with a suspension of "hermeneutical obligation" (Medina, 2013, 
p. 116) in that it is prudent for Muslims to be out of the news, maintaining a "social 
silence" (ibid, p. 117) given that a climate of widespread Islamophobia exists for 
them.  Arikarikam offers a counter-example to Abdullah B: 
...yes there are some also who believe um why should we condemn it? I 
didn't do anything.  And I reckon it's the majority. I'm not sure how 
everyone else feels here but the majority will think um 'why should I 
condemn it? Of course it is a bad thing' see what I mean? Yes, I'm a 
Muslim but I was not there you know? Um, also, for example, um what 
Carlito said before, yes, people were scared to talk about things and 
they still are scared to talk about things.  You always have to watch 
what you say and I'm not sure if that is the case for everyone but if you 
say the wrong thing then you can land yourself in trouble and may have 
a policeman knock your door or ring your telephone saying 'how is this?' 
Don't grow your beard, there were some people mentioning that um 
'don't grow your beard'. I was told myself that when I went on the lesser 
pilgrimage to Mecca when I came back I was in the Mosque like five 
times a day you know I was really spiritual I had a buzz you know.  




was a family member now', 'because they might be watching you'. 
'What do you mean? 'Who?' And you know there's a conception that 
you know, yeah, you're being watched.  You know, what we do, what 
we say will have a huge impact.  We could end up in the cells without a 
reason.  I mean, I don't think there is anybody here I'm not sure and I 
think the majority as well who don't believe or actually believe they can 
end up in the cells without a reason and this is just a personal thing 
because there have been many people who have just gone in for 
nothing, but it was just a perception and also media, also influencing 
(referring to the question chosen for discussion on the flip chart)...or 
influencing perceptions, your own perceptions as a Muslim.  I think if 
you have the basic knowledge, I don't think the media can influence you 
that much um because you have a point of contact to go to talk to 
people, real people who you know, know their thing and you can talk to 
them, OK, and get your answers like Carlito said if you have an Imam 
you can talk but then the ones who don't have much knowledge then 
there's a vulnerability there as well that they could be researching 
themselves and who knows what they could find..." (referring to 
Muslims who look on the internet for Islamic guidance) (lines 343-367). 
Arikarikam has articulated a counter-argument to challenge dominant media 
narratives.  He  believes the majority of Muslims in Britain do not condone acts of 
terrorism carried out in the name of Islam, but also do not feel the need to 
apologise for something that they are not responsible for.  He returns to the theme 
of Muslim agency speaking of issues that he believes will bring Muslims to the 
attention of the security services. "People were scared to talk about things and 
they still are scared to talk about things.  You always have to watch what you say" 
(lines 347-348) and not looking too Muslim, such as growing a beard for fear of 
being arrested and "end up in the cells" (line 357).  Arikarikam is citing a genuine 
fear by Muslims that they are a 'watched community' and that those without the 
basic knowledge of Islam are so afraid to speak about or question sections of 
Islamic knowledge that they may turn to the Internet for information rather than ask 
someone.  There is a fear that they will be arrested and "are scared to talk about 




English-speaking Imam to give them knowledge of Islam which, they claim is not 
widespread in Britain.  Additionally those without basic knowledge of Islam are 
more likely to believe the media reports about Islam and Muslims.  Arikarikam 
makes the distinction between those who have knowledge and those who do not 
in the degree to which the media influences them, referring to his fellow Muslim 
participants as having knowledge.   
Repeatedly, the effects of the anti-terrorism laws (Home Office, 2011a) and 
negative media reporting influences those Muslims who are perceived not to have 
knowledge of Islam, and creates "an internal barrier around the Muslim mind" (line 
315-316), limiting their agency to discuss issues they feel are important. The 
notion of an 'internal barrier' that limits discussion suggests that being viewed as 
anti-British is a matter of concern for Muslims.  The Prevent Strategy, notions of 
FBVs and not being able to celebrate their religion publicly positions Muslims 
outside multiculturalism and into securitisation.  Corruption of knowledge about 
them is an epistemic injustice allowing their testimonies a lesser credibility and 
engendering "hermeneutical injustice" (Fricker, 2007, p. 7) for Muslims.  "The 
cognitive minimum violated" in this instance, (Medina, 2013, p. 139), a lack of 
knowledge of Muslims, supports the argument that a weakening of multiculturalism 
has allowed for securitisation (which manifests as Islamophobia) to occupy a 
lacuna in the social imaginations of non-Muslims.  Although Arikarikam recognises 
the value of having Islamic knowledge as a counter to internalising corrupted 
knowledge of Islam and Muslims, he is nevertheless unable to publicly articulate 
his views because he is part of a hermeneutically marginalised group.  




participate in meaning-making and meaning-expressing practices" (Medina, 2013, 
p. 109) but there is a hermeneutical lacuna occupied by widespread Islamophobia, 
the dynamics of which "block new forms of understanding and foster 
communicative dysfunctions" (Medina, 2013, p. 111). 
Abdullah B responds to Arikarikam quoting an incident after the 7/7 bombings in 
London (London Assembly, 2006).  He recalls how the management committee at 
his London  Mosque stopped all activities for young Muslims, being concerned the 
authorities "might get suspicious" (line375).  He continued, "they didn't want them 
(the authorities) to make them feel suspicious all of a sudden, even though 
everyone knew they were very spiritual guys" (lines 375-376), "we also had a 
cleaner who was cleaning our area saying 'why is your Mosque open? It should be 
shut down'.  He was saying it to people going to the Mosque, 'because your 
religion is the one you know that is you know attacked' and that kind of stuff" (lines 
377-381). 
The management committee at the London Mosque were aware that young 
Muslims would be targeted for abuse.  They chose to curtail their 'Muslimness' by 
restricting public events that would highlight Muslim identity afraid it may bring 
young Muslims to the notice of the security services.  This comment conflicts with 
what was said earlier in that those with knowledge would not necessarily believe 
that innocent Muslims would be arrested and "end up in the cells" (line357).  I 
assume the management committee have Islamic knowledge, but that local 
tension in the area around the Mosque necessitated prudence.  The management 




subjecting them to abuse.  Their decision to limit injustices from occurring by 
curtailing the young people's Muslim identity is seen by Medina (2013, p. 117) as a 
suspension of hermeneutical obligation or responsibility.  Furthermore, possessing 
knowledge of Islam was not enough for them to challenge the widespread view 
that Islam and terrorism are connected.  The Mosque decided that the young 
people going to and from the Mosque would bring them to the attention of the 
security services, even though the Mosque knew the young Muslims to be "very 
spiritual guys" (line 376).  The Mosque management were subjected to 
hermeneutical injustice (Fricker, 2007) in that they knew the widely shared public 
knowledge about them in Britain disadvantaged them in being able to display 
Muslim identity.  They were "silenced" (Medina, 2013, p. 117) in public, unable to 
present a counter-argument marginalising them in their Muslim identity and 
'othering' them as British citizens in conditions of postcolonialism.    
Abdullah B continued the theme of Muslims having to apologise for acts of 
terrorism in Britain saying: 
...it is not something done in our religion...done in our name and we 
don't see the politician Tony Blair or...making hundreds of apologies of 
what happened in Iraq yet he has not apologised...do you know what I 
mean? And that is affecting the Muslim mentality and that is bad (lines 
389-392). 
He returned to the theme of Muslims who have a lack of Islamic knowledge: 
...there is a concept of the hypodermic syringe model right? Or slowly 
getting de-sensitised (laughs)... basically um especially from Muslims 
who are not educated for example...might not be as into the religion, the 
more and more media exposure Islam is bad...Muslim is bad, this is 
bad. The first time you may think, 'oh it's just  the media', ...but the more 
you keep bombarding them with it..., slowly, slowly, slowly they will start 
believing that message. They will slowly get desensitised to it.  I do 




vulnerable to you know believing what the media is saying (lines 392-
399).   
Abdullah B is unable to publicly criticise the decisions Tony Blair and his 
government made in respect of the invasion of Iraq.  He is aware that political 
decisions made by the government have implications for the Ummah globally in 
that attacks on Muslims worldwide affect British Muslims, who are not able to 
publicly articulate their concerns.  He feels there are 'double standards' when 
Muslims are pressured to apologise after terrorist attacks but this does not apply to 
Tony Blair whom he sees as responsible for Muslims abroad being killed. 
The analogy of a "hypodermic syringe model"11 (line 393) by Abdullah B, is used to 
justify and expose an approach used by the media that he sees as being 
responsible for influencing some Muslims in Britain.  Medina (2013, p. 109) argues 
that maintaining privilege can be a "powerful source of resistance against 
expanding one's hermeneutical sensibilities" and that a hermeneutical insensitivity 
or white ignorance has resulted in an active ignorance that protects the privileges 
and also "hides complicity with oppression" (ibid).  Abdullah B concludes by 
reiterating his fellow respondents saying that Muslims without Islamic knowledge 
are vulnerable.  He continues saying that Muslims need to have more knowledge 
of their religion so that they will not be influenced by the media and will be 
equipped to forward a counter-argument against attacks on Islam and Muslims 
and have a Muslim identity in British society.  He does not say how or whether it is 
possible to exercise Muslim agency to speak about international issues affecting 
                                            
11
 This is also referred to by Lala in the data analysis of the CoE with the women in Chapter 7. See also 




Muslims in Britain, but he is fearful that Muslims will not embrace Muslim identity 
due to media misinformation about Islam.  It may be overwhelming for some to 
locate a lacuna "where the name of a distinctive social experience should be" 
(Fricker, 2007, pp. 150-151) and recognise Islamophobia, which is protected from 
being seen as 'different'.  Fricker (2007, p. 150) recalls how "speak outs" were 
created for some women to speak of their sexual intimidation long before labels 
such as 'sexual harassment' for example, were used to be able to describe it.  This 
research has used the term 'platforms' to describe a way for Muslim voices to be 
articulated and heard.  Muslims in Britain are still looking for platforms from where 
they can challenge Islamophobia which remains 'normalised'. 
Abdullah B knows that Muslims are vulnerable to injustices caused by believing 
media misinformation and that their identities as Muslims is negatively affected.  
He believes that knowledge of Islam will provide some defence for Muslims who 
are affected by being negatively stereotyped.  However, their collective 
testimonies as knowledgeable Muslims will not be heard because of a structural 
identity prejudice against them.  
Bongo responds to Abdullah B by returning to the theme of the Ummah quoting a 
story attributed to United States congresswoman Michelle Bachman who said 
falafel should be banned  "because this is the Jihadi's food"  ('Jihadi'- the common 
misinterpretation of a word denoting a 'struggle for a good cause') (everyone 
laughs) (line 404).  Bongo continues saying: 
Now just think if this passes into law and given the United States is a 
close ally to Britain, you could see it could just easily spill over to the 




that ok if they start that to falafel hmm we'll go to shawarma (Arabic 
food) (everyone laughs) after that they may say what else comes from 
Arabia the after a few seconds into Arabic music and the Koran and 
God knows what else (lines 404-409).   
Bongo is repeating a widely circulated story subsequently proved to be false 
(Nisita, 2012; Weber, 2012).  However, he believes the story is true and continues 
to tell of a seemingly plausible decision to ban falafel due to it being linked to 
'Jihadis'.  Although Bongo is the subject of a hoax, he passes his knowledge of the 
hoax to his fellow respondents prompting Abdullah B to tell a similar anti-Muslim 
story.  The difficulty for Muslims to get accurate knowledge has been a recurring 
theme throughout the CoE with the consensus being that Muslims who are 
knowledgeable are able to recognise media misrepresentation.  When faced with 
'another' story purporting to marginalise Muslims and Islam the men accept what 
they have been told as true.  
They are subjects of a "situated hermeneutical inequality" in that:   
...their social situation is such that a collective hermeneutical gap 
prevents them in particular from making sense of an experience which it 
is strongly in their interests to render intelligible (Fricker, 2007, p. 7).   
The young people believe the story about Muslims because it is integral to 
previous narratives which have 'othered' them, and has prevented them from 
looking for other sources of information that would have revealed the story as 'fake 
news'.  In ways that the wider non-Muslim public in Britain believe 'fake news' 
about Islam and Muslims, so the young Muslims have been 'duped'.  However, as 
Muslims they are hermeneutically marginalised and subjects of testimonial 
injustice between themselves due to their "collective hermeneutical 




"cultural stereotyping" of Islam and Muslims (Medina, 2013, p. 165) and how as 
suspect communities they have knowledge about them manipulated (ibid, p. 169), 
including a postcolonial gaze (Said, 1978) to Middle Eastern food.  The story 
Bongo refers to reinforces Western media obsession with "images of violence and 
disorder in their coverage of Third World countries" (Medina, 2013, p. 177) that is 
transposed to falafel.  This is a "well-established trend in Postcolonial studies" 
(ibid), which Bongo has internalised in his acceptance of being negatively 
stereotyped as a Muslim.  Medina's (2013, p. 184) hypothesis explores how 
"distortions and bodies of ignorance" support multiple forms of oppression due to a 
lack of epistemic friction, which in Bongo's case led him to be hermeneutically 
marginalised.  Abdullah B responds to Bongo saying: 
Recently, there was another commentator talking about the boy band, I 
don't even know them, most people know about them, the 'One 
Direction' for example yeah and I think they have a Muslim member in 
the band? And they were saying the right-wing commentator from the 
US was saying basically we should stop our daughters from listening to 
'One Direction' because he is undercover and is a 'Jihadi' and is trying 
to get them into Islam basically and I was thinking 'what?', and the 
funniest thing is he wears a Palestinian scarf around his neck which is 
fashion, but he is wearing the Palestinian number one symbol for Jihad 
(laughs). But I think that is the extreme instance. I don't think most of 
the non-Muslim read this kind of stuff and they would probably start 
laughing as well. I think they were extreme right wings (lines 411-421). 
Abdullah B has identified what he believes to be the "extreme right wings" (line 
421) in American anti-Muslim discourse.  His story refers to the writings of an 
American right-wing blogger Debbie Schlussel, who wrote "that parents should 
keep their daughters away from Zayn" (Malik) during One Direction's tour of 
America (Wheeler, 2012).  Abdullah B makes reference to "undercover Jihadi " 
(line 415) and once again "the number one symbol for 'Jihad'  " (line 419) in 




knowledge in describing an 'Islamic terrorist'.  Abdullah recognises an apparent 
faux pas by Abdullah B and reminds the community of the true meaning of 'Jihad': 
He mentioned a key word basically that proves the point that was 
mentioned about 'are we being influenced' and that word 'Jihad', 
because Jihad itself is a very noble concept and again it goes back to 
that point that when Muslims talk about Jihad openly I'm not talking 
about the Jihad that is the media's definition of Jihad which is holy war; 
that's not the case but Jihad itself is a noble concept which is struggling 
to purify yourself and to better yourself and to be closer to God so that 
example with Jihad is a very good example to prove that non-Muslims 
and Muslims are being influenced by the media because they are 
avoiding discussions about Jihad in their own circles and in their own 
study circles and classes and so on um yeah I think people have come 
to ...before I finish I think people need to name their children Jihad 
(laughs) (lines423-431). 
Abdullah has recognised that Abdullah B has been influenced by the media's 
interpretation of the meaning of 'Jihad' and is keen to show that he has knowledge 
of its true meaning.  He softens the blow given to Abdullah B saying that "non-
Muslims and Muslims are being influenced by the media" (lines 428-429).  
However, he then returns to his argument that Muslims avoid talking about 'Jihad' 
due to a lack of Islamic knowledge and media influence (line 429).  He concludes 
by once again softening the blow to Abdullah B by making a joke that “people 
need to name their children 'Jihad'  " so that it can't be avoided in discussion (line 
431).  Abdullah argues the answer to the question for discussion is 'yes', the 
media does influence the way Muslims think.  He has made his point at the 
expense of challenging the knowledge, or lack of knowledge by Abdullah B, an 
educated young Muslim.  He reinforces narratives articulated earlier that Muslims 
without Islamic knowledge run the risk of avoiding legitimate discussions among 
themselves and are therefore weakened in their abilities to challenge media 




injustice has occurred between Abdullah and Abdullah B in Abdullah B's use of the 
word 'Jihad', which Abdullah has recognised as being incorrect.  Abdullah B's 
knowledge of 'Jihad' has been influenced by the media causing him to use the 
word 'Jihad' in ways that a person without Islamic knowledge would.  A testimonial 
injustice (Fricker, 2007) has occurred between hearer, Abdullah, and interlocutor, 
Abdullah B.   Abdullah B has been subjected to a hermeneutical injustice (ibid) due 
to him being a subject of social understanding whose knowledge of 'Jihad' was 
compromised in front of his fellow Muslims.  Medina (2013) suggests that the 
"epistemic agency that a subject has within a discursive practice is such that their 
knowledge and ignorance are co-constituted" (ibid, p. 294).  This excuses the 
charge that Abdullah B should have known better, concurring with Abdullah who 
blames the media in influencing Muslim knowledge rather than suggest that 
Abdullah B is ignorant of Islam.   
Arikarikam continues with the theme of misinterpreting 'Jihad' by recalling how it 
has been seen by non-Muslims:  "I know someone who is called 'Jahid' and 
somebody attacked him 'cos his car [number plate] said 'Jahid ' as well.  They got 
him outside and attacked him" (lines 435-436).  Arikarikam has chosen to continue 
a lack of knowledge theme quoting a story about non-Muslims having a lack of 
knowledge.  It may be that Arikarikam is 'taking heat' off Abdullah B by recalling 
stories of non-Muslims having no knowledge of 'Jihad'.  
Themes encapsulating lack of Islamic knowledge by non-Muslims and Muslims 
alike appear to be connected with how the media corrupt knowledge against 




The media maintain an epistemic authority (Medina, 2013, p. 130) over Islam and 
Muslims which appears to be their "default status" (ibid) until evidence to the 
contrary emerges questioning their authority.  Muslim testimony is unable to 
challenge Islamophobic media narratives which maintains a "credibility excess" 
(Medina, 2013, p. 59) and "epistemic arrogance" (Medina, 2013, p. 31) 
normalising Islamophobia.  Although Medina (2013) differs from Fricker (2007) in 
respect of people in authority being harmed by a credibility excess in a single 
"testimonial exchange" (Medina, 2013, p. 59), he acknowledges that epistemic 
harm is done when "maintained through a sustained effort over time and across 
interaction" (ibid).  This adds weight to the argument that Muslims who believe 
media misinformation are hermeneutically marginalised and subjects of injustices.  
Abdullah B returns to the theme of 'Jihad' blaming 'educators' associated with 
Mosques for not teaching the true meaning of 'Jihad':   
They are finding it hard to talk about the concept of Jihad ...Muslim 
educators because they think that if they talk about Jihad the Sun 
newspaper is going to get hold of it '[name of local Mosque] is teaching 
Jihad!' and without knowing what the context is, people will say 'these 
guys are Jihadis' ...but it is important for the Muslims themselves to 
learn about the concept of Jihad because otherwise if you do not know 
the true concept of Jihad, most people will be ignorant and even the 
non-Muslim will be ignorant, but the problem is because of the media 
influence, Muslims are scared to talk about the concept of Jihad, and as 
I know myself Jihad in Islam is for a noble cause but you know even if I 
said that now probably I'd be in a police station, they would probably 
arrest me now (laughs) just because I made that comment but yeah I do 
believe in that sense... definitely in the concept of Jihad, Muslims have 
been influenced by the media... that is one taboo subject no-one's going 
to talk about even to give the right concept, they just think if someone 
gets hold of it that the Mosque is teaching them about jihad, people 




Abdullah B does not want to admit his earlier mistake in his use of Jihad: "I know 
myself that Jihad in Islam is for a noble cause" (lines 444-445), but then says that 
Mosques are reluctant to talk about correcting media stereotypes for fear of being 
targeted by the media or security services.  The influence of the media is such that 
it is able to corrupt Islamic language, shaping how knowledge of Islam is 
understood that restricts Muslim agency.  Abdullah B argues that knowledge of 
Islam and Muslims is controlled, weakening the ability of Muslims to have 
knowledge of Islam to be able to challenge being 'othered' by the media and wider 
non-Muslim public.  This is indicative of postcolonial conditions existing for 
Muslims living in Britain and in terms of epistemic injustice a hermeneutical 
impoverishment by Muslims subjecting them to both hermeneutical and testimonial 
injustice (Fricker, 2007).   
Step 9: Last words 
Respondents are invited to give their last words on the enquiry or to pass. 
Arikarikam:  
I just wanted to say about the influences, but also influences and action 
I think as well.  You form a plan to live your life now in this way because 
um if you're too open about your religion or anything about that, then 
you could land in trouble even if it is with the best intentions so you will 
um or it will fashion the way you are...even naming for example naming 
your children you think...do you know what I mean?" (lines 457-461). 
Arikarikam argues that being a Muslim living in Britain will mean being subjected to 
forms of abuse, so he chooses to hide his identity as a Muslim.  However, he 
chooses to remain a Muslim through his family, friends and while at his Mosque.  
He has made sacrifices in hiding his identity as a Muslim to avoid confrontation 




then you could land in trouble, even if it is with the best of intentions" (lines 458-
459).  He does not clarify whether he means being 'othered' as a Muslim or risking 
the unwanted attention from the security services: "even if it is with the best of 
intentions" (line 459).  What is clear for Arikarikam, however, is that he fears 
openly identifying as a Muslim living in Wales.  This is not only an infringement of 
his human rights (Human Rights Act 1998) but is morally wrong.  Although as 
Medina (2013, p. 28) argues: "Epistemic oppression is not an equal opportunity 
institution: it affects all of us, but not all of us equally".   Arikarikam illustrates as 
Muslim he is oppressed and "hermeneutically marginalized" (Fricker, 2007, p. 7) 
due to social injustices breeding "ignorance and irresponsibility simultaneously" 
(Medina, 2013, p. 131) resulting in a lack of knowledge of Islam and Muslims.  
Arikarikam has decided to hide that he is Muslim.  However, for Muslim women 
this is not an option (discussed in Chapter 7).  In Chapter 4, I argued how social 
inequality and "conditions of oppression" (Medina, 2013, p. 131) make it harder for 
non-Muslims to maintain being epistemically responsible, in other words, "being 
adequately knowledgeable about themselves, about their peers, and about the 
world" (Medina, 2013, p. 131).  In this thesis I argue a false consciousness 
(Lukacs, 1971) maintains and protects an ideology of Islamophobia (a social 
inequality and condition of oppression) making it harder to be epistemically 
responsible and a "virtuous hearer" (Fricker, 2007, p. 170).  
Arikarikam's position aligns with earlier comments about the young Muslim men's 
parents who, "never wanting to upset the host" (line 137-138) and not wanting to 
be visibly Muslim "in front of the natives" (line 144) encouraged their sons to shun 




are viewed by the British public deciding to appease.  This is a postcolonial 
construct and complies with a notion of being 'colonised' within one's own country 
and further supports the argument that Muslims are 'othered'.  Arikarikam's 
decision suggests he may be lacking in knowledge of Islam but bases his decision 
on his knowledge of how Muslims are 'othered' in Britain.  He may not like having 
to choose to hide his identity and may be 'wounded' in his Muslim identity but 
chooses to 'play the game' and not "upset" his host  or "antagonise" the "native 
community" (lines 136-155), which are options available to the 'colonised' to 
survive colonialism.  He may also be suspending his "hermeneutical 
responsibilities" (Medina, 2013, p. 90) as a "resistant experience(s)" or "epistemic 
friction" (ibid, p. 7) to challenge conditions of Islamophobia.  
El-Fino and Carlito opt to "Pass" (lines 462-463).  Abdullah responds to Arikarikam 
by countering what he has said about 'hiding one's Muslim identity by saying: "I 
just think er both non-Muslims and Muslims have a duty to kind of learn about their 
own faith and about other faiths as well and to kind of be confident to explain and 
to express themselves freely without feeling intimidated and that is the only way 
you will get rid of stereotypes and negative misconceptions" (lines 464-467). 
Abdullah clearly disagrees with the stance taken by Arikarikam by saying "Muslims 
have a duty" (line 464) and "to kind of be confident to explain and express 
themselves freely without feeling intimidated" (lines 465-466).  By arguing non-
Muslims and Muslims "have a duty to kind of learn about their own faith and about 
other faiths" (lines 464-465), Abdullah is intimating that Arikarikam does not have 




confident to express himself freely and is the only way to "get rid of stereotypes 
and negative misconceptions" (lines 466-467).  Abdullah recognises there is an 
injustice committed by Muslims hiding their identity.  The duty to learn about others 
is recognised by Fricker (2007) and Medina (2013) as ways to counter epistemic 
injustice by becoming a "virtuous hearer" (Fricker, 2007, p. 170) as a way to 
engender hermeneutical justice for Muslims.   
Abdullah B agrees with Abdullah: "Both Muslims and non-Muslims should feel less 
intimidated to have open discussions about these issues because without dialogue 
we are going to stay ignorant" (lines 468-469).  
Abdullah B has recognised that non-Muslims are affected by negative reporting of 
Islam and Muslims and is keen that Muslims should be allowed to present 
themselves in "open discussions" (line 468-469) so that non-Muslims have 
knowledge of them.  He disagrees with Arikarikam who has echoed the view of 
their parents' generation as being outside of society and occupying a position of a 
subjugated Muslim.  He is aware that this may bring him into confrontation with 
non-Muslims in openly displaying his Muslim identity but is clear that both Muslims 
and non-Muslims will "stay ignorant" (line 469) without dialogue to counter 
incorrect and misleading knowledge of them by the media.  It may also be that 
Abdullah B is making reference to the CoE itself as a forum which highlighted the 
importance of knowledge for Muslims and non-Muslims to try to reduce the 
'othering' of Muslims in Britain by being a "virtuous hearer" (Fricker, 2007, p. 170) 




Sandman: "Pretty much just to not take media portrayal of certain activities like as 
the last word basically what Mohammed said to educate ourselves" (lines 470-
471).  
Sandman summarises what he believes are the salient points made during the 
enquiry: the media misrepresentation of Islam and Muslims, and the need to have 
the right knowledge.  I believe he is referring to Muslims in his answer, as he 
clarified his answer with "Mohammed said to educate ourselves" (line 471) 
aligning Sandman with his fellow respondents who propose having knowledge of 
Islam is vital for Muslim identity and forwarding a counter-argument to media 
misrepresentation.  This position contrasts the Muslim men from their parents' 
generation who were described as being "very traditional in their views" (lines 154-
155), "not as religious" (line 203) "and are having children who know nothing 
whatsoever about their religion" (lines 204-205).  The young men who have a 
knowledge of Islam know the Prophet Mohammed encouraged Muslims to 
educate themselves, used by Sandman: "educate ourselves" (line 471) as 
justification for what was previously said about Muslims having knowledge about 
Islam.  In using a quote from the 'Hadith', Sandman has intimated that Muslims 
without such knowledge may not be in the truest sense, Muslims.  This position 
concurs with what Bongo said earlier about Islam having existed for many years 
and that the attack on it is a socially relevant concept of a post 9/11 world-view 
(lines 79-88) and that Muslims have battled with a lack of or corruption of Islamic 
knowledge for years.  Positioning Muslims in a socially situated context (Medina, 




of hermeneutical injustice (Fricker, 2007) and how Muslims seek to counter how 
knowledge of them is controlled.      
Mr Fish continued the theme of knowledge saying: 
Instead of using the media, use books like, our books as the translation 
as a way of our God, even if you are not Muslim, maybe as the person.  
Islamic studies probably the prophet, everything is well rounded even 
like dealing with non-Muslims, even like if you could study like that it 
would be probably [be] like a book it's that big (laughs)" (lines 472-475). 
Mr Fish believes that instead of learning about Islam from the media, Muslims and 
non-Muslims should read English translated texts of Islam and Muslims.  Mr Fish 
is aware knowledge of Islam and Muslims may be corrupted and that the only true 
sources stem from Islamic texts.  Mr Fish's response, although brief, has 
summarised the key issues discussed throughout the CoE which was the need for 
a 'true' knowledge of Islam and Muslims.  Mr Fish's summary not only extends to 
non-Muslims as a way of understanding Muslims but also for Muslims in their 
dealings with non-Muslims.  This suggest that Mr Fish recognises a 'true' 
knowledge of Islam may challenge Islamophobia: "everything is well rounded even 
like dealing with non-Muslims" (line474) and that realising the "virtuous hearer" 
(Fricker, 2007, p. 170) and having "kaleidoscopic sensibilities" (Medina, 2013, p. 
306) would lessen the effects of Islamophobia.   
Bongo returns to the theme of being allowed to practice one's religion as defined 
by Article 18 in the United Nations (Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948) 





I think we live in the world of humanity and human rights.  I think 
Muslims should be left to practice their own religion as long as er its 
according to human rights and right now we have the United Nations 
and er I think this is because we almost over two billion people so 
things like media and all this stuff should not come into um ... targeting 
Muslims rather than improving their condition and respecting that they 
are part of this world, they are part of this planet so we, as humanity, 
should strive to let Muslims be valued and represented fairly not in a 
good way but in the reality so it depends what is their real focus, is it 
good or bad that's for people to decide (lines 476-482). 
As a Muslim, Bongo has decided to step outside his identity as a Muslim to 
consider his response within the context of human rights.  He is aware of Human 
Rights legislation conferring a right to practice religion and knows that the media 
misrepresent and influence the public's view of Islam and Muslims.  Bongo 
suggests an alternative approach in allowing Muslims to be judged within contexts 
that free them from media bias to being allowed to practice their religion without 
having to hide their Muslim identity.  Muslims may then be judged not negatively or 
positively but that it "depends what is their real focus, is it good or bad? That's for 
people to decide" (lines 482).  Bongo has situated the actions of Muslims within 
human rights legislation where they may be judged individually on their actions 
and not by stereotyping the Muslim community on the actions of a few.  This may 
be a suggestion by Bongo for Muslims to take responsibility for their individual 
actions and not misinterpret Islamic texts to justify themselves.  Furthermore it 
may be a proposition for non-Muslims to judge Muslims as individuals and not as 
'Muslims' who may or may not justify their actions by their interpretation of Islam.  
Bongo has metaphorically positioned Muslims within a human rights court of law 
where they are judged free from bias.  Bongo's deference for a human rights 
paradigm calls for an ethical consideration when reporting Islam and Muslims.  




he differs from the other respondents, some of who were critical of how security 
legislation in Britain marginalises Muslims.  This may be the case as he usually 
lives in Tanzania and does not have the lived experiences of his fellow Muslims.  
As a consequence of Bongo aligning himself within a human rights context and re-
framing his narrative I considered how an epistemic injustice approach has moved 
the narrative from an Islamophobic narrative, informed by a colonising of the 
Muslim mind, to one where injustice may be seen more clearly, and resistance or 
epistemic friction succeed, free from oppressive legislative control.    
6.4. Conclusion 
Step 10: Review of Enquiry 
This part of the enquiry affords all participants the opportunity to summarise key 
points or to identify further areas for future enquiry. 
Abdullah B: I come from a social science background... so this kind of stuff I do 
kind of enjoy it (lines 499-500). 
Arikarikam: It's a very nice way of getting more information out a very nice way, in 
a nice informal, relaxed manner (lines 504-505). 
Bongo: I think what would make it more like better for these discussions if we 
could have also non-Muslims as well to inside...us because also it would be a 
challenge also to us like how we are going to speak out and how are they going to 
speak out and how will this information going to match.  You then see then, from 




Bongo suggests using a CoE approach with Muslims and non-Muslims as a way of 
gauging and debating concerns that both groups may have about each other. 
Abdullah B responds to Bongo saying:  
That would be good research in itself (laughs), having non-Muslims and 
Muslims having a frank discussion. Sometimes the non-Muslims they 
might feel like they don't want to be offending us, but the one thing 
about British society, British people, I'm British myself, we're quite you 
know, we don't like to...how would you say...intrude into someone else's 
space...sometimes we've got things we want to say but we keep it all in 
because so to get an opportunity where we can have a frank discussion 
where they don't feel intimidated.  If they want to talk about it, you know 
...if they want to say 'yes from what I have been hearing about Muslims 
this and that', I want to hear them say it (lines 515-522).  
Abdullah B is echoing Bongo's wish for non-Muslims to have the right knowledge 
of Islam and Muslims, recognising a reticence for some non-Muslims who may be 
intimidated to engage in a 'frank discussion'.  Abdullah is on the one hand praising 
'Britishness', reinforcing his 'Britishness', "the one thing about British society, 
British people I'm British myself we're quite" (lines 517-518) suggesting perhaps 
the reason they don't have the right knowledge of Islam and Muslims is that they 
are too polite to ask.  He continues by saying a CoE would be good place for non-
Muslims to be able to ask questions about what they have heard from the media 
about Islam and Muslims.  Abdullah uses the phrase "where we can have a frank 
discussion where they don't feel intimidated" (line 520) as a way of perhaps 
excusing non-Muslim Britons of being Islamophobic.  The term 'frank discussion' 
itself, I would argue, confirms Abdullah B's Britishness in wanting to create a 
comfortable environment where Muslims can speak to Non-Muslims in a respectful 
environment.  His final comment, "I want to hear them say it" (line 522), is a 




knowledgeable enough to challenge any misinformation that non-Muslims may 
have about Muslims.  His continual reference to 'Britishness' reinforces his identity 
as a British Muslim and his right to belong in Britain and not be portrayed as a 
'foreigner' with a foreign religion, or as argued 'colonised' in his own country.  He 
recognises that as long as his citizenship in Britain is in doubt, he will be treated as 
the 'other'.  Abdullah B is vocalising his ideal by wanting to recreate the respectful 
environment of a CoE in a Britain where British people talk about Islam and 
Muslims in conditions of 'fair play' where corrupted knowledge by the media may 
be challenged.  Abdullah B wants an ethical society which encompasses the 
"virtuous hearer" (Fricker, 2007, p. 170) and "responsible agency" (Medina, 2013, 
p. 121) and where the 'othering' of Muslims is lessened, improving the lives of 
Muslims.  Step 10, the review of the enquiry is included within the conclusion to 
prioritise the final comments of the young Muslims to be able to articulate their 
concerns and have their voices heard by the wider non-Muslim public.  They 
recognise that a CoE was a respectful forum for debate and want others to be a 
part of it so they will better understand Muslim concerns. 
The young Muslim men recognised their identities and citizenship as Muslims 
living in Britain was being manipulated by sections of the media making them 
appear and feel different by portraying them as potential terrorists.  They also 
recognised the need for correct or true knowledge of Islam and the difficulties 
young Muslims have accessing knowledge.  Muslims want non-Muslims to know 
about them but their voices are manipulated by the media.  They also want to be 
able to lawfully protest in public about concerns they may have but are fearful of 




Conditions of postcolonialism constructed and existing in the social imaginations of 
the wider non-Muslim public means Muslim voices will not be heard.  Other than 
Abdullah (lines 240-261) the respondents did not refer to 'Islamophobia' (line 261), 
instead choosing to articulate their lived experiences in terms of being made to 
feel different, questioning their 'Britishness' and their ability to celebrate their 
'Muslimness' weakened.  Their inability to recognise Islamophobia is a concern I 
address further in this thesis.    
In Chapter 8, I bring together both sets of data analysis from the Muslim men and 
the Muslim women and using my theoretical positioning articulate a framework to 
argue their voices can better be heard by the wider non-Muslim public.  In Chapter 
7, I go on to analyse the data from a CoE with a group of young Muslim women.  I 
use Steps one to ten of the enquiry process used in this chapter to examine the 
data and focus on epistemic injustice as an analytic tool.  The loci of power that 
seeks to influence my respondents as young Muslim women is examined.  These 
include the Prevent strategy, Fundamental British Values (FBV's), and the media.  
The area of visible Muslim identity is also an important area for analysis.  I now 




7. CHAPTER 7: DATA ANALYSIS OF THE COMMUNITY OF ENQUIRY 
CONDUCTED WITH THE COHORT OF MUSLIM WOMEN 
7.1. Introduction 
In this chapter I present the transcript of the Community of Enquiry carried out with 
15 Muslim women.  Line numbering refers to the original transcript (Appendix 1).  
My analysis of the transcript is woven through the chapter as the question for 
enquiry is identified and explored by participants.  Five key and related ideas are 
explored during the enquiry: 
 being made to feel different; 
 media stereotyping of Muslim women as being oppressed; 
 media obsession with the Hijab; 
 media influence on non-Muslim's knowledge of Muslims and Islam; 
 the lack of knowledge of non-Muslims of Islam. 
Thinking with the ideas identified in Chapters 2 and 3, I identify postcolonialism 
and securitisation as underpinning concepts that informed the enquiry.  Drawing 
on the ideas of Miranda Fricker (2007) and Jose Medina (2013) I identify 
Islamophobia as a lacuna that impacts on Muslim ability to speak out, creating 
epistemic relations and practices which cause both Muslim and non-Muslim to be 
wronged as epistemic subjects.  I identify discriminatory epistemic injustice that 
includes identity prejudice, credibility deficit, testimonial and hermeneutical 
injustice as important concepts that are used to analyse the discourse of the 
respondents and to shed light on how Muslims living in Wales are wronged as 
epistemic subjects.  I begin by providing brief pen-pictures of the respondents 




subjected to critical analysis using the key concepts of Islamophobia and 
discriminatory epistemic injustice. 
7.2. Brief Pen Pictures of the Respondents 
The fifteen Muslim women who took part in the Community of Enquiry came from 
a range of social backgrounds.  Some lived in Wales and were studying at a local 
university; others were foreign students also at university and the remaining 
women in employment.  A few of the women knew each other and the rest were 
introduced for the first time.  The women at university used the on-campus 
Mosque while the others had either attended Mosques in France, Oman or their 
local Mosque in South Wales.  The brief pen pictures that follow are limited in 
description to preserve anonymity: 
 Kiran: in her late teens and is studying full-time at university. She does not 
wear the Hijab or a headscarf.  She is Sudanese. 
 Katrina: in her mid 20s is a full-time student at a local university. She lives 
locally but was born in Somalia.  She wears a headscarf. 
 Lala: in her late 20s and is in full-time employment. She wears a head-scarf.   
 Shimb: in her late teens and is studying at a local college. She does not 
wear the Hijab or headscarf.  
 Leah: in her early 20s and studies at a local university. She wears the Hijab 
but not face covering.  
 Irah: Is in her early 20s and is studying full time at a local university. She 
wears the Hijab and headscarf but not face covering.  
 Aya: in her late teens and is studying full-time at a Welsh university. She 
lives in Oman. She wears a headscarf.   
 Nessa: Is 13 years of age and is a pupil at a local school. She wears a 
head-scarf. 
 Nouf : Is in her early 20s and is a French citizen.  She is a full-time student 
at a Welsh university. She wears a headscarf.  





 Jill: Is in her early 20s, lives locally and is in full-time employment. She does 
not wear the Hijab nor headscarf. 
 Amina: in her mid-20s, lives locally and is a paediatric nurse.  She wears 
the Hijab but not the face covering.  
 Sarah: in her early 20s and is in full-time employment. She does not wear 
the Hijab, headscarf, nor face covering. 
 Areej: in her late teens, is studying engineering at a local university and 
lives in Oman. She wears a headscarf.   
 Khadeejah: Is in her 20s, a full-time student at a local university. She wears 
the Hijab but not face covering. 
 
7.3. Introduction to the Community of Enquiry. 
The Community of Enquiry (CoE) took place at a community centre on the 10th 
December 2011.  A research conversation was carried out prior to the CoE and 
the 10-step process for the CoE followed (see Chapter 5).  The process employed 
in selecting a question is shown here as an example of how both Muslim men and 
women choose questions for their enquiries. 
Step 1: Choosing a stimulus for enquiry. 
A ten-minute video 'Being Me' was selected.  The DVD focused on audio/visual 
face-to-face interviews with young Muslim men and women about their 
experiences of Islamophobia in South Wales (Mort, 2008).  The recording also 
included 'vox pop' street interviews with members of the public who were asked 
what Islam and Muslims meant to them. 
Step 2: Presentation of the stimulus 





Step 3: Individual thinking time. 
Participants were asked to take some time to reflect and make notes on what the 
DVD made them think about. 
Step 4: Forming questions 
The women were separated into five groups and were asked to formulate a 
question they would be interested in discussing.  The questions were offered for 
enquiry and in Step 5 the groups explained why they had formulated their 
questions. 
7.3.1. Question 1. Why is it that the first thing that comes to mind 
to a non-Muslim is 'terrorist'? 
Step 5:  Justifying the choice of questions 
Shim justified their choice of question by saying that whenever Islam or Muslims 
are discussed by non-Muslims they immediately stereotype that they (Muslims) 
must be a terrorist or it concerns terrorism.  Katrina agreed with Shim adding that it 
is a common occurrence.  
The group believe that Islam and Muslims are both stereotyped in society and are 
presented as being inextricably connected to terrorism.   
Discussion 
Jill, Katrina and Shimb know that Muslims are stereotyped and refer to non-
Muslims as being responsible.  They don't mention the role of the media in 
stereotyping instead suggesting that it is widespread and not confined to any one 




7.3.2. Question 2. Is the media misrepresenting Islam for their 
own gain? 
Step 5:  Justifying the choice of questions 
Lala spoke on behalf of her group saying that the media are strong and that they 
manipulate how Muslims are represented by linking them to acts of terrorism, for 
example, 9/11. 
Discussion 
Lala knows the media are responsible for spreading misinformation about Islam 
and Muslims and that this impacts on Muslims being 'othered'.  She recognises 
that Muslims are misrepresented for financial gain by the media and that they 
make informed decisions to deliberately report them as a suspect community.    
7.3.3. Question 3. Should Muslims integrate into the wider 
community? Is it a priority to educate people about Islam? 
Amina, Leah and Kiran have suggested two questions for enquiry.  The first 
question suggests that Muslims are not part of the wider community and second 
question makes an assumption that the wider non-Muslim community are ignorant 
of Islam.  The group infer that it is a priority to educate the wider community to 
reduce their 'othering'.  Amina supports her group's question saying that Muslims 
have a duty to do more than just go to the Mosque and stay in their houses and 
they need to go out and educate people about Islam to challenge the negative 
reporting of Islam and Muslims by the media.  Amina suggests the media are 
ignorant of Islam (having never picked up a Quran) which she believes is reflected 





 The first question suggests that the group believe that Muslims in Britain live 
separate lives from the wider non-Muslim community.  The second question 
appears to inform the first one by providing an answer in that it is a priority to 
educate non-Muslims about Islam and that it may be a lack of knowledge by non-
Muslims that contributes to Muslims wanting to live apart from them.  The above 
questions appear to signpost a situation in Britain where Muslims are limited in 
their choices other than to live parallel or separate lives due to a lack of knowledge 
about them resulting in Muslims being 'othered' by non-Muslims.  The women 
recognise the media contribute to this and see it as their duty to challenge 
misconceptions of Muslims.   
7.3.4. Question 4. Should Muslim women continue to speak out? 
Step 5: Areej spoke on behalf of her group saying that as Muslim women are a 
more visible representation of Islam, they need to get out there and challenge 
what media say.  Areej made reference to Question 3 which she said was similar 
to her group's question.  
Discussion 
Areej makes an assumption that Muslim women are speaking out.  She continues 
saying that as Muslim women are instantly identifiable as Muslim they are in a 
position to go out and have face-to-face conversations with non-Muslims to 
educate them about Islam.  Areej recognises the need for this to occur, but in 
asking the question 'should Muslim women continue to speak out?' infers that 




Muslim and arguably subjected to more abuse than Muslim men, women are best 
placed to challenge incidents of 'othering'.    
7.3.5. Question 5. Should Islam be taught at primary school 
level? 
Aya, Khadeejah and Sarah justified their choice of question saying they initially 
wanted to include secondary schools in their question but thought that it would not 
be practicable.  Sarah recalled how her fellow primary school pupils questioned 
why she had different skin colour.  She concluded, saying that there is need to 
educate people about Islam.      
Discussion 
The group recognise that non-Muslims do not have a knowledge of Islam and are 
exposed to misinformation about Muslims.  They believe knowledge of Islam 
should be taught in primary schools so that non-Muslims have correct knowledge 
to challenge dominantly held views that Islam and Muslims have an association 
with terrorism.  Sarah mentions a lack of diversity awareness while at primary 
school supporting her group's question to educate young people about Islam. 
Sarah continues saying their choice of question made her think about racism and 
that by tackling it in school, 'kids' do not grow up racist and would be able to 
educate their parents.  She says that she feels Muslims no longer mix with non-
Muslims and that people's perception of Muslims is still mostly negative.  Sarah 
concluded by saying that 'we come here and learn and educate ourselves but they 






The concepts identified from the five questions put forward by the Muslim women 
include the following:   
1. Muslims are negatively stereotyped by the media who present them as 
being a suspect community linked to acts of terrorism. 
2. Muslims feel rejected and isolated from wider society having to live 
parallel lives. 
3. Education of non-Muslims about Islam and Muslims is vital to lessen 
the effects of Islamophobia.   
4. They (Muslim women), being visibly identifiable as Muslim, are best 
placed to challenge stereotypes and to counter Islamophobia and 
should continue to do so.  
Step 6: Voting 
A 'blind' vote was carried out to choose one question to explore further during the 
COE.  The question chosen was No. 4: 'Is the media misrepresenting Islam for 
their own gain'? 
Discussion 
The choice of question reflects that the Muslim women have recognised the media 
deliberately misrepresent and stereotype them for gain.  Muslims are presented as 
a suspect community who have an association with terrorism.  The question 
chosen assumes the media misrepresents Islam and Muslims.  However, 'for their 
own gain' may suggest a deliberate act of misrepresentation for reasons other 
than selling newspapers for financial gain which is not yet clear.  The effects of 
being misrepresented are articulated by the women as being made to feel different 




these conditions as postcolonial constructs with elements of 'othering' being 
realised and sustained by widespread Islamophobia which forces Muslims and 
non-Muslims to live apart and experience parallel lives.  Their wish to challenging 
instances of Islamophobia face-to-face is discussed and that they as women are 
best placed to do so.  In Chapter 3, I argued how the Prevent strategy securitised 
British Muslims and how Fundamental British Values (FBVs) 'othered' Muslims 
within British society.  The British media capitalise in sensationally presenting 
Islam and Muslims as suspect in society and align with instruments of power, 
making a challenge to them misrepresenting Islam and Muslims difficult.  Similarly, 
colonising Muslims in Britain has allowed Islamophobia to flourish in the social 
imaginations of the public, normalising and legitimising Islamophobia.  Control of 
knowledge of marginalised communities supports the argument of colonisation 
facilitating epistemic injustices (Fricker, 2007; Medina, 2013). 
Step 7: The Enquiry: First Thoughts 
Respondents sit in a circle facing each other and the group whose question was 
chosen is invited to begin the enquiry.  Nouf was the first to respond to the 
question:  
We were just saying that about the media they always spoke of the bad 
behaviour of Muslims like we always hear about Muslim did this and 
that, but they never spoke about what we do right (lines 5-7). 
Nouf knows the media selectively report Islam and Muslims negatively.  The 
structure of this type of reporting confirms the wider non-Muslim public discourses 
in which Islamophobia has become normalised (Petley and Richardson, 2011; 




examples taken from the media in France who failed to report a week of Muslim 
celebration, instead showing Muslims protesting: "they showed like the bad 
celebrations they didn't show how we celebrate, how we fast, how we share, how 
we are happy this day" (lines 11-12).  Nouf continued: "there is a girl who, um, 
wanted to stand up against the high rate of rape in Egypt...and she took a picture 
of herself naked and put it on her blog, they showed these just to sell headlines" 
(lines 13-15).   
The French media have manipulated knowledge of Islam and Muslims informing 
public opinion and allowing its readers to have an "unduly deflated credibility 
judgment" of Muslims (Fricker, 2007, p. 22).  Nouf is subjected to Islamophobia 
and hermeneutical injustice (Fricker, 2007), being wronged in her membership of a 
marginalised community.12  Nouf gives an example of a young Egyptian woman 
who used her social media blog to highlight the: "high rate of rape in Egypt" (line 
14).  However, rather than support the blogger, French media distribute naked 
photographs as an act of sensationalism to sell newspapers. 
Nouf is mistaken in thinking the media would publicise the blogger's aim as an act 
of beneficence however, she illustrates that sections of the media will 
misrepresent Islam and Muslims for commercial gain. 
The Egyptian blogger has been subjected to hermeneutical injustice having been 
wronged by the media by them using images for commercial gain and not for the 
                                            
12
French Muslims are generally aware of the colonisation of Algeria by France in 1830 which, although does 
not form part of this research, nevertheless is an important component in the construction of French 




original intentions of the blogger which was to highlight high levels of rape against 
women in Egypt.  The blogger is a victim of testimonial injustice and in considering 
that she is part of a marginalised group of 'othered' women in Egypt, also 
hermeneutical injustice (Fricker, 2007).  Nouf also articulates how the blogger is 
trying to create an epistemic resistance (Medina, 2013, p. 16) or epistemic friction 
(ibid, p. 48) by attempting to redefine Muslim body image misrepresented by the 
French media.  The blogger's attempt at creating a "beneficial epistemic friction" 
(Medina, 2013, p.50) has been seized by the French media and represented as a 
"detrimental epistemic friction, censoring, silencing, and inhibiting the formation of 
beliefs" (ibid).  Nouf has responded to the question whether the media 
misrepresent Islam for their own gain citing evidence of how sections of the 
French media objectify Muslim women, which is indicative of conditions of 
postcolonialism existing for them.      
Step 8: Middle words 
Lala responded to Nouf  by continuing the theme of role models: 
...when somebody in the media, it could be anyone, they may not even 
be practicing Muslim, so they just use religion saying "this was the man 
who killed another man" whereas in the world there are so many crimes 
happening, but they never say "this atheist has killed another man", 
there's loads of different religions, Buddhist, they never use religion with 
anyone else in the world in a crime, but when a Muslim does 
something, they might not even be practicing, they might have been 
born in it, they always say "the Muslim has done something" (lines 20-
26). 
Lala has recognised that the media deliberately report negative stories about Islam 
and Muslims highlighting that Islam is a bad religion, but fail to mention religious 




different, 'othering' them as deviant thus contributing to 'colonising' the Muslim 
community in Britain (and elsewhere).  This exacerbates Islamophobia and hate 
crimes toward Muslims demonising religious and cultural differences between 
Muslim and non-Muslim which  is the antithesis of a multicultural society.  Amina 
agrees with Lala: 
I think the word terrorism is simply giving a label to Muslim people it's 
become a label to us, the word 'terrorism' and I think the media uses 
that regular as a regular base, you know? and, I think they all use it with 
other religions to people who commit something bad. I think they need 
to understand that there are good people and there are bad people, you 
know whatever religion you follow because, at the end of the day, not 
everybody is perfect it's their personal problem that's made them do 
something bad so we shouldn't be labelled like that at all. They should 
be labelled for who they are and not for what they follow (lines 27-34). 
Amina thus continues the theme of the media linking Muslims to acts of terrorism 
reiterating Lala's response emphasising how media control information, selectively 
and negatively reporting on Islam and Muslims.  Amina is aware of the injustices 
caused to Muslims which contributes to Islamophobia and a 'colonising' of Muslims 
to continue.  Amina believes that misrepresenting Muslims as being terrorists is 
the media's default position in reporting Islam and Muslims.  The media have 
adopted an "epistemic authority" as their "default status" as competent subjects 
(Medina, 2013, p. 130).  Medina argues that the "default status" (ibid) is not lost 
until there is evidence to call it into question.  I argue until Muslim voices are 
heard, the default position of 'normalising' Islamophobia will endure.  Katrina 
agreed with Amina saying: 
...it was actually quite interesting, I watched TV you know, the whole 
9/11 ten-year anniversary came along, the programmes on TV and one 
of them was about the fire-fighters, how they can portray you, then you 
have the fire-fighters who were there on 9/11 trying to save lives and 




heroes, and what happened was that a couple of months after 9/11 
happened they started reporting in the media, stuff about their private 
lives. Some of the fire-fighters, they were going to clubs, they were 
getting arrested, getting drunk and the media basically was portraying 
them as 'look at these heroes they are now drunk in clubs' and getting 
arrested and it was kind of, like, wait a minute, a couple of months ago 
they were heroes and you are now portraying them as something bad 
and I see the same happening 'cos basically it's what sells headlines 
(lines 35-46). 
Katrina has given an example of how the media exploit vulnerabilities to sell 
newspapers or promote content.  However, the New York fire-fighters she 
describes (who are more likely to be suffering from post traumatic stress disorder) 
are not a marginalised community in ways argued in this research and do not 
therefore suffer testimonial or hermeneutical injustices (Fricker, 2007).  Katrina 
continues: 
...they [the media] show Muslims in a weird kind of, it's not really the 
right representation and they always speak the words that are not really 
good you know, up there [points to her head]...that's how I see it...why 
not go to the Mosque and ask people. Like when they write about 
Muslim women, Muslim women are oppressed, Muslim women can't 
this, go and ask the Muslim woman. That's why I enjoy what you guys 
did today because you're actually asking us, we are the Muslim women, 
we live through it every day so don't just write about us, ask us instead 
of asking the men (lines 49-56).  
Katrina has made an assumption that the media lack knowledge of Islam and 
Muslims and therefore reporting of them is inaccurate and negatively biased.  
Katrina supports her assumption by referring how the media report Muslim women 
as oppressed, suggesting they speak to Muslim women to have the correct 
information.  Katrina, is mistaken in thinking the media are ignorant of Islam and 
Muslims, and similarly Nouf and Amina who argue the media are not interested in 
facts over sensational reporting, for example, vulnerable post 9/11 fire-fighters.  I 




knowledge of them is concealed in a form of ignorance where anti-Muslim 
narratives may be accommodated.  The concept of ignorance is a continuing 
theme shown in the narratives of the Muslim women and is worthy of analysis 
through an epistemic injustice lens as "active ignorance" (Medina, 2013, p. 51), 
"epistemic arrogance" (Medina, 2013, p. 31) and a range of potential ignorance's 
(see Peels and Blaauw, 2016).  I now return to the analysis of Katrina's response 
(lines 49-56). 
Katrina recognises Muslims are misrepresented and prey to hermeneutical 
injustice (Fricker, 2007, p. 6).  She wants the media to have knowledge about 
Islam and Muslims, believing they are ignorant.  I argue Katrina is hampered by a 
false consciousness protecting the ideology of Islamophobia from being identified 
and challenged.  The stories reported on Islam and Muslims prevent the wider 
public from considering their "epistemic obligations to know others" (Medina, 2013, 
p. 155) and being able to move to "epistemic responsibility" (ibid, p. 119) where 
they may reduce or eliminate perceived differences between Muslims and non-
Muslims.  In isolating Muslims, the media protect their privilege or "epistemic 
authority" (Medina, 2013, p. 130) which is "itself an instrument of oppression" 
(Medina, 2013, p. 155). 
Katrina has introduced the concept of Muslim identity, picked up by Nouf who tells 
of her lived experiences in France as a young Muslim woman: 
In school it is not allowed to wear the scarf so when we go to school we 
have to take it off and when you come out of school you can put it on, 
but now they forbid women to wear the Niqab, everywhere and also the 
Mums who want to go out with their children for a day out in school, 




trying to...of course in France we have a lot of private nurseries, we 
don't have a lot of public, so they are funded by private people ... who 
don't want the teacher to wear a scarf...so this is what's going on in 
France, so everyday there is a new problem (lines 62-71).  
Nouf tells us about the lived experiences of Muslim women in France post-2011 
where the ban of wearing a Niqab (a Veil covering the face) by Muslim women in 
public places was legislated (Weaver, 2018) by the French government who were 
first in Europe to enact law.  Some commentators claim it was a political move by 
the then President Sarkozy to win far-right votes, while others claim it was a move 
to free Muslim women from oppression, citing the National motto of France, 
Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, and a "threat to the integrity of the Republic (Younge, 
2010, p. 177) in support of the ban (Chrisafis, 2011; Weaver, 2018).  However, for 
Nouf the ban had implications not just for the restricted agency of Muslim women 
in Muslim identity, but for mothers of some Muslim children who have to remove 
the face covering while taking their child to school and while accompanying their 
children on school trips.  Some women may choose not to go to public spaces 
fearing prosecution or forego part of their identity as Muslim.  I argue it to be an 
infringement of their right to practice their religion under article 18 (Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, 948), and an 'objectification' and 'colonisation' of 
Muslim women by legislative control.  The decision to ban the face covering is also 
an epistemic injustice committed against Muslim women by invoking negative 
identity prejudice, which Fricker (2007, p. 34) says is, "the most morally 
problematic kind of prejudice...behind which there lies one or more ethically 




Restricting Muslim identity is an attack on multiculturalism and an attempt to 
'colonise' Muslims by legislation.  Medina (2013, p. 96) argues that due to 
"hermeneutical insensitivities", "people's credibility can get undermined" restricting 
Muslim agency in having a voice to argue their case for wearing the hijab.  
"Socially cultivated hermeneutical insensitivities" (Medina, 2013, p. 97) allows 
hermeneutical gaps to be formed in the social imagination of the non-Muslim 
public preventing them from understanding Muslim cultural and religious needs.  
Katrina responds to Nouf by asking: "Is it true also that they are also trying to, is it 
ban Muslim women from wearing the maxi-dress in France?" (lines 72-73). 
Nouf responds saying that the maxi-dress is not banned in France but that she 
had faced pressure while at school from her teachers: 
...when you try to act invisible when you wear a maxi-skirt or dresses 
you always have problems, like I had a lot of problems in school when I 
was wearing skirts like teachers were saying to me 'don't you know you 
are a pretty girl, you should show your legs and all this, so they are 
trying to make you feel that you're not normal, you have to act as like 
the other 'cos they are people as they are normal (lines 75-79). 
Considering the comments of her (male) teacher as being sexist and 
unprofessional aside, Nouf has been 'colonised' as a French Muslim by her 
teacher(s), being made to feel different from the rest of her peers.  Her Muslim 
identity is challenged and she is subjected to negative "identity prejudice", 
"systematic testimonial injustice" (Fricker, 2007, p. 35) and "hermeneutical 
injustice" (ibid, p. 6).  Nouf's identity as a Muslim woman to "try and act invisible" 




in her appearance but also modesty in how she chooses to live her life as a 
Muslim. 
Katrina responds to Nouf saying that although she disagreed with the ban on face-
covering in France, she could understand why they chose to ban it due to needing 
to see faces, but could not understand why Nouf's teacher(s)  "want to see your 
skin (line 83)  ...you can't wear skirts tomorrow the day after that you can't wear 
colour in public, where does this stop?" (lines 84-85). 
Katrina may be intimating that Nouf's teacher is enacting a "white gaze" with Nouf 
(Medina, 2013, p. 188) while he is "blind to the social relationality" (Medina, 2013, 
p. 189) in failing to recognise how his own "life, culture, and history are bound up 
with that of others" (ibid).  Katrina continued the theme of Muslim women's identity: 
I believe that we have a certain responsibility when we wear the Hijab, 
the scarf. I remember someone saying to me 'whether we like it or not if 
you wear the scarf, once you have identified yourself as a Muslim, 
whether you wear the scarf or not you are an ambassador for the 
religion so whatever you do', so if you walk on the street, loud, rude, 
insulting people, people might look at you and say 'wait, is that what 
religion is about?', to try and make me feel inferior, people might believe 
that, so I do think that we ... that we should take some responsibility, but 
I understand the girls as well [indicating to her fellow respondents on 
her right hand side] just because we wear the scarf and some people 
don't, it doesn't mean that the Muslims that do wear a scarf are more 
religious um 'cos that's just, I feel my religion and my faith is not 
wrapped around the scarf, it is something deeper. It's probably part of it 
but it's not like if you don't wear a scarf you are less religious than 
someone who wears the scarf, communities where people make you 
feel that way, and yea, it's not right (lines 89-101). 
Katrina has extended the theme of Muslim women's identity and the importance of 
being a role model for Islam initiated earlier by Nouf and continued by Lala.  




acknowledges some respondents wear the Hijab and others wear headscarves in 
their Muslim identity.  Katrina argues that her Muslim identity is not "wrapped 
around the scarf" (line 98) progressing a counter-argument to Muslims who claim 
they are defined by what they wear and furthermore, the Niqab (face covering) is a 
signifier of oppression.  Katrina challenges French authorities, undermining 
attempts to objectify and colonise Muslim women living in France by redefining 
Muslim identity.  Katrina extends a redefining of Muslim identity to encompass 
Muslims in her own community who may wish to judge her on her degree of 
'Muslimness' as a consequence of what she wears: "communities where people 
make you feel that way, and yeah, it's not right" (lines100-101).  Katrina knows 
Muslim communities (made up of different cultures and clan loyalties) 'police' 
Muslims, judging them on a sliding scale of 'Muslimness' depending what they do, 
say and wear. 
It may be that the French authorities underpin their justification in 'colonising' 
Muslim women by relying on "a socially situated theory" (Fricker, 2007, p. 71) 
implying Islam and Muslims are associated with terrorism and that Muslim faces 
need to be seen in public.   A negative credibility judgement (ibid) is made easier 
for authorities in Islamophobia being unchecked and sustained by a hostile press.  
What is not clear is whether 'colonising' Muslim women is as a result of negative 
identity prejudice or attacks on Islam.  Nouf extends Katrina's argument by 
continuing the theme of Muslim identity: 
I find it strange how, as you say, the woman who wears the scarf, but 
still there is a lot of misunderstanding of it like I think that people who 
doesn't know about scarf say "oh is it your parents who forced you to 
wear it"? or, is it "are you a prisoner of your scarf, is it not your will or 




think it must be something normal now in our society that Muslim is 
now, Islam is now the first religion of the world, one months, two months 
ago [turning her head to her left to acknowledge this claim] yeah so a lot 
of Muslims to wear it is really important that nobody knows about it, they 
always think it is not a personal choice and I find this opinion very, very 
strange (lines 102-109). 
France has an increasingly Muslim population of about 8.8% (Pew Research 
Centre, 2016).  It is difficult to accurately gauge the exact number of Muslims living 
in France as laws prohibit the French republic to conduct a census that 
encompasses elements of race or religious belief, however, independent surveys 
carried out produce useful approximation.  For England and Wales the Muslim 
population in 2011 was approximately 4.8%.  With a decline in traditional Christian 
religious belief and an increase in French Muslims since 2010 due to migration of 
Muslims into Europe, the projected Muslim population in Europe is set to increase 
by 2050 to 14% of the population (Pew Research Centre, 2016). 
Nouf says although Islam has rapidly grown in France, there is little knowledge of 
the significance of the headscarf as being part of Muslim women's identity.  It is 
possible the wider non-Muslim French society view Muslims as having a credibility 
deficit simply because they are Muslim. The examples given by Nouf, "oh is it your 
parents who forced you to wear it... are you a prisoner of your scarf"? and "is it not 
your will or discretion"? (lines 104-105) are examples of "negative identity 
prejudice" (Fricker, 2007, p. 34) as a consequence of 'normalising' Islamophobia, 
and that the, "stereotype embodies an unreliable empirical generalization about 
the social group in question" (ibid, p. 32).  As a member of a marginalised group 
living in France, Nouf recognises she is 'othered' by wider French society and is 




Muslim Nouf is ready to challenge Islamophobia  (as suggested in question four by 
Lima, Areej and Nessa: "should Muslim women continue to speak out"?).  Her 
positive Muslim identity strengthens the argument put forward by Lala, (line 20), 
and Katrina (line 89), regarding Muslim women being role-models and 
ambassadors (line 92) for Islam.  I consider that their need to challenge being 
'objectified' and 'othered' are examples of "epistemic friction" (Medina, 2013, p. 16) 
considered as a "duty" by the women (Amina in response to question 3) who want 
to challenge "active ignorance" (Medina, 2013, pp. 27-40) by having "epistemic 
resistances" (ibid, p. 29).   
Fricker (2007, p. 27) recognises that particular groups or peoples are 
systematically subjected to "tracker prejudice" in a way that follows a group or 
person.  I argue Muslim women are subjected to tracker prejudice as a 
consequence of an "epistemic irresponsibility" (Medina, 2013, p. 189) from those 
"blind to differences" (ibid, p. 188).  
Nouf believes that if she presents a 'true' account of Islam, giving knowledge of 
why Muslim women wear the hijab (in respect of the Niqab in this instance), her 
testimony will be believed by non-Muslims.  As Muslim Nouf embodies identity that 
not only hermeneutically marginalises her but her testimony is given lesser 
credibility than that of a non-Muslim.  Her Muslim identity is subsumed in a 
discourse of negative media reporting and she is 'othered' from French society.  
Furthermore she is contrasted to an exemplary of French women needing to be 




legislators.  This is a further example of how Muslim women are 'objectified' within 
postcolonial constructs.  Aya provides an example: 
A lot of people come on to me and tell me that they actually feel sorry 
for me, they think I am oppressed. I just want people to stop feeling 
sorry for me, I'm actually proud and happy and I'm not forced, my Dad 
didn't force me to wear this (indicating to her headscarf). I'm doing it my 
way, so there are two types of people, people who feel sorry for us and 
people who are ignorant, and there are other people who actually feel 
we don't actually have hair (everyone laughs).  I have this girl who come 
up to me and asked me, "so are you sick"? I said "really? [everyone 
laughs] this is my religion", I just find it like very rude for people to just 
assume that we are oppressed. We are very happy ladies, I mean it's 
not that we're forced (lines 111-119). 
Aya continues the theme of identity and lived experiences as a Muslim woman in 
Britain.  She argues against those who are ignorant of Islam and those who are 
rude by assuming she is a victim of Islam.  Aya has been hermeneutically 
marginalised by her interlocutors who assume she is oppressed.  They see the 
Hijab (referred to as a scarf) being a signifier for hiding her identity as a woman 
and that Islam is culpable for oppressing her reflecting dominant discourses that a 
hegemonic masculine Islam is responsible.    
The need to set Muslim women free from oppression is an example argued by 
Spivak (1988) in her essays on 'widow burning' or Sati when 'identifying' 
subalterns in need of rescuing from oppression rather than asking of their needs.  
Spivak's argument focuses on those having power imposing their values on others 
who are deemed to be oppressed, which is an example of hermeneutical injustice 
(Fricker, 2007).   Aya wants others to know about Muslim women to understand 
why they choose to wear the Hijab.  Aya is 'colonised' and 'othered' by conditions 




lacuna or communication intelligibility in the collective hermeneutical resources of 
non-Muslims preventing them from becoming "virtuous hearers" (Fricker, 2007, p. 
169) which may allow an understanding of Muslim women.   Postcolonialism 
ensures that Muslim women (a subjugated community) do not have a platform 
from where their testimony may be made.  Islamophobia prevents them from being 
able to articulate "epistemic friction" (Medina, 2013, p. 158) and opportunity for 
non-Muslims to become "virtuous hearers" (Fricker, 2007, p. 169).  Medina (2013, 
p. 158) further argues that "isolated communities" cannot achieve epistemic 
friction without the "cooperation with others".  I argue the wider non-Muslim public 
(hindered by false consciousness) cannot see Islamophobia as anything other 
than 'normal'.  
Amina responded to Aya saying: "I just wanted to say about the Hijab that it's not 
just Muslim women who wear headscarves or cover themselves" (line120-121).   
Amina gives examples of Jewish and Hindu women cover their heads with 
headscarves who are not seen and continues: "I can't understand why the media 
or people you know have this fascination, why they think we are oppressed or we 
are not happy" (lines124-126). 
Amina knows her identity as a Muslim woman 'others' her while Jews and Hindu 
women are not subjected to the same degree of discrimination as Muslim women.  
Amina is reiterating the comments from previous women respondents in the CoE 




reporting, the French legislation against the hijab13, the British Government's 
Prevent strategy, and FBV.  The media's reporting of Muslim women as being 
'oppressed' is a postcolonial construct, employed to objectify Muslim women 
creating hostility toward Muslim men who are seen as the protagonists by forcing 
Muslim women to wear the hijab.  
 
 Amina continues: 
Why these questions, you know, why not come and try and understand 
with us rather than putting these questions into you know, the mind and 
especially again the media. I feel that they use us women to gain 
money, to gain status, all these newspapers and television and I think I 
find it so disappointing because us Muslim women we are doing so 
much for, you know, this country and we are doing so much, you know 
other places and it's just clothing, it's just material and underneath we 
are still flesh and blood and, you know, we are doing so much, why 
can't they see that, why can't they come and ask us, you know. Ask us 
about our jobs or ask us when we've done something amazing" 
(lines132-140).  
Amina continued to give an example of the Prophet Mohammed's wife Khadija 
who fought for equal rights for women long before women in Britain had the right 
to vote (lines 140-145), "so why us"? (line 145). 
Amina knows Muslim women in Britain are unjustly targeted by the media which  
profit from stories about them and she struggles to understand why.  She argues 
Muslim women do so much for the country and is disappointed stories about them 
focus on clothing and not the person wearing them.  Amina wants people to have 
                                            
13
 Although the French legislation was initially discussed by Nouf, it would affect all Muslim women either 




more information about the work of Muslim women suggesting they ask about their 
jobs and achievements.  
Amina is a qualified practicing paediatric nurse encapsulating someone doing 
"something amazing" (lines 139-140), however she is vilified as Muslim.  Wearing 
the Hijab not only identifies her as Muslim but an oppressed Muslim and 
representative of negative discourses about Islam and Muslims. 
Amina is 'othered' in postcolonial conditions (Spivak, 1988), and injustices as Aya 
by similarly failing to recognise an ideology of Islamophobia subjecting her to 
"testimonial injustice" (Fricker, 2007, p. 7) due to "hermeneutical gaps" or lacuna 
(Medina, 2013, p. 110), unable to create "epistemic friction" (ibid, p. 158) to effect 
change.   Kiran makes a useful distinction to Amina saying:  
I just want to say that even though the Muslim women do wear the 
hijab, even though they are covering their heads does not mean they 
are covering their personality um and I have to admit like I don't wear a 
scarf, but when I first came to [name of town] and I met all these lovely 
people cos they wore Hijab, I did kind of keep to myself a little bit more, 
um, you know, I'd never been in an environment where I'm the only one 
who doesn't wear one, but you know I took the first step and introduced 
myself to some people and you know, I was pleasantly surprised.  It is a 
very, very open community and um basically don't judge somebody just 
because they wear Hijab 'cos that, you know, doesn't really it shouldn't 
change your perception of people (lines 146-154). 
Kiran, who studies at a local university is from Sudan, a predominantly Islamic 
country, and does not wear the Hijab or headscarf at home.  On meeting Muslim 
women students at university she was initially reluctant to join them as most wore 
the Hijab.  She assumed they were a 'closed community' but was "pleasantly 
surprised" (line 152) and we shouldn't:  "judge somebody just because they wear 




who wore the Hijab.  Kiran had preconceived ideas about Muslims who wore the 
Hijab possibly due to Islam being a minority religion in her region of Sudan where 
only the more conservative Muslim women wear it.  This contrasts significantly 
with Britain where the majority of Muslim women wear the Hijab (Morey and Yaqin, 
2011). 
Unwittingly, Kiran is responsible for committing hermeneutical injustice to her 
fellow students in believing they were a closed group.  When she met them and 
found them to be "a very, very open community" and Kiran became a "virtuous 
hearer" (Fricker, 2007, p. 169) as she then gave the women a greater degree of 
credibility due to a gap in her collective hermeneutical resources having been 
filled.  I argue that in her contact with Muslim women who wear the Hijab, Kiran will 
suspend a "credibility judgment" (ibid, p. 173) about them which  supports 
Medina's argument that isolated communities need to exert "epistemic resistance" 
(Medina, 2013, p. 48) between themselves and other communities to recognise 
their "epistemic responsibilities" (ibid, p. 119) to bring about "beneficial epistemic 
friction" (Medina, 2013, p. 50) to be self-critical and "to compare and contrast one's 
beliefs" (ibid).  Medina qualifies this position with a caveat explaining that 
epistemic resistance can be positive in unmasking prejudices and bias and 
conversely negative in a "reluctance to learn or a refusal to believe the kind of 
stubbornness that gets in the way of knowledge" (Medina, 2013, p. 50).  Being 
insensitive to the presence and influence of cognitive forces is a form of "active 
ignorance" which impedes the achievement of "epistemic virtues" (Medina, 2013, 
p. 51) and similarly achieving epistemic justice for individuals and social groups.  




being sensitive to Muslims positions the media having "epistemic arrogance" 
(Medina, 2013, p. 31) in their reporting of Islam and Muslims.  Medina articulates 
being open to many different viewpoints as having "a strong notion of 
contestability" (Medina, 2013, p. 273).  I consider how a weakening of 
multiculturalism has inhibited contestability in Chapter 2, and explore the work of 
Cantle's interculturalism (Cantle, 2012) as a "radically pluralistic social sensibility 
that enables us to come together without having to sacrifice our differences" 
(Medina, 2013, p. 306) as a potential way forward in Chapter 8.  Nouf responds to 
Kiran giving another example from France: 
I was in the first year of high school so I was 16. I was reading for 
German at that time. We had to go swimming in the swimming as part 
of the ...Curriculum, part of our education and um it is with the class, ... 
with all the boys and the girls. I didn't want to go because I didn't want 
to show my body to the boys, so I went to my GP and asked him to 
write a sick note for me, he is a Jew, he is our GP for four years now.  
He totally understood this like um, my opinion about it so he did it for 
me and when I gave it to my sport teacher he didn't believe it because 
he knows me, he is my neighbour, so he would see me with my scarf 
everyday like when I want to go to school and he said "are you really 
allergic to chlorine?", so I said "of course not but what did you want me 
to say?" and then he didn't got upset or anything, he told me that 
woman in France in the 60s and the 70s, they fought for their rights, 
"they fought for your rights, they fought for you to be free", and I was 
like...I was shocked because I told him "so what, don't you think I am 
not free so because women fought for their rights do you think that I 
have to go in the district half naked...is this my right...will men respect 
me if I wear a mini-skirt and a lot of make up, you know...is this freedom 
for a woman"? And then he said, "no, no, no it's not about this," so I 
said, "since when I have the right to vote in Western countries, since 
when women have a right to vote"? ...since the 20th century.  For us, 
this is the beginning and I said "since the law for contraception because 
before 1971 it was forbidden in France for a woman to abort. Since 
when does it exist? So if you just look a little bit at my opinion and my 
religion you will understand that what you are claiming is wrong" and 
then he said, "OK, I do understand your position" (lines 167-189).    
Nouf is asserting her identity as a French Muslim woman who has to negotiate a 




Her school failed to recognise this and she was compelled to lie about her reason 
not to go swimming with her classmates.  She has been subjected to a 
"hermeneutical injustice" (Fricker, 2007, pp. 147-175) by laws that fail to recognise 
her right to practice her religion.  Nouf is further 'othered' and objectified as Muslim 
by a "white gaze" (Medina, 2013, p. 188) further marginalising her by not 
recognising her needs as a Muslim living in France where conditions of 
postcolonialism also exist.    
During the conversation with her sports teacher (who is aware she is Muslim), 
Nouf suffers further hermeneutical injustice (ibid) in his assumption that she is 
forced to cover up by wearing the Hijab.  He justifies his assumption referring to 
how French women fought for their rights in the 1960s and 70s.  Nouf challenges 
him with a counter-view of her right not to show her body if she chooses not to, 
either as a woman or as a Muslim.  Nouf argues an historical timeline of women's 
rights saying how it was only in the 20th century in Western civilisation that women 
had rights and that: "for us, this is the beginning" (lines 185-186).  Nouf has 
positioned herself as being outside Western culture and in her identity as a Muslim 
woman by saying that Muslim women have had freedom to be modest since the 
Prophet Mohammed's wife Khadija fought for Muslim women's rights.  Nouf is 
inferring that Islam has been more respectful to Muslim women than Western 
society.  Following the conversation with her sports teacher who said: "OK, I do 
understand your position" (line189) he became a "virtuous hearer" (Fricker, 2007, 
pp. 170-171) as he adjusted the degree of credibility afforded to Nouf as a Muslim, 
even though initially he was aware of her religion.  He listened to her and moving 




neutralised his structural identity prejudice (ibid, p. 173) affording Nouf 
hermeneutical justice (ibid).  Nouf's GP knew she didn't want to show her body in 
front of her classmates and though aware that what he was doing was wrong, was 
prepared to lie and say that she had a chlorine allergy to help her in her identity as 
a young Muslim woman.  He was aware of structural identity prejudices in the 
policies of the French authorities 'othering' Muslim women and was an element in 
a subversion of policies making him a "virtuous hearer" (Fricker, 2007, p. 169). 
Nouf's sports teacher was aware that she was a Muslim and wrongly assumed she 
was forced to wear the Hijab.  He may further assume Muslim women who wear 
the Hijab are 'oppressed', however, he may also reserve judgement until he has 
further knowledge or "extra corroborative evidence" (ibid, p. 173) before making or 
suspending a credibility judgement about Muslim women.  Furthermore, although 
he knew Nouf was Muslim, the knowledge he had about Muslim women was 
wrong.  (This research has not extended to French media and acknowledges it 
cannot assume the sources of misinformation by Nouf's teacher).  
In describing her GP, Nouf emphasises that: "he is a Jew, he totally understood 
this like um my opinion" (lines 173-174).  Nouf chose to highlight her Doctor's 
Jewish identity as relevant in him helping her.  On one hand we may consider the 
Jew and the Muslim to be diametrically opposed to each other, particularly when 
conflict between Israel and Palestine are important considerations for many.  
However, Nouf emphasises his religion illustrating that her GP recognised her 
predicament in going swimming with her classmates and that religion need not be 




body in front of her classmates in the long-term was to fake a chlorine allergy.  In 
agreeing to sanction misdiagnoses of Nouf, Nouf and her doctor colluded to 
protect her modesty as a Muslim woman.  Her doctor was a "virtuous hearer" 
(Fricker, 2007, p. 169) and an "epistemic hero" (Medina, 2013, p. 186) who lived 
up to his "epistemic responsibilities" (ibid) by recognising Nouf's moral 
trustworthiness (Medina, 2013, p. 76).  This allowed a condition of epistemic trust 
between them resulting in him giving Nouf testimonial justice, even though she 
would be lying to the French authorities in her reasons for not going swimming.  
Nouf was marginalised and 'colonised' in France as a consequence of legislation 
preventing her from fully practicing her religion in school and furthermore, 
assuming her identity as a Muslim woman.  Areej next sought to clarify Nouf's 
position further: 
I just wanted to point out a bit about women in Islam and freedom.  
Islam has always been encouraging women to go out there, it has never 
said 'stay home and take care'; it has always been saying 'get out 
there'.  You can see from the role-model; like Khadija [the prophet 
Mohammed's wife], she was a strong woman.  We have so many 
women who fought in wars like we have Muslim women like these, she 
fought in a war and they are role-models.  From long time ago we've 
always been having these models but, again, the media, they just target 
a few little minor stories saying, 'ah woman in prison, home she doesn't 
do anything, she is locked up.'  Well, that's not true because I am not 
from here, I'm from Oman and if you see like we are more stronger than 
the men right now, women are getting really empowered. The media 
doesn't show this and even here like when I came to this country I was 
impressed by the sisters here and I have been really motivated by my 
house mates each one of them, we all come from different cultures and 
I think all these women are leaders, like that this is our generation to 
rise, yet the media is not showing this (lines 192-205). 
Areej continues the theme of role-models by reference to the Prophet 
Mohammed's wife Khadija, who has been spoken about several times in the CoE.  




prisoners in their homes and probably in their identity as Muslim women.  It is not 
clear if she is referring to media reporting in Oman or the media in general terms.  
Areej believes Muslim women: "are more stronger than the men right now" (line 
200) and "women are getting really empowered" (line 201), but that the media do 
not report this.  I suspect Areej believes the media have an agenda in negatively 
portraying Muslim women distorting the social imagination of the wider non-Muslim 
public about Muslims.  Her comments about Muslim women being "stronger than 
the men" may be a reference to the media being controlled largely by men or a 
reference to Muslim men.  Areej is a confident, educated woman studying 
engineering in a predominantly male environment.  Her comments may be a 
reference to her own position as a minority woman in a male environment and as a 
potential role-model for Muslims.   
Areej describes how Muslim women are marginalised by the media who portray 
them as subjugated and oppressed and that Muslim men are responsible for 
oppressing them.  Areej challenges the dominant media narrative which is 
responsible for the spread of "negative identity prejudice" (Fricker, 2007, p. 124) 
against Muslim women.  Her comments "I think all these women are leaders", and 
"this is our generation to rise" (lines 203-204), are examples of Muslim women 
aspiring to succeed as Muslims and where their testimonies will be afforded the 
credibility they deserve and challenging "hermeneutical injustice"(s)  (Fricker, 
2007, p. 6).  Areej is aware of her "epistemic responsibility" (Medina, 2013, p. 119) 
and the "shared hermeneutical responsibilities" (Medina, 2013, p. 90) of her fellow 
Muslim women in promoting their epistemic agency as speakers.  She qualifies 




privilege, or "active ignorance" (Medina, 2013, p. 28) as barriers to Muslim women 
achieving "epistemic justice" (Medina, 2013, p. 186).  Areej has recognised a lack 
of "epistemic friction" (Medina, 2013, p. 70) for Muslim women in their lives even 
though they are stronger, getting more empowered as role models than men, and 
that this is her generation to rise.  Areej knows Muslim women are objectified by 
men and is looking for epistemic friction to present "alternatives" to men whose 
"vitiated epistemic perspectives avoid friction and protect themselves against 
alternatives" (Medina, 2013, p. 70).  Medina (2013) divides active ignorance of the 
privileged into subsets of advantage and disadvantage which are crucial in 
constructing epistemic counterpoints for creating epistemic resistances 
(resistances to knowledge and to ignorance) which "can contribute to maintaining 
epistemic oppression, or to fight against it" (Medina, 2013, p. 29).  It is not clear 
whether Areej is referring to Muslim men or non-Muslim men in her reference to 
male privilege and therefore the category of active ignorance cannot be identified 
from her responses.  Kiran introduces the topic of culture and religion: 
I just thought of an issue that can be brought up... nobody really 
realises the big difference between culture and religion.  A lot of people 
assume that, things like oppression you know, having arranged 
marriages, and things like that are all Islamic, from Islam where really 
it's from culture, different backgrounds, Pakistani backgrounds, Bengali 
backgrounds, Arab backgrounds.  It's purely cultural and it does not 
come from Islam at all (lines 220-225). 
There are distinct differences between forced marriage and arranged marriage in 
British-Asian culture.  Forced marriage is a crime in Britain while arranged 
marriage (providing both parties being married are in agreement), is a common 
familial arrangement for many British Asians.  However, Kiran has linked arranged 




oppression from Islam.  She is aware that the public perception of arranged 
marriage may be one of forced marriage and tries to explain this in cultural not 
Islamic narratives.  Kiran is from South Sudan where Islam is a minority religion 
and perhaps arranged marriages may seem as strange to her.  This topic is much 
discussed in Britain where the concept of clan loyalty and the need to look outside 
of one's community for a partner in marriage may also reflect the need to marry a 
Muslim or choose outside of a limited gene pool where some communities may be 
interrelated.   
Kiran is aware that there is a blurring between culture and religion which affects 
both Muslim and non-Muslim communities.  This not only affects Muslim 
communities but also Sikh and Hindu communities where 'honour' is a strong 
cultural construct in how for example, daughters are considered suitable for 
marriage.  Kiran's contribution to the CoE is to distinguish between cultural 
practices and Islam to dispel notions that Islam is culpable in oppression.  Areej 
supports Kiran by providing further distinctions between culture and religion: 
Someone made a point about Islam, it is exactly what I was going to 
say that culture is different but it's not the major part like in Islamic 
countries, in Arab countries, all women have education and every 
woman has the same rights  as men.  Women are getting stronger and 
all these women they get scholarships.  Never mind about their 
background or their income, everyone had a fair chance like, countries 
which is based on Islam like I'm a, [inaudible] so I can't use your rules, 
but in an Islamic country I would say yes, women are as strong, but 
they are really not shown in the media, there are so many of them that I 
can tell you so many female role-models that I've seen, more than male 
role-models, even the Muslim men are scared because the female 
women are getting so strong, we are like, right there [indicating with her 
hands at her head height] and beating them and beating them, so yes 




Areej challenges the dominant media discourse in Britain that Muslim women are 
oppressed.  She compares how Muslim women in Islamic countries are given the 
opportunities for education and are "beating" (lines 227-237) Muslim men, but 
does not explain further.  Areej appears to suggest the media in Islamic countries 
fail to highlight Muslim women's achievements and promoting female Muslim role-
models.  She does not say that the media outlets in Islamic countries position 
Muslim women as being oppressed due to the Hijab being 'normal' attire for 
women in these countries, unlike the vast majority of Western media who equate 
the hijab to subservience.   Areej appears to confirm this view: "culture is different 
but it's not the major part like in Islamic countries" (line 228) and "every woman 
has the same rights as men" (line 229) and "everyone had a fair chance like 
countries based on Islam" (line 231).   
Areej argues that though the media in Islamic countries choose not to promote 
Muslim women as role-models and may be guilty of misogyny, their identity as 
Muslim women are not subjected to media assault as they are within Western 
societies.  Epistemic injustice provides us with a theoretical lens to analyse this.  I 
suggest that the Muslim women in Islamic countries are subjected to 
hermeneutical injustice by the Islamic media as they comprise a marginalised 
group whose testimony as role-models is being given lesser credibility than Muslim 
men.  The Islamic media do not have the same anti-Islam agenda that this 
research suggests exists in the West and furthermore Islamic state policies do not 
appear to reflect a postcolonial  'othering' or marginalisation in their treatment of 
Muslim women.  Any instances of misogyny perpetrated by the Islamic media does 




only how their achievements are recognised and circulated among the Muslim 
communities.14 
Muslim women are subjected to "epistemic objectification" (Fricker, 2007, p. 132; 
Haslanger, 2017, p. 285) or "sexual objectification" (Fricker, 2007, p. 133) when 
they have wrongfully been excluded from the community of trusted informants in 
the "sharing of knowledge" (ibid, p. 132) or their successes as Muslim women.  
Areej builds on her previous responses saying Muslim men are "scared" and that 
Muslim women in Islamic countries are "beating them" (lines 227-237).  Areej says 
opportunities for women in Islamic countries are good and they are outperforming 
Muslim men but obstacles prevent Muslim women from progressing.  It is not 
known if she is referring to the workplace as a consequence of male privilege in 
Islamic societies.  Areej has described a situation where Muslim women in Islamic 
countries are "hermeneutically marginalized" (Fricker, 2007, p. 6) because they 
are women.  However, the academic opportunities afforded them have the 
potential for "epistemic resistance" (Medina, 2013, p. 14) in challenging male 
privilege.  Building on the work of Medina (2013) "epistemic resistances" (ibid, p. 
49) may first need to address the structural inequalities couched in the epistemic 
advantages of the "privileged" (Medina, 2013, p. 29) before the cognitive attitudes 
that support "forms of privileged ignorance" may be exposed (Medina, 2013, p. 
33).  
                                            
14
 Reference to the Islamic media is an interpretation of the narratives from the women and is not indicative 




 Step 9: Last words 
Respondents are invited to give their last words on the enquiry or to pass. 
Sarah responds first by continuing the theme of the media misrepresenting Islam 
and how this is manifest in the social imagination of the public and in their contact 
with Muslim women: 
I'm not sure what to say but I think the media has a big part to play in 
what they show. My understanding of what the media is for them to 
inform people about what's going on around us, not the kind of sways to 
one side or this side or pass out information that is negative constantly, 
constantly and they need to look into more positive attributes of Islamic 
role-models, women out there, inform people about that and not always 
talk about 9/11 and terrorists the constant thing that keeps coming up 
again and again, but we really need to educate them ourselves where 
we are in the century where freedom of speech is a big thing among 
diverse cultures, people from different backgrounds, it's really, really 
rude to walk around and ask like, 'What's on your head? What is that 
you are wearing? Why is your skin colour different?' It comes to a point 
really where it frustrates me at times because I think, 'what the hell.  I'm 
in a country where you think you'd be accustomed to this', but you're 
still way backward than us yet they say to us, 'you're backwards 
because you dress like this' or 'you do this or you think like that', they 
don't need to do this (lines 243-256). 
Sarah believes the media is a powerful influence, shaping the social imagination of 
the public and should be responsible in what they say.  She believes they should 
report on positive Islamic role models instead of continually negatively reporting on 
Islam and Muslims and linking them to terrorism.  Free speech is important and 
she wants those without knowledge of Islam and Muslims to "educate themselves" 
(line 249) before confronting her about her Hijab and being racist toward her.  She 
challenges the assumptions made by her uneducated interlocutors who accuse 
her of being 'backward' (line 254) arguing that it is they who are backward 
because of their lack of knowledge'.  Sarah is misrecognising ignorance, or lack of 




right information about Muslims which fails to inform the wider public about them.  
Sarah is hampered by a false consciousness in believing that the media would act 
differently if they had knowledge of Islam and Muslims.  Edwards and Cromwell 
(2018) suggest, having the right information about Muslims is not important for the 
media, neither is whether the rise and spread of Islamophobia marginalises 
Muslims in Britain.    
Sarah has recognised that incorrect and negatively framed discourses of Muslim 
women is carried out by the media and I argue she is subjected to hermeneutical 
injustice (Fricker, 2007, p. 147) by her membership of a marginalised group and 
also by being a subject of a "tracker prejudice" (ibid, p. 27) in her identity as a 
Muslim woman.  She is marginalised in her identity as a Muslim by Islamophobia 
and racial prejudice because of her skin colour.  She is subjected to a testimonial 
injustice as a result of an identity-prejudicial credibility deficit (ibid, p. 28) in being 
systematically marginalised.  The wider non-Muslim public are subjected to 
constant negative reporting of Islam and Muslims by the media breeding 
arrogance, laziness, and closed-mindedness inculcating "active ignorance" in their 
social imaginations as a result of "circulating distorted scripts" (Medina, 2013, p. 
68).   
Khadeejah responds to Sarah saying: "I do think the media plays a part in saying 
non-Islamic stuff, if I were a non-Muslim, I would be afraid of Muslims because of 
what is in the papers about Islam" (lines 257-258).  Khadeejah blames the British 
media for marginalising Muslim women and that they target Islam.  She excuses 




non-Muslim then she would be afraid of Muslims because of how they are reported 
on.  When Muslims are marginalised following media attacks on Islam it is 
because of their association with Islam and not wholly skin colour that singles 
them out. 
Not all Asians are subject to Islamophobia, though some are subjected to racism 
because of their skin colour.  I argue rather than the wider public focusing on 
religious intolerance for example being anti-Islam, Islamophobia as described in 
this research is infused with cultural intolerance that assumes Muslims to be anti-
British.  This places Muslims outside British society (and citizenship) and 
identifiable as the enemy within.  This is supported by Khadeejah saying that if she 
were a non-Muslim she would be: "afraid of Muslims" (line 258).  This lends 
support to the definition of Islamophobia suggested originally (Runnymede Trust, 
1994; 1997) rather than a definition wholly focusing on racism.  The British 
government has argued that only a 'race' of people may be the subject of racism 
and therefore a criminal act and sentiments of anti-religion are not sufficient to 
warrant a category deserving protection in law.   
I briefly recap some key arguments in this research before returning to Aya.  I 
argue Islamophobia should be considered as having elements of cultural 
intolerance, a harmful constituent that marginalises and 'others' Muslims living in 
Britain.  Cultural intolerance increases the perceived differences between Muslim 
and non-Muslim communities more than perceived differences between religions.  
This permits the media to negatively frame Muslims by focusing on culture, 




further pushing Muslims to the margins of society.  This research further argues 
that elements of reframing Britishness and belonging (underpinned by 
securitisation) are present in the Prevent strategy limiting Muslim agency to free 
speech and protest.  Statutory requirements to teach Fundamental British Values 
in schools (DfE, 2014; ESTYN, 2015) are all postcolonial notions paving the way 
to 'colonising' Muslims living in Britain.  Aya responds to Khadeejah returning to 
the theme that Muslim women are oppressed by Islam: 
We're not oppressed. I wish people would ask me, if people have a 
problem then just come and ask me, like we wouldn't mind explaining 
why we wear the scarf and everything, I'm so tired of being misjudged 
as soon as I enter a lecture room, everyone just looks at me. For 
example, I joined a fencing society and when I joined everyone just 
looked at me 'so you're a Muslim, why are you here?' They think we just 
go to the Mosque and pray, we are just normal ladies, we have fun as 
well, we laugh, we do things, we do fencing; I think people should just 
try to educate themselves (lines 260-266). 
Aya recalls how as a student in a Welsh university she was conscious of being 
"misjudged" (line 262) by her fellow students and gives two examples, walking into 
a lecture room and joining the fencing club at university.  Aya does not say what 
her fellow students said to her, but has 'imagined' what they thought in seeing her 
at the fencing club: "you're a Muslim, why are you here" (line 264).  Aya has 
recognised what has been termed in this research by other Muslims as receiving 
'funny looks', "which may be nothing" ( Allen, 2020, p. 58) or perhaps a "residual 
internalization" (Fricker, 2007, p. 37).  She is aware that people are looking at her 
disapprovingly or her "sensory receptors are firing" but that does not mean a 
"particular action is racist" (Yancy, 2008, p. 7).  Fricker argues that a form of 
"rational sensitivity" (Fricker, 2007, p. 5) emerges after countless experiences of 




argues this is "communicative intimidation" and "micro-aggression" and is 
symptomatic of hermeneutical injustice which is a "collective hermeneutical 
impoverishment" (Fricker, 2007, p. 7) or according to Allen (2020, p. 58) "which 
may be nothing".   Medina further argues that hermeneutical injustice can be so 
severe that it may lead to the radical curtailment of voice, interpretive capacities, 
and status as a participant in meaning-making and meaning-sharing practices 
ending in "hermeneutical death" (ibid, p. 41). 
I suggest that the similarities between hermeneutical death and the silencing of 
voices within a postcolonial context cannot easily be dismissed.  Similarly when 
the interpretive powers of the young Muslims fail to recognise Islamophobia, their 
voices are killed (Medina, 2017, p. 47).  Aya may be thinking that the person giving 
her 'funny looks' is giving her lesser credibility, as Fricker (2007, p. 37) explains in 
what she refers to as "residual internalization" (ibid) where a person's genuine 
beliefs may have moved on but continues as a "sort of half-life" (Fricker, 2007, p. 
37) for the once held oppressive ideology (ibid).  It may also be that Aya is 
subjected to a "collective hermeneutical impoverishment" (Fricker, 2007, p. 7) 
preventing her from understanding 'funny looks'.   Although her fellow students did 
not say anything to her, Aya is attuned (from her previous encounters) in knowing 
what they were (Allen, 2015a).  Aya is reflecting an earlier discussion of the wider 
public viewing Muslim women as being oppressed by Islam.  When they see a 
Muslim woman acting outside of their imagined framework they are surprised by 
the Muslim actor in a 'strange' situation.  At the time that the CoE was carried out 
universities were being encouraged to engage with the government's Prevent 




Although Prevent was not yet statutory, it is not known to what extent Prevent, or a 
lack of knowledge about Muslims contributed to 'funny looks' and a lesser degree 
of credibility afforded to Aya.  Research by Mir (2009) with Muslim students on 
campus showed that preserving their Muslim identity may take precedence over 
engaging in friendships with non-Muslim peers and research with Muslim students 
on-campus in Wales is under-researched.    
Aya is subjected to hermeneutical injustice (Fricker, 2007, p. 6) as her fellow 
students have given her a lesser degree of credibility due to her being a Muslim 
woman.  This is a "prejudicial stereotype" (ibid, p. 4) existing in the social 
imagination of her non-Muslim fellow students.  Aya is also hampered in her view 
that non-Muslims should educate themselves about Islam so they would 
understand why Muslim women wear the Hijab.  Fricker refers to the "virtuous 
hearer" as being a person who gives increased credibility to the testimony of a 
speaker (Fricker, 2007, p. 169).  However, due to widespread Islamophobia there 
is a collective hermeneutical gap in the resources of the hearer (ibid) to give 
credibility to the speaker (Muslim woman) in that the testimony of Muslim women 
cannot be "corrective in structure" (Fricker, 2007, p. 169).  A similar gap exists for 
Aya who believes that more knowledge about Islam by non-Muslims will educate 
them.  Both are victims of epistemic injustice and Aya has a false consciousness 
concerning an ideology of Islamophobia which she fails to recognise.         
Naomi responds next: "You know, people, we need to help them have a further 




Naomi wants her fellow Muslims to help non-Muslims increase understanding of 
Islam, echoing Aya's view that non-Muslims will hear her testimony.  Once more 
Islamophobia has created a lacuna in the hermeneutical resources of the hearer 
and it follows that Naomi is similarly a victim of hermeneutical injustice and false 
consciousness.  Nessa responds to Naomi by returning to the theme of 
stereotyping Muslims with terrorism:  
I just don't like the fact that, they don't say like, if somebody bombed a 
place or Christians bombed a place but they would say a Muslim 
bombed the place, they should just say the person, they wouldn't say a 
Buddhist bombed the place but they would say a Muslim bombed the 
place (lines 269-272). 
Nessa believes misrepresenting Muslims is the media's "default status" (Medina, 
2013, p. 130) in stereotyping Islam or Muslims and is evidence of the media 
showing they have power and "epistemic authority" (ibid) over others.  Nessa is 
hermeneutically marginalised by media who inculcate Muslims as terrorists in the 
social imaginations of the wider non-Muslim public in Britain and subject her to 
"hermeneutical injustice" (Fricker, 2007, p. 7).  
 Areej responds to Nessa saying: "There are misconceptions from the media, they 
should stop using that because we're getting stronger and um, yeah just" 
(everyone laughs) (lines 273-274).  Katrina picks up the theme of 'last words' 
summarising her views saying: 
I think mine is important as well, I think we should all have a good set of 
morals and just treat everyone with respect, no matter where you come 
from, I think if we were a bit more respectful towards each other we 
would, you know, we wouldn't have that racial ignorance, Muslims, 
terrorists, all that, treat others the way you would want to be treated 




Katrina has not recognised the effects of Islamophobia from biased media 
reporting choosing instead to blame "racial ignorance" (lines 275-279).  Katrina is 
the first person in the CoE to consider moral and ethical considerations as a 
challenge to stereotyping, calling for the wider public to re-think what they hear 
and read from the media.  Katrina concludes her response by paraphrasing a 
biblical reference for making peace (Lansu, 2019), saying we should "treat others 
the way you would want to be treated" (line 279).  Fricker (2007) presents an 
analogy between first, the virtuous agent's moral perceptual capacity and second, 
the virtuous hearer's testimonial perceptual capacity (ibid, p. 72).  In the case of 
the first, if the hearer has had a "proper moral upbringing" or "socialisation" then 
when confronted with testimony will make a judgment based on their moral 
compass.  In the second case the hearer will be looking for cues or epistemically 
salient features and social cues that relate to "trustworthiness" (ibid) to make a 
credibility judgement.  Fricker (2007, p. 72) argues that the analogies described 
are dependent on five "closely related points of parallel" described as follows:   
1. that in the testimonial as in the moral sphere, the model for 
judgement is perceptual, and so non-inferential;  
2. in both spheres, good judgement is uncodifiable;  
3. in both spheres, the judgement is intrinsically motivating and  
4. intrinsically reason-giving;  
5. and in both spheres the judgement typically contains an emotional 
aspect that is a proper part of the cognition. 
Fricker's last point of parallel (number 5) is vital for non-Muslims to internalise 
injustices against Muslim women and may allow an increase in testimonial 




Islamophobia.  The "reconstruction of cognitive and affective structures" (Medina, 
2013, p. 89) by epistemic interventions including "moral and political ones" (ibid) 
may improve "epistemic interactions and interpersonal relations" (Medina, 2013, p. 
89) and address the "cognitive and affective numbing" described as, an 
"insensitivity to insensitivity" (ibid).  By allowing an ethical or moral re-education to 
be realised an epistemic responsibility and shared responsibility may be achieved.   
The Muslim women want to have a voice and to be heard but fail to locate a 
platform from where they can present testimony.  In Chapter 8, I offer an 
alternative framework where epistemic justice and moral and ethical narratives 
may be considered as ways to challenge dominant media narratives.  Amina was 
the next to respond to Katrina continuing the theme of negative media reporting: 
...um they [media] should be beginning to take responsibility 'cos I feel 
in a way they created this hatred between people who don't understand 
about Muslims and so I think they need to start to, stop writing about 
these bad things and start writing about good things um, and maybe 
have, you know, shows on the BBC for example, Muslim women who 
do good things rather than one individual in the community is doing 
something bad (lines 280-285). 
Amina is emphasising (along with some of her fellow respondents) that the media 
should take responsibility for their reporting and the BBC should show Muslim 
women as role-models.  Amina and Aya are subjected to a hermeneutical 
injustice.  Gaps in their collective hermeneutical resources makes them fail to 
recognise that educating non-Muslims about Islam and how the media operate are 
postcolonial constructs protecting an ideology of Islamophobia.  Amina expects the 
media to learn about Islam altering their moral compass so they become "virtuous 




(ibid).  Amina's testimony will not be heard by the media and she is thus 'colonised' 
even though (as this research recognises) Amina does "amazing things" (lines 
139-140) as a paediatric nurse in Wales.  I also acknowledge that I have afforded 
Amina's testimony a greater credibility as a paediatric nurse thereby unwittingly 
subjecting her fellow respondents to a testimonial injustice, an epistemic injustice, 
by failing to acknowledge their respective occupations. 
The testimonial insensitivities of the wider non-Muslim public and the "persistence 
of hermeneutical gaps" (Medina, 2013, p. 96) render the voices of Muslim women 
role models "less intelligible" and "less credible" (ibid) than non-Muslims.   Leah 
responds to Amina saying: 
I agree with all the points being made, they all make good points 
[laughs] yeah and the media should take responsibility because they 
play a part in how people, non-Muslims see Islam these days and it 
would really change their views and maybe we could all get along and 
treat others the way you want to be treated, on a friendly basis (lines 
286-289).   
Leah supports the responses of Katrina and Amina: "treat others the way you 
would want to be treated" (lines 278-279 and 282-283) which is indicative of 
wanting the media to adopt ethical and moral stances in their reporting to change 
the negatively held views of the non-Muslim wider population.  Leah recognises 
misrepresenting Muslims subjects them to "negative identity prejudice", which is 
both an "intellectual and an ethical offence" (Fricker, 2007, p. 124) sustaining 
testimonial injustice.  The goal of Intellectual virtues is to gather enough evidence 
from reliable authorities so as to be able to neutralise the impact of prejudice in 
making credibility judgements (ibid, p. 121).  The goal of ethical virtues is to do 




(Zagzebski, 2000).  Both intellectual and ethical virtues have the same end point, 
which is to seek testimonial justice and an epistemic trust (Fricker, 2007, pp. 121-
123) between non-Muslim and Muslims to neutralise Islamophobia.  Leah believes 
the media are prejudiced to Islam and Muslims by misinformation feeding into the 
intellectual narrative where the public acquire knowledge to make credibility 
judgments on Islam and Muslims.  She calls for the media to be ethical and moral 
in their reporting changing their intellectual repository to accurately reflect Islam 
and Muslims. 
The wider non-Muslim public need knowledge of Muslims and Islam to 'colonise' or 
fill a lacuna in their hermeneutical resources which allows them to become 
"virtuous hearers" (Fricker, 2007, p. 169).   Leah (and her fellow Muslim women) 
do not yet have agency to change the intellectual narrative of the media, so appeal 
to the media to have "ethical considerations" (Fricker, 2007, p. 122) for them and 
take responsibility for their reporting.  Leah, Amina and Katrina articulated how the 
media should adopt a moral position when reporting Islam and Muslims and 
recognise that they do not.  According to Medina (2013), "responsible agency" 
(Medina, 2013, p. 121) requires a "minimal social knowledge of others and minimal 
empirical knowledge of the world" or "cognitive minimums" (ibid, p. 127).  
However, in cases where there are "systematic distortions" and "pervasive 
epistemic injustices" (Medina, 2013, p. 128) or roadblocks to accessing certain 
bodies of knowledge, their ability to be responsible agents should be called into 
question and possibly suspended.  In the case of the media who "knowingly" 
(Medina, 2013, p. 122) disseminated misinformation about Islam and Muslims still 




position or that of responsible agents is not commercially in their interest.  Kiran 
returns to the theme of Muslims being linked to terrorism and how Muslims try to 
further counter-narratives: 
I really do think that the sole, that the central issue that Islam and 
terrorism, 9/11, it's just that one thing that people focus on when it 
comes to Islam and, you know, it would be, you know, people need to 
think outside the box, 'cos it is repetitive as Sarah said at the beginning 
of the issues like terrorism and 9/11, it just keeps popping up again and 
again and people, not only do people get reminded of 9/11 but people 
get reminded, like Muslims, we Muslims get reminded of the religious 
intolerance of that time, and that as well, so it's like, it's bad for normal 
people to relive 9/11 and Americans because it happened to them, but 
then it's bad for us as well because it reminds us of the pressures that 
we went through back then and it's just so much negativity that a little 
bit of positivity would be nice, like we have, you know, spiritual Muslim 
leaders out there who, you know, are doing their bit, for example um 
[name of spiritual Muslim leader] he did a blog during Ramadan and 
each day he would do, um Ramadan lasts for 30 days, and he did a 
blog for each day and each day he conveyed a positive message of 
Islam. Things like that if they were given more recognition, um ... it 
would be really good for us and will help spread the positiveness of 
Islam (lines 290-305).  
Kiran recognises that the media misrepresent Islam by linking it to terrorism and 
on the anniversary of 9/11, non-Muslims and Muslims relive it.  She refers to non-
Muslims in Britain as "normal people” (line 297) inferring Muslims in Britain are 
'other'.  However, Kiran does not mean Muslims in Britain are 'not normal' but 
perhaps indicates that Muslims are seen as outside notions of 'Britishness' and is 
indicative of them appearing different or 'colonised'.  Kiran knows she does not 
have a voice to promote positive messages of Islam which will be heard by non-
Muslims.  She wants messages from an online Imam to be broadcasted to the 




Kiran is also mistaken in believing that knowledge of Islam is key to lessening the 
'othering' of Muslims.  She fails to recognise conditions of postcolonialism exist 
and that Islamophobia has led to widespread negative identity prejudice against 
Islam and Muslims.  She is suffering from a "cognitive disablement" preventing her 
from understanding why knowledge of Islam or testimony of Islam is given a lower 
degree of credibility than she gives to Islam.  Her "hermeneutical 
disadvantage...prevents her from protesting it, let alone securing effective 
measures to stop it" (Fricker, 2007, p. 151).  Irah continues the theme of Islamic 
knowledge by non-Muslims and the media: 
I haven't spoke before but I think on the whole people should have 
sufficient knowledge before speaking about any religion, even culture, 
and also people need to stop assuming and judging others regardless 
of what ethnic background they come from or what religious beliefs that 
they have and also everybody wants to live in peace.  How do people 
expect to live in peace if they are not showing how to make peace or 
how to maintain peace so, in order to live in peace we have to have or 
show how to make peace (lines 307-312). 
Irah sees a society where British Muslims have been positioned as 'the other', as a 
result of Islamophobia and cultural racism being perpetrated against them.  She 
uses the word 'peace' on six occasions during her response suggesting that she 
considers Islam and Britain to be 'at war' or at least, in conflict with each other with 
British Muslims caught in the crossfire.  British Muslims are unable to defuse the 
situation due to them not having a voice to effect change and to "have or show 
how to make peace" (line 312) in a society where the media publish anti-Muslim 
propaganda marginalising Islam and British Muslims (Edwards and Cromwell, 
2018).  If there is no 'peace' in Britain toward Islam then it follows that there is 'no 
peace' toward British Muslims who are seen as a suspect community 'colonised' 




Irah has described how Muslims in Britain are hermeneutically marginalised as a 
result of "structural identity prejudice" (Fricker, 2007, p. 173) manifesting itself in 
Islamophobia.  To show how to make and maintain peace (310-312) non-Muslims 
must be able to hear the voices of Muslims in Britain in order to become virtuous 
hearers raising the credibility of Muslim testimony and achieving epistemic justice.  
In respect of Irah's comment "show how to make peace" (line312), demands the 
hearer be able to hear testimony from a hermeneutically marginalised group to 
become a "virtuous hearer" (Fricker, 2007, p. 169).  Nouf responds to Irah 
summarising her final comments saying:  
There is so much to say um... I just wanted to talk about our question.  I 
think it's really in our interests to make this situation of peace between 
Muslims and non-Muslims.  I think if you ask everybody um, they all 
agree that there are two clans...groups in the world, the Muslims and 
the non-Muslims. If all of the people who were really like claiming that 
Muslim people are really bad, that we are violent, that we are animals, 
we are primitive,...that it is really a lack of knowledge, a big lack of 
knowledge and there is already stupid people like Huntington who 
creates two armies and they don't think they just follow, they just follow.  
I think, um as you said, if you really want to live in peace...we'll have to 
make peace (313-321). 
Nouf begins her response by agreeing that it is in the interests of Muslims to have 
peace and describes how Muslims are framed in derogatory narratives of being 
really bad, violent, animals and primitive (lines 317-318).  Nouf again reiterates 
that 'othering' Muslims occurs as a result of a "lack of knowledge, a big lack of 
knowledge" (line 318) by non-Muslims.  Nouf does not mention the media in her 
response inferring perhaps that non-Muslims must take responsibility for their 
knowledge even though the media present Islam and Muslims negatively.  She 
makes reference to the theory of Samuel Huntington (Huntington, 1993) (line 319), 




at war with Islam, and "conflicts will therefore occur" (Giddens, 2001, p. 560).  
Nouf recognises the theme of 'making peace' by Irah contrasting two clans (line 
315) that she believes exists in the world order (Muslims and non-Muslims) along 
with Huntington's theory and the inevitability of conflict.  Nouf argues that if non-
Muslims have knowledge about Islam then conflict can be avoided.   
Nouf describes how it is "really in our interests to make this situation of peace 
between Muslims and non-Muslims" (line 314) echoing Fricker (2007, p. 7) who 
describes situated hermeneutical inequality where: 
...their social situation is such that a collective hermeneutical gap 
prevents them in particular from making sense of an experience which it 
is strongly in their interests to render intelligible. 
Nouf has articulated how I believe this research has argued the ways Muslims are 
hermeneutically marginalised and that she believes in order to achieve 'peace' 
knowledge of Islam and Muslims must be transmitted to non-Muslims to challenge 
the view that conflict with Islam is inevitable.  She knows that Muslims must be 
instrumental in giving this message but cannot identify a conduit where this may 
occur.  This research further argues normalising Islamophobia has prevented 
Muslim testimony.  Lala extends Nouf's idea: 
What I would say is the media is creating these so-called terrorists, like 
people who are young they might be vulnerable and because its 
everywhere they might actually be thinking 'OK, everyone is thinking 
we're terrorists', ...actually go out and do violent things...by constantly 
making people think like that, they might actually give in to it if they are 
vulnerable, so I think in another way the media should be challenged 
just for example, newspapers and bombs,...you can always challenge it 
by writing in with your own point of view. The media should be 




Lala returns to the media saying that when a young vulnerable Muslim is 'othered' 
as a potential terrorist because he is Muslim he may act out the identity given to 
him by the media.  She believes the media should be challenged and that they can 
be challenged (328-329).  Lala articulates a 'hypodermic needle theory' that media 
messages are injected directly into the brains of passive audiences, (see Lasswell, 
1927, for example; also Abdullah B, line 393 men's transcript at Appendix 2), and 
that without knowledge of Islam and Muslims, the recipients are more likely than 
not to be passive.  She suggests challenging the media by writing to them.  Lala is 
subjected to a hermeneutical injustice as a lacuna in her collective hermeneutical 
resources (Fricker, 2007, p. 7) prevents her from understanding that her written 
testimony will not be given the credibility it deserves.  Lala and her fellow Muslims 
are right in wanting to resist "the imposition of mainstream meanings and 
interpretations" (Medina, 2013, p. 114) by the media or, as Medina dramatically 
asserts: "hermeneutical villains" (ibid, p. 115), who are "exceptional in maintaining 
hermeneutical gaps in place and blocking attempts to bridge those gaps".    
The media act with such "epistemic arrogance" (Fricker, 2007, p. 20) in their 
negative reporting and consideration for vulnerable young Muslims that "a range of 
epistemic virtues" (ibid) is out of their reach making them impervious to such 
criticism.  Chapter 3 argued that following on from the Leveson inquiry (Leveson, 
2012), the then Prime Minister, David Cameron could have legislated to make the 
press accountable but chose not to do so.  In reporting Islam and Muslims the 
media position themselves as "overly esteemed in their capacity as knowers" 
(Fricker, 2007, p. 20) constantly privileging themselves by focusing on Islam and 




contributes to some readers seeing sections of the press having a "credibility 
excess" (ibid) in their 'knowledge' of Islam and Muslims in Britain, allowing the 
testimony of the media to be given credibility by its readers thus creating 
hermeneutical injustice against British Muslims.  However, Medina (2013) differs 
from Fricker (2007) here believing that at the "moments of testimonial exchanges" 
(Medina, 2013, p. 59), if no harm is done to those with credibility excess, then no 
epistemic harm may be attributed to them.  Jill continues the theme of education: 
I think Muslims educate themselves as they go, 'cos like sometimes the 
media shows the negative side and we try to show ourselves.  You 
know like we need to carry on educating ourselves as Muslim ladies 
and show we are not like the small minorities and Islam's peace,...and 
that's it. [Everyone laughs] (lines 330-333). 
Jill believes Muslims should educate themselves in respect of Islam as a response 
to the negative reporting of them by the British media.  Jill suggests that 
knowledge of Islam is an effective counter-argument able to distance Muslims 
from the dominant media narratives of Islam and Muslims.  Knowledge of Islam 
has been a theme repeatedly articulated throughout the CoE as an antidote for 
Muslims to employ when faced with negative reporting and education is seen as 
their 'subversion' to 'colonisation' by the media.  Although Jill has not articulated 
where her knowledge of Islam may be directed, it is the beginning of looking for 
"possibilities of resistance in every discursive practice" (Medina, 2013, p. 16) to 
create epistemic friction to "fight against ignorance" and "facilitate the learning of 
others" (ibid, p. 17).  Kiran responds to Jill for her final comments: 
Can I just ask something really important, ...from what I know, there is 
um, out of all of this negativity, I think it is, in a way, promoting Islam 
because there are always people who convert and that the strong 




and educate themselves and then they end up converting themselves 
which is beautiful (lines 334-338).   
Kiran contributes to previously suggested counter-arguments by saying when 
people educate themselves they can see the 'truth behind a story' and may be 
drawn into embracing Islam as a result, viewing it as a positive outcome from a 
negative story.  This may suggest that education is the key in forwarding a 
counter-argument to a 'colonising' of the Muslim mind and recognising that Muslim 
testimony may be given a higher degree of credibility by those educated about 
Islam and are "virtuous hearers" (Fricker, 2007, p. 169).  The significance of what 
Kiran says about those who are not educated, (in that she believes they will not be 
able to understand or embrace Islam), is due to them giving Islam a lesser degree 
of credibility (Fricker, 2007) preventing them from being 'educated' about Islam.  
Kiran's counter-argument challenges being 'colonised' but her testimony is unlikely 
to be heard because she is a victim of both a prejudicial credibility deficit and 
hermeneutical injustice (ibid).  Irah has the final word of the enquiry: 
Can I just add to that also people say Islam is all about being oppressed 
but statistics actually shows there are more reverts or converts into 
Islam than any other religion and if women were to be oppressed why 
so many women becoming Muslims? Just doesn't make sense to me 
(lines 339-342). 
Irah articulates a challenge against one example of media stereotyping claiming 
Muslim women are oppressed by their religion, evidencing non-Muslim women are 
embracing Islam.  She articulates an argument from her Muslim respondents that 
women who are educated are able to see through the fog of media misinformation 
and able to embrace Islam.  These are the educated "virtuous hearers" (Fricker, 




adjust their credibility upwards.  Having heard Muslim testimony they are able to 
choose to embrace Islam: "and they end up converting themselves which is 
beautiful" (lines 337-338).    
7.4. Conclusion 
Step 10, the review of the enquiry is included within the conclusion to prioritise the 
final comments of the participants and for them to be able to articulate their 
concerns and have their voices heard by the wider non-Muslim public.  
 Step10: Review of the Enquiry 
The Community of Enquiry brought together fifteen, mostly higher-educated young 
Muslim women living in Wales to explore a question for discussion chosen by 
themselves: 'Is the media misrepresenting Islam for their own gain?' 
The women explored how the media stereotyped Muslims by linking them to acts 
of terrorism focusing on Islam as being responsible instead of the person who has 
committed the crime.  Examples were given of how the media praise some 
individuals following an atrocity and then demonise them afterwards in order to sell 
newspapers.  The women explored how the media portray the Hijab and how this 
may influence public opinion inculcating in their social imaginations a view that 
Islam is responsible for the oppression of Muslim women.  Nouf, a French citizen 
provided examples from her schooldays in France to support how teachers had 
been influenced by the media and in the case of France, government legislation.  
The concepts of religion and culture were explored, locating boundaries between 




name of Islam.  Areas such as forced and arranged marriages were placed firmly 
in the area of culture thereby asserting that Islam is not oppressive to women.  
The role of Islam in Islamic countries was explored by some of the women who 
resided abroad highlighting the opportunities for women to have an education, 
often at the expense of Muslim men who were described as being not as strong as 
the women and in fear of being overtaken by them.  Positive Muslim women as 
role-models was seen to be an important issue for challenging Islamophobia and 
they considered women to be in the frontline of such challenges. 
Negative reporting of Islam and Muslims by the media dominated the enquiry 
throughout and was discussed at length by the women giving examples of 
stereotyping and offering counter arguments to challenge the dominant media 
narrative about Islam and Muslims, not only in Britain but globally.  This reflected 
the views from the women who, although together for the CoE, live very different 
lives in Islamic and non-Islamic countries.  
The concept of 'education' or knowledge was a thread that ran through the enquiry 
and was discussed in terms of a lack of knowledge by non-Muslims, the media, as 
well as the need for Muslim women to 'educate' themselves about Islam to be able 
to challenge Islamophobia and be positive role-models for Islam to change public 
perception of them.  The concepts arising from how knowledge of Islam and 
Muslims is misrepresented and distilled in the social imagination of the public was 
analysed through the lens of Fricker (2007) and Medina's (2013) theories of 




Muslims through a social justice lens to better explain why the wider non-Muslim 
public in Britain is not hearing Muslim voices.  
The concept of 'colonising' the Muslim mind was explored and how this restricted 
agency and a platform from where to present a counter challenge to Islamophobia.  
These issues were explored at length within postcolonial thought as a way of 
bringing together the influences which, I argue, 'others' British Muslims.  The 
efficacy of an online Imam during Ramadan and media platforms for Muslim 
voices was discussed as a way of promoting positive messages of Islam, but on 
analysis, fell victim to testimonial and hermeneutical injustice.  A central and 
recurring theme was the need for non-Muslims to have knowledge of Islam and 
Muslims in order to lessen hostility toward Muslims.  The argument in this research 
asserts that this is not possible, due to a false consciousness permeating the 
minds of both Muslim and non-Muslim actors.  It is therefore crucial to explore why 
knowledge about Islam and Muslims is trapped in a postcolonial construct 
maintaining, concealing and protecting Islamophobia.  Furthermore, the Muslim 
women did not refer to nor explore the ideology of Islamophobia, choosing to focus 
on the media not having the correct knowledge of Islam.  Such a view hides 
deliberate misrepresentation of Muslims and Islam resulting in them being 
objectified in a postcolonial construct.  I see this as further evidence to support 
how Islamophobia is protected even from those it affects the most.  
In Chapter 8, I present the findings from an analysis of the data from both CoE 
conducted with the Muslim men and women.  Through postcolonial and epistemic 




through their lived experiences of Islamophobia.  I suggest ways in which Muslims 
may identify injustices caused to them by the protected ideology of Islamophobia 
by reframing, and allowing their narratives to challenge the political and public 




8. CHAPTER 8: DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS  
8.1. Introduction 
I begin this chapter by reviewing my motivation for wanting to engage in research 
with young Muslims living in Wales.  I go on to review the research process and 
theoretical assumptions made before showing how I engaged with postcolonialism 
and epistemic injustice which shaped the analysis of the CoE data.  I provide a 
summary of the main findings before going on to present the findings to each 
research question in detail.  I continue with the contribution that the CoE has made 
to the research process before proposing a reframing of Muslim narratives through 
Human Rights, epistemic injustice and postcolonial concepts.  I go on to show the 
relevance and limitations of the research. 
In 2001 I formed a professional relationship with Muslims who were working with a 
locally based ethnic minority charity and together we produced two resources 
'What if'  (Mort, 2004) and 'Being Me' (Mort, 2008) for use in schools to challenge 
Islamophobia in South Wales.  When I retired in 2010, I continued working with the 
charity in a voluntary capacity.  I was acutely aware of how Islamophobia was 
affecting Muslims and wanted to further my academic studies, by researching 
ways that affected their lives, so I may construct a counter-argument with which to 
lessen its effects.  My initial research design using semi-structured interviews with 
adult Muslims had not uncovered incidents of Islamophobia.  I subsequently 
carried out two Communities of Enquiry (CoE) with young Muslims.  Initial scrutiny 
of the CoE data showed they had been marginalised, but I could not 'read' the 




literature and theory, including government policy that I suspected may have 
influenced their lived experiences as Muslims living in Wales. 
During this time, I wrote a programme of informal lessons to challenge the rhetoric 
of far right-wing groups operating in South Wales who were potentially responsible 
for influencing predominantly Welsh, white young people.  Using the available 
funding and together with a Muslim colleague we delivered the THINK Project 
(2012) across South Wales over a 3-year period to young people who had been 
referred to a charitable service provider.  Using my knowledge of what the young 
people were saying about minority communities, including Muslims living in Wales, 
I constructed a theoretical framework which allowed me to interrogate the CoE 
data and formulate a hypothesis.  I suspected that an inability for Muslims to 
publicly celebrate their identities stemmed from a weakening of multiculturalism 
specifically for Muslims living in Britain.  From my reading of the CoE data I noted 
that the Muslims had been securitised and objectified and that their sense of 
belonging and loyalty to Britain was questioned.  My hypothesis broadened to 
include the government's Prevent Strategy (Home Office, 2011a) and political 
rhetoric around notions of British values (Cameron, 2011).  Although the Prevent 
Strategy had been in force since 2003 and Fundamental British Values not 
introduced until 2014 (DfE, 2014) events including the Trojan Horse controversy in 
2014 (Holmwood and O'Toole, 2018) and subsequent legislation (Counter-
Terrorism and Security Act 2015) for Prevent and FBV to be enacted in schools 
(and other public bodies) (ESTYN, 2015) gave rise to a concern for me about its 
use.  This influenced the theoretical framework and the literature review to 




questions for discussion identifying sections of the British media as responsible for 
misrepresenting Muslims.  This prompted me to examine how the media 
selectively and negatively report on Muslims living in Britain.   
Chapter 5, the methodology, describes how my reading of the CoE data through 
theory, legislation, and government policy (Jackson and Mazzei, 2012) shaped this 
thesis.  I wanted to locate instances where Islamophobia had 'othered' Muslims, 
but I was concerned about speaking for marginalised groups within postcolonial 
thought.  Noting that postcolonial conditions had 'othered' Muslims I wanted to 
progress my research in ways that would not speak for Muslims (Spivak, 1988; 
Said, 1978) and avoid replicating colonial injustices when applying "postcolonial 
thought" (Meer, 2014, p. 502).  
I further engaged with theory suggesting that if Islamophobia can be considered 
an ideology then it may also be the case that it is protected by a false 
consciousness (Lukacs, 1971) existing in the minds of both Muslims and non-
Muslims protecting and sustaining a 'normalised' postcolonial constructed belief 
(Bhargava, 2013) which I believe is Islamophobia. Notwithstanding that the 
presence of conditions of false consciousness in the minds of Muslims and non-
Muslims would require further research, I suggest that a curtailing of intellectual 
freedom (ibid) may also be considered as hermeneutical injustice (Fricker, 2007; 
Medina, 2013) opening up the area of epistemic injustice (Fricker, 2007) to be 
considered alongside postcolonialism.  This would allow injustices perpetrated 
against Muslims to be identified in an epistemic injustice framework freeing secular 




I now turn to present a summary of the main findings of the research.    
8.2. A Summary of the Findings 
In Chapters 2 and 3 I argued that multiculturalism for Muslims living in Britain 
changed as Muslims began to be gradually securitised as a consequence of the 
Prevent Strategy (Home Office, 2011a) and perceived as being different by 
notions of Britishness and belonging forming part of political rhetoric (Cameron, 
2011).  The data obtained from the CoE preceded the legislation of FBV (DfE, 
2014) and subsequent introduction into school curriculum which was underpinned 
by the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015.  However, messages from 
government made Prevent and FBV clear to Muslims living in Britain prior to 2014.  
In this chapter I shall refer to the line numbers in the men's transcripts as MTL and 
in the women's transcripts as WTL. 
As a result of analysing the CoE data I was not able to prove conclusively that a 
weakening of multiculturalism nor the introduction of FBV was responsible for a 
lessening of Muslim agency or belonging.  In respect of a weakening of 
multiculturalism I considered that although there are overwhelming instances of 
'othering' in both CoE which is symptomatic of such conditions, it remains 
unproven.  The Muslim men spoke of being fearful of arrest and prosecution by 
being seen as visibly Muslim and when also voicing dissent while living in Britain.  
However, Prevent could not be dissociated from other counter-terrorism strategies 
in force at the time of data collection.  It is of interest to note however, that the 
early formulation of Prevent was founded on "counterinsurgency models which 




presence of postcolonial narratives in the CoE should not be seen as 
extraordinary.   
The data showed that the lived experiences of Muslims living in Britain made them 
feel different.  They were portrayed as potential security risks and enemies of 
Britain wanting to lead separate and un-British lives and having loyalties or 
"multiple loyalties" (Bloemraad et al., 2008, p. 160) allied to hostile foreign lands.  
The CoE data strongly showed the narratives of the Muslim respondents being 
articulated in postcolonial thought.  They comment on the lives of their parents in 
similar terms further recognising that both are positioned as the 'other' in British 
society.  The respondents wanted to be recognised as Muslims and British citizens 
believing that the wider British public were ignorant of their lives as Muslims and of 
Islam as a religion.  However, the respondents did not recognise that the ideology 
of Islamophobia, normalised in the social imagination of the wider non-Muslim 
public, prevented that public from properly knowing Muslims and Islam.  Similarly, 
an apparent inability by the respondents to recognise Islamophobia, a postcolonial 
construct, suggests they are also cognitively disabled, having been 'colonised' in 
their social imaginations.  My reading of the data has influenced and supported the 
theoretical assumption that postcolonial conditions exist for Muslims living in 
Britain and furthermore that these conditions support, maintain and sustain 
Islamophobia.  
The data showed that neither CoE appeared to recognise nor to evidence 
Islamophobia (other than Abdullah who refers to it in context of the media 




been 'othered' mainly in postcolonial narratives of securitisation and objectification.  
A common theme in the CoE was the need for non-Muslims to have knowledge of 
Islam and Muslims to counter the negative reporting by sections of the media.  
Although my hypotheses were not proven conclusively, I suggest that a lack of 
knowledge of Muslims and Islam may be a consideration in how knowledge of 
them is shaped in postcolonial thought, including a weakening of their agency to 
celebrate Muslim identity, positioning them also as a suspect community.  The 
strength of postcolonialism to control the thought and agency of the 'colonised' is 
its innate ability to hide the hegemony that sustains it.  I propose that false 
consciousness can be considered as a way to explore how both Muslims and non-
Muslims fail to recognise Islamophobia.    
Arguing that Islamophobia is a postcolonial construct and that its definition does 
not reflect the harm caused to Muslims, I suggest alternative descriptors.  I further 
propose that the theory of epistemic injustice is a way forward in breaking free 
from postcolonial thought and that injustices caused to Muslims in Britain be 
identified and articulated through it.  Testimonies of Muslims are largely unheard in 
Britain and dismissed as unimportant.  As a community they are subject to 
hermeneutical marginalisation where injustices committed against them are 
'normalised' in a postcolonial construct and fear reintroduced in a restructured 
Western "security state" (Amin-Khan, 2012, p. 1597).  It is vital that the narrative of 





Analysis of the data through both postcolonial and epistemic injustice lenses, 
showed how the respondents were 'othered' and marginalised in their lived 
experiences of Muslims in Wales.  The inability to have their voices heard in 
postcolonial conditions is unjust.  I adopted an epistemic justice paradigm to 
deconstruct Islamophobia so that both Muslim and non-Muslim may identify a 
lacuna in their social imaginations harbouring an ideology of Islamophobia.  I now 
turn to my research journey to show how its progression informed the research 
questions that have guided and shaped this research to better understand 
Islamophobia in the light of the lived experiences of Muslims living in Wales.   
8.3. Postcolonialism and Epistemic Injustice 
I begin by exploring how I engaged with theory and literature to address the aim of 
the study and how the research questions evolved from the iterative process.  I go 
on to revisit the research questions before addressing each question in turn to 
discuss the findings.    
The overarching research aim for this thesis was to: Explore the lived experience 
of young British Muslims living in Wales in the light of Postcolonial and Epistemic 
Injustice theories.  However, before arriving at a stage where I was able to 
interpret the data from both CoE I had revised my initial research design, research 
methods, and engaged with theory and government policy (see research process 
map in 5.1.1).  This was a necessary process for me to read theory, policy and 
data to authentically portray the voices of the young Muslims using all resources 
available to me.  The data from each CoE was not clear to me until familiar with 




elements of the Prevent Strategy (Home Office, 2011a) into the THINK Project 
(2012).  I began to consider my reflexive position where I may have unwittingly 
been responsible for marginalising young people, categorising them as vulnerable 
in my delivery of the THINK Project (2012) and the All Wales Core Programme 
(2004) as a police officer.  I began to question how policy for social good may also 
be responsible for marginalising groups or communities.  This permitted me to 
examine the Prevent Strategy and FBV as being postcolonial constructs that may 
be responsible for 'othering' young Muslims. 
In my reading of the CoE data (and the one-to-one interview data), I identified a 
recurring theme where Muslims wanted others to have knowledge about them.  
The quest for authentic knowledge also extended to young Muslims who wanted 
knowledge of Islam but were often denied this by management at Mosques.  
These were seen as important areas for the construction of Muslim identity which I 
saw as representative of postcolonial conditions where knowledge was denied.  
The data from both CoE showed that the young Muslims blamed the media for 
deliberately misrepresenting them whilst believing that if the media had knowledge 
of Islam and Muslims then they would not misrepresent them.  I initially considered 
this as naivety by the young Muslims.  However, having engaged with postcolonial 
theory, I changed my position to consider that this may have been false 
consciousness.  I further engaged with theory suggesting that false consciousness 
was protecting Islamophobia (if it were seen as an ideology).  This concurred with 
the view that the young Muslims did not appear to recognise Islamophobia, 
preferring instead to articulate their lived experiences of 'othering' in postcolonial 




postcolonial terms including notions of a 'colonising of the Muslim mind' along with 
incidents of 'othering' by securitisation and objectification reinforced my belief that 
a postcolonial construct had evolved for Muslims living in Britain.  My reading of 
postcolonial theory also warned me of the dangers of speaking for marginalised 
groups (Spivak, 1988; Meer, 2014, p. 502) and unwittingly framing Muslims within 
my own "imperialist gaze" (Denzin and Lincoln, 2011, p. 171).  I decided to engage 
with theory to find an alternative narrative.   
My reading of Bhargava (2013) in his study of epistemic injustice and colonialism 
in India was crucial in linking a failure to think for oneself (or intellectual freedom) 
(ibid, p. 415) with false consciousness.  I saw this as an example of hermeneutical 
injustice, where a lack of hermeneutical resources prevents non-Muslims from 
giving credibility to Muslim testimony.  As I engaged with epistemic injustice 
(Fricker, 2007; Medina, 2013) and the CoE data, I could see that this would offer a 
way forward from postcolonialism and allow injustices perpetrated against Muslims 
to be framed in a secular and human rights understanding, where potentially 
Islamophobia may be redefined.  The ever-growing canon of epistemic injustice 
literature allows for a wide range of alternative descriptions of injustice to be 
articulated, moving away from narrowly constructed definitions which may serve 
those who construct them and not those that it claims to protect.  The implications 
for this allowed me to consider that the designated definition of Islamophobia,  
protected and maintained by false consciousness, was not fit for purpose and that 
injustices caused by its ineffectiveness necessitate reframing in narratives of 




The iterative process of re-reading data, policy and theory (Jackson and Mazzei, 
2012) permitted me to construct research questions to guide interrogation of the 
CoE data and allow me to propose a way to challenge Islamophobia and expose it 
as a form of 'Trojan Horse' (a destructive programme masquerading as a benign 
policy).  I am aware of the irony in using such a term which was used to discredit 
Muslim operated schools in Birmingham (Holmwood and O'Toole, 2018).  I revisit 
each research question in turn going on to explore the CoE data from the Muslim 
men and the Muslim women to see whether the data has answered each question.  
The research questions were: 
 Is Postcolonialism visible in the narratives of young Muslims living in 
Wales and if so, in what ways? 
 Is Epistemic Injustice visible in the narratives of young Muslims living 
in Wales and if so, in what ways? 
 How might we understand Islamophobia in light of Muslim experience?  
8.4. Research Question 1: 
 RQ1: Is Postcolonialism visible in the narratives of young Muslims 
living in Wales and if so, in what ways? 
Postcolonial conditions existing for Muslims living in Britain is an important concept 
to understand how knowledge is controlled.  I first provide an analysis of the CoE 
with the Muslim men followed by an analysis of research question 1 from the 
Muslim women.  At the beginning of each analysis I remind the reader of the 
concepts considered by each group during their CoE before going on to introduce 




Muslim men    
The concepts identified in the four questions put forward for the CoE by the 
Muslim men include the following:  
1. Muslims are negatively stereotyped by the media as being a suspect 
community linked to acts of terrorism. 
2. Muslims feel isolated and rejected from wider society. 
3. Knowledge is key to understanding Islam and Muslims and is vital 
for Muslims to be able to put forward counter-arguments in support  
of their religion. 
4. Knowledge of Islam is vital in understanding their identity as 
Muslims. 
5. Knowledge can be negatively manipulated by the media to their 
detriment. 
The question chosen for discussion was: 'Do common stereotypes or media 
influence your own perception about Islam even though you are Muslim'?  
Using the theory of postcolonialism to initially analyse data from both CoEs, I 
identify instances where an 'othering' of Muslims has occurred.  The Muslim men 
recognise and articulate conditions of colonisation in stories about their parents 
and their parents' generation (MTL 137) who speak about themselves as "guests" 
in Britain with the hope of returning to their country of birth (MTL 110) and says 
that his parents' generation do not want to upset their "host" (MTL 138).  He refers 
to the majority non-Muslim British community as the "native community" (MTL 137-
139) and "native population" (MTL 251) and that his parents' generation are 
"traditional" (MTL 154) adopting subservient positions as citizens.  Abdullah B is 
articulating postcolonial language to describe the attitudes of his parents' 




representative narratives of being 'colonised'.  He continues by saying that he 
wanted to be able to "print my identity  inside British society" (MTL 121) unlike his 
parents' generation who want their sons to subsume their Muslim identity in British 
society and not be seen as a Muslim.  This is a clear indication that Muslims living 
in Britain recognise they are 'othered' in a postcolonial Britain.   
The Muslim men explained that they could not access knowledge of Islam nor how 
to be a Muslim from their parents who are ignorant of Islam.  Their parents often 
rely on their cultural heritage and reporting from the British media to have 
knowledge so they may be able to interpret Islam (MTL 203-211).  A lack of 
knowledge or lack of agency to gain knowledge by their parents is indicative of 
being 'colonised' within postcolonial constructs.  Furthermore, lack of knowledge 
from the Mosques (MTL 159-166; 194-195) may also be considered representative 
of postcolonial conditions for young Muslims, who are denied access to knowledge 
of Islam and being a Muslim which are vital elements in constructing Muslim 
identity. 
Abdullah refers to Muslims having an "identity crisis" (MTL 242) and an "inferiority 
complex" (MTL 32) due to the effects of being negatively stereotyped and not 
being able to access knowledge that would strengthen their identity as Muslims 
living in Britain.  These are examples of postcolonial conditions existing for 
Muslims.  Arikarikam  further recognises Muslims who access the internet looking 
for sources of Islamic knowledge could be identified by security officials and 
arrested or prosecuted as a consequence of acting upon incorrect Islamic 




Prevent and security legislation (Home Office, 2011a; Counter-Terrorism and 
Security Act 2015), however it may also be seen as an example of 'othering' in 
postcolonial terms where access to knowledge is controlled and compromised by 
legislation.  Abdullah B recognises the power of the media in influencing Muslims 
who do not have knowledge of Islam.  He also recognises that Muslims who 
believe negative reporting of Islam and Muslims by sections of the British press 
may influence them in believing that Islam is bad, preventing them from engaging 
with their faith and becoming a Muslim in name only (MTL 394-399), which I 
suggest is a further example of postcolonialism.   
When Muslims feel they are aggrieved and want to lawfully protest against 
perceived injustices (MTL 243-248) they are viewed as being anti-British (men's 
transcript 250).  Additionally, in articulating political beliefs (for example, opposing 
Britain's foreign policy) in public spaces, Muslims are seen to be "disloyal to this 
country" (MTL 250) and feel that they are "under siege" in their own country (MTL 
303; 310-311).  This may be particularly relevant in considering the Ummah, 
where transnational loyalties to fellow Muslims may take precedence over Britain's 
foreign policy.  Abdullah refers to the speech made by the then Prime Minister 
David Cameron (Cameron, 2011) who gave examples of how notions of 
Britishness and his view that multiculturalism in Britain had failed, was used to 
make Muslims living in Britain abide by FBV (MTL 253-261).  This is an important 
issue recognised by Abdullah who recalled that Cameron's speech was a direct 
message to British Muslims to be more British.  For Muslims living in Britain, 




ESTYN, 2015), later followed by counter-terrorism legislation (Counter-Terrorism 
and Security Act  2015) to ensure compliance.      
A lack of agency with which to articulate their views as Muslims in Britain may be 
considered in two ways.  First, to speak about Islam other than in religiously 
sanctioned terms can render Muslims guilty of apostasy.  Secondly, Muslim 
agency is restricted being unable to publicly assert their identity as Muslims for 
fear of being seen as anti-British or a potential terrorist (MTL 346-368) as a 
consequence of negative media reporting (MTL 395-396).  Arikarikam recalled that 
he was warned by a family member about being 'too Muslim' and that following a 
pilgrimage by Arikarikam a family member told him "they might be watching you" 
(MTL 354-355).  This view supports the argument in Chapter 2 that 
multiculturalism for Muslims living in Britain is weakened and that for Muslims 
conditions of securitisation and objectification are indicative of postcolonialism.  
Abdullah referred to decisions and policies made by the British government as 
creating "an internal barrier around the Muslim mind" (MTL 315-316) which I 
suggest is a 'colonising' of the Muslim mind restricting how Muslims living in Britain 
can exercise agency.  Abdullah acknowledges that British government policy has 
influenced Muslims in their thinking, restricting their agency as Muslims.  This is an 
example of postcolonial conditions existing for Muslims living in Britain.  
Bongo believes that Muslims in Britain are judged by their religion, which is 
misrepresented by sections of the media, and the entertainment industry linking 
Muslims to acts of terrorism (MTL 212-220).  He acknowledges that his agency as 




Akbar" (MTL 221) meaning 'God is great'.  Bongo explains that 'Alahu Akbar' is 
spoken by actors in the entertainment industry just before detonating a bomb or 
when reported by the media following a terrorist act.  Therefore, its use in 
everyday conversation by Muslims is restricted because of its misappropriation by 
the Western media.  This is an example of how the use of language is 
appropriated to progress a value judgment which has 'othered' Muslims in 
restricting their use of language.  This is a further example of 'othering' by 
controlling the use of Muslim voices by postcolonialism.   
Bongo suggests Muslims be allowed to practice their religion under international 
law, free from media bias.  He makes the point of wanting to refer to everyone as 
'being human' and that Muslims should be judged under Human Rights Act 
legislation and not because they are simply Muslim (MTL 476-482).  Bongo 
recognises that Muslims are negatively stereotyped and suggests that Muslims be 
judged in an alternative secularly informed paradigm where they are seen as 
human being who are Muslim.  Bongo wants an alternative framework where 
negative bias against Islam and Muslims may be eliminated.  Bongo has 
articulated that postcolonially informed narratives 'others' Muslims and that a 
reframing of them in a paradigm that prioritises human rights would serve them 
better.  This summarises and concurs with the theoretical position adopted in this 
thesis which seeks to move from a postcolonial narrative to epistemic justice. 
Summary of Research Question 1 with the Men 
An analysis of the data from the CoE with the Muslim men showed examples of 




securitising of Muslims.  They reported their parents being 'guests' in Britain 
feeling that they needed to conform to notions of Britishness and encouraged their 
sons to hide their Muslim identity.  The men reported a lack of, or lack of access 
to, knowledge of Islam and how they are negatively stereotyped by the media for 
being Muslim.  They recognise oppressive conditions exist for them but cannot 
define them, preferring to be seen as Muslims in a human rights context.  They do 
not recognise postcolonial conditions, believing instead that non-Muslims are 
ignorant of Islam and Muslims.  I now turn to the findings of the CoE with the 
Muslim women in respect of Research question 1. 
Muslim women  
A summary of the concepts that are evident in the five questions put forward by 
the Muslim women include the following:   
1. Muslims are negatively stereotyped by the media who present them 
as being a suspect community linked to acts of terrorism. 
2. Muslims feel rejected and isolated from wider society having to live 
parallel lives. 
3. Education of non-Muslims about Islam and Muslims is vital to lessen 
the effects of being 'othered'.    
4. They (Muslim women), being visibly identifiable as Muslim, are best 
placed to challenge stereotypes and to counter 'othering' and should 
continue to do so. 
The question chosen for discussion was: 'Is the media misrepresenting Islam for 
their own gain'? 
Using the theory of postcolonialism to analyse CoE data from the Muslim women, I 




women had discussed potential questions to progress the CoE choosing to focus 
on how the British media negatively stereotype Muslims by associating them with 
acts of terrorism for financial gain.  Amina, Leah and Kiran had previously 
suggested two questions asking whether Muslims should integrate into the wider 
community and whether it was a priority to educate non-Muslims about Islam.  The 
women recognised that some Muslims live parallel lives from the wider non-
Muslim British society and that knowledge about them is controlled and 
disseminated by the media.  In such circumstances they concede that only 
Muslims are able to give the correct knowledge about them, with Areej 
commenting in support of her group's question: 'should Muslim women continue to 
speak out?' Areej knows Muslims are misrepresented and wants to reinforce that 
they already do speak out against being stereotyped.  Sarah commented that 
young people should be taught about Islam while at school so they can educate 
their parents who don't feel the need to educate themselves or their children. 
Notwithstanding the women had yet to choose their question for the CoE they 
recognise they are negatively stereotyped by the media and that knowledge of 
them is controlled, incorrect and lacking.  I see these initial comments by the 
Muslim women as being representative of conditions where they are 'othered' in 
postcolonial terms.        
Having selected their question to progress the CoE the women gave examples 
where the media only report Muslims after doing something bad.  The media then 
refer to that person as 'Muslim', using the prefix 'Muslim' in ways that negatively 




default position by sections of the British print media.  Katrina gave examples of 
the media portraying Muslim women as oppressed and wanted them instead to go 
to the mosque and ask the women, instead of asking the men.  This suggests that 
it is the Muslim men who are asked about their lived experiences as Muslims and 
not the women.  If this is correct, then the women are not able to tell of their lived 
experiences to challenge the dominant narratives that exist for and about them.  
Katrina continued, saying, "That's why I enjoy what you guys did today because 
you're actually asking us, we are the Muslim women, we live through it every day 
so just don't write about us, ask us instead of asking the men" (WTL 54-56).  
Katrina is showing support for the process of the CoE and also illustrating that 
Muslim women's voices are not sought to challenge the media narrative that 
positions them as oppressed.  Most of the Muslim women in the CoE are visibly 
recognisable as Muslim and as such are subjected to more instances of 'othering' 
than the men (Perry, 2013).  They continue to be objectified as oppressed by the 
media but their stories to counter the charges of oppression are not sought.  
Although the women recognise the media deliberately manipulate knowledge 
about Muslims, they still want them to have knowledge of Islam and Muslims so 
they will be better informed and not print misinformation about them.  The women 
fail to recognise that an ideology of Islamophobia contributes to them being 
'othered' and that the media narrative is a contributing element to postcolonial 
conditions existing for them.  I also acknowledge a contradiction in the women 
wanting the media to have more knowledge of them (suggesting an ignorance of 




Nouf (a French citizen) told how a ban on face-coverings restricted the agency of 
Muslim women in France (WTL 62-66), and how she was told by her teacher 
"don't you know you are a pretty girl you should show your legs" and act like the 
others "cos they are people as they are normal" (WTL 77-79).  Nouf has 
articulated an attack on her faith and culture by state legislation in France 
positioning her as 'not normal'.  This is indicative of postcolonial 'othering'.  Kiran 
refers to non-Muslims in Britain as "normal people" (WTL 297) indicating that 
Muslims are perceived as being the 'other', which is a postcolonial construct.  She 
gives examples of where she has been asked: "are you a prisoner of your scarf?" 
and "is it not your will or discretion?" (WTL 104-105). Kiran also gave examples 
where Muslim women were seen as 'in need of rescuing' which are examples of 
being objectified and 'othered' in postcolonial thought.   
Nouf gave other examples of being pressured to go swimming with her classmates 
in France and how her doctor lied to say that she had a medical condition and 
could not go swimming.  Nouf did not want to be seen in a swimming costume in 
front of her classmates but this was ignored by the French education authorities 
who failed to recognise her culture as a Muslim.  Aya continued the theme by 
saying she has had people say they feel sorry for her being oppressed, reinforcing 
the narratives around Islamophobia which ensures she is seen as part of a 
subjugated group.  Both Nouf and Aya are 'othered' in postcolonial thought where 
their culture and identities as young Muslims are dismissed.   
The Muslim women see themselves as role-models for Islam and attacks on their 




Katrina pointed out her faith is not "wrapped around the scarf" (WTL 98), 
suggesting perhaps that some women believe their faith is bound by the hijab.  
Amina gives examples of Jewish and Hindu women who cover their heads but are 
not portrayed as "oppressed", illustrating that Islam and Muslims are objects of 
negative media attention and Muslim women are objectified simply for being 
Muslim (WTL 125).  The deliberate 'othering' and objectification of Muslim women 
are postcolonial constructs. 
The women were keen to present themselves as strong Muslims outperforming 
Muslim men in both educational and workplace settings.  However, their 
achievements are not reported by the media in Britain, nor in predominantly 
Islamic countries where women are afforded equal opportunities to education and 
work (WTL 227-237).  The women blame the media as responsible for 
misrepresenting them along with Khadeejah who says: "if I were a non-Muslim, I 
would be afraid of Muslims because of what is in the papers about Islam" (WTL 
257-258).  This appears to support the presence of an ideology of Islamophobia 
rather than racism for Muslims.  However, the women fail to recognise 
Islamophobia, continuing to blame non-Muslims for not having knowledge of Islam 
and Muslims.  They further blame the media, insisting that they should educate 
themselves.   Sarah and her fellow respondents believe that if non-Muslims had 
knowledge of Islam and Muslims this would lessen the 'othering' of Muslims.  The 
women are labouring under conditions of false consciousness (a postcolonial 
construct) which prevents them from recognising the ideology of Islamophobia.  
Katrina summarises her views by stating we should all have " good set of morals" 




respect for example, a Human Rights paradigm.  The women want the media to 
take responsibility for reporting on Muslims and to publish positive stories about 
Muslims living in Britain.  However, acknowledging postcolonial theory, any 
challenge to the dominant narratives in a postcolonial Britain must come from 
Muslims (Said, 1978; Spivak, 1988).  Continuing the theme of positive stories 
Kiran believes that messages from an online Imam should be publicly broadcast 
so non-Muslims may become aware of Islam.  I believe Kiran is 'colonised' in her 
social imagination and cannot understand how Islamophobia influences the social 
imaginations of the wider non-Muslim public when confronted with an Imam giving 
them knowledge of Islam and Muslims.  Irah proposed that there is a need to 
"have or show how to make peace" (WTL 312).  This was taken up by Nouf who 
went on to describe Muslims and non-Muslims in the world as being "two clans" in 
the world (WTL 315).  This may indicate a belief by Irah that there is a war or 
conflict between Muslims and non-Muslims which was supported by Nouf making 
a reference to a "clash of civilisations" (WTL 313-321) (see also Huntington, 1993) 
and that it is "really in our interests to make this situation of peace between 
Muslims and non-Muslims" (WTL 314).  These postcolonial concepts are strongly 
articulated by the women. 
Lala introduces the concept of vulnerability by suggesting that the media are 
creating "these so-called terrorists" (WTL 322) and says the media should be 
challenged by "writing with your own point of view" (WTL 328).  The comments 
made by Lala are illustrations that Muslim women do not have the resources with 




Islam and Muslims in Britain.  Furthermore, neither do they identify a conduit 
where their voices will be heard.  
Summary of Research Question 1 with the Women.  
The Muslim women strongly articulated narratives of being marginalised, 
objectified, and 'othered'.  They tell of being negatively stereotyped by the media 
and their achievements ignored.  Knowledge about them is controlled and their 
ability to have others know about them is limited to the voices of others.  They 
describe conditions of postcolonialism neither recognising Islamophobia nor the 
elements (false consciousness) that sustain it.  
8.4.1. A Move from Postcolonialism to Epistemic Injustice. 
Summary of analysis of Research Question 1. 
The data from each CoE was analysed through a postcolonial lens highlighting 
instances where Muslims had been 'othered'.  Analysis of both CoE showed that 
incidents of 'othering' is a constant theme throughout the told lived experiences of 
the Muslim men and women.  This adds weight to the argument proposed in this 
research that postcolonial conditions exist for Muslims living in Britain.  Evidence 
of postcolonial 'othering' was shown to be present in the descriptions of their 
families, their access to Islamic knowledge, and how knowledge of Muslims was 
controlled by sections of the British media.  I suggest that postcolonialism for 
Muslims living in Britain, contributes to sustaining Islamophobia as an ideology 




Both Muslim men and women want Muslims and non-Muslims (including the 
media) to have knowledge of Islam and Muslims and further recognise that 
sections of the media deliberately misrepresent and stereotype them.  
Through postcolonial analysis the men are securitised, access to knowledge of 
their faith and culture are restricted and political agency obstructed as a 
consequence of securitisation.  The women have also been securitised as a 
"prisoner" of their scarf (WTL 104), objectified by a "white gaze" (Medina, 2013, p. 
188; Yancy, 2008) from white men (in this instance French legislators) who want to 
'free' Muslim women.  The women Muslim respondents originally from 
predominantly Islamic countries report that although their achievements are not 
reported in the press (suggesting perhaps misogyny) they are not 'othered' to the 
degree that Muslim women are in the Western press.  The women see themselves 
as best placed to continue to speak out (against Islamophobia) as they "live 
through it every day" (WTL 55).  The counter-argument to the colonising of 
Muslims in Britain has to come from Muslims themselves (Said, 1978; Spivak, 
1988).   
Islamophobia, an ideology protected by false consciousness, remains hidden in a 
postcolonial Britain, preventing a counter-argument from being put forward.  
Neither the Muslim men nor women refer to 'Islamophobia' when articulating their 
own lived experiences of being 'othered', suggesting it remains a protected 
ideology. 
Postcolonialism is not restricted to Britain extending to France where Nouf spoke 




of postcolonialism for former colonising nations may still be relevant today, along 
with how Islamophobia is "defined" in each country (Allen, 2020, p. 123) and 
whether it is supported by legislation. 
Moving from postcolonialism to epistemic injustice is a deliberate attempt to 
reframe Muslim narratives to address and challenge Islamophobia.  By prioritising 
epistemic injustice as my main data analytical tool, I was able to identify instances 
of epistemic injustice in the lived experiences of the Muslim men and women.  I 
combine their responses, presenting the findings from both CoE in response to 
research question 2.  I first summarise key epistemic injustices identified from CoE 
with the men and women before going on to broadly summarise how epistemic 
injustice was visible in the narratives of the respondents in the data Chapters 6 
and 7.   
8.5. Research Question 2: A Summary  
 RQ2: Is epistemic injustice visible in the narratives of young Muslims 
living in Wales and if so, in what ways? 
Analysis of both sets of CoE data showed a range of epistemic injustices are 
present in the lived experiences of the Muslim respondents.  The Muslim men told 
of their experiences in failing to access knowledge of Islam either from the 
Mosques (MTL 155-166; 178-184; 189-191) or from their parents (MTL 67) 
causing them to be hermeneutically marginalised in their capacity as young 
Muslims who are denied access to knowledge of Islam (MTL 204-205).  The men 
also recognise that incorrect knowledge of Islam is being enacted by Muslims who 




marginalized groups"  and subjects of "testimonial injustice" (Fricker, 2007, pp. 6-
7).  The men want non-Muslims to have knowledge of them to lessen the effects of 
marginalisation.  The women also want others to have knowledge of them, 
including the media.  However, due to the prejudicial stereotype, Islamophobia 
occupying the lacuna in the social imaginations of non-Muslims, a credibility deficit 
exists for both Muslim men and women who don't recognise the ideology of 
Islamophobia. 
The men recognise the subservient position of their parents' generation who live 
as 'guests' in a country where they do not achieve full citizenship.  Their lack of 
Islamic knowledge ensures they are also "hermeneutically marginalized" (Fricker, 
2007, p. 6), not able to give their children knowledge of Islam and perhaps 
choosing a "self-imposed public silence" (Medina, 2013, p. 102).  The women refer 
to the differences between Muslim and non-Muslim in terms relating to a clash of 
civilisations (Huntington, 1993) (WTL 319).  This is an example of "situated 
hermeneutical inequality" (Fricker, 2007, p. 7) and they are "hermeneutically 
marginalized" (ibid, p.6). 
The young Muslim men do not want to accept their parents' position and strive to 
be recognised as British Muslims.  They are fearful of speaking out and are 
"scared to talk about things" (MTL 348) and engage in "political action" (Medina, 
2013, p. 86).  This makes them unable to bring about "epistemic friction" (Medina, 
2013, p. 27) with which to make their voices heard and bring the wider non-Muslim 
British public to be "virtuous hearer(s)" (Fricker, 2007, p. 169-171).  They believe 




2007, p. 170) (MTL 301).  They are subjects of hermeneutical injustice (Fricker, 
2007, p. 147) due to Islamophobia occupying a lacuna in the collective interpretive 
resources of the wider non-Muslim British public.  Furthermore, "persistent 
Islamophobia in the media means that young British Muslims develop a sense of 
cultural inferiority and lose confidence both in themselves and their parents" 
(Runnymede Trust, 1997, p. 12).  The Muslim women also fail to have their voices 
heard but want others to know that they are role-models and "this is our generation 
to rise" (WTL 203-204) from the burden of hermeneutical injustice. 
The media misrepresent Islam and Muslims appropriating language (for example 
'jihad' and Alahu Akbar) (MTL 221) for their own gain, are examples of testimonial 
injustice as Muslims are denied status as knowers and givers of information 
(Fricker, 2007).  The media link Islam and Muslims to political and military conflicts 
(MTL 248) positioning Muslims as anti-British, and potential terrorists.  The men 
are securitised and the women objectified.  Nouf (a French citizen studying in 
Wales) spoke of the French media objectifying Muslim women (WTL 5-7; 14) 
causing hermeneutical injustices to Muslim women and engendering "detrimental 
epistemic friction, censoring, silencing and inhibiting the formation of beliefs" 
(Medina, 2013, p. 50).  This was a constant theme throughout the CoE with the 
women where the media adopt "epistemic authority" (Medina, 2013, p. 130) 
prioritising their voices over the voices of Muslim women who fail to be heard and 
unable to engage in "epistemic friction" (Medina, 2013, p. 158) highlighting a 
failure by the media in engaging their "epistemic responsibilities" (ibid, p. 187).  
The women spoke of wearing the hijab and how the media objectify them as 




75-79).  This is "epistemic objectification" (Fricker, 2007, p. 133) or a "sexual 
objectification" (ibid) where the women are excluded from the community of trusted 
informants in sharing knowledge.  
Summary 
The use of epistemic injustice as a tool with which to locate injustices caused to 
Muslims living in Britain gives us a deeper understanding of how injustices are 
perpetrated against minority communities.  In recognising a diverse range of 
categories including ethics, oppression and responsibility, we can locate injustices 
caused to Muslims.  Furthermore, epistemic injustice theory offers an effective 
counter-narrative or resistance with which to challenge injustices, allowing 
responses to be framed in a human rights paradigm where cultural and religious 
bias may be lessened.  Epistemic injustice further allows epistemically 
marginalised voices to be forefronted, from where a focus on the credibility of 
testimonies may be examined, rather than Muslim voices being hid in a fog of 
cultural and religious bias.  
Analysis of both CoE showed that Muslims living in Britain are subjected to 
hermeneutical injustices because their socially situated position makes them 
powerless.  Muslims find themselves in "hermeneutical darkness" (Fricker, 2007, 
p. 149) preventing them from understanding a significant area of their social 
experience (Fricker, 2007).  Succinctly, they believe that if the wider British non-
Muslim public has knowledge of them, the effects of Islamophobia will be 
lessened.  They believe that if the wider non-Muslim British public have 'proper' or 




negative stereotyping of Muslims.  I argue the wider non-Muslim population are 
entrenched in a normalisation or 'darkness' of widespread Islamophobia and that 
they are negatively influenced by testimonial injustice (Fricker, 2007).  They give a 
lesser credibility to Muslim testimony which prevents them from hearing Muslim 
voices and recognising injustices caused to Muslims.  Succinctly, both Muslims 
and non-Muslims are "cognitively handicapped by a hermeneutical lacuna" 
(Fricker, 2007, p. 151) with both unaware they are suffering from a 
misunderstanding of each other.  The Muslim community believe that given the 
opportunity to give others knowledge of themselves, the wider non-Muslim British 
people will listen, become better informed, and less Islamophobic.  However, the 
non-Muslim British people are unable to hear Muslim testimony as a consequence 
of Islamophobia being 'normalised', occupying a void or lacuna where knowledge 
of Muslims should reside.  A cognitive disablement (Fricker, 2007) present for both 
communities prevents them from understanding significant parts of their 
experience which is in their interests to understand (Ibid).  I argue however, that 
the wider non-Muslim British public are not 'victims' of epistemic injustice in the 
same ways that Muslims have been disadvantaged.  Non-Muslims may be 
hampered by a cognitive disadvantage in their ability to understand Muslims, but 
are not marginalised by their testimonies being given a lesser credibility.  The 
wider non-Muslim British public has 'gone along' or has been subsumed into 
conditions where Islamophobia has 'blinded them' (Medina, 2013, p. 89) from 
having knowledge of British Muslims.  Such knowledge, "corrective in structure" 
(Fricker, 2007, p. 169), could potentially lessen identity prejudice against Muslims 
allowing testimonial justice to occur and non-Muslims to recognise when injustices 




hermeneutically marginalised as a community.  However, postcolonial conditions 
existing for Muslims living in Britain prevent the "virtuous hearer" (Fricker, 2007, p. 
5) from correcting prejudicial influences.  Fricker describes that the degree of 
credibility needed, in this case by Muslims:  
...is adjusted upwards to compensate for the cognitive and expressive 
handicap imposed on the hermeneutically marginalized speaker by the 
non-inclusive hermeneutical climate, by structural identity prejudice 
(ibid, p. 170).  
Both groups are "labouring with the same inadequate tools" (Fricker, 2007, p. 7).  
Muslims are hampered by not being able to adequately interpret their religion to 
align with current sensibilities including homosexuality, sexual equality and 
transgender issues.  They may not be free to speak out publicly about the various 
interpretations of, for example, Jihad, espousal violence, and the differences 
between forced and arranged marriages for fear of apostasy.  This, coupled with 
the obstacles outlined earlier, contributes to Muslims being the victims of both 
hermeneutical and testimonial injustice: they are wronged in their capacity as 
givers of knowledge and in their capacity as subjects of social understanding 
(Fricker, 2007).    
Muslims are limited in their agency to speak about social issues without having to 
frame their narratives in the teaching of Islam or the Hadith (the sayings and 
teachings of the Prophet Mohammed).  If Muslims speak outside of these 
narratives they may be accused of criticising Islam or worse, apostasy.  Muslims 
without knowledge of Islam may not want to engage in debate about social issues 
in Britain and may be wary about giving information about themselves to non-




injustice, which may be why they articulate 'othering' in terms of racism and not 
Islamophobia, which may be seen as acknowledging that negative and critical 
views of Islam and Muslims exist.   
Deploying the theories of Fricker (2007) and Medina (2013), I have looked at how 
the media's influence on Muslims, with and without Islamic knowledge, has shaped 
how they see themselves as British Muslims.  Those without such knowledge are 
more likely to believe the negative press reports about Islam and Muslims and will 
limit their Muslim agency accordingly.  They may also pass this misinformation 
onto their children as being factual.  Those who do have Islamic knowledge are 
able to notionally put forward a counter-view to the normalisation of Islamophobia.  
Their testimonies, however are not given the credibility they deserve (Fricker, 
2007) nor a kaleidoscopic social consciousness (Medina, 2013, p. 74) allowing 
Muslims the opportunity to be heard.  Therefore, testimonial and hermeneutical 
injustices continue to be perpetrated against Muslims living in Britain (Fricker, 
2007; Medina, 2013).  
In Chapter 4, I presented my theoretical position arguing that an ideology of 
Islamophobia is protected by a false consciousness in both Muslims and non-
Muslims.  I now turn to the final research question. 
8.6. Research Question 3:  





The data from the CoE showed how the young Muslim respondents were able to 
articulate instances of 'othering' perpetrated against them.  They told us that the 
media were responsible for publishing negative information about them and that 
they were made to feel different or 'othered' just for being Muslim.  A constant 
theme throughout both CoE was the participants' wish that non-Muslims need to 
have knowledge about Muslims and Islam to lessen 'othering' against them.  This 
research suggests that Islamophobia, an "ideology" (Allen, 2015a; Allen, 2020, p. 
34) is protected by a false consciousness that conceals Islamophobia from being 
recognised as the source of 'othering'.  Successive British governments have 
refused to change the definition of Islamophobia (discussed in Chapter 3) and to 
introduce policies that would seriously acknowledge and address widespread 
Islamophobia in Britain.  Political inertia and offensive comments made in political 
spaces (Johnson, 2018; Hughes, 2018) have contributed to Islamophobia being 
normalised in British public spaces making it difficult for Muslims to recognise it.  
The focus on a definition may be seen as a smokescreen hiding widespread hate 
crime toward Muslims (Allen, 2020) who are seen as not belonging in British 
society and further compounded by hatred, driven by right-wing narratives which 
are increasingly normalised in everyday conversation about Muslims (Allen, 2020).  
Islamophobia has been defined in many ways across Europe, shaped by political, 
historical, and religious associations between Islam and the host country (ibid, p. 
31).  Postcolonial conditions for Muslims living in Britain construct and control the 
narrative around Muslim discourse (ibid), undermining any challenges to 
Islamophobia.  At the time of writing there is currently no political will to effect 




moving from an inadequate definition and a colonising narrative will better frame 
Muslim discourse.    
Having identified that epistemic injustice is also present in the lived experiences of 
young Muslims living in Britain, I suggest a reframing of their voices would allow 
virtuous hearers a better understanding of Muslim voices if the concept of justice 
was not clouded by postcolonial narratives and false consciousness.  I 
acknowledge that although I move from a postcolonial narrative which has 
'othered' them to epistemic injustice, priority must be afforded to Muslims to decide 
how their voices are heard.  I further acknowledge that I have already interpreted 
their voices through my theoretical position which unwittingly may contain 
elements of postcolonialism as I present accounts from the CoE data.  I also 
suggest that my proposition of an alternative paradigm may be temporal as society 
changes and Islamophobia changes its form.  Defining Islamophobia has the 
potential to control the political narrative around its use and to attempt to define it a 
questionable exercise.  Similarly removing it would be "counter-productive" (Allen, 
2020, p. 120) as it is already part of a wide body of academic work describing anti-
Muslim sentiment and its removal would lessen the conversation around it.  I 
maintain that examining Muslim narratives through epistemic injustice reveal 
instances of injustice that do not require a definition.  This research has moved 
beyond the usual criticism of "state scrutiny, counter-terrorist policies and media 
representation" (Allen, 2020, p. 39; Hargreaves, 2015) to interrogate 
postcolonialism and epistemic injustice to add to the scholarly investigation of 
Islamophobia.  The social construction of postcolonial conditions for Muslims living 




ways other than identified in this research.  Furthermore, this research has 
focused on Muslim voices and not as victims of crime as included in Hargreaves' 
article (ibid).  I now move to explain how I believe a CoE approach could provide 
advocacy for young Muslims in Wales to prioritise their voices.  
8.7. The Contribution of the CoE  
In Chapter 5, I outlined the strengths of using a CoE as a pedagogical tool for 
gathering data.  A CoE allows respectful and ethical philosophical discussion to 
occur, shifting power relationships between the researcher and the young people.  
It is different to other qualitative methods where respondents respond to questions 
posed by the researcher.  The enquiry allowed the participants to explore what the 
stimulus meant to them and not to respond to what I as researcher might find 
important.  I argue that this way of working is particularly important in the field of 
justice and human rights.  It is a way of collecting data democratically and is a 
viable research approach when investigating the beliefs, attitudes, perceptions and 
values of respondents.  
In epistemic injustice terms a CoE may be considered as supporting efforts to 
"neutralize the impact of structural identity prejudice" (Fricker, 2007, p. 173), 
clearing the way for "virtuous hearers" (ibid, p. 171) and "epistemic responsibility" 
(Medina, 2013, pp. 119-132) to occur and as a result of "shifting the unequal 
relations of power" (Fricker, 2007, p. 174) to counteract hermeneutical injustices.  
The focus on the CoE in producing new knowledge supports the need for 
knowledge to fill a lacuna that allows the speaker's testimony increased credibility 




discussing how they want others to have knowledge about them.  I have argued 
that a lacuna exists in society about Muslims that prevents understanding of 
Muslims.  The belief that others are merely ignorant of Islam does not explain what 
is happening to them.  The lacuna of Islamophobia is a key barrier to 
understanding between Muslim and non-Muslim.   
A CoE approach would additionally allow knowledge from marginalised groups to 
inform current debates, including political recognition and representation for 
Muslims living in Britain, with the objective of "changing social structures and 
relations" (Medina, 2013, p. 314) between Muslims and the wider non-Muslim 
community.  This could potentially allow Muslims and non-Muslims to engage in 
dialogue and share differing views and challenge widely held notions of 
stereotypes that hinder relations between different cultures, values and beliefs.  
I suggest that a CoE approach is also suitable for future academic research by 
young Muslims and that an acknowledgment of postcolonial influences by the 
state identified in this research may allow others to interrogate hidden control and 
authority that seeks to influence and marginalise particular members of British 
society.  However, in articulating Muslim narratives, I suggest that postcolonialism 
be confined to identifying the sources of injustice and that an epistemic injustice 
narrative is preferable in articulating a response.  This would allow Muslim 
injustices to be reframed and compared with, for example, the Human Rights Act  
1998  where the secular narrative of epistemic injustice may be used in 
congruence.  However, I accept that some young Muslims may want to choose a 




within postcolonialism as a counter-colonial narrative.  If Muslims recognise that 
postcolonial conditions affect their lived experience, they may want to further 
analyse postcolonialism for Muslims living in Britain themselves.  I see 
postcolonialism for Muslims in Britain being an obstacle in recognising and 
affecting a challenge to Islamophobia.  Furthermore, convincing British 
governments that postcolonial conditions exist for Muslims living in Britain, rather 
than merely within academic research, is challenging.  
The existing body of literature regarding Islamophobia and Muslims generally has 
focused on the marginalisation of Muslims by reference to historical Islam (Sayyid 
and Vakil, 2010; Esposito and Kalin, 2011), and by concentrating on religious 
narratives and global territorial conquests chronicling the rise and fall of Islamic 
societies (Kumar, 2012).  Furthermore, a focus on 'Orientalist narratives' (Said, 
1978) has sustained the perceived incompatibility of Islam and Muslims in the 
West, reinforced by "a new form of colonial domination" (Gilroy, 2004, p. 2) by 
military intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan and that "the imperial and colonial 
past continues to shape political life in the overdeveloped-but-no-longer-imperial 
countries" (ibid). 
In 2015, Allen (2015a) suggested that a Human Rights Act approach may be a 
way forward in reframing the dehumanising narrative of Islamophobia which was 
largely being propagated by sections of the British print media.  This was also 
suggested by Bongo (see Chapter 6) and Amina (see Chapter 7) in their 




only label Muslims as 'Muslims' but rarely label non-Muslims as to their religious 
denomination when reporting crime.  
In Chapter 2, I argued that multiculturalism for Muslims in Britain has been 
weakened.  Bongo and Amina suggest that when people do bad things, they 
should be identified for who they are and not their religion.  Perhaps Bongo and 
Amina recognise postcolonial conditions exist for them and reject multiculturalism 
for Muslims, preferring instead Human Rights protection.  This would allow a 
Human Rights approach to supersede "social oppression" and "surveillance" 
(Anderson, 2016, pp. 2-20) for Muslims from expansive anti-terror legislation.  
Human Rights approaches may also allow challenges to be made in reviewing 
Prevent, for example, holding government to account (ibid) and permitting Muslims 
to "lawfully express dissent" (Cunningham, 2007, p. 124).  Appiah progresses the 
argument by suggesting that if a person is responsible for shaping their own life 
then "state acknowledgement of such identities is intrinsically illiberal" (Appiah, 
2005, p. 70), otherwise the state would be advantaging and disadvantaging 
particular identities, preventing the person from shaping his or her own life (ibid). 
Unfortunately, other than a failed attempt to change the definition of Islamophobia 
(All Party Parliamentary Group on British Muslims, 2018), and recommendations 
from Europe (Ramberg, 2004; European Monitoring Centre on Racism and 
Xenophobia, 2006) and further afield (Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, 2008) 
a narrative of Islamophobia through a Human Rights perspective appears not to 
have gained traction as the right-wing Islamophobic narrative in Britain has 




(also Britain) does preclude reframing Muslim narratives.  I suggest an 
amalgamation of 2 concepts used in this research (the CoE and epistemic 
injustice) together with a Human Rights approach may progress Muslim narratives 
further to disturb political inactivity, and I go on to discuss this. 
8.8. Reframing Muslim narratives in the context of Human Rights, 
Epistemic Injustice and Community of Enquiry Approaches   
8.8.1. Human Rights and Epistemic Injustice 
I now turn to looking at the findings in more depth and suggest ways in which 
Muslims living in Britain may be able to reclaim lost agency to challenge their lived 
experiences of being 'othered'. 
As a way of illustrating how human rights may be seen in contrast with epistemic 
injustice as a tool to interrogate data, I provide a brief resume of 4 articles that 
have been described by the young Muslim men and women in the CoE as having 
been breached: 
 Article 9: Freedom of thought, conscience and religion (Human Rights 
Act 1998). The right to practice one's religion, alone, in a community, 
in public or in private. Testimonial and hermeneutical injustice (Fricker, 
2007; Medina, 2013) perpetrated against Muslims for being Muslim. 
 Article 10: Freedom of expression (Human Rights Act 1998). The 
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and 
ideas without interference by public authority. Hermeneutical injustice 
and testimonial injustice when given a lesser credibility to one's 
testimony (Fricker, 2007; Medina, 2013). 
 Article 11: Freedom of assembly and association (Human Rights Act 
1998). The right to lawful protest. Hermeneutical injustice and 




2007; Medina, 2013). Hermeneutical injustice when the right to protest 
by Muslims is seen as anti-British and an enemy within. 
 Article 14: Prohibition of discrimination (Human Rights Act 1998). Not 
to be discriminated against due to one's sex, race, colour, language, 
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association 
with a national minority, property, birth or other status. Hermeneutical 
injustice and testimonial injustices (Fricker, 2007; Medina, 2013), 
perpetrated against Muslims.  
Having identified breaches of human rights using epistemic injustice Medina 
(2013) further allows young Muslims to consider "epistemic friction" (ibid, p. 158) 
as ways to challenge perceptions of what is "socially relevant or irrelevant in their 
life" (Medina, 2013, p. 158).  Epistemic friction further involves the "mutual 
contestation of differently normatively structured knowledges; it interrogates 
epistemic exclusions, disqualifications, and hegemonies" (ibid, p. 281).  This 
allows an interrogation of, in this case, human rights to see if the protection 
afforded is robust enough to engender justice for them.  Epistemic friction may 
also allow young Muslims to engage with others to consider difficult conversations 
such as the notion of apostasy which may prevent some Muslims from critiquing 
Islam; benefitting others in "epistemic cooperation" (ibid); or in recognising and 
criticising Britain's historical past in colonialism. 
Although Human Rights legislation may undermine government multicultural 
policies, in particular "state-based citizenship" (Bloemraad et al., 2008, p. 164), 
attempts for Human Rights approaches in addressing Islamophobia since 2015 
(Allen, 2015a) have not succeeded therefore alternative narratives may offer a 




8.8.2. A CoE Approach 
The structure of a CoE allows young Muslim men and women as enquirers to 
democratically decide on questions that they want to explore.  I have also 
suggested that as a tool to gather data it is a viable method to further research 
with Muslims.  Using epistemic injustice alongside a CoE approach to interrogate 
phenomena may also be seen as innovative methods of working with minority 
groups of people to better understand their lived experiences.  Furthermore, this 
may allow their "limited" voices (Healy, 2019, pp. 430-431) to be heard 
contributing to their "perceived belonging" through "a dialogic role" (ibid, p. 429) to 
occur allowing Muslims to be seen by the wider non-Muslim public as full members 
of British society.   
Having described how human rights and epistemic injustice can be used to 
compliment and critique each other I now consider how a CoE approach allows 
researchers to: 1) engage with multiple theories and policies or a "plugging in" of 
data and theory (Jackson and Mazzei, 2012, p. 2); 2) complement and enhance 
the use of epistemic injustice (Fricker, 2007; Medina, 2013); 3) articulate research 
methodology. 
When I began this PhD, I found the advice of Clough and Nutbrown (2002) 
invaluable.  At the end of my research I return to their work and see how their 
recommendations have guided and infused my journey.  A CoE can empower 
young Muslims to engage in "radical questioning" (Clough and Nutbrown, 2002, p. 
128), allowing the phenomenon to be explored to be articulated through "radical 




(Medina, 2013, p. 158).  "Radical listening" (Clough and Nutbrown, 2002, p. 79) is 
aligned with being "virtuous hearers" (Fricker, 2007, p. 171). "Radical reading" 
(Clough and Nutbrown, 2002, p. 99) is aligned with 'epistemic injustice' as a data 
analysis tool (Fricker, 2007; Medina, 2013), and the CoE with the use of "focused 
conversation as a research method" (Clough and Nutbrown, 2002, p. 84).  
Furthermore, the CoE as a pedagogical tool allows young Muslims as researchers 
to consider that the 'oppressed' must be made aware of the nature of their 
situation to remove themselves from it (Freire, 1970).  All of the above are present 
in the research methodology used in this research which plugged data into theory 
(Clough and Nutbrown, 2002) and policy. 
8.9. Relevance of Research 
It is vital for society in Britain that we recognise the harm that is being done to our 
fellow citizens who are Muslim.  We cannot rely on government policy nor media 
regulation to address hate crime being perpetrated against Muslims living in 
Britain.  Unless we work toward building an inclusive society where Muslims have 
a voice, they will continue choosing to live separate lives to avoid being targeted.  
Some Muslims may decide that their only option to defend their right as citizens, is 
to engage in extremist and criminal activities in order to bring about social change. 
Unless we tackle hate crime and Islamophobia we will be complicit by our inactivity 
and acquiescence in a minority of  Muslims choosing to engage in extremism.  
Social cohesion for Muslims living in Britain is a right and working towards 
challenging Islamophobia and all Muslim-directed hate crime must remain a 




8.10. Summary  
It is vital that young Muslims engage in conversations that locate and identify 
injustices caused to them as a result of Islamophobia.  Government reluctance to 
recognise Islamophobia (All Party Parliamentary Group on British Muslims, 2018) 
indicates that a reframing of Muslim experience may allow them to acknowledge 
'injustices' rather than 'Islamophobia' and be willing to consider protecting Muslims 
in Britain.  The theories of epistemic injustice allow for Muslims to engage with 
epistemic and political agency to interrogate why "structural conditions" unfairly 
compromise their "ability to act" (Simpson, 2017, p. 254). They need to speak out 
in measured and rational ways to challenge injustices that seek to marginalise 
them and produce evidence through an epistemic injustice lens to hold those in 
government and media to account.  Furthermore, by engaging with the non-
Muslim community the concept of ignorance may be explored through epistemic 
injustice to further explore its potential for harm.  In Chapters 6 and 7, the Muslim 
men and women refer to having a 'duty' (MTL 464-467; see also 7.3.3) to have 
knowledge of their religion to challenge ignorance or "active ignorance" (Medina, 
2013, pp. 27-40) so that non-Muslims may become "virtuous hearers" (Fricker, 





9. CHAPTER 9: CONCLUSION 
9.1. The Research Process 
This research makes an important contribution to knowledge through the research 
methodology.  By deciding to analyse the data using an epistemic injustice lens, I 
have taken an ethical, secular position prioritising incidents of socially situated 
injustices that are seen as 'normal'.  The research began as a traditional, 
qualitative research project.  I had a clear research question in mind and set out to 
answer it through one-to-one research interviews that I intended to transcribe, 
code, categorise and thematise.  What emerged did not produce what I expected, 
and I had to think again.  That was the true beginning of my research journey as I 
looked for a different approach to data collection.  The one-to-one interviews 
showed me that it is difficult for Muslims to bring their meaning making voices to 
the public arena.  I knew they had experienced Islamophobia, but they did not talk 
about it in the interviews.  I realised that the public space is embedded with 
Islamophobic assumptions based on deficit stereotypes about Muslims which 
creates discourses that damage them and dismiss them as epistemic agents.  
Non-Muslims fail to hear Muslim voices because of the deficit beliefs about 
Muslims promulgated by the media. 
I chose the rarely used Community of Enquiry (CoE) as a research tool.  The 
significance of this approach is its capacity to be a respondent-centred rather than 
researcher-centred approach to data collection.  This research shows what can 
happen when CoE participants formulate and democratically choose the enquiry 
questions themselves.  Engaging groups of people rather than individuals, it 




chance to express their views on their chosen question.  The CoE therefore 
operates within a paradigm that recognises the contours of inter-subjective 
meaning and embraces an epistemology where knowledge is not 'found' but 
constructed by the participants.   
The CoE adopts a democratic process to select the question and during the 
enquiry the structure ensures all voices are heard and responded to.  An aim of 
the enquiry is for participants to gain a substantially clearer understanding of the 
topic under investigation by the end of the process than at the beginning.  It is 
therefore not mere conversation as one may find in a focus group, but the 
development of a more complex and comprehensive understanding of the topic 
under enquiry.  It requires a deep respect for all contributors in the enquiry and a 
willingness to self-correct in the light of the contributors in the community.  It 
depends on empathetic listening and courage to agree and disagree with each 
other respectfully and to generate ideas that might not have been identified in 
other research approaches.  The resulting enquiry is a collective response to the 
research question because it is built on the contributions of each participant. 
My findings suggest that the CoE has potential as a viable research approach in 
qualitative research, with a particular value to those who wish to research the 
beliefs, attitudes, perceptions and values of respondents.  The CoE as a research 
tool has the power to engage participants in dialogue where they share stories, 
seek intersubjective meanings and recount experiences.  The process of the CoE 
promotes a place of safety and openness that facilitates a flow of shared stories.  




respondents and give insight into how the specific problematic of power impacts 
on participants and uncovers the social consequences of power relations. 
My research suggests that the CoE is a participatory practice that could also 
support dialogue between Muslim and non-Muslim by creating opportunities for 
authentic dialogue where everyone can express their views and opinions.  If there 
were opportunities to hear Muslim voices, particularly in a CoE, I suggest that non-
Muslims would be taken aback by the depth of thinking that might be 
demonstrated and be prepared to examine any deficit beliefs held that are fuelled 
by Islamophobia.  The CoE provides a platform for non-Muslims to hear Muslims 
enquire in ways that may challenge how Islamophobia has influenced their 
understanding of what Muslims are like.  This could have value for both Muslims 
and non-Muslims in challenging stereotypes and recognising commonalities not 
differences. 
Having collected the CoE data, I realised that traditional qualitative approaches to 
coding and interpreting were not appropriate to the CoE.  I came across the 
process of "plugging in" (Jackson and Mazzei, 2012, p. 2) and began exploring 
theory to help me read the data and create new analytic questions.  This approach 
took me on a journey into the fields of postcolonialism, Islamophobia and 
epistemic injustice against the wider political context of the government's Prevent 
Strategy and Fundamental British Values and my own researcher positioning.  By 
articulating my own experiences as a police officer and educator and identifying 
critical incidents that influenced my thinking, I infused my research with context 




these theories and policy with the data that was created in this research, looking 
for what each could tell me about the other and always aware that my own 
experiences informed how I opened up ways of thinking with data through theory. 
My experiences as a police officer and educator prompted my research and my 
engagement with theory sustained me through the doctoral process.  To think 
about my experiences through theory, took my experience beyond the reflexive 
process and added a depth of understanding I had not expected.  The writing 
process was central to my journey as the research shifted and evolved over time.  
Questions opened up that are explored through theory and data together. 
I conclude the thesis by summarising how reframing Muslim narratives though 
epistemic injustice is not an alternative paradigm from where to engage in 
postcolonial thought, but a genuine desire to allow Muslims living in Britain an 
alternative paradigm to consider themselves. 
9.2. Reframing Muslim Narratives 
The implications of my findings are that Muslims living in Britain are a diverse 
community who are discriminated as a consequence of being negatively 
stereotyped.  Widespread Islamophobia, notions of securitisation and 
objectification contribute to the construction of postcolonial conditions existing for 
them which is reflected in the telling of their lived experiences.   
I considered that in attempting to produce an alternative narrative I had 
succumbed to a trap warned by Spivak (1988) and others in speaking for British 




on the Muslim as victim by presenting different narratives to the one dominantly 
held.  The Muslim respondents overwhelmingly wanted to challenge oppression of 
themselves by progressing a counter-argument solely founded on narratives of 
Islam.  They told me that they were unable to further narratives of their lived 
experiences as Muslims living in Wales and that their identity as Muslims was the 
only conduit available to them.  
I identified state policies and negative media reporting, which marginalised 
Muslims. contributing to postcolonial conditions and widespread Islamophobia 
existing for them.  I constructed a theoretical framework in which to explain how 
they are marginalised and offered an alternative paradigm which would allow their 
voices to be heard.  
Following Fricker (2007; 2017) and Medina (2013) I draw on the key concepts of 
testimonial and hermeneutical injustice and the idea of the virtuous hearer to 
illuminate the ways in which the young Muslim respondents in this research are 
marginalised just for being Muslim.  Epistemic injustice further allows us to see 
how the voices of the respondents are not heard as a consequence of 
Islamophobia filling the lacuna of hermeneutical resources of the wider non-
Muslim British public.  This prevents non-Muslims from becoming virtuous hearers 
and giving credibility to Muslim testimony.  By framing the responses from the 
young Muslims within an epistemic injustice framework we are able to construct 
narratives about them which disassociates their experiences from a religious 
context to a secular one.  Being allowed to hear these narratives and achieving 




2017, pp. 54-55) lessening the effects of Islamophobia in the social imagination of 
the public, allowing a lacuna of Islamophobia to be displaced.    
I have considered this apparent inability to recognise Islamophobia from both 
Muslim and non-Muslim perspectives and have considered that an economy of 
hermeneutical resources affects them both.  If both were offered alternative 
narratives, then Muslims may recognise how they are marginalised and non-
Muslims see how they may become virtuous hearers.  I do not believe this position 
highlights 'victims', rather it destabilises the 'normality' of injustice.  Fricker's work 
provides us with a tool to analyse how injustice occurs and how to counter it.  A 
universal or 'common ground' epistemic injustice approach allows conversation to 
be framed within universal justice instead of culture and religion which are 
misrepresented in postcolonial constructs.  Furthermore, narratives constructed 
within an epistemic injustice context inform and compliment the secular construct 
of multiculturalism in Britain, allowing Muslim identity opportunities to be 
celebrated. 
9.3. Limitations of Study 
I now consider how future research may progress Muslim voices in being heard.  I 
consider the work of Cantle (2012) as being vitally important in developing 
dialogue between disparate communities particularly his work in furthering 
multiculturalism to interculturalism (ibid, p. 88).  I have also considered this shift 
from an epistemic position that "given the right socio-political conditions" (Medina, 
2013, p. 281), epistemic friction allows us to reframe the way voices and 




of the past (ibid, p. 282).  Cantle's vision of a new concept to manage community 
relations is to be applauded; however, there has not been the political will by 
successive governments to address, nor public support to invest in his vision.  
Similarly, the Prevent Strategy (Thomas, 2019) is seen to work against community 
cohesion policies, reinforcing anti-Muslim discourses.  This research has argued 
that in recognising postcolonial conditions exist for Muslims living in Britain, a 
move from cultural narratives may allow a conduit for their voices to be 
constructed.  I acknowledge that change can only be achieved as a consequence 
of political will and have decided not to pursue interculturalism as a way forward at 
this time. 
Achieving epistemic justice for Muslims living in Wales assumes individuals will be 
able to recognise their prejudices, engage with them intellectually and move to 
become virtuous hearers.  Dotson (2014) argues that testimonial and 
hermeneutical injustices are first and second order forms of oppression and that a 
third, epistemically oppressive system operates to create an "unlevel knowing 
field" (Bailey, 2014, p. 62).  The result of this is that testimonial and hermeneutical 
injustices are not recognised due to unequal social power relationships sharing 
hermeneutical resources in favour of "dominant groups" (ibid, p. 64).  This 
research has recognised that postcolonial conditions and resultant dominant 
discourses of Islamophobia are part of a systematic oppression against Muslims in 
Britain (and are therefore third-order epistemically oppressive systems of 
oppression), and that acknowledgement of postcolonialism is vital so it may be 




The data collection from both sets of CoE was a snapshot in time and this 
research is based mainly on the two CoE but informed by the one-to-one 
interviews and my own experience in the field.  Although the data from the one-to-
one interviews were interesting, the overall word count limited its inclusion in the 
research directly.  On reflection, it would have been useful to conduct a CoE with 
the one-to-one interviewees and to compare the data from each to see whether 
the adults would articulate their lived experiences of Islamophobia or 'othering' in 
postcolonial terms.  
The data from the CoE were collated prior to Prevent and FBV being legislated in 
schools, colleges and universities which may have impacted on the CoE data, 
possibly strengthening my hypotheses that Prevent and FBV contributed to 
'othering'.  I am also aware that in Wales FBV are expressed in terms of national 
values which also acknowledges the words "British values" being a "distraction" 
(ESTYN, 2020, p. 22; Welsh Government, 2016). 
The potential for the CoE to bring different voices together to promote epistemic 
virtue is limited to an individualistic approach.  This is important in understanding 
people's experiences and in terms of epistemic injustice may engage empathy 
among liberals who see the treatment of Muslims in Britain as unacceptable.  
However, the voices and experiences of Muslims may remain in the CoE and it will 
fail to engage the wider non-Muslim public who have not had a chance to be part 




9.4. Further Research 
I now consider how future research may progress Muslim voices in being heard.  I 
have identified five areas that are worthy of further research to better understand 
oppressive behaviour toward Muslims living in Britain, and to bring about social 
justice for them.   
9.4.1. Postcolonialism 
I consider epistemic injustice, the Prevent strategy and ignorance as being 
important considerations for future research within postcolonial thought.  If 
epistemic justice is to become a reality for Muslims living in Britain then further 
research into postcolonialism as an ideology would be advantageous in presenting 
evidence to the government that postcolonial conditions for Muslims contribute to 
Islamophobia being sustained.  In their study of Bhabha (1991) Moore-Gilbert et 
al., (1997) argue that a response to "postcolonial politics" (ibid, pp. 166-167) is to 
seize the dominant narratives and open them up to a "re-articulation from 
postcolonial perspectives".  Examining mechanisms that control Muslim voices is 
vital in identifying political and social control, for example considering 'false 
consciousness' in postcolonial conditions and a lacuna in hermeneutical resources 
in epistemic injustice conditions.  This has significance to determine whether false 
consciousness prevents both Muslims and non-Muslims from recognising the 
effects of Islamophobia.  Furthermore, as covered in the limitations of this 
research, postcolonial conditions as a third-order oppressive system (Dotson, 
2014, pp. 129-133; Bailey, 2014) needs to be recognised so the "unlevel knowing 




for the benefit of Muslims so that "shared hermeneutical resources" (Dotson, 2014, 
p. 131) limit Muslim "epistemic exclusion"(ibid, p. 130). 
The Prevent strategy and associated FBV are worthy of further research as this 
research considers both concepts need to be examined as ideologies to gauge the 
extent to which they affect Muslim consciousness and agency.   
The concept of 'ignorance' (Peels and Blaauw, 2016) within the canon of epistemic 
injustice is worthy of further research with Muslims to interrogate how knowledge 
about them may be better understood.  I acknowledge "active ignorance" and 
"epistemic arrogance" (Medina, 2013, p. 51; 31) are injustices committed against 
Muslims living in Wales and that further research in 'ignorance' may unlock how 
false consciousness and "false belief" (Fricker, 2007, p. 21) sustain Islamophobia.   
9.4.2. Deep Epistemic Injustice 
It may be that Muslims in Britain are seen by the wider, secular, non-Muslim public 
(in an epistemic injustice paradigm) as "religious aliens" (Kidd, 2017, p. 389) 
holding religious belief in "supernatural entities" (ibid, p. 392) prejudicially deflating 
Muslim testimonial credibility.  This is particularly true of religious groups who 
"might be negatively stereotyped" (Kidd, 2017, p. 392).  A similar condition is also 
said to occur within academia where those who hold a "naturalistic worldview" 
(ibid), which argues that belief in religion must be evidence of "epistemic fault" 
(Kidd, 2017, p. 393) and as such those who claim a religious experience are not 
given testimonial credibility.  The denial by naturalists of this condition, referred to 




but is worthy of further academic examination.  However, an interesting point to 
note is whether a lack of hermeneutical resources by non-Muslims may contribute 
to them viewing Muslims as aliens, generating hermeneutical injustices toward 
them.  Haslanger (2017, p. 279) puts forward the view that if knowledge of God is 
gained "through mystical experience or revelation not available to all rational 
inquirers, this would not be objective knowledge".  Furthermore, religious belief 
may be attacked by science, rationality and logic precluding it from being 
considered alongside rights championed by for example, children's rights, 
feminism, women's rights, anti-racism, animal rights and environmental issues that 
have all ultimately gained political traction to achieve positive results.      
9.4.3. Safe Spaces for Muslim Discussion 
A recent ESTYN report (2020) into how schools were implementing Prevent 
(Home Office, 2011a) showed that a minority of schools did not have mechanism 
in place to allow pupils to be consulted or listened to about "risky behaviours or 
expressions of radical or extremist inspired ideas" (ESTYN, 2020, p. 15), a 
potential breach of article 12 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989; School 
Councils (Wales) Regulations 2005).  There are examples of resilience building to 
counter extremism, with a strong emphasis in involving Prevent staff (ESTYN, 
2020, pp. 17-21).  However, I see little to suggest a safe space for Muslim voices 
to be heard other that within a narrative constrained by Prevent duties (Taylor and 
Soni, 2017), which I suggest further securitises Muslim voices.  The right to be 




(Sparkes, 2005; Thomas and Killick, 2007) along with critical thinking without fear 
of being labelled 'extreme' is a fundamental right for all young people.  
I also extend proposed future research to include whether Prevent (Home Office, 
2011a) and FBV (DfE, 2014; ESTYN, 2015) have significance for Muslim students 
studying at British Universities in the context of the government's Office for 
Students (Office for Students, 2018; Higher Education and Research Act 2017; 
discussed in Appendix 8 ) which has relevance for free speech or political dissent 
on campus. 
I have also considered that if I were to write the THINK Project (2012) now, I would 
consider a different approach for example, allowing white, Welsh young people to 
consider privilege as a way to exploring postcolonialism, which would include 
acknowledging Britain's "colonial legacy from which Muslims are now recuperating 
from" (Bari, 2004, p. 122; see also for example, Dotson, 2014). 
9.4.4. Islamophobia seen through an Epistemic Injustice 
Perspective 
The study of Islamophobia as an ideology from an epistemic injustice perspective 
would allow injustices to be seen for what they are and not hidden in terminology 
that presents Muslim hate crime as somehow normal and acceptable.  
Islamophobia is invisible in "public and political spaces" (Allen, 2020, p. 129) and I 
argue there is no need to redefine it but rather locate and analyse it through 
epistemic injustice so it may be seen.  Postcolonial and epistemic injustice 
descriptors are more relevant than looking for evidence of Islamophobia.  




however - individuals and communities - sadly do" (Allen, 2020, p. 121).  The 
failure to attribute state policy directly to the 'othering' of the young Muslims does 
not mean that state hegemony does not exist for them.  It means that further 
research is needed to uncover it and questions for future research must come 
from Muslims themselves. 
9.4.5. Muslims as Researchers 
Finally, and in cognizance of postcolonial warnings of speaking for marginalised 
groups, further research should be carried out by Muslims themselves and their 
voices articulated in ways that they see as authentic.  This includes allowing 
narratives to be interpreted through postcolonialism which may be more 
"comprehensible and politically meaningful to them" (Portelli, 1991; Denzin and 
Lincoln, 2011, p. 457),15 for them to see the conditions in which they are 'othered' 
without their narratives being interpreted by others.   
 
 
                                            
15
 I note that Trastulli's death was manipulated for political gain and the analogy for Muslims to see 
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Kim:  OK. Alright,so those of you over here it was your question so would one of you like 3 
to start the enquiry by saying what you think? 4 
Nouf: We were just saying that about the media they always spoke of the bad behaviour 5 
of Muslims like we always hear about Muslim did this and that but they never spoke about 6 
what we do right and for example this week it was a Muslim celebration Surah we 7 
celebrated the day when God saved Moses from the pharaoh yeah, and, as you say, as 8 
you know there is Sunni and Shia in Muslim, like Sunni, we will all fast this day but 9 
they put on the Shia that there are strange ways to be celebrated and like when I looked at 10 
the video I looked at the French media but they showed like the bad celebrations they 11 
didn't show how we celebrate how we fast how we share how we are happy this day I 12 
saw a few months ago I think in Egypt there is a girl who um wanted to stand up against 13 
the high rate of rape in Egypt because it has high rates and she took a picture of herself 14 
naked and put it on her blog they showed these just to sell headlines because when I 15 
went on this famous website journal website, the amount of people who shared this image 16 
was more than people who share about a man killing his family or something more 17 
important. They don't show maybe a lot of ways to protest but they don't show the World 18 
how woman they are protesting so this is what we wanted to do. 19 
Lala: As we were discussing role models when somebody in the media it could be 20 
anyone, they may not even be practising Muslim, so they just use religion saying "this was 21 
the man who killed another man" whereas in the World there are so many crimes 22 
happening but they never say "this atheist has killed another man" there's loads of 23 
different religions, Buddhist, they never use religion with anyone else in the World in a 24 




have been born in it... they always say "the Muslim has done something". 26 
Amina: I think I agree.  I think the word terrorism is simply giving a label to Muslim people 27 
It's become a label to us, the word, 'terrorism' and I think the media uses that regular, as a 28 
regular base, you know and I think they all use it with other religions to people who 29 
commit something bad, I think they need to understand that there are good people and 30 
there are bad people, you know whatever religion you follow because, at the end of the 31 
day, not everybody is perfect it's their personal problem that's made them do something 32 
bad so we shouldn't be labelled like that at all.  They should be labelled for who they are 33 
and not for what they follow. 34 
Katrina: I totally tend to agree with Amina what she said, it was actually quite  35 
interesting.  I watched TV you know the whole 9/11 ten year anniversary came along the 36 
programmes on TV and one of them was about the fire-fighters... how they can portray 37 
you then you have the fire-fighters who were there on 9/11 trying to save lives and 38 
everything... they were seen as heroes, the media created them as heroes and what 39 
happened was that a couple of months after 9/11 happened they started reporting in the 40 
media stuff about their private lives.  Some of the fire-fighters, they were going to clubs, 41 
they were getting arrested, getting drunk and the media basically was portraying them as 42 
'look at these heroes they are now drunk in clubs' and getting arrested and it was kind of 43 
like, wait a minute, a couple of months ago they were heroes and now you are portraying 44 
them as something bad and I see the same happening cos basically it's what sells 45 
headlines and saying you know about the Muslim celebration that Nouf was talking about 46 
is, like you say, it is a happy celebration and everything but they don't want to know about 47 
them because people are going to know about it in the newspaper so you will hear about 48 
the way they.. the things they do.. that might sell headlines and show Muslims in a weird 49 
kind of way..it's not really the right representation and they always speak the words that 50 
are not really good.. you know up there (pointing to her head) .. sorry, that's how I see it, 51 




Muslim women Muslim women are oppressed, Muslim women can't do this go and ask the 53 
Muslim woman. That's why really I enjoy what you guys did today because you're actually 54 
asking us, we are the Muslim women we live through it every day so don't just write about 55 
us, ask us instead of asking the men or... 56 
Kim: Can I link what you said to Nouf because you seem to imply from your comment that 57 
actually Muslim women are more mis-represented in the media than other groups and 58 
some of the examples we had which seemed to support that actually women particularly in 59 
France because they've changed the law about wearing... is it that you are allowed to 60 
wear a scarf or is it just the Hijab or the Niqab. 61 
Nouf: (speaking of life in France) In school it is not allowed to wear the scarf so when we 62 
go to school we have to take it off and when you come out of school you can put it on...but 63 
now they forbid women to wear the Niqab, everywhere and also the Mums who want to go 64 
out with their children for a day out in school, they are not allowed to come if they wear the 65 
scarf and now they are trying to (pause while trying to translate).......kindergarten...... 66 
Kim: Nursery teachers. 67 
Nouf: Nursery teachers.....of course in France we have a lot of private nurseries we don’t 68 
have a lot of public, so they are funded by private people...some of them are Muslims,  69 
some of them are Muslims so they don’t want the nursery teacher to wear a scarf....this is 70 
what's going on at the moment in France...so everyday there is a new problem. 71 
Katrina:  Is it true also that they are also trying to … is it ban Muslim women from wearing 72 
the maxi dresses in France?  I've heard something about it that they are trying to... 73 
Nouf: No they don’t ban but like in the UK no but when you try to...how can I say this....to  74 
when you try to act invisible when you wear a maxi skirt..or dresses you always have 75 
problems like I had a lot of problems in school when I was wearing skirts like teachers  76 
were saying to me “don’t you know you are a pretty girl you should show your legs and all 77 
this so they are trying to make you feel that you're not normal, you have to act as like the 78 
other cos they are  people as they are normal. 79 
Katrina:  It's the skirt.  I think I agreed, not agreed but could understand why the French 80 
government was saying you know women were not allowed to wear the Burqa because  81 




further and say you can't wear a skirt because we want to see your skin – that's just a little 83 
bit like , I don’t know but for me ..where does this stop? You can’t wear skirts tomorrow the 84 
day after that you can't wear colour in public ...where does this stop? 85 
Kim: Do you think women are in the front line because they are so visible because  86 
obviously the scarf makes you very visible-I notice all of you are wearing a scarf but does 87 
that put women really in the front line and, I mean, that's … 88 
Katrina: I think it does and I believe that we have a certain responsibility when wear  89 
the Hijab,  the scarf, I remember someone saying to me “whether we like it or not if you  90 
wear the scarf once you have identified yourself as a Muslim whether you wear a scarf or  91 
not  you are an ambassador for the religion so whatever you do”,  so if you walk on the  92 
street, loud, rude, insulting people, people might look at you and say wait is that what  the 93 
religion is really about, to try and make me feel inferior … people .. might believe that so I  94 
do think that we…...that we should take some responsibility, but I understand the girls as  95 
well (indicating to her right hand side) just because we wear the scarf and some people  96 
don't, it doesn't mean that the Muslims that do wear a scarf are more religious um cos  97 
that's just – I feel my religion and my faith is not wrapped around the scarf, it is something 98 
deeper. It's probably part of it but it's not like if you don't wear the scarf you are less  99 
religious than someone who wears the scarf, communities where people make you feel  100 
that way, and its yea...it’s not right.      101 
Nouf I find it strange how, as you say, the woman who wears the scarf, but still there is a  102 
lot of misunderstanding of it….like I think that people who doesn’t know about scarf say  103 
“oh is it your parents who forced you to wear it?”or is it “Are you a prisoner of your scarf, is  104 
it not your will or discretion “? I find it  really strange because the scarf is something now...  105 
I think it must be something normal now in our society that Muslim is now Islam now is the 106 
first religion in the world, one months, two months ago? (turning to her left to acknowledge 107 
this claim ) yeah so a lot of Muslims to wear it is really important that nobody knows about  108 
it they always think it is not a personal choice and I find this opinion very, very, strange.  109 
Kim: What are the implications of that then …. sorry.. 110 




think I am oppressed I just want people to stop feeling sorry for me, I’m actually proud and 112 
happy and I’m not forced, my Dad didn’t force me to wear this (indicating the headscarf)  113 
I’m doing it my way so there are two types of people – people who feel sorry for us and 114 
people who are ignorant ...and there are other people who actually feel we don't actually 115 
have hair (everyone laughs) ….I have this girl who just come up to me and asked me “so  116 
are you sick”? I said really (everyone laughs) this is my religion....I just find it like very rude 117 
for people to just assume that we are oppressed.  We are very happy ladies, I mean, it’s  118 
not that we’re forced... 119 
Amina:  I just wanted to say about the Hijab that it's not just Muslim women who wear 120 
headscarves or cover themselves …in Christianity it’s the nuns as well they wear  black  121 
and white and totally covered from head to shoulder to up here (indicates her waist)  I  122 
mean that's exactly what we are doing.  Even Jewish women and Hindu women.  I think 123 
women they cover their heads as well so I can't understand why the media or people you 124 
know why they have this fascination, why they think we're oppressed or, you know, we're  125 
not happy.  I have never seen in the media where they've said something you know, went  126 
to a nun and said “you're oppressed and you shouldn't be allowed to marry”, you shouldn't 127 
you know.  We don't question that.  Even as Muslims we know that's what they want to  128 
follow and that's their religion – we don't go asking, you know, you're oppressed and you 129 
can't get married and you have to stay in this house …you know in a confined place we  130 
don't question that because we know that’s their religion and we respect that and people 131 
need to respect us for that.  Why these questions, you know.  Why not come and try and 132 
understand with us rather than putting these questions into you know the mind and 133 
especially again the media. I feel that they use us women to gain money, to gain status, all 134 
these newspapers and television and I think I find it so disappointing because us Muslim 135 
women, we are doing so much for, you know, this country and we are doing so much, you 136 
know, other places and it's just clothing, it's just material and underneath we are still flesh 137 
and blood, and, you know, we are doing so much, why can't they see that, why can't they 138 
come and ask us, you know.  Ask us about our jobs or ask us when we've done something 139 
amazing.  There are so many amazing women out there and not just now for thousands of 140 
years ago if we look at the Prophets who have , look at Khadija (the prophet Muhammad’s 141 
wife) she was a business woman, you know she was high in her community, she was very 142 




I mean, in this country, for hundreds of years people didn't have this luxury, women had to 144 
fight for, to vote so why us? (looking around to the rest of the group) why this stigmatism? 145 
Kiran:  I just want to say that even though the Muslim women do wear the Hijab, even 146 
though they are covering their head does not mean they are covering their personality um 147 
and I have to admit like I don't wear a scarf but when I first came to (town) and I met all 148 
these lovely people cos they wore Hijab.... it did um, I did kind of keep to myself a little bit 149 
more um, you know, I'd never been in an environment where I'm the only one who doesn't 150 
wear one but, you know, I took the first step and I introduced myself to some people and,  151 
you know, I was pleasantly surprised.  It is a very, very open community and um basically 152 
don't judge somebody just because they wear Hijab cos that, you know, doesn't really, it 153 
shouldn't change your perception of people. 154 
Kim:  It's interesting, I have to say something because I was on a train going from  155 
(town)  up to London and there were a couple of girls from Swansea – you could tell  156 
they were from (town)  because of their accents – and there were two Muslim girls and one 157 
is in complete western dress and the other one was with the complete scarf and I  158 
say my own prejudiced stereotypes was challenged by that because I thought they  159 
were obviously they were laughing, they were joking, they were obviously best friends and 160 
having fun and my perception was well, if you're a Muslim women who wears a scarf then 161 
you wouldn't be friends with a Muslim woman who didn't wear a scarf, that's what my 162 
perception was and that was a real challenge for me, on that train journey so I mean that's 163 
my own sort of ignorance really. 164 
Nouf: I just wanted to talk about what  Amina said the value of woman in Islam and the  165 
value of a woman in Western cultures, to have some rights that we have it from beginning 166 
and I wanted to tell you a story about what happened to me.  I was in high school and in 167 
France in high school, first year of high school so I was 16, I was reading for German at  168 
that time.  We had to go swimming in the swimming pool as part of the... curriculum (Kim 169 
says this word) – part of our education – and um it is with all the class….with all the boys, 170 
and the girls I didn't want to go because I didn't want to show my body to the boys so I  171 
went to my GP and I asked him to write a sick note for me like allergic to chlorine or 172 
something….(girls laugh)......so he did it for me, he is Jew, he is our GP for four years now.  173 
He totally understood this like my opinion about it so he did it for me and when I gave it  174 




would see me with my scarf everyday like when I want to go to school and he said “are  176 
you really allergic to chlorine”  so I said of course not but what did you want me to say and 177 
then he didn’t got upset or anything he told me that woman in Frances in the 60s and the  178 
70s, they fought for their rights, they fought for your rights, they fought for you to be free  179 
and I was like, I was shocked because  I told him “so what, don't you think I am not free so 180 
because women fought for their rights do you think that I have to go in the district half  181 
naked”  is this my right...will men respect me if I wear a mini skirt and a lot of make-up you 182 
know this is how you know.....is this freedom for a woman?  And then he said “no, no, no,  183 
it's not about this” ….so I said “Since when I have the right to vote in western countries, 184 
since when women have a right to vote” .....since the 20th century.  For us, this is the 185 
beginning I said “since the law for contraception because before 1971 it was forbidden  186 
in France for a woman to abort.  Since when does it exist?....so if you just look a little bit at 187 
my opinion and my religion you will understand that what you are claiming is wrong”  and 188 
then he said ok I do understand your position … 189 
Kim:  There's an interesting thought isn't it that what do we mean by freedom  190 
Nouf: ...yeah 191 
Areej:  I just wanted to point out a bit about Women in Islam and freedom, Islam has  192 
always been encouraging women to go out there it has never said stay home and take  193 
care... it has always been saying get out there.  You can see from the role model like  194 
Khadija (the prophet Muhammad’s wife) she was a strong woman .  We have so many 195 
women who fought in wars like we have Muslim women like these she fought in a war and 196 
these are role models.  From long time ago we've always been having these models but, 197 
again, the media, they just target a few little minor stories saying ah woman in prison,  198 
home she doesn't do anything, she is locked up.  Well, that's not true because I am not  199 
from here I'm from Oman and if you see like we are more stronger than the men right now 200 
women are getting really empowered.  The media doesn't show this and even here like  201 
when I came to this country I was impressed by the sisters here and I have been really 202 
motivated by my house mates each one of them we all come from different cultures and I 203 
think all these women are leaders, like that this is our generation to rise... yet the media is 204 




Kim:  There's a difference isn't there – sorry – between you and um, you're all educated – 206 
some of you are still at school but most of you are working or university-educated and you 207 
are a new generation I think um, just from my own experience, I used to work with  208 
Pakistani families in Reading and none of the women had ever been educated um, now I 209 
think that there are – a lot of the stereotypes perhaps link-it's much more about class, um 210 
village people that had come from the villages, they didn't have education – the women  211 
were in the home and it was very difficult for them to do anything else to be honest but so,  212 
I mean, stereotypes had arisen from their ….... - there are some factual basis and I mean  213 
the key differences between people who are, I would say, educated middle class, working 214 
class, class I think makes a big factor – it certainly does in Britain for the differences  215 
between working class, middle class people whatever your cultural ethnic background um  216 
so I think, what I'm trying to say is the – to what extent you think that because you're 217 
educated that this is what's making a big difference in the way that you're saying you've  218 
got to be out there. 219 
Kiran: I just thought of an issue that can be brought up ....there is um, nobody really  220 
realises the big difference between culture and religion.  A lot of people assume that, you 221 
know, um, things like oppression you know, having arranged marriages, and things like 222 
that are all Islamic, from Islam where really it's from culture, different backgrounds – 223 
Pakistani backgrounds, Bengali backgrounds, Arab backgrounds.  It's purely cultural and it 224 
does not come from Islam at all 225 
Kim:  Thank you ever so much.  So, what's  the implications of … 226 
Areej:  someone made a point about Islam, it is exactly what I was going to say that  227 
culture is different but it’s not the major part like in Islamic countries, in Arab countries, all 228 
women have education and every woman has the same rights as men women are getting 229 
stronger and all these women they get scholarships.  Never mind about their background,  230 
or their incomes, everyone had a fair chance like …...countries which is based on Islam  231 
like I’m a (inaudible)    so I can’t use your rules, but in an Islamic country I would say, yes, 232 
women are as strong but they are really not shown in the media...there are so many of  233 
them that I can tell you so many female role models that I've seen more than male role 234 




strong we are like right there (indicating with her hands at head height) and beating them 236 
and beating them.....so yes.......(everyone laughs) 237 
Kim:  I'm very aware of the time and I don't want – and I know that people might feel “my 238 
goodness I really need to go and I feel rude saying I need to go” um so I think we perhaps 239 
ought to try to wind it up a bit and uh just to give a chance for everybody to have a last  240 
word on the enquiry and what we've discussed before we go so if I – and if you don't want  241 
to say anything just say pass and  that's fine.  Can I go over to you? 242 
Sarah: I’m not sure what to say but I think the media has a big part to play in what they 243 
show... my understanding of what the media is for them to inform people about what's  244 
going on around us not the kind of sways to one side or this side  or pass out information 245 
that is negative constantly, constantly and they  need to look into more positive attributes  246 
of Islamic role models , women out there inform people about that and not always talk  247 
about 9/11 and terrorists the constant thing that keeps coming up again and again ..but we 248 
really need to educate themselves where we are in the century where freedom of speech  249 
is a big thing amongst diverse cultures people from different backgrounds its really, really, 250 
rude to walk around and ask  like what is that on your head? What is that you are wearing? 251 
Why is your skin colour different, it comes to a point really where  it frustrates me at times 252 
because I think what the hell. I'm in a country where you think you'd be accustomed to this 253 
but you're still way backward than us yet they say to us “your backwards because you  254 
dress like this” or you do this or you think like that they don’t need to do this.  If we are  255 
going to move forward then... 256 
Khadeejah:  I do think the media plays a part in saying non-Islamic stuff...if I were a non-257 
Muslim I would be afraid of Muslims because of what is in the papers about Islam... 258 
Kim: You can see why people are influenced by the media 259 
Aya: We’re not oppressed. I wish people would just ask me.If people have a problem then 260 
just come to me and ask me ….like we wouldn’t mind explaining why we wear the scarf  261 
and everything …......I’m so tired of being misjudged as soon as I enter a lecture room 262 
everyone just looks at me. For example like I joined a fencing society and when I joined 263 
everyone just looked at me ”you're a Muslim, why are you here”?  They think we just go to 264 
the mosque and pray we are just normal ladies.........we have fun as well, we laugh we do 265 




Naomi: You know people we need to help them have a further understanding of our  267 
religion – it's like media actually should show that…. 268 
Nessa: I just don't like the fact that ...they don't say like, if somebody bombed a place or  269 
Christians bombed a place but they would say a Muslim bombed the place.... they should 270 
just say the person – they wouldn't say a Buddhist bombed the place but they would say a 271 
Muslim bombed the place... 272 
Areej: There are misconceptions from the media , they should stop using that because  273 
we're getting stronger and um , yeah just....(everyone laughs) 274 
Katrina:I think mine is important as well I think we should all have good set of morals 275 
and just treat everyone with respect, no matter where you come from ….....I think if we  276 
were a bit more respectful towards each other we would, you know, we wouldn't have that 277 
racial ignorance, Muslims, terrorists, all that,.......treat others the way you would want to be 278 
treated … 279 
Amina: I think I would say to this question is that um they should be beginning to take 280 
responsibility cos I feel in a way they created this hatred between people who don't 281 
understand about Muslims and so I think they need to start to.....stop writing about these  282 
bad things and start writing about good things um and maybe have, you know, shows on  283 
the BBC for example Muslim women who do good things rather than one individual in the 284 
community is doing something bad. 285 
Leah: I agree with all the points being made ….they all make good points (laughs) yeah  286 
and the media should take responsibility because they play a part in how people, non-287 
Muslims see Islam these days and it would really change their views and maybe we could  288 
all get along and treat others the way you want to be treated... on a friendly basis ....... 289 
Kiran: There are misconceptions of the media.  I really do think that the sole, that the  290 
central issue that Islam and terrorism, 9/11 – it's just that one thing that people focus on 291 
when it comes to Islam and, you know, it would be, you know – people need to think  292 
outside the box, you know, cos it is repetitive as Sarah said............at the beginning of the 293 
issues like terrorism and 9/11 – it just keeps popping up again and again and people – not 294 
only do people get reminded of 9/11 but people get reminded – like Muslims, we Muslims  295 




for normal people to relive 9/11 and Americans because it happened to them but then it's  297 
bad for us as well because it reminds us of the pressures that we all went through back  298 
then and it's just so much negativity that a little bit of positivity would be nice like we have, 299 
you know, spiritual Muslim leaders out there who, you know, are doing their bit, for  300 
example, um, (spiritual Muslim leader) he did a blog during Ramadan and each day he 301 
would do, um Ramadan lasts for 30 days, and he did a blog for each day and for each day 302 
he conveyed  a positive message of Islam.  Things like that. If they were given more 303 
recognition um.. it would be really good for us and will help spread the .. positiveness of 304 
Islam. 305 
Kim:  Thank you. 306 
Irah: I haven’t spoke before but  I think on the whole  people should have sufficient 307 
knowledge before speaking about any religion even culture and also people need to stop 308 
assuming and judging others regardless of what ethnic background they come from  or  309 
what religious beliefs that they have and also everybody wants to live in peace.  How do 310 
people expect to live in peace if they are not showing how to make peace or how to  311 
maintain peace so, in order to live in peace we have to have or show how to make peace. 312 
Nouf: There is so much to say um... I just wanted to talk about our question I think it's  313 
really in our interests to make this situation of peace between Muslims and non-Muslims. I 314 
think if you ask everybody um they all agree that there are two clans.....groups in the  315 
world, the Muslim and the non-Muslims if all of the people who were really like claiming  316 
that Muslims people are really bad that we are violent, that we are animals we are 317 
back…..primitive?... that it is really a lack of knowledge, a big lack of knowledge and there  318 
is already stupid people like Huntington who creates two armies......  319 
(inaudible) and they don’t think they just follow...they just follow, they just follow.  I think,  320 
um, as you said  if you really want to live in peace.....we'll have to make peace. 321 
Lala:  What I would say is the media is creating these so called terrorist, like people who  322 
are young they might be vulnerable and because it’s everywhere they might actually be 323 
thinking ok everyone is thinking we’re terrorists .. actually go out and be like that.  They are 324 
actually committing you know, this whole negative for people to go out and do violent 325 




are vulnerable so I think in another way the media should be challenged  just for example 327 
newspapers and bombs.. you can always challenge it by writing with your own point of  328 
view.  The media should be challenged.   329 
Jill:  I think Muslims educate themselves as they go cos like sometimes the media  330 
shows the negative side and we try and show ourselves.  You know like we need to carry  331 
on educating ourselves as Muslim ladies, show we are not like the small minorities and 332 
Islam’s peace and  ….that’s it...(everyone laughs). 333 
Kiran: Can I just ask something really important …........there, you know, from what I know 334 
there is um out of all this negativity I think it is in a way promoting Islam because there are 335 
always people who convert and that the strong negativeness of Islam in the media actually 336 
encourages people to go and educate themselves and then they end up converting 337 
themselves which is beautiful. 338 
Irah: Can I just add to that also people say Islam is all about the being oppressed but 339 
statistics actually shows there are more reverts or converts into Islam than any other  340 
religion and if women were to be oppressed why so many women becoming Muslims –  341 
just doesn't make sense to me. 342 
Kim:  Thank you very much, I hope you enjoyed it.  It strikes me that you are a very  343 
powerful, potentially powerful group of women and I don't know if you like the style of  344 
being able to discuss because you said about make peace – the reason I like using this 345 
approach to discussing issues is because it's very respectful for other people um we are 346 
allowed to disagree with each other, we don't have to agree but as long as we do it in a  347 
nice way and we support our ideas with evidence and we are prepared to be challenged  348 
um and I think to be able to facilitate enquiries like this it's a very useful thing for people to  349 
do so if any of you would be interested in having the training – it only occurs to me while  350 
I've been listening to you, in how to facilitate communities of enquiry …. I would be happy  351 
to do the training for you without charge um because it seems to me that each of you in  352 
your own settings have got the potential to raise the issues, to get them discussed, get 353 
people thinking and reflecting and, for me, it's a very powerful tool, a community of enquiry 354 
because it's very equal, very democratic um and I think that women in particular like it ...  355 




forward and this is the first time we've ever done anything as a group together and I think if 357 
you met regularly and had enquiries like this with a different question each time um it  358 
would become something where you would develop your own thinking and ideas um so I 359 
would be very happy if people were interested in that …..........if you want to, you know, if  360 
you were interested in having training in how to run this – it's normally a two day training 361 
course but we'd probably do a lot in a day if people wanted some support and it would be 362 
really nice to do. 363 
Ok, well it is 4 clock and you need to make sure you've filled in your forms as long as you  364 
are still happy . 365 
Chris: Can I say one thing before you all disappear and I never, ever see you again and a 366 
load of ripped consent forms – can I say just one thing and it will only take two minutes.   367 
Ok, I'm going to get some thank you's out of the way first cos there's something else I 368 
wanted to mention and I've got to thank the wonderful Kim um firstly for giving her time  369 
up, secondly for facilitating the Community Enquiry and thirdly for being my support for my 370 
PhD.  Um, second thanks to my very good friends, Deeba and Oanez.  I've known  371 
Oanez many, many, many years and Deeba for not that long but again you've also  372 
come along on your days off um one of you, two of you (laugh) but I appreciate the time,  373 
the thought you have given and also the arrangements for these wonderful people in 374 
turning up and I know I haven't personally got to know you and to sort of talk to you one to 375 
one but I just want to offer my thanks to all of you – most important of all is whether you  376 
want to be part of this.  Now, I can't use your voices without your permission.  If you want  377 
to be part of it, that's wonderful – all I would ask you to do is to sign a consent form – first  378 
of all, look at all the boxes and tick them.  I need your contact details.  Without your contact 379 
details I can't reply to you and if I can't reply to you with my transcript of what we've done, I 380 
can't use it.  The next thing is it would be a good idea if you would take your label off and 381 
stick it to your consent form in which case I know exactly who you are.  And the last thing  382 
is if you want – like, I've done quite a few in-depth one-to-one interviews with some Muslim 383 
ladies and some Muslim guys.  If you wanted to be part of a one to one interview – if you 384 
could just – my email is actually on the form there – if you can make a note of it and email 385 




and I've got many, many years before I complete what I want to do and I think that's all I 387 
want to say – let me just check it – consent forms, labels.  Thanks, that's all I've got to say 388 
other than thank you for your time - you've been wonderful so thank you – I couldn't do  389 









Kim: So our question that we're going with is 'Do common stereotypes influence your own  4 
perception about Islam even though you are a Muslim?' Ok so we've democratically chosen.  5 
Now I just want to go through a few ground rules. In order to make this work obviously we want to  6 
be able to hear what each other have to say (Kim is saying to someone 'you have to go now do you? 7 
- shame'). 8 
Chris: Happy to continue? 9 
Someone then says 'yes'. 10 
Kim: Nice to see you.  Sorry you have to go. (Lot of background talking). 11 
Kim: What I'm going to suggest rather than us discuss how we might do this, I'm just going to 12 
suggest that if you want to say something, you indicate you want to speak up by putting up your  13 
hand, ok. The person who is speaking last chooses the next person to speak ok.We always start  14 
with the people whose question it was so that they can start us off.  What we are trying to do here  15 
is um agree and disagree with each other so that we try and get into this question so you might like 16 
to say 'I agree with you because... or I disagree with you because' – that's quite helpful. My job is  17 
not to comment.  Not to have any views on this at all because I'm the facilitator but what I might do 18 
is try to help you to think more deeply about it by my intervention, ok.  So, is everyone happy to do 19 
that if they want to say something?  Yes.  So you need to be able to look around and see who  20 
wants to speak so try to give people who have not spoken already a chance if somebody has  21 
spoken a lot um and then we won't speak over each other.  We won't interrupt each other.  We  22 
show we are really listening by saying 'I agree with you or I disagree with you' and we try to move 23 
forward on this.  Now, we are not going to solve this question.  We are not going to answer it but  24 
we are going get a chance to explore what we think about it.I think it's a really interesting  question 25 
actually and it's the one I was hoping people would vote for and I thought was really interesting so 26 
let's – it's your question and your question, well in fact all three questions so would you like to start 27 
with trying to answer that question?  I mean, do you think so.  Do common stereotypes or media 28 





Abdullah:  I think in my own view a lot of Muslims are totally affected by what they see in the media 31 
and also about the common stereotypes, it gives a kind of an inferiority complex that people doubt 32 
certain aspects of the faith because they don't have a knowledge about Islam or about that subject 33 
matter and so for example the key question would be 'Does terrorism have a place in Islam?  As a 34 
Muslim I know very well that today there is no place for terrorism in Islam but that's based on our  35 
own understanding, based on my own readings, going to lectures and so on and also my own  36 
study of the Koran and the life of the Prophet (peace be upon him) but as for the people who don't 37 
have the exposure to Islamic knowledge then perhaps I think they do feel that there is a link  38 
between terrorism and Islam so quite often we even have like some people joke around and say to 39 
other people ….......they just joke around and say, for example, 'What's up Taliban?' something like 40 
that just because he has a beard and I've heard it from Muslims joking about other Muslims even 41 
their friends based on their appearance and if you question them they will just say 'I'm just joking'  42 
but it's actually it's the media that has influenced them to think that you know a person who wears  43 
a certain dress code or a person who's protesting you know, we have legitimate protests,  but quite 44 
often you see people protesting about something that you assume we are probably angry about – 45 
angry and crazy about something. 46 
Kim: Right, do you want to respond to that?  Just put your hand up. 47 
Carlito: I think there is like more to the age difference as well cos when I was younger …...9/11 48 
whatever happened it was such a sensitive subject I was like pretty young myself. Nobody actually 49 
ever wanted to confront someone of my age at that time because I was young even if I was in the 50 
Mosque I would ask the teacher about terrorism they were very precautious about how they would  51 
go about teaching you so it was only until later that I had my own understanding of what terrorism 52 
was at that age whatever but it wasn't until later life I actually from my religious views I discovered 53 
that terrorism isn't part of my religion but at that age everyone was so careful about how they  54 
would approach you about it I didn't have a clear understanding of the ….nothing. 55 
Kim: Can you choose the next person? 56 
Abdullah B: I agree with him , my brother here in the sense that the media does influence the 57 
Muslims themselves , for example I was involved in Islamic society for the last five years and many  58 
of the students that come up to me and they have told me that their parents told them not to join  59 
the Islamic society and that's because the media making the Islamic society as a hot bed for 60 
extremism and you hear you know in the news Islamic societies   the presidents of students ....you 61 
know you hear university students blowing people up and that kind of stuff  or attempting to blow 62 
people up and they think 'ooohh even the parents .are thinking my son, especially the sons more 63 




label them a terrorist and especially when people become more observient .maybe from a more 65 
physical point of view maybe he starts growing a beard or he starts praying  … many Muslims  66 
come from a background where the family are not that religious so many - the family themselves 67 
don't really pray and all that so some families  for example, the kids or students ….lots of Muslims 68 
are learning Islam from a society because they are staying with their fell Muslims and when they  69 
start doing stuff that perhaps their parents should be doing from a religious point of view, the  70 
person starts thinking 'wow, look what the media says, is my son becoming the next Osama Bin 71 
Laden or something like that' because the media is giving that perception to them and that is quite 72 
daunting from the kids' point of view because they are a bit confused .… they think they are doing  73 
a good thing but unfortunately you know the media stereotypes... 74 
Kim: So are you suggesting that there might be a generational difference here?  That maybe the 75 
parents were not as um knowledgeable about Islam or their faith and the younger generation  76 
almost because of 9/11 have become more interested in the roots of their faith?  So, who would  77 
like to respond to that? 78 
Bongo: Um, I think it's um it's not an issue to do with the generation because as the teaching of 79 
Islam – the purpose of the religion was before this is a religion that is more than 1,400 years old so 80 
it's not a matter of the generation but it is a matter of events that are happening in the society and 81 
how the society interact with each other. So, it is just recently it's been a situation whereby in Islam 82 
there is a direct link between Islam and terrorism.  Now this direct link between Islam and terrorism  83 
is a perception – it's a perceptive link apparently between Islam and terrorism you see and this 84 
comes because  that most of the people that get informed about Islam is from the media  you see 85 
and this media is not taking the responsibility of giving uh fair because  the media should report 86 
everything as the reality – everything as it's supposed to do.  Now, they are just taking the one part  87 
of the story but they are not showing the other part of the story, you see. 88 
Kim:  Do you think it might be different, I mean you're from Tanzania and um, do you think it's 89 
affecting people differently depending on where they're from?  I think it might be interesting that um 90 
your experience of having an Islamic society where you're seeing perhaps people – I mean maybe 91 
the parents don't know as much about their religion or maybe they do but they're just afraid that  92 
their children will be targeted um either recruited even or will be perceived by the wider society –  93 
'he goes to Islamic society therefore he is a terrorist’ so they're actually – there is like a double 94 
stereotype going on? 95 
Mr Fish: I think there is a generation difference between the parents and the sons and daughters  96 
for example like parents usually take the news as gospel whereas the children usually take theirs  97 




listen to music, playing games, playing sport – they don't care what goes on around them so in  99 
those terms there is a generational difference and basically I’ve got a  problem there is like my  100 
family told me not to grow a beard as in allowed to defend myself saying this is the sunah of the 101 
prophet which means that’s his thing (salam) and basically I think cos he said to everyone like 102 
basically let it grow, don't shave, just trim your moustache and but like some members of my family 103 
said like you might not get a job or something like that (laughs), do you know something silly like  104 
that and I said if that's the case then that's it isn't it.  That's the world then so I'm not going to like 105 
adapt myself just to get a job – that's just pathetic really. Yeah. 106 
Abdullah B: I think there's also a generational gap in the sense that,  in the sense that when our 107 
parents came here they came with the mentality, the majority, I'm not saying all of them yeah, the 108 
majority of the older generation, the economic migration, they came with the mentality that they are 109 
here to come and earn a living and most of them had this Utopian goal of going back to their  110 
country and living in a villa, living in a mansion , perhaps I’m going to much into our culture, too  111 
much yeah (laughs), but what's happened 30/40 years down the line they actually settled down  112 
here.  They haven't realised that. Most of them are probably in their 70's now – they are still  113 
thinking I want to go back home again.  Most likely, no offence here but their graves are going to  114 
be over here (a cemetery) in (town).  So, what happened but with the younger  115 
generation, they are probably are more in touch with reality in the sense that they know that  116 
(town) or Britain is their home now if you know what I mean and they don't think that they need  117 
to – that the parents are worried about the kids for example , he gave the beard example, for 118 
example they do want the kids to earn a living and all that kind of stuff whereas the kids are  119 
thinking to themselves I'm a citizen of Britain, I can do what I like as long as it's within the law and  120 
all that kind of stuff.  Um, I should be able to print my identity inside British society and so we're a  121 
bit more free ...you know.  We're a bit more you know – we don't feel that we need to conform to  122 
you know make our people happy so I think the parents probably have a bit more inferior  123 
complexity than the kids themselves.  We were born into a society, where we probably interacted 124 
more with the whites more than they do and so it's not actually a big deal.  They actually think it's a 125 
big deal but it's actually not a big deal. 126 
Kim: Are they still perceiving themselves as immigrants and you're  perceiving yourselves as Asian 127 
British? 128 
Abdullah B:  For example, um, in my workplace where I work they let me pray for example yeah.  129 
If I told my parents , well not my parents they understand but if I told my wider relatives that I'm  130 




'don't ask them, they're not going to let you' … and stuff but when I asked my employer if I could  132 
pray he said yeah go ahead, so long as you are being productive go ahead, you can pray, do you 133 
know what I mean but a lot of the older generation they won't .. that.They won't ask their employer  134 
if you know what I mean? 135 
Abdullah:  Just going back to that I think a lot of the parents who come to this country they see 136 
themselves as guests of this country and on any occasions when you have guests the guest never 137 
wants to upset his host and so he feels that Islam or whatever in the media , if it is going to 138 
antagonise... native community basically then they don't want to avoid that at all costs whatever if 139 
possible …........ and so this is the thing  with the British born generation – born in this country, they 140 
don't see themselves as guests, they see themselves as natives of this country so that's why they  141 
are willing to express themselves more freely basically, even if that makes some people feel 142 
uncomfortable. For example, they are willing to grow a beard and wear the Islamic attire and so on  143 
in front of the natives but they feel they are the natives whereas our parents feel sometimes that  144 
they are the guests and they don't want to antagonise the natives and  make people feel 145 
uncomfortable or whatever....and so there is a real problem in that we see the parents and we also 146 
have to look at - most of our parents especially in the Asian community, Pakistani, Bengali – most  147 
of our parents come from a country which is pretty much illiterate.  A big proportion of the 148 
community/population is illiterate particularly the women and so most of their knowledge of Islam  149 
they can't rely on books or texts or articles to arrive at an understanding of Islam and this limits  150 
their understanding of Islam and so this is a real problem because we know  English and because 151 
there's a lot of texts and a lot of Islamic scriptures that have been translated into English, we have  152 
a lot more access to Islamic knowledge than our parents and so their understanding and ideas of 153 
Islam is slightly different to ours and that's why we tend to say that they are very traditional in their 154 
views.  The other thing is um, that in many cities across the UK where there is a large Muslim 155 
population, most of the Muslims in the UK are from the Asian continent and most Mosques and 156 
Madrassas of the Islamic schools have a real problem which is that they need to find qualified  157 
Imams and teachers who know both English and Bengali as well as Arabic and that is in very short 158 
supply.  And so, what you have is basically, you have um uh you have in some mosques  are  159 
catered towards the Bengali or the Pakistani or the first generation community at the expense of  160 
the youngsters and in other mosques where there is a bit more modern thinking are catered  161 
towards the young at the expense of the old and so that gap is never fully bridged and the only 162 
solution that I can think of is either the Bangladeshi or Pakistani or whatever country they are from 163 
that those Imams or teachers are fully trained and fully versed in English as well as in their own  164 




the old generation as well. 166 
Carlito: I would like to say as Abdulla was saying, I am from Rochdale as well myself, I was born 167 
there, and my uncle is a chairman in one of the mosques there, and the old Imam there he passed 168 
away, but the thing was when the new Imam,  he had to go through like tasks, they had to finally  169 
find a guy from South Africa.  Really well- knowledged.  He could speak Urdu a very popular 170 
language in that area – English and Arabic and when he came, the older generation seemed to   171 
not dislike but have a problem with him... it was probably just the way he tried to teach us.  He  172 
was directing it for the new younger generation of children and he had to explain to the older 173 
generation is that when you came here you had an Imam  to explain everything to you in terms you 174 
could understand.   You know everything.  You've been here now it's our time to teach the younger 175 
generation the prospective and there's a certain way about going about that., and since he  176 
explained that to everyone they are a lot more  - a lot more happy with this – ok, he really knows  177 
how to respond to a younger crowd whatever,  to both sides but it would be nice to have  178 
someone,.... someone like that in every mosque. People go to someone it's like, personally out of 179 
everyone here, would any of you actually see anything good about the old Imams.... asking about 180 
personal questions, honestly?  Like, that Imam in Rochdale, I've been to him about really personal 181 
questions.  Anything and he'll give me a confident answer about it and I feel comfortable about  it  182 
like myself before, with the old Imam... I could never really picture myself going to him about  183 
anything like that. 184 
Sandman:  I think yeah, the point that he was saying is um that in your area it's really good that  185 
the Imams do actually get in touch with the youth whereas in my area it was like the opposite in a 186 
sense that they um kept the um old Imams  in a sense and they used to focus more of the talks on 187 
aspects of that probably were important for the modern day in a sense so um ….. a lot of the time  188 
we used to speak in um the native languages such as Urdu, or Gujarati and for me as a person I 189 
don't understand Gujarati  I would say my native language in a sense …... so I never used to  190 
benefit from any of the talks and like you said that when you asked us all if um if we feel  191 
comfortable talking to the Imams, like the older ones , I was like, I felt intimated too.  I would never 192 
ask them about any personal issues because firstly I didn’t understand them and they probably  193 
would not have spoke English with me and I think again a lot of the time it's a lack of education in a 194 
sense for the youth and um also the elders in a sense too. 195 
Abdullah B: Going back to the original question. Muslims …...... What was the question? 196 
Kim repeats:  The question was: Do common stereotypes and media influence your own  197 




Abdullah B: Again?: You know …... the last portion of the talk has been about the elders but it  199 
does also affect a lot of the youngsters in the sense that um like I said a lot of parents themselves 200 
especially now … if  you put the Muslim generation back three generations the really elder 201 
generations they were quite religious and quite traditional,  then the ones in between probably in  202 
their fifties or their forties, they are not as religious and some of them are not – they are not  203 
religious at all in many aspects so, you know, they are having children who know nothing  204 
whatsoever about their religion, so they are mostly being born Muslim, Muslim by name, but they 205 
know nothing whatsoever about their religion.  Absolutely nothing.  So, they are learning their Islam 206 
from the media itself and a lot of them are learning their Islam from the media itself (laughs) so, 207 
whatever the media portrays, they start thinking 'is that what Islam really is ?' but they have no 208 
background knowledge whatsoever and, in a sense, that is affecting – they are being approached  209 
um by – and is affecting their faith in a sense and it is affecting – the media is affecting their 210 
perception of Islam , I would say (don’t know what anyone else thinks?) 211 
Bongo:  Talking about stereotypes as well um – movie industry, Hollywood (laughs in the  212 
background) because it's sort of  entertainment in the youth right now um the older generation  213 
didn't much have this eh, there were not much into things of movies and what would pass for 214 
entertainment but the youngsters now, they love movies and watching all this stuff.  For 215 
entertainment – now within this entertainment industry whereby a large pool of youngsters you see 216 
are attracted, they put, I could say, propaganda due to...to the last movie. .. They’ve no sense of 217 
Muslims ….. and cause enormous chaos in Islamic countries …......... You see um Muslims now  218 
from these movies, from this entertainment, they are things that they learn they are things that they 219 
take as customs.  Now, when they go back to their own society they think that oh, if I do this, this  220 
will happen or, if I say ‘ Alahu Akbar’,  you go to the bus station and you just say ‘Alahu Akbar’...  221 
you say that phrase, (laughs)  that catchphrase, someone will say ‘Does  he have a bomb or 222 
something ‘... it's an Arabic term which means ‘God is great’, you see and it has nothing to do with 223 
bomb or terrorism but it has been linked that and translated inside the movie and switched on to 224 
people, millions of people around the world. Now, if you say that anyway, it will link directly that this 225 
refers to terrorism you see but actually it doesn't mean this or there is no relationship whatsoever.  226 
So, you see now how something very small within the entertainment industry could even make 227 
Muslims themselves say no, I won't say ‘God is great’ in Arabic in case....  I'd rather keep quiet. 228 
Abdullah:  A slightly different point I think is um, I think some of the concerns that Muslims think 229 
about and have issues with basically is shared not just by Muslims but also by religious groups of 230 
other faiths, for example, like Christianity and in this part of the world, particularly the UK, I think 231 
religion is generally perceived as something that is against Science and something  that's  232 




sometimes feel about their faith being under attack sometimes by figures like Richard Dawkin, and 234 
Christopher Hitchens and also some of the liberal media, we also share the same concerns so 235 
normally we have to tackle the stereotype about Islam in general and we also have to tackle the 236 
stereotype about religion in general and um I think a lot of people who you know don't believe in a 237 
particular faith or who put themselves atheist then they tend to package all the religious  238 
communities into one basket and give them a stereotype so I think we are kind of having to tackle 239 
this on two double fronts um and another thing that I would just like to mention is this um – a lot of  240 
the stereotype of Muslims in the media is always linked to political events and this sometimes 241 
complicates things even more for the Muslims because this is where the real identity crisis comes 242 
from um is because political events can be interpreted in so many different ways; more  243 
complicated than religion where you got like every person has their own political ideas and  244 
opinions um and what we see in the world is sometimes most of us feel as though um we are  245 
under attack and I'm saying this  quite clearly; I think some people think that the Islamic faith is  246 
under attack from certain forces um and um and this complicates things a lot more for them  247 
because, for example, the war in Iraq and the war in Afghanistan; those people who are politically 248 
minded, the Muslim populated-minded, or even the Muslim activists, when they talk about some of 249 
these issues then sometimes they are perceived to be disloyal to this country or something or  250 
against the native population but that's not really the case, it is just that they have different – they 251 
interpret politics differently um because um they are not really directed from the newspapers but  252 
they actually go to the sources um and comments like from David Cameron when I think he was in 253 
Germany I think the EDL (English Defence League) were on a march the same day and he made  254 
this – you know he said that multiculturalism has failed and the same comment was made in 255 
Germany and then we see like the rise of far-right parties in Belgium and Switzerland and France  256 
and other countries as well and then you see like George W. Bush saying you are with us or  257 
against us and so people think that – Muslims sometimes think that their faith is under attack and  258 
so when they speak out against it, they are normally engaged in political activities and that's where 259 
the news from the cameraman catches them and this is what kind of fuels this stereotype and 260 
Islamophobia in society I think. 261 
Kim: Can you try and sort of summarise a little bit because there are a lot of issues being raised  262 
here which shows how complex this issue is. I mean I think one of the things you are raising is that 263 
we live in this country unlike Tanzania and unlike um any of the African countries or even in  264 
America, we are in a secular society and so the growth of secularism and where maybe 10% of the  265 
Christian population go to church follow their faith and that's why I think it's quite interesting that 266 




moving towards the secular society so influenced by living in a secular society and moving away  268 
from religion there's a global consequence but also um that's on the top of not having a good 269 
understanding of their religion because they would have come from illiterate backgrounds at least 270 
probably in their parents generation maybe their own generation so they don't have the opportunity  271 
to study and understand and then we push into the mix um that the younger generation – now it 272 
seems to me that there's, I don't know, there seems to be two things going on here.  There's the 273 
younger generation who take their faith much more seriously and we got that from the young  274 
women didn't we?  Because, not all of them were wearing their hijab.  Some of them were just 275 
dressed in jeans and t-shirts but they were very vocal about making – and some of them didn't  276 
used to wear the hijab and do now and it was very much about a decision of wanting to show their 277 
religion.  They wanted to – they wanted people to know they were Muslim and parents saying we 278 
don't want you to do that, afraid of them maybe being targeted in the streets and more likely is a 279 
woman to be targeted I think because the dress is just so much more you know prominent than 280 
maybe just a beard which is like the key thing isn’t it for men, um but also there's the generation of 281 
young Muslims who are still rejecting you know …..... so very much part of the secular society so 282 
you've got …so there's – that seems to be suggesting that's linked to education and not having the 283 
opportunity to really understand their religion which seems to be linked to what Carlito was saying 284 
about where is the opportunity within the mosques without modern  Imams  who speak English to 285 
actually speak to that younger generation so there's that generation gap.  And then, on top of that, 286 
we've got the global context where Muslim communities are being attacked by the west – 287 
Afghanistan, Iraq and so on for ostensibly  about the oil but – I'm sorry,  about 9/11 (I think Chris is 288 
saying 'Freudian slip there Kim' – laughs in the background) – in reality it's about oil and resources – 289 
exactly – um, that seems to be – so – it is very complex – you have to be actually very well  290 
educated to be able to handle that whole complexity of what it means to be a Muslim today, 291 
Abdullah: I think when you talk about Face-book and other social media as well they can feel part  292 
of a global village they no longer are British, Welsh etc, they are also global citizens, so they take 293 
issues very more seriously about what's happening around the world. 294 
Abdullah B: Just for example again we are talking about the extradition of Babar Ahmad appeal 295 
happened like for example we had mosques around the UK  with an e petition with over 150,000 296 
Muslims signing a petition because – and we have a lot of non-Muslims signing that petition  297 
because they thought it was unfair with that law that you could extradite a British citizen to  298 
America, but you can’t do it the other way around, with  minimal evidence whatsoever and so that’s 299 
partly why we had a big response unfortunately,... he may appeal, but we have a twitter generation 300 
and so on who believe it may be your son tomorrow for something, we don't know why – we still  301 
don't know why he is being sent to America we still don’t fully know why because they still didn’t 302 




because apart from one suspect the rest are Muslims you know …..the guy who tried to hack into  304 
the  American system, the rest of the suspects are all Muslim and most of them are British born 305 
Muslims so it just makes it more complicated. 306 
Abdullah: I just want to mention a personal thing...that sometimes we feel there is a contradiction  307 
as well from what's out there, what's already out there for example when we were told to you know 308 
express our opinion, freedom of expression, express freely but the moment that the people were 309 
beginning to express themselves especially with regards to political events, then they are under  310 
siege I think that's when they feel like – and certain events that have happened,  I don't know why 311 
they should be targeted for example the Muslims when they use the radar (airport security scanners) 312 
are being checked and so on and when they go to airports and so on.  It's like – what  313 
happens is that sometimes like if you have a broad mind sometimes some of the decisions and 314 
policies that have been made is basically meant to try to kind of create an internal barrier around  315 
the Muslim mind that you can't express regarding politics, outside that if that makes sense ...if you 316 
talk about certain events then sometimes there is suspicion that you may be under the radar.  We  317 
are not talking about the extremists; we are just talking about people who are politically aware. 318 
Abdullah B: There is a joke that goes around the Muslim circle sometimes...George Galloway  319 
says sometimes for example if a Muslim said it he would probably be locked up in Paddington  320 
Green station, because George Galloway is seen as the you know a non-Muslim saying these  321 
views,  and he’s allowed to say certain stuff that a  lot of Muslims wouldn’t say what he does 322 
regarding the political … but I don't agree with everything he says …..but regarding political events,  323 
a little joke that he can get away with it, but if  Muslims say the same thing...... 324 
Kim:  What do you feel about the new – and I'm trying to represent the media you know – to 325 
summarise what the media says rather than what my personal view is but there've been a lot of  326 
very key events like the Satanic Verses of Salman Rushdie and the Danish cartoons and let's say  327 
it, 9/11 and the London bombings where people were asking Muslims to actually say this was a  328 
bad thing.  To say not, you know, I think you were saying earlier people do bad things...why are  329 
they are just labelled Muslim?, but I think a lot of people say well why don't Muslim people say that 330 
was a bad... we don't agree with that.  I mean, do you think that …...? (People talking over each  331 
other). 332 
Arikarikam: I think there is some – do you know, do you mean like um condemning bad things? 333 
Kim: Yes. 334 




listen  The Sun (newspaper) ain’t going to sell 4 million newspapers per day saying oh Muslims are 336 
saying they are against the burning of the (laughs)...... rather what they say is ‘Those Muslim guys 337 
with the beards’, shouting Allah and burning down the Embassy ….that is going to sell because, for  338 
example, 9/11 for example, I don't know any Muslims personally who have condoned it for  339 
example, but yet they have you know, The Sun will report this so called cleric is calling the 9/11 340 
bombers ‘The magnificent 19’.  Now, you know, in the street, that's not the majority view …. 341 
Understand it? but the media over-sensationalise it.  (People talking over each other). 342 
Arikarikam:  Yes, I almost forgot what I was going to say...Yes, there are some also who believe  343 
um why should we condemn it? I didn't do anything.  And I reckon it is the majority.  I'm not sure  344 
how everyone else feels here but the majority will think um why should I condemn it. Of course it is  345 
a bad thing – see what I mean?  Yes, I'm a Muslim but I was not there... you know.  Um, also, for 346 
example, um what Carlito said before, yes, people were scared to talk about things and they still  347 
are scared to talk about things.  You always have to watch what you say and, I'm not sure if that's  348 
the case for everyone but if you say the wrong thing then you can land yourself in trouble and may 349 
have a policeman knock your door or ring your telephone saying ‘how is this?’  Don’t grow your 350 
beard , there were some people mentioning that um don't grow your beard.  I was told myself that 351 
when I went on the lesser pilgrimage to Mecca – when I came back I was in the Mosque like five 352 
times a day you know I was really spiritual – had a buzz, you know.  Somebody said to me 'do you  353 
go five times?  And I said 'yeah'.  '(this was a family member now),  because they might be  354 
watching you.'  'What do you mean?'  'Who?' (group laugh)  And you know there's a conception  355 
that you know, yeah, you're being watched.  You know, what we do, what we say will have a huge 356 
impact.  We could end up in the cells.  I mean, I don't think there's anybody here – I'm not sure and  357 
I think the majority as well  who don't believe or actually who believe that they can end up in the  358 
cells without a reason ....and this is just a personal thing because there have been many people  359 
who have just gone in for nothing, but it was just a perception and also media, also influencing 360 
(referring to the question written on the flip chart)….. or influencing perceptions, your own 361 
perceptions as a Muslim.  I think if you have the basic knowledge, I don't think the media can 362 
influence you that much um because you have a point of contact to go to talk to people, real  363 
people who you know... know their thing and you can really talk with them, ok, and get your  364 
answers like Carlito said if you have an Imam you can talk but then the ones who don't have much 365 
knowledge then there's a vulnerability there as well that they could be researching themselves and 366 
who knows what they could find (referring to Muslims who look on the internet for Islamic  367 





Abdullah B: Two things, replying to two things,  yeah, thinking about the Muslim population, I 370 
remember when 7/7 happened, in our gathering a lot of conversations were about current affairs,  371 
you know young Muslims were talking ... especially I come from London and I actually come from  372 
the King Cross area so the thing actually happened ….and even our Mosque for a couple of  373 
months actually stopped any youngsters from doing any events as they were worried that they  374 
might get suspicious, the authorities.... they just wanted , they didn’t want them to make them feel 375 
suspicious all of a sudden, even though everyone knew they were very spiritual guys......they 376 
stopped them from doing events eh because they thought you know ......and we also had a 377 
um..... a cleaner who was cleaning our area – the cleaner, he made it look like a kind of er a  378 
racist comment.  He was saying 'why is your Mosque open it should be shut down, he was saying  379 
it to people going to the Mosque because you know your religion is the one – you know that is you 380 
know attacked and that kind of stuff.  But anyway, going back a lot of Muslims were condoning the 381 
issue and it came to a point when one of my mates was saying 'why do we have to keep on 382 
apologising?  We haven't done anything wrong. Why do we have to keep on apologising every like 383 
you know you have a Daily mail reader with a petition you know Muslims should apologise for that, 384 
they ... so much stuff in that area how much more do they have to apologise for and you know we 385 
shouldn't become too apologetic, you know, some people...they haven't gone radical but they will  386 
say 'how come when they are bombing the Muslims, they don't apologise that much you  387 
understand, yeah?  Why do we have to – you know, we are not condoning that event but we've  388 
done our apologies you know.  We are saying it is not something done in our religion … done in  389 
our name and we don't see the politician Tony Blair or ….......... making hundreds of apologies of 390 
what happened in Iraq ….yet he has not apologised, do you know what I mean?  And that is  391 
affecting the Muslim mentality and that is bad.  The second issue regarding social….there is a 392 
concept of the hypodermic syringe model right?  Or slowly getting de-sensitised (laughs)...  393 
basically um especially from Muslims who are not educated for example …..... might not be as into 394 
the religion, the more and more media exposure …...Islam is bad.... Muslim is bad, this is bad, the 395 
first time you may think oh it’s just the  media, media... but the more you are keep bombarding  396 
them with it….., slowly, slowly, slowly they will start believing that message.  They will slowly get 397 
desensitised to it.  I do think, especially those who may not be as knowledgeable they might be 398 
vulnerable to you know believing what the media is saying. 399 
Bongo:  I think coming back to your point of saying that why we should focus on international  400 
context for example regarding – like I come from Tanzania – why has that to do with Muslims and 401 
young people actually being as they are.  Just recently for example in the United States – I think it 402 




schools because this is the Jihadi’s food (everyone laughs).  Now just think if that passes into law 404 
and given the United States is a close ally to Britain, you see it could just easily spill over to the  405 
other side and all the western world will burn falafel because she say that ok if they start that to 406 
falafel hmmm we'll go to shawarma  (Arabic food)  (everyone laughs) after that they may say what 407 
else come from Arabia then after just a few seconds  into Arabic music and the Koran and God 408 
Knows what else... 409 
Kim: But not oil (everyone laughs). 410 
Abdullah B: Recently, there was another commentator talking about the boy band, I don’t even  411 
know about them, most people know about them, the ‘One Direction’ for example yeah and I think 412 
they have a Muslim member in the band?  And they were saying – the right wing commentator was 413 
saying, the right wing commentator from the US was saying basically we should stop our  414 
daughters from listening to One Direction because he is undercover Jihadi trying to get them into 415 
Islam basically – and I was thinking ‘what?’..... 416 
Kim: The ignorance is just breathtaking. 417 
Abdullah B: And the funniest thing is he wears the Palestinian scarf around his neck which is 418 
fashion, but he is wearing the Palestinian number one symbol for Jihad (laughs).  But I think that is 419 
the extreme instance.  I don't think most of the non Muslim read this kind of stuff and they would 420 
probably start laughing as well.  I think they were extreme right wings. 421 
Kim: But there is a lot of that in America – unfortunately. 422 
Abdullah:  He mentioned a key word basically that proves the point that was mentioned about are 423 
we being influenced and that word ‘Jihad’,  because Jihad itself is a very noble concept and again  424 
it goes back to that point that when Muslims talk about Jihad openly – I'm not talking about the  425 
Jihad that is the media's definition of Jihad which is holy war that's not the case but Jihad itself is a  426 
noble concept which is struggling to purify yourself and to better yourself and to be closer to God  427 
so that example with Jihad is a very good example to prove that non-Muslims and Muslims are  428 
being influenced by the media because they are avoiding the discussions about Jihad in their own 429 
circles and in their own study-circles and classes and so on um yeah I think people have come  430 
to.. before I finish I think people need to name their children Jihad (laughs) but I think in our days.. 431 
.... 432 
Kim: They name the children Jihad (laughs). 433 
(A few people are talking over each other here). 434 
Arikarikam: I know someone who is called Jahid and somebody attacked him cos his car (number 435 




Kim: (mentions the case of a paediatrician who was mistaken for a paedophile) 437 
 Abdullah B: They are finding it hard to talk about the concept of Jihad …. Muslim  438 
educators because they think that if they talk about Jihad the Sun newspaper is going to get hold  439 
of it – ‘Local Mosque is teaching Jihad’!  and without knowing what the context is people will  440 
say ‘ These guys are Jihadis’ ….... but it is important for the Muslims themselves to ...learn about  441 
the concept of Jihad because otherwise if you do not know the true concept of Jihad most people  442 
will become ignorant and even the no-Muslim will become ignorant,  but the problem is because of 443 
the media influence Muslims are scared to talk about the concept of Jihad and  as I know myself 444 
Jihad in Islam is for a noble cause but you know even if I said that now probably I'd be in a police 445 
station, they would probably arrest me now (laughs) just because I made that comment but yeah I  446 
do believe in that sense …......definitely in the concept of Jihad Muslims have been influenced by  447 
the media because honestly I don't think any of us have been to – even in (town), even though I get a 448 
lot of good Imam, that is one taboo subject that no-one's going to talk about even to give the right 449 
concept they just think if someone gets hold of it that the Mosque is teaching them about  450 
Jihad, people would just take it the wrong way basically. 451 
Kim: We live in a very complex world don't we?  We are going to have to pull it together because  452 
it's actually 5.10pm and we must do the last thing which is to go around and just give everyone a 453 
chance to have a last word.  If you haven't got anything to add or you don't want to say anything  454 
just say pass, but just to give people a chance just to saying something to pull it together for them 455 
and to bring this enquiry to its close.  Anybody want to start? 456 
Arikarikam:  I just wanted to say about the influences, but also influences and action I think as  457 
well.  You form a plan to live your life now in this way because um if you're too open about your 458 
religion or anything about that, then you could land in trouble even if it is with the best of intentions  459 
so you will um or it will fashion the way you are... even naming  for example naming your children 460 
you think... do you know what I mean?. 461 
El-Fino: No nothing to say. 462 
Carlito: Pass 463 
Abdullah: I just think er both non-Muslims and Muslims have a duty to kind of learn about their  464 
own faith and about other faiths as well and to kind of be confident to explain and to express 465 
themselves freely without feeling intimidated and that is the only way you will get rid of stereotypes 466 
and negative misconceptions. 467 
Abdullah B:  Both Muslims and non-Muslims should feel less intimidated to have open  468 




Sandman: Pretty much just to not to take media portrayal of certain activities like as the last word 470 
basically what Mohammed said to educate ourselves. 471 
Mr Fish: I’ll say like instead of using the media  use the books like, our books as the translation as  472 
a way of our God, even if you are not Muslim,  maybe as the person, Islamic studies probably the 473 
prophet, everything is well rounded even like dealing with non-Muslims , even like if you could  474 
study like that it would be like probably like a book – it's that big (laughs) so …. 475 
Bongo: I think we live in the world of humanity and human rights I think Muslims should be left to 476 
practise their own religion as long as er its according to human rights and right now we have the 477 
United Nations and er I think this is because we almost over 2 billion people so things like media  478 
and all this stuff should not come into um targeting Muslims rather than improving their condition  479 
and respecting that they are part of this world, they are part of this planet so we, as humanity,  480 
should strive to let Muslims be valued and represented fairly – not in a good way but in the reality   481 
so it depends what is their real focus, is it good or bad – that's for people to decide. 482 
Kim:  That's a really nice place to end.  Well I really enjoyed that.  I found it very interesting – I  483 
think I learned a lot and I feel very privileged to have the opportunity to be here and hear what you  484 
all had to say and, as Chris said, we don't get the opportunity very often to hear different voices  485 
and I know that Chris will represent what you've got to say very fairly in his thesis. 486 
Chris:Yes, there were a few things you guys were saying that you know trailing off some of the um  487 
comments that have been made by some of the young people I work with.  Arvind and myself, we 488 
work with predominantly white Welsh working class kids and a lot of things you were saying were 489 
ringing quite true there particularly in relation to stereotyping prejudice that you were both speaking 490 
of – very interesting.  Like I say, this is the second time we have done this – the girls and now  491 
with the gentlemen.  I couldn't do it without you – you know, it's impossible to do what I intend to do  492 
without you guys and um other than thanking the wonderful Kim for, again, facilitating this  493 
community of enquiry and I know that she said that if any one of you guys want to take it any  494 
further within your own community or want to do some training, Kim does do this type of training 495 
 … 496 
Kim: How do you find this way of being in a space together and sharing your views? Do you find it   497 
a useful tool, does it help?  498 
Abdullah B: I come from a social science background …...so this kind of stuff I do kind of enjoy  499 
it..... 500 




ideas and you know be able to share with each other um where it's open you know where it's not 502 
talked down…... 503 
Arikarikam: It's a very nice way of getting more information out – a very nice way, in a nice  504 
informal, relaxed manner. 505 
Kim:  And it's very respectful.  We all have to be very respectful to each other, listen to each other 506 
and not talk over each other, not put each other down.  I thought, you know you're all educated 507 
people but for some of the younger people who perhaps ….... that’s quite a challenge for some of 508 
them and this strategy does work very well in terms of you've got your rules and very few young 509 
people actually don't respond well to this um.... 510 
Bongo: I think what would make it more like better for these discussions if we could have also  511 
non-Muslims as well to inside…....... us because also it would be a challenge also to us like how  512 
we are going to speak out and how are they going to speak out and how will this information going  513 
to match you see then, from their view you get the picture how society is..... 514 
Abdullah B: That would be good research in itself (laughs) having non-Muslims and Muslims 515 
together having a frank discussion.  Sometimes the non-Muslims they might feel like they don't  516 
want to be offending us, but the one thing about British society, British people – I'm British myself 517 
we're quite you know, we don't like to …...how would you say... intrude into someone else's 518 
space.....sometimes we've got things we want to say but we keep it all in because so to get an 519 
opportunity where we can have a frank discussion where they don't feel intimidated.  If  they want  520 
to  talk about it, you know…. if they want to say ‘yes from  what I have been hearing  521 
about..Muslims this and that’, I want to hear them say it. 522 
Kim:  And the important thing about this style is that you are looking at clarifying concepts of ideas 523 
not scoring points.  It's not a debate.  It's not about 'I'll win, you'll lose'.  Well let's open that up and 524 
let's see what assumptions people are making and what are the implications of thinking like that.  525 
How do we challenge assumptions so that people have to stop and think 'oh, why do I think that?  526 
Where did that come from? I've changed my mind actually’.  One of the key things we want people 527 
 to say in this kind of thing is 'actually, after listening to your thoughts about it, I think I've changed  528 
my mind about it'.  So that it is a genuine – people feel they can be honest, that they can tell the  529 
truth as they see it but realise other people's truths are different and start to – and actually to  530 
unpick – I mean even something like that people are worried about how they name their child in  531 
case that could lead to something.  That's a very – you know, that's a really crucial thing isn't it. 532 
Abdullah B:  Well in American it's a big deal because Visa applications with a Muslim name .....  533 




London now and he has been waiting for his Visa for the last six/seven weeks yeah.  Crazy.  I  535 
mean he was told he was going to get it you know very soon and now he has got fed up and he is 536 
staying with his mates and is just waiting to get his Visa now. I remember his University telling him 537 
and we were like telling him don't worry, you're going to get it but it took extra long because he has 538 
the name Mohammed something, something, something... 539 
Kim:  It's unbelievable! 540 
Abdullah B: And I think the media two years ago, a two year old got stopped (laughs). Common 541 
sense should alert them yeah, a two year old is going to mastermind a terrorist attack you know. 542 
Chris:  Only in America! 543 
Kim:  Who knows...  I mean if you could see all the police stations in London now, they are 544 
absolutely choc o block because every single overseas student has got to go and register with the 545 
police station and fill in massive forms.  Well, of course, all the overseas students have just arrived  546 
to do their PhDs and their Masters and things and the police stations are completely overwhelmed. 547 
Chris:  Talking about masses and masses and masses of data, all I'm going to ask you – if you  548 
want to um – if I can ask you if I can use your interview all I will ask you to do is if you could stick 549 
your badge on one side making sure you sign the rest.  If you could put your email address when I 550 
get this transcribed -I'll send you a copy but also can you choose a name?  Can you choose a 551 
pseudonym so I can swap your proper name for another  name – not a girl's name, don't choose  552 
a girl's name.  It could be any name but only you know the name. What I'll do, I'll swap the names 553 
and only you will know your conversation in that.  Is that ok?  Don't forget your email address and I 554 
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11.6. Appendix 6: Glossary of Terms 
Abbiya: 
APPG: 
Also used to describe the hijab. 
All party Parliamentary Group on British Muslims is an 
informal cross-party group formed by MPs and members of 
the House of Lords who share a common interest in a 




A one piece veil covering the face and body often leaving a 
mesh screen to see through. 
'Colonised' refers to Muslims affected by the argument 
forwarded in this research. Colonised (without single 
quotation marks) denotes those referred to by the wider 
literature for example, postcolonial theory.  
Colonising: Being 'othered' or marginalised as a consequence of state 
policy and legislation. 
Colonising of the 
mind: 
A state of mind for some Muslims living in Britain brought 
about by postcolonial conditions. 
CONTEST: Counter-terrorism strategy employed by the British 
government which includes Prevent, Pursue, Protect and 
Prepare. 
Extremism: The vocal or active opposition to our shared values (FBV).  
These include democracy and the rule of law, mutual respect 
and tolerance of other faiths and beliefs (Counter-terrorism 




Defined by the government as 'democracy, the rule of law, 
individual liberty, and mutual respect and tolerance of those 
with different faiths' (see Chapter 3). Criticised in this research 
by being vaguely defined and having wording taken from the 
Prevent anti-extremist policy. 
Hijab: Means covering up but generally used to describe head-
scarves worn by Muslim women. 
Imam: 
ISIL:   
ISIS:                                                         
The leader of prayers in a Mosque. 
An acronym for the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant. 
An acronym for the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria. 
Islam: The religious system established through the prophet 
Muhammad; the Muslim religion; the body of Muslims, the 
Muslim world. 
Islamophobia: Hatred or fear of Islam or Muslims.  The dread, hatred and 
hostility towards Islam and Muslims perpetuated by a series of 




stereotypes and beliefs to Muslims (Runnymede, 1997, p.1).  
A contested term as it may not reflect accurately hate crime 
perpetrated against Muslims. 
Madrassa: An Islamic educational establishment. 
Media: Used in this research to denote sections of the British print 
media who negatively report on Islam and Muslims.  When 
other media platforms are discussed they are referred to as 
'the wider media', or referred to by name and appropriately 
referenced. 
Mosque: Place of worship for Muslims. 
Multiculturalism: Has generally allowed for the celebration of diversity.  It has 
been subjected to different interpretations. Within the context 
of this research it refers to the ability of Muslims living in Britain 
to be able to publicly celebrate being a Muslim. 
Muslim: A follower of the religion of Islam. 
Muslimness: Degree of agency of being a Muslim and ability to express 
Muslim identity in public spaces.. 
Niqab: A veil for the face that leaves the eyes clear. 
Othered, Othering: Marginalised under postcolonial conditions. 
Postcolonial 
conditions: 
A state of being 'othered' by state policy and legislation. 
Postcolonialism: In the context of this research, the marginalisation, 
securitisation and control of British Muslims by the actions of 
the state in its policies, restricting the political agency of British 
Muslims by 'colonising the Muslim mind' limiting their agency 
to allow their voices to be heard. The theory of Postcolonialism 
is used to support how Muslims living in Britain are controlled 





Quran or Koran 
Initially a 'hearts and minds' education approach.  Has grown 
to encompass many areas of surveillance. This research has 
positioned Prevent as central to marginalising British Muslims 
by the introduction of Fundamental British values (FBV's) (see 
Chapter 3). 
The central religious text of Islam. 
Securitisation: Being made to feel different, in fear of being arrested or 
prosecuted for displaying Muslimness while living in Britain. 
Sharia law: There are many interpretations but in simple terms it is how 
the Quran and sayings of the prophet Muhammad are 




Throbe: A long garment used to cover up the body. 
Ummah: The Muslim community. Comprising individuals bound to one 
another by religious ties. A feeling of global solidarity with 
fellow Muslims. 
Wider non-Muslim 
Public or British 
public: 
This is used to refer to the majority non-Muslim population in 
Britain. It is not meant to generalise everyone but present a 
representation of the public who do not have knowledge of 
Islam or Muslims (74% of the British public claim that they 
































11.7. Appendix 7: Summaries of Relevant Acts, Policies and Reports 
from Chapter 2. 
 [The] Race Relations Act 1965, 1976, Race Relations Amendment Act 2000, 
[The] Equality Act 2010     
 [The] Race relations Act of 1965 was the first legislation attempting to combat 
discrimination, particularly regarding skin colour, with limited success.  In its latter 
stage the Act created public regulatory agencies charged with promoting greater 
equality of opportunity regarding employment, education, housing and public 
facilities.  The Act was later incorporated and amended by the introduction of the 
Race Relations Amendment Act in 2000.  In 2010 The Equality Act came into force 
incorporating many previous pieces of legislation into one Act (Equality Act 2010).  
The introduction of amendments to the Race Relations Act 1965 may be seen as 
society's reaction to incidents of injustice and that events triggering changes in the 
law often arise from conflict and the need to define legislatively what is and what is 
not acceptable in the maelstrom of human interaction. 
[The] Scarman Report (1981) 
 Following the Brixton riot in 1981, Lord Scarman was appointed to lead an enquiry 
into the riots.  The Scarman Report (1981) made major recommendations to 
policing, including the condemnation of wide-scale use of indiscriminate stop and 
search powers, which were identified as being overused against black youths.  The 
recommendations later resulted in the formulation of the Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act 1984 marking major changes in codes of practice for the police, 
including the stopping and searching of suspects.  The Report (Scarman, 1981) 
additionally identified racial disadvantage and inner-city decline as requiring urgent 




contributory factors.  1. The heavy handed stop and search or 'hard' policing, that 
created a lack of trust, culminating in the introduction of the Police and Criminal 
Evidence Act, 1984.  2. A pathological image of black youth and the image of the 
stereotypical black family suffering from cultural and family disadvantage.  This 
replicates itself, creating material conditions which maintain poverty, reproducing 
their own troubles, which mirror stereotypical views of black family life, rather than a 
focus on racism (Solomos, 1988; Gilroy, 2002).  3. The question of bilingualism 
among Asian children not being able to communicate effectively with parents due to 
their parents having a limited command of English (Anwar, 1988).   
 Although Scarman (1981) recognised policing failures, the report focused on the 
perceived weak culture of the African-Caribbean community and the need for a 
multicultural solution for problems that were rooted in unemployment, poor 
education and ill-health (Gilroy, 2002).  Tyler (2010) argued that little emphasis was 
given to the British Nationality Act 1981 which removed the automatic right to 
citizenship of Commonwealth subjects, in effect creating second class citizens, 
which contributed to fuelling the riots. 
[The] Rampton (1981) and Swann (1985) Reports 
When black and latterly, Asian children began attending British schools from the 
1960s onwards, there were generally two approaches adopted to lessen the 
impact that racial stereotyping was having.  One was the colour blind approach 
advocated by Dr Martin Luther King, judging people on their "merits" (Modood and 
May, 2001, p. 306), and the second, encouraging cultural practices labelled as the 




approaches were well meaning they ignored the cultural isolation that many young 
people felt when attending school.  The Labour Government at that time ordered a 
review to be carried out.  The Rampton Report (1981), was critical of teachers 
being ill-prepared for teaching in multicultural classrooms, negatively stereotyping 
African-Caribbean boys, and finding evidence of cultural bias during IQ testing.  
The report caused a furore with its emphasis on teacher racism causing the 
conservative government of the day to put pressure on Rampton into resigning, 
subsequently replacing him with Michael Swann.  Swann directed his final report 
away from anti-racist strategies to one of "inclusive multiculturalism" which saw 
multicultural education as enabling: 
...all ethnic groups, both minority and majority, to participate fully in 
shaping society, while also allowing, and where necessary assisting the 
ethnic minority communities in maintaining their distinct ethnic identities 
within a framework of commonly accepted values (Department of 
Education and Science, 1985, p. 5).         
The report (ibid), although acknowledging underachievement in African-Caribbean 
students, presented a differentiated research finding revealing Asians and whites 
were achieving similar results, perhaps confirming the second conclusion that 
Scarman (1981) arrived at when he presented the stereotypical image of black 
families as being weak, once again placing the blame within the families rather 
than society.  Modood and May (2001) argue that the ensuing debate polarised 
the differences between antiracist and multicultural education, the former being 
responsible for the rejection of culturalism, thereby hiding cultural racism from 
view.  This had the effect of reinforcing the black and white dichotomy finally 
forcing an amalgamation of the two, minimising the distinctive experiences and 




understanding and awareness, at the expense of neglecting the wider "political 
dimension and power structures" (Grinter, 1990, p. 212). 
Between the publication of the Swann Report (Department of Education and 
Science, 1985), which dealt with black, Asian and white academic achievement, 
and the Runnymede Report (Runnymede Trust, 1997) twelve years later which 
dealt with Islamophobia, there were several key events notable for the negative 
impact they had on Muslims living in Britain.  These events marked a shift in the 
social imagination in the 'othering' of  Muslims and are central in the stereotyping 
of the Muslim community in Britain. 
[The] Burnage Report (Macdonald, 1989) 
On Wednesday the 17th September 1986, Ahmed Iqbal Ullah, a 13 year old Asian 
pupil at Burnage high school, Manchester, was stabbed to death after an 
altercation in the schoolyard with Darren Coulburn, a fellow white pupil.  The 
school believed that the murder of Ahmed was racially motivated, but the Police 
disagreed.  The inquiry team were criticised for putting forward their views when 
they were not in possession of the facts, and in doing so they alienated both the 
Asian and white communities which resulted in further tensions including violence 
in the aftermath of Ahmed's murder.  In the years leading up to the murder of 
Ahmed, the education system in Britain had gone through many changes with 
schools  choosing to adopt anti-racist policies.  The Head-teacher of Burnage High 
school Dr. Gough, had embraced the ideology of anti-racism and multicultural 
policies, which he implemented throughout the school.  Section 11 of the Local 




due to immigrant population" (Macdonald, 1989, p. 176).  In practice at Burnage 
this meant the recruitment of staff that were Black or Asian.  The multicultural side 
of the school included: 
... the soft underbelly of multiculturalism, Indian music, Eid festivals, 
multi-faith assemblies, and section 11 continued to give Burnage High 
School its image of a school implementing the local authority's policies 
on race' (Macdonald, 1989, p. 167).              
The more cynical refer to this kind of multiculturalism as "Sari's, Samosas and 
Steel Bands" (Macdonald, 1989, p. 299), and the Burnage report was one of the 
earliest reports to criticise the interpretation and implementation of multicultural 
policies.  Following the murder of Ahmed Iqbal Ullah, Mr Ian Macdonald QC was 
asked to chair the inquiry into the circumstances leading to Ahmed's murder and to 
report its main findings to Manchester City Council.  However, the publication of 
his report was prevented by a legal challenge from Manchester City Council that 
sparked a National debate on anti-racism in education.  The report therefore was 
eventually published by the authors of the inquiry team independently in 1989. 
The findings of the inquiry were scathing of the management at Burnage High 
school, accusing them of failing to mediate between white and Asian groups at the 
school, which was hampered by a lack of communication between staff, senior 
management and students.  This led to an increase in racial identity and a closing 
of ranks among Asian pupils, and a lack of management to deal with divisions 
between staff who saw some as 'informers'.  Some members of staff were violent 
toward pupils, some staff were racist toward pupils, some staff were racist to fellow 
staff, and some staff were hankering for a return to the past, reluctant to change 




The Head-teacher Dr Gough, was reported to have been so "obsessed with the 
ideology of anti-racism" (Macdonald, 1989, p. 117) that he failed to see how the 
discriminatory treatment of white students not only impacted on the school but on 
the neighbourhood outside the school, leading to racial conflict between white and 
Asian pupils which the school ultimately had no control over. 
In our view an adherence to some kind of cosmetic anti-racism, which 
carries with it a failure to deal with the real racism experienced by the 
black community is a very dangerous thing (Macdonald, 1989, p. 117). 
Multiculturalist policies failed to recognise the need for an understanding of the 
realities of living together with different cultures under the umbrella of a 
community.  
The change from a multicultural approach by Burnage High School, towards an 
equal opportunities approach came about in 1984 when Manchester Education 
Committee developed an Anti-Racist policy.  The message sent to its 20,000 
employees by the Education Committee reinforced the message that all staff were 
expected to contribute fully to an education service founded on equal rights and 
that practices that work against this would lead to dismissal (Macdonald, 1989). 
It is clear that this shift in policy is one of several changes being made in the wake 
of the recommendations by Lord Scarman (Scarman,1981), following the events of 
the Brixton rioting. The legislative framework which placed a duty on bodies to 
uphold equal opportunities is a positive step forward.  However, punitive policies 
alone do not address the need for community cohesion, which must start with 
communities, rather than a top down approach favoured by politicians who may 




International Conflicts and Muslim Reaction (1990-2012) 
On the 2nd August 1990, Saddam Hussein, the leader of Iraq, ordered the military 
invasion and occupation of Kuwait.  Following the United Nations Security Council 
call for Iraq to withdraw, the United States and its Western NATO (North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation) allies, mobilised troops to Saudi Arabia.  On November 29th, 
the United Nations Security Council authorised the use of force if Iraq did not 
withdraw from Kuwait by the 15th January 1991.  Between January 16th and 
February 24th allied air and ground offensives had resulted in Arab and United 
States forces retaking Kuwait.  Following the ceasefire the terms of peace required 
Iraq to recognise the sovereignty of Kuwait, and to rid itself of nuclear, biological 
and chemical weapons.  Pending those conditions being met, economic sanctions 
would continue (Hickman, 2016). 
The effects of such an international conflict for Muslims in Britain, following on 
from the Rushdie Affair, is difficult to quantify.  What is evident are the reactions of 
British Muslims from varying alliances.  At a national Muslim meeting in Bradford 
on the 20th January 1991 Lewis, (1994, p. 167) reported: 
...the resolutions insisted that 'the USA led aggression against Iraq' 
must stop and these forces withdraw from Muslim territories; the Saudi 
ruling family was condemned for allowing non-Muslim forces access to 
the Islamic heartlands and declared unfit to be the custodian of Mecca 
and Medina; therefore it was every Muslim's duty to 'restore the Khilafat 
[Caliphate]'.  
It is interesting to note that what was seen internationally as an act of aggression 
on the part of Iraq, has been transposed for many Muslims into a question of 
solidarity for the Ummah or global Muslim brotherhood, and revulsion for the 




resolution called for during the meeting, was the restoration of a land for Muslims, 
calling attention to Western support for Israel and opposition towards Muslim 
Palestinians.  A further national meeting of 35 British Muslim organisations on 12th 
August 1990 reiterated the anti-Western view and once again viewed the incursion 
of American and allied troops into Kuwait and Iraq through a different set of 
political and religiously structured lenses: 
We cannot tolerate the intervention of non-Muslim powers in the 
essentially internal Muslim affair. The build up of non-Muslims [sic] 
military forces in the vicinity of Islam's most holy shrines (Makkah, 
Madinah and Jerusalem) is not acceptable. Any government in Muslim 
lands co-operating with the non-Muslim armies cannot demand the 
support of Muslims worldwide (Muslim News, 1990, p. 1). 
As the conflict in Iraq continued, Muslims in Britain who protested against the 
incursion were largely reported by the media to be supporters of Saddam Hussein 
and viewed as being anti-British in their loyalties.  The West Yorkshire police 
reported a 100% increase in racist attacks in Bradford and a 58% increase in West 
Yorkshire as a whole (Runnymede Trust, 1997, p. 10).  Some Mulims believed 
they had been intellectually attacked by Rushdie and now they were being 
militarily attacked and abandoned by the custodians of Islam ( McRoy, 2006).  
Following on from one military conflict, the war in Bosnia was an important event 
for Muslims.  
The Bosnian conflict 1992 to 1995, was an ethnically based war in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, a former republic of Yugoslavia.  The lead up to the war involved 
several social, economic and political changes involving Bosniaks (Bosnian 
Muslims), Serbs, and Croats as well as the Yugoslav army.  The conflict was 




and resulted in catastrophic loss of life.  For the purposes of this research, and not 
to marginalise the plight of the other groups involved, this account  will only 
consider the impact of the war on Muslims in Britain (Reuters, 2008). 
Bosniaks had once been considered a distinct nation with a recognised 'Muslim' 
identity.  For many Muslims and non-Muslims living in Britain, the war highlighted 
their 'existence' and the fact that there were so many indigenous Muslims living in 
Western Europe and in particular, a country traditionally thought of as non-Islamic 
rather than being described as Middle Eastern in geographical terms.  The 
systemic killing of Bosniaks caused sharp psychological trauma for Muslims living 
in Britain who likened it to a Muslim holocaust in Europe (McRoy, 2006).  Many 
Bosniaks were native "European Muslims" (LeBor, 1997, p. 20), white skinned, 
largely secular and "indistinguishable in culture and language from their 
neighbours" (McRoy, 2006, p. 23).  
Bosnian Muslims were 'ethnically cleansed' because they came to be 
identified as a 'racial' group by people who were phenotypically, 
linguistically and culturally the same as themselves (Modood, 2006, pp. 
51-62).  
They were also part of a multi-faith and multi-ethnic community which did little to 
calm British Muslim fears.  The British Government stance was not to lift the arms 
embargo or intervene militarily to support the Bosniaks, but to support a negotiated 
settlement.  Some Muslims viewed this decision as one of a series of recurring 






[The] Macpherson Report (Macpherson, 1999) 
A vital part of developing Britain's race relations began with the publication of  the 
Macpherson Report in 1999.  Although the report was the result of an enquiry into 
the murder of a British African-Caribbean teenager, its findings had a profound 
influence on all ethnic minorities in Britain and is therefore deeply relevant to the 
aims of this research.  The Macpherson report into the circumstances surrounding 
the murder of Stephen Lawrence (Macpherson, 1999), was a given a high profile 
status following its publication which charted the serious failings of the police 
investigation highlighting race and racism among the criteria for its investigatory 
failings.  Macpherson recommended that the definition of a racist incident should 
be changed to (recommendation 12): "A racist incident is any incident which is 
perceived to be racist by the victim or any other person" (Macpherson, 1999).  The 
change in definition would address the requirement for the police to decide 
whether an incident is reportable and in need of investigation, making reporting 
victim focused.  Recommendations 67 to 69 consider amending the National 
Curriculum aimed at valuing cultural diversity and preventing racism, in an attempt 
to better reflect the needs of a diverse society.  Recommendations include, the 
reporting and recording of all racist incidents as well as the ethnicity of 'excluded' 
pupils and that the Office for Standards in Education (OFSTED) record such in 
their examination (Macpherson, 1999).  
A major criticism made by Macpherson was that the Metropolitan police (and 
elsewhere) were guilty of institutional racism.  Macpherson defines this as:  
The collective failure of an organisation to provide an appropriate and 
professional service to people because of their colour, culture or ethnic 




which amount to discrimination through unwitting prejudice, ignorance, 
thoughtlessness and racial stereotyping which disadvantage minority 
ethnic people' (Macpherson, 1999, p. 28).   
For Muslims, the Macpherson report offered little comfort either in the definition of 
racism, which did not cover Muslims specifically in relation to religion, and in the 
identification of institutionalised racism, which failed to include religion.  
Macpherson's report (1999) overlooked the impact the report on Islamophobia 
(Runnymede Trust, 1997) may have had, and failed to plug the gaps in the 
Blasphemy Act (Abolished in England and Wales in 2008) that Runnymede had 
recommended, and which Muslims desperately wanted, leaving Islam open for 
further attack.  In contrast to the Runnymede Trust (1997) recommendations, the 
Government embraced the Macpherson report with its emphasis on diversity 
training and police reform.  The report was also the catalyst for the implementation 
of the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000, requiring public bodies to actively 
promote racial equality (Race Relations Act 1976).  It did not however result in 
protection for Muslims or realise the potential to reduce Islamophobia, "since non-
ethnic religious identities were not recognized under existing provisions as in need 










11.8. Appendix 8: Summaries of Relevant Acts, Policies and Reports 
from Chapter 3   
The Channel Programme (HM Government, 2015)  
"The Channel programme in England and Wales is a voluntary initiative providing 
a multi-agency approach to support people vulnerable to being drawn into 
terrorism" (Home Office, 2017, p. 5).  Panels, which are cited in each local 
authority, meet to discuss the needs of the person referred and where appropriate 
tailor a package of support which may include ideological, educational, mental 
health and other vulnerabilities.  The Channel programme is a pre-crime initiative, 
legislated by the Counter-terrorism and Security Act 2015 placing a duty on local 
authorities to provide support for vulnerable people. 
Recently published statistical data from the Home Office (2017a) allows us to 
interrogate some of the referrals made under Prevent (Home Office, 2011a) by the 
educational sector.  Between April 2015 and March 2016 a total of 7,631 
individuals were subject to a referral due to concerns that they were vulnerable to 
being drawn into terrorism (Home Office, 2017a, p. 4).  The education sector made 
the most referrals (2,539) accounting for 33% of referrals.  Of the 7,631 referrals, 
2,766 left the process requiring no further action, 3,793 (50%) were signposted to 
alternative services and 1,072 (14%) were deemed suitable, through preliminary 
assessment, to be discussed at a Channel panel.  Subsequently, 381 people 
received Channel support, 365 having left the process with 16 young people still 
receiving support.  Of the 7,631 individuals referred, 78% were male, with those 
under 20 years of age accounting for 56%.  Of the 1,072 individuals discussed at 
Channel panel meetings, 63% were under 20 years of age and those receiving 




in relation to 'Islamic extremism' concerns and 10% for far right-wing extremism 
concerns.   
The percentage of Muslim students varies greatly in England and Wales 
dependant on geographical locations, however, they only make up 1 in 12 children 
(Office for National Statistics, 2012), yet are more likely to be referred under 
Prevent (Home Office, 2011a) than young people who exhibit far right-wing views 
in educational establishments. 
A more recent survey from Channel, April 2017 to March 2018 (Home Office, 
2018a) showed the education sector still making the most referrals at 33%.  Of the 
total number of referrals, 44% were for concerns about 'Islamic extremism (down 
from 78% between 2015-16), and 18% for far right-wing extremism indicating a 
rise in concern about young people with far-right views.  Those discussed at 
Channel panel meetings and required support accounted for 50% 'Islamic 
extremism' and 32% for far right-wing extremism, with the percentage of those 
under 20 years of age at 62% compared with 63% in 2015-16. The figures suggest 
a rise in concern for young people with far right-wing views. 
The most recent survey (Home Office, 2019) shows the education sector with 33% 
of all referrals.  Of these, 24% were for concerns relating to Islamist 'radicalisation' 
and 24% for concerns of right-wing 'radicalisation'.  These figures suggest a rise in 
concern for right-wing 'radicalisation' and a decrease for Islamic 'radicalisation'.  It 
is of note that the terminology of the survey (ibid) has changed from 'extremism' to 
'radicalisation'.   




'vulnerability' in respect of 'at risk of radicalisation' (O'Donnell, 2017), which has 
implications in educational settings, potentially silencing debate for fear of being 
reported as being vulnerable.   
 [The] Casey Review (2016) 
The Casey Review (2016) is a report by Dame Louise Casey into integration and 
opportunity of deprived communities, which includes recommendations associated 
with the Prevent Strategy (Home Office, 2011a).  I argue that the report continues 
to advance the government's promotion of British values into Muslim spaces. 
In July 2015, at the request of the then Prime minister and Home Secretary, Dame 
Louise Casey was asked to undertake a review into integration and opportunity 
into the most isolated and deprived communities in Britain (Casey Review, 2016).  
The report showed that some of the most deprived and segregated communities 
comprised of citizens having Pakistani and Bangladeshi heritage.  A poll (ibid) 
additionally showed 55% of the public agreed there was a fundamental clash 
between Islam and the values of British society.  Furthermore, 46% of British 
Muslims felt that being a Muslim in Britain was difficult because of prejudice 
against Islam, together with a growing sense of grievance and a strong 
identification with the Ummah or global Muslim community (Casey, 2016, pp. 12-
13).  Recommendations included the need for schools to teach integration as part 
of the National Curriculum to halt the spread of racism and extremism, attaching 
more weight to British values, laws and history (Casey, 2016, p. 168).  Also, the 
need for an integration oath for immigrants intending to settle in Britain and 
promotion of integrated schools allowing pupils to mix with others from different 




Cantle (2016) largely welcomed the review with its emphasis on community 
cohesion and integration, but was critical of its lack of attention to the white 'host'; 
community, reminding us that integration demands support from both sides of the 
community.   
I argue that Casey (2016) reinforced the government's position by recommending 
that teachers continue with their responsibilities in implementing Prevent (Home 
Office, 2011a) by encouraging the ideology of FBVs and failing to acknowledge 
Britain's colonial past.   
[The] Office for Students ([The] Higher Education and Research Act 2017) 
and Prevent on Campus 
I now look at how the Prevent Strategy (Home Office, 2011a) came to be 
implemented in Higher Education, initially as guidance (Office for Students, 2018), 
and latterly as a statutory obligation (Higher Education and Research Act 2017).  I 
show how Prevent is a tool to exercise Counter-terrorism legislation (Counter-
Terrorism and Security Act 2015), and how government has used Prevent as a 
conduit to further its policies into education by the introduction of Fundamental 
British Values (FBV) (DfE, 2014; ESTYN, 2015). I look first at Prevent in 
universities followed by an examination of the Office for Students and its impact on 
free speech on campus.  
Prevent in Universities 
As early as 2005, the then, Education Secretary Ruth Kelly was telling university 
leaders they had a duty to inform the police of "possible criminal acts" (Kelly, 2005; 




of 'unacceptable behaviour' ".  There had been "largely positive working 
relationships with local and regional police" (Thomas, 2012, p. 145) over the years 
in response to issues such as crime on campus, animal rights activist activities, 
far-right political activity, as well as incidents of so-called 'Islamic extremism'. 
(Thomas, 2012).  The publication of a report into terrorism and extremism on 
British campuses (Glees and Pope, 2005), identified one secondary school and 22 
universities where terrorists had at one time studied.  The report was widely cited 
by the wider media "under alarmist and scare-mongering headlines" and for its 
"questionable data" (Fekete, 2009, p. 107) and "turning Prevent into a hot-button 
issue with Muslims" (Khan, 2016, pp. 151-152).  Renton (2008) argued that the 
Glees report was flawed and accused Glees of trawling newspapers for evidence 
of Islamist activity and proceeding to try and establish connections to those 
identified with universities where they had previously been students.  Renton 
(2008) accused Glees of 'naming and shaming' without evidence of wrongdoing 
and of advocating for greater police and security service activities on campuses 
with academics encouraged to name those deemed to exhibit suspicious 
behaviour to the authorities.   
Although the Glees report (2005) was subjected to criticism, 14 months following 
its publication the Minister of State for Higher Education and lifelong learning Bill 
Rammell MP, issued new guidelines for universities to target "violent extremism in 
the name of Islam" (Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills, 2006), with 
"universities asked to share information with security services regarding suspicious 
students and external speakers" (Fekete, 2009, p. 108). 
The police are keen to build on existing relationships to support HE 




example, violent extremism that may lead to terrorism) should they 
occur (Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills, 2009, p. 23).   
 
New guidelines were also issued by the Minister of state for Higher education and 
Intellectual property, David Lammy MP, on how colleges should respond to the 
threat of violence (Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills, 2009).  I 
suggest that the UK government were not convinced that universities were doing 
enough to prevent students from potentially being radicalised on campus.  This 
resulted in the government ordering a report from Lord Carlisle of Berriew QC (a 
previous reviewer of terrorism legislation in the UK) (HM Government, 2011).  Lord 
Carlisle claimed that "universities have been slow or even reluctant to recognise 
their full responsibilities" (HM Government, 2011, paragraph 51), subsequently 
leading to criticism of British universities and justifying a punitive approach by 
government to introduce legislation to ensure compliance (see Counter-terrorism 
and Security Act 2015).  Carlisle was later removed as an independent reviewer of 
Prevent following a legal challenge over his impartiality (Bowcott, 2019).  Thomas 
(2012, p. 142) argued that the figures given in Carlisle's report was "fairly 
consistent with the number of British young people who now experience higher 
education".   Sutton (2015, p. 47) reported that a culture conducive to promoting 
non-violent extremism had developed on a number of UK university campuses, but 
that Prevent has been viewed by some as an abuse of power "to target students 
and is also open to further abuse".  Sutton also argued that Prevent was an 
example of government controlling academic freedom, which was at the heart of 






[The] Office for Students ([The] Higher Education and Research Act 2017)  
On 19th October 2017 , the then universities minister, Jo Johnson MP, launched a 
consultation for the creation of an Office for Students (OfS) (see also, Office for 
Students, 2018) to hold universities to account, to ensure free speech on campus 
continued and that "no-platforming" and "safe spaces" should not be used to shut 
down legitimate free speech (The Telegraph, 2017).  There was no mention made 
by Johnson or the Chairman of the OfS, Sir Michael Barber, of the rationale behind 
the consultation, neither were there any references made to Prevent, terrorism or 
extremism (ibid).  Johnson criticised a campaign by Oxford university students to 
take down a statue of colonialist, Sir Cecil Rhodes with Johnson commenting "the 
mark of a civilisation is a knowledge and understanding of your own past" (The 
Telegraph, 2017a), adding, "freedom of speech is a fundamentally British value 
which is undermined by a reluctance of institutions to embrace healthy vigorous 
debate" (Thomson et al., 2017).  I argue that it is unusual for Johnson to refer to 
monitoring and regulating free speech on campus when at that time legislation 
existed (Education Act 1986: s.43; European Convention on Human Rights, 2010).  
I further argue that by Johnson highlighting freedom of speech and Fundamental 
British Values (FBV), control of universities by government is underpinned by 
legislation (Counter-terrorism and Security Act 2015) to ensure compliance.  The 
OfS website shows advice for students on a range of issues including well-being, 
finance and promoting equal opportunities (OfS, 2018).  I acknowledge that further 
research is needed to establish to what extent Prevent (Home Office, 2011a) and 
the OfS (2018) affect Muslim agency on university campuses in the UK (see for 
example, Scott-Baumann et al., 2020). 
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